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PETER JONKERS & MARCEL SAROT 
Tilburg University 
 
This collection of papers is derived from the nineteenth biannual con-
ference of the European Society for Philosophy of Religion, held in the ‘Kon-
takt der Kontinenten’ in Soesterberg, the Netherlands, from 30 August to 2 
September 2012, which was sponsored by the School of Catholic Theology of 
Tilburg University and the Department of Religious Studies and Theology of 
Utrecht University. The conference brought together some eighty philoso-
phers of religion and researchers from related disciplines, most of them com-
ing from one of the four founding regions of the ESPR, viz. the English speak-
ing region, the North-European region, the German speaking and the Dutch 
speaking region. Because of the excellent reputation of these conferences 
over the years, scholars from Eastern and Southern Europe, and even from 
some non-European countries also participated, thereby enlivening and 
broadening the discussions about the conference theme. As usual at ESPR 
conferences, the 2012 conference theme was so chosen that it lent itself to 
both analytical and continental approaches and to the conversation between 
the two.  Moreover, the study of ‘embodied religion’ – for this was the theme 
– cannot take place in isolation, but needs the input from various other disci-
plines. This is reflected in the current volume. 
The study of religion is often marred by a mentalistic bias. Religion is 
then interpreted as primarily belonging to the sphere of the spiritual. While 
it is true that for most religious traditions (Christian as well as non-Christian) 
God is a spiritual and disembodied being, even the presence of God is always 
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a mediated presence, and it may well be argued that this mediation is always 
material in character.1 It is one-sided to approach religion through the study 
of convictions, concepts, values and arguments only. Religions are also typi-
cally very down to earth, dealing with issues of sexuality, reproduction and 
family, with practices about food, offering and sacrifice, questions of birth 
and death etc. Hence the human body is always involved in the concepts and 
practices of religions. Furthermore religions also express themselves in vari-
ous material ways, such as in icons and (other) works of art, in prayers, songs 
and the liturgy, which all have a strong physical component, in the inscrip-
tion of the religious in the human body (e.g. the sacraments, the ritual of cir-
cumcision, and stigmata), and last but not least in a religiously inspired dis-
ciplining of the human body. Thus, even spirituality is often embodied.2 
The idea that religion is something purely spiritual is challenged in a dif-
ferent way as well, namely by recent developments in neuroscience. The find-
ings of neuroscience challenge philosophy of religion to rethink those charac-
teristics of human nature that are vital for religion, such as free will, altruism, 
morality, and last but not least the human person as a ‘self.’ Some of the more 
extreme forms of neuroscience go as far as to suggest that a complete material 
explanation of human nature is in sight, thus annihilating, together with the 
spiritual dimension of the human person, the spiritual dimension of religion. 
In order to have a fruitful discussion between philosophy of religion and neu-
roscience it is imperative to avoid such a reductionism. But, at the same time, 
it is clear that neuroscientific research sheds an intriguing light on the ques-
tion what it means when people call themselves religious. 
This gives ample support for the two underlying theses of the contribu-
tions to this conference volume. First, that religion is always embodied in var-
ious ways:  on the level of God’s presence in humans, on that of the multitude 
of ways in which people express their religiosity, and on that of the neurologi-
cal processes that accompany religious feelings and attitudes. Second, that 
major changes in the basic anthropological concepts regarding the human 
body inevitably have an impact upon religion, and thus also challenge philos-
ophy of religion to rethink how religions are embodied in the human person.  
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Birgit Meyer, Mediation and the Genesis of Presence: Towards a Material Approach to 
Religion (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012), 8–9. 
2
 See, e.g., Willem Marie Speelman, God aan den lijve ondervinden: Lichamelijke spiritualiteit vol-
gens Franciscus en Clara (Leeuwarden: Discovery Books, 2012). 
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The papers included in this volume highlight the complexity of the con-
ference-theme as well as the variety of philosophical perspectives that are 
taken in order to understand the phenomenon of embodied religion.  They 
differ in style, method and in their ways to relate to culture and science. To 
give an example, it was in the wake of the rise of phenomenology and its con-
cept of the ‘body as subject’ that theological anthropology and (continental) 
philosophy of religion started to pay systematic attention to the impact of re-
ligion on the human body in general and to various shapes of religious em-
bodiment in particular. Similarly, analytic philosophy has always been strong 
in examining the effects of scientific discoveries on the traditional idea of the 
human person as a free, morally responsible, spiritual being. One of the goals 
of the conference was to foster a dialogue between these approaches, resulting 
in a better view of the promising perspectives, concepts and arguments that 
philosophy of religion can use in order answer the questions raised by the new 
developments in our understanding of human nature.  
This volume starts with the keynote address by Ola Sigurdson, in which 
he discusses different perspectives on (religious) embodiment, particularly 
stemming from (the history of) culture and modern medicine. Sigurdson ex-
plains that, because of the current hegemony of medicine (including neuro-
science), the personal as well as the social dimension of religious embodiment 
is lost out of sight. Hence, he stresses the need of a non-reductive approach of 
religious embodiment, which is exactly what the contributions to this volume, 
taken together, try to achieve. 
In order to structure the great variety of perspectives on embodied relig-
ion somewhat of the conference, we divided the general conference theme 
into four subthemes and asked the main speakers to comment on it. Their 
contributions to this volume are arranged accordingly. The first subtheme is 
embodied religion: a philosophical reflection on mystical experiences and reli-
gious disciplining. In all religious traditions there are numerous examples of 
how religion does not only change the human mind (e.g. through conversion), 
but also affects the human body directly (e.g. various mystical experiences, 
including the so-called stigmata as an extreme example) and indirectly (e.g. 
through the moral and doctrinal teachings of religions, physical disciplining 
etc.). Can philosophy of religion offer (new) anthropological concepts to un-
derstand the corporeal impact of religion? Moreover, do these insights enable 
philosophy of religion to criticise problematic aspects of religious embodi-
ment? In their papers, Jonna Bornemark and Petruschka Schaafsma comment 
on these questions. Bornemark takes a Christian mystic text as her point of 
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departure in order to present a phenomenological analysis of sensibility as the 
meeting place between the soul and God. Schaafsma treats the same question 
as Bornemark by turning to the book of Hosea, investigating different motives 
of embodiment in the text. In particular, she explores the body-related no-
tions of ‘dependence’ and ‘discernment.’ 
The second subtheme deals with rituals and sacraments as embodiments 
of God, and asks if this takes us beyond a purely symbolic religion. In all relig-
ions rituals play a crucial role in making the presence of God or the Divine felt 
by humans. In the (Catholic) theology of the Eucharist the real presence of 
God is expressed through the doctrine of the transubstantiation. But other 
sacraments and rituals can also be considered as material expressions of a 
spiritual reality. Can philosophy of religion make sense of these embodiments 
of God and does it influence our view of magical practices? In his paper, Mark 
Wynn starts his answer to these questions by noting some of the ways in 
which human beings can be attuned in bodily terms to place-relative ‘existen-
tial meanings.’ He then extends this case to the religious domain, by examin-
ing the nature of sacred sites and the role of religious concepts in aesthetic 
experience. In his reply to Wynn, Roderich Barth reconstructs religious expe-
rience in the context of a symbol theory that incorporates insights of philo-
sophical anthropology and the contemporary theory of emotion. 
The third subtheme focuses on the issue of neuroscience and free will, and 
asks whether we still can say that we are called to be free. It is aimed at various 
ways to rethink free will in light of recent empirical research that seems to 
imply that decisions are made in the brain before we are aware of them. Do 
these scientific insights present an adequate understanding of the philosophi-
cal concept of the free will, and, if so, can we still say with Paul that we are 
called to be free (Gal. 5:13)? In his contribution to this subtheme, Marcel Sarot 
evaluates neuroscientific experiments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s 
experiments. He argues that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate be-
tween compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will, nor do they 
count against the libertarian conception of free will. In his response paper, 
Aku Visala first argues that the nature of our freedom and what is required for 
are outside the sciences. He then shows that the positive function of neurosci-
ence in this context is to highlight the fact that some of our actions are driven 
by causal factors which we have not previously recognised and which we have 
no control over. 
The final subtheme deals with another aspect of the relation between a 
scientific outlook on the body and its implications for religion. Its title was: 
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Religion, Morality and Being Human: What about ‘Thy will be done’? It is about 
psychobiological and etiological research, suggesting that certain degrees of 
moral consciousness and behaviour are found not only among human beings, 
but also among animals, especially primates. This seems to suggest that mo-
rality is not specifically human. If this insight is true, it obviously challenges 
the idea of human’s unique dignity, which is supported by the religious con-
viction that humans are children of God par excellence. Furthermore, does the 
religious commandment that humans are called upon to do the will of God 
then still make sense? In his paper, Dalferth addresses these questions by fo-
cusing on the concept of human dignity, a controversial concept in contempo-
rary philosophy and policy. From a Kantian and Christian perspective, ‘digni-
ty’ is best understood as an orienting term which which calls attention to the 
humane vs. inhumane way of life to which we commit ourselves when we as-
cribe dignity to others and ourselves. From a Christian point of view, this hu-
mane way of life is a consequence of acknowledging the basic passivity of hu-
man life with respect to what is made possible in and for us through the gift of 
the love of God. In his response, Cottingham argues that the inalienable dig-
nity of all human beings is independent of circumstances, capacities, or quali-
fications. Kantian autonomy (construed as the rational will, or the ability to 
exercise it) cannot ground such a notion. The roots of universal human dig-
nity are more plausibly traced to the Judaeo-Christian worldview in which 
God loves all his children equally, despite their vulnerability and weakness. To 
mature morally is to come to realize that we gain nothing by insisting on our 
status, or ‘standing on our dignity’; we should recognize instead the depend-
ency we share with all our neighbours. 
The final part of this volume consists of a selected number of short-
papers that were presented during the conference by junior as well as senior 
researchers. Besides quality, the main selection criterion was whether the pa-
pers connected to one of the four subthemes. 
  







Religious Embodiment between Medicine 
 and Modernity 
 
OLA SIGURDSON 
University of Gothenburg 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this essay, I discuss how religious embodiment has been and is 
conceived in relation to other perspectives on embodiment such as 
the role of medicine in modernity. My focus is on the cultural repre-
sentation of embodiment, and the theoretical perspective is phe-
nomenological and hermeneutical. I start out from an account of the 
dissection of the abbess Chiara of Montefalco’s body in 1308 to show 
how even such a practice as the cutting open of bodies takes on 
meaning in relation to its context, from the religious search for indi-
cations of sanctity to medical autopsies. This is an example of a his-
torical displacement of the meaning of embodiment, and to talk re-
sponsibly about embodiment in a philosophical context also means to 
take into account the historicity of embodiment. For a philosophy of 
religion, then, it is a challenge to talk about religious embodiment in 
a modern context where medicine has become hegemonic in the cul-
tural representation of the body, turning the body into, in essence, a 
manipulable object. For religion, defined as the subjective, this means 
that the personal as well as the social embodiment of faith is lost 
sight of in a process of ‘excarnation.’ For the religious body to occur 
today in any meaningful sense, there is a need of a refiguration of the 
understanding of embodiment as such, which can be achieved 
through phenomenological accounts of embodiment. I end the article 
with some suggestions how this might look. 
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In August 1308, the abbess Chiara of Montefalco died in her monastery. 
As she was considered to be both a renowned ascetic and a visionary, her fel-
low nuns decided to embalm her so as to preserve her body on account of her 
holiness. On the Italian peninsula at this time, embalmment by evisceration 
was coming into practice, and to perform this, Chiara’s body was to be 
opened. She was consequently cut open by one of her sisters and both her 
viscera and her heart were taken out to be buried on separately. The follow-
ing day, her fellow nuns continued their explorations of her innards, eventu-
ally finding a cross in her opened heart. A further examination of her heart 
showed even further symbols of the crucifixion, and in her gallbladder three 
small stones, referring to the trinity, were discovered. The miraculous work-
ings of the heart were considered to be further proof of Chiara’s holiness. 
The reason we know anything about this death and consequent dissec-
tion is because of the testimony given by her fellow sister Francesca of Mon-
tefalco. In her account, Francesca gives two reasons for opening Chiara’s 
body: preserving her body by embalming it but also hoping to find something 
‘wonderful’ in her heart. Embalmment was seen as a short-term measure, 
stabilizing the corpse for a couple of days, so that it could be laid on display. 
The hope was, of course, that Chiara’s body would prove to be a miracle-
working relic, and this hope catered, to put it in modern terms, not only to 
religious but also to civic interests, since this could enhance the reputation of 
the city in question, attracting pilgrims. Further, the cutting open of Chiara’s 
body took place in accordance with contemporary medicine; Sister Francesca 
was the daughter of a physician. There seem to be at least three contexts in-
volved in the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco, then: religious, civic and 
medical. As Katharine Park amply has demonstrated, in an account from 
which I took this example, this period in the Middle Ages was no stranger to 
human dissection.1 Through ‘Holy Anatomy,’ evidence for a person’s sanctity 
could hopefully be produced. These dissections were, if not common, then at 
                                                 
1 
This example is from Katharine Park, Secrets of Women: Gender, Generation, and the Origins of 
Human Dissection (New York 2010), 39–47. 
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least uncontroversial. Far from being some kind of religious taboo, dissection 
was practised for a number of purposes, some of them religious. That the 
church at that time was hostile towards dissection is a misconception, wide-
spread despite the work of many medievalists.2 Bodies, especially women’s 
bodies, were cut open for several reasons: authenticating sanctity, establish-
ing evidence in a criminal case, Caesarean section and, increasingly, to gain 
anatomical knowledge. These practices were often associated, conceptually as 
well as practically. Dissection of the body was, at that time, not primarily 
seen as a medical procedure. Except for the (rare) public dissection of bodies 
for medical research exclusively, which was performed on executed foreign 
criminals and was considered dishonouring, opening up the body was most 
commonly a practice for the cultural and social elite. Medical expertise was, 
however, called upon to establish evidence, not only in juridical processes 
but also, and perhaps foremost, in processes of canonization. From the case 
of Chiara of Montefalco and onwards, medical examinations, including au-





The topic for this article is religious embodiment or, perhaps more pre-
cisely, how religious embodiment has been and is conceived in relation to 
other perspectives on embodiment, especially the changing role of medicine 
in modernity. My own theoretical perspective will be phenomenological and 
hermeneutical, in a broad sense, and will focus upon questions regarding the 
cultural representation of embodiment rather than, as is also traditional 
within the phenomenological movement, the subjective experience of em-
bodiment, or, as is common to the natural sciences, the biological or physical 
body. I am convinced that the cultural representation of embodiment plays 
an essential role in any understanding of the body, including a biological un-
derstanding.3 From this follows, among other things, that the body has a his-
tory. It is not an unproblematic given, neither in the form of its representa-
tion nor as embodiment as such. This also means, presumably, that the ex-
                                                 
2
 Except for the work of Park, see also Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of 
Medical Perception, transl.: A. M. Sheridan (London/New York 2010), 153 f. 
3 
For a more extensive discussion of these matters, see my Himmelska kroppar: Inkarnation, blick, 
kroppslighet. Logos/Pathos 6 (Göteborg 2006), esp. ch. 1 and 8; English translation forthcoming with 
Eerdmans as Heavenly Bodies. 
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perience of being embodied varies with time. However, one could object that 
any talk of cultural representations, subjective experiences and biological 
evidence is an abstract way of speaking about phenomena that perhaps are 
not so distinct from each other; that this introduces precisely those distinc-
tions that this article wants to overcome. Nevertheless, I think it might be 
prudent, for reasons of exposition if nothing else, to go along with such cate-
gories for a while just to show in a preliminary way that there are many ways 
to talk about embodiment. 
The reason that I began with Katharine Park’s account of the dissection 
of Chiara of Montefalco here is somewhat different from Park’s original in-
tent; I think it shows quite clearly how both the dissection of bodies as well 
as the bodies themselves acquire meaning in a particular context. Even such a 
practice as the cutting open of bodies, for our part mostly associated with 
medical autopsies, does not have an established meaning but can take on 
different meanings depending upon the relevant context of interpretation. 
The interest that her fellow sisters took in her opened body had little to do 
with what we would call an autopsy, and even if a medical authority was 
called upon to establish the facts that would lead to her sanctification, such 
an authority was never independent of the framing religious interest in 
Chiara’s embodiment. As I hinted at in the beginning, it might be that con-
cepts such as ‘religious,’ ‘civic’ or ‘medical,’ even though they surely would 
have some kind of referent in the beginning of the fourteenth century, are 
slightly misleading if we take them to refer to some kind of easily distin-
guishable spheres of meaning. The differentiation between the ‘religious,’ 
‘civic’ and ‘scientific’ spheres of meaning take on contemporary meaning only 
through modernity. From the account of the dissection of Chiara of Monte-
falco, it is quite clear that there was no way of distinguishing the religious 
and the civic spheres, as if they were independent of each other. Also, medi-
cine was understood in a religious context. Park explicitly warns against the 
anachronistic supposition that just because the understanding of embodi-
ment in our time is dominated by medical paradigms, the same was true in 
pre-modern times.4 And of course this does not only refer to the practice of 
dissection but to embodiment as such. It is not the case that the history of 
embodiment is the history of anatomy and physiology at the core, to which 
all other ‘cultural meanings’ is added: ‘the inhabitants of northern Italian cit-
ies from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, understood their 
                                                 
4 
Park, Secrets of Women, 21–22. 
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bodies primarily in terms of family and kinship, on the one hand, and relig-
ion, on the other,’ says Park.5 Medicine comes third.  
Through relating religious embodiment to the interest that medicine has 
had and still has for human embodiment, I think we can get a notion of how 
religious embodiment has changed through history. Of course I will only give 
the barest of outlines of this history, but if I am successful in giving at least a 
preliminary account of this history and what this means today, I will have 
fulfilled my purposes. Thus, in the next section I will return to a historical 
account of the changing role of religion and medicine for embodiment, end-
ing in a more principled discussion of how to understand embodiment from a 
philosophical perspective informed by this history. Then I will take a look 
upon how embodiment has been medicalized in modernity and where that 
leaves religious embodiment. Finally, I will present some thoughts on how 
embodiment can be conceived of differently with the help of a phenomenol-
ogical perspective, and how also the role of religious embodiment can be re-
conceived thereby.  
 
 
EMBODIMENT AT THE DAWN OF MODERNITY 
The human body, in pre- or (very) early modern times was seen as a 
nexus between the created and the divine spheres. As God was incarnated in 
Christ, meaning that God became palpable human flesh, the body took on a 
particular prominence as a conduit for divine grace. Caroline Walker Bynum 
is one of the foremost medievalists who have emphasized how very somatic 
the religious culture at this era was; the human body, and even the female 
body became a symbol for humanity as such.6 Since woman, in the Middle 
Ages, was associated in a particular way with embodiment, by analogy she 
performed the more perfect imitatio Christi through her very physicality. In 
this way, woman could be the representative also of the male embodiment. 
The gendered aspects aside, embodiment was seen as the human form of re-
lationality, not only extending to the relations between human bodies but 
also between the immanent and the transcendent. Even the sense of vision 
was often understood as a reciprocal and mimetic relation rather than as a 
                                                 
5
 Park, Secrets of Women, 23. 
6
 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medie-
val Women (Berkeley 1987), 263. 
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relation of domination and subordination, as later became the case.7 As such, 
human bodies were not only vulnerable to physical trauma, but also to spiri-
tual possession by the Holy Spirit as well as the devil, both of whom could be 
presumed to leave bodily marks, a reason as good as any to examine the 
depths of human embodiment in extraordinary persons. The reason Park 
gives for the surprising fact that ‘Holy Anatomy’ was performed almost exclu-
sively on women – the first known autopsy of a man (Ignatius of Loyola in 
1556) took place two hundred and fifty years after the autopsy of Chiara of 
Montefalco – is both the association of women with corporeality and the (lit-
eral) inwardness of their devotion.8 
In the last two decades of the fifteenth century, according to Park, a new 
enthusiasm for dissection in the direct service of medical knowledge began to 
establish itself. Partly inspired by Galen’s endorsement of dissection as essen-
tial to health care, physicians began to appreciate the practice as a way of 
gaining essential information about diseases and causes of death. This enthu-
siasm trickled down to their well-off clients, who required autopsies as a part 
of their family health care. Even if medical examination in the form of dissec-
tion was driven by particular interests founded in conceptions of human em-
bodiment that went beyond medicine, it was also a part of a process of an 
increasing significance of medical learning as such, in cases of establishing 
lineage as well as canonicity. Medical authors began publishing anatomical 
works, with Andreas Vesalius’ On the Fabric of the Human Body from 1543 as 
a landmark. The formal dissections held by medical faculties began to attract 
more interest, both audience-wise and as a sign for the achievements of the 
city. Consequently, it became more frequent. Medicine also laid claim to a 
greater authority to read corporeal signs in a truthful way, as these signs were 
just too complex or ambiguous for anyone to interpret without the correct 
experience, erudition and judgement. With the growth of medical dissections 
follows a claim to greater expertise on human embodiment. The body be-
came a stage for the performance of signs and symptoms that only could be 
made to produce evidence through interpretation by a particular compe-
tence. The physicist is the expert and the body the object of his expertise. 
This growing prominence of medical anatomy did not mean, however, 
that anatomy now was somehow independent of theological or religious con-
cerns. Vesalius’ book is a case in point, relying for its visual presentation of 
                                                 
7
 Park, Secrets of Women, 73. Cf. Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twen-
tieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1993). 
8
 Park, Secrets of Women, 35. 
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the human body on available iconographic traditions such as Saint Anthony 
and the miser’s heart and the extraction of Julius Caesar from his mother’s 
womb. Anatomical illustrations could also be part of devotional images, so as 
to suggest that the border between the two were not entirely stable. At the 
same time, Vesalius’ work was, as Park points out, a step in the direction of 
the ‘desacralization’ of anatomy; even when using iconographic traditions, 
more obviously religious elements have been left out. His book was informed 
by his strategy to obtain imperial patronage from the head of the Holy Ro-
man Empire, but also of integrating physica (which corresponds with what 
we call internal medicine) and surgery through the medium of anatomy. This 
new conception of medicine was celebrated by Vesalius as a return to Greek 
medicine. In fact, he staged his own ‘revival’ as a ‘Caesarean’ birth, in a simi-
lar way to that of the emperor being seen as a new and from his immediate 
successors independent beginning of an imperial lineage: ‘Vesalius has 
snatched anatomy from the jaws of death, just as Charles resuscitated the 
Roman Empire, just as the midwife saved the infant Caesar, and just as 
Apollo rescued Asclepius from Coronis’ womb.’9 The bodies depicted in his 
exposition were often women, signalling a gendered figuration of the rela-
tionship between subject (physician) and object (woman). The physician was 
someone who investigated the ‘secrets of women,’ revealing them to the in-
terested onlooker. The distance between subject and object has now in-
creased, both in terms of epistemology and affection, compared to earlier 
centuries, and the element of reciprocity has been all but lost. 
What can we learn from Park’s book Secrets of Women that treats, in 
some detail, the praxis of dissection between the fourteenth and the six-
teenth century in northern Italy? As she herself points out, this story ‘is part 
of a larger story in which anatomical knowledge gained by exploring the dis-
sected body became a way to think about the self.’10 As the body is never 
given as such but only through some particular configuration of interpreta-
tive power, there is a need if one wishes to speak about embodied religion to 
specify which body one is talking about. Park’s analysis helps us with two 
things: first, the insight that to speak of embodied religion or the religious 
body always is an abstraction in a certain sense, namely that what is seen as 
the domain of the religious is always a part of a larger configuration of other 
domains such as the political, the cultural, the scientific (including medicine) 
et cetera. As we understand from Park’s account, there is a vast difference 
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between a domain of the religious in pre-modern times, where it in a sense to 
a large extent overlapped (or perhaps better: never was distinct from) the 
scientific domain. But, secondly, Park’s analysis also helps us to understand 
at least part of the story that has led to the configuration of these domains 
today, where I presume that it is not very controversial to suggest that medi-
cine often defines what is taken to be the fundamental understanding of em-
bodiment, namely (a version of) the physical or biological body. This per-
spective has, of course, been naturalized for us up to the point that we find it 
hard to understand how anyone can understand embodiment in another way; 
as Park points out, it is indeed difficult ‘to think of this understanding of the 
body as having had a beginning’ saturated as our culture is with such concep-
tualizations and visualizations of our embodiment.11 But none of these con-
ceptualizations or visualizations of the body that are part of our daily life are 
neutral or innocent. The body is never distinct as such from the cultural, po-
litical and social intersections that both produce it and uphold it, making it 
appear as given. 
 
 
A PHILOSOPHY OF EMBODIMENT 
Now let us turn briefly to the philosophical position on embodiment 
that I invoke here. It is inspired by, among others, Judith Butler, although 
she, of course, puts more emphasis on the gendered form of our understand-
ing of embodiment.12 Butler has, not surprisingly, been criticized for her per-
spective in Gender Trouble as advocating a remarkably weightless under-
standing of embodiment, as if the materiality of the body is dissolved in lin-
guistic constructions.13 Thus, her philosophical perspective would contribute 
to the typically modern alienation from nature. This is a criticism that be-
longs to a more general class of critiques of social constructivism that disap-
proves of its claims in that they seem to champion the presumably nonsensi-
cal idea that the body is a social construct, therefore denying its materiality. 
However, I belong to those who think that this is a misinterpretation of But-
ler’s position: far from the counterintuitive claim that there is nothing before 
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discourse, denying the materiality of the body, a more constructive under-
standing of Butler’s argument would be that the ‘pre-discursive’ materiality of 
the body is never possible to conceptualize or visualize in any other way than 
through discourse.14 What it is that is ‘matter’ or ‘body’ is thus not an abso-
lute fundament for philosophical or political arguments, but is itself a con-
tested notion that is part of the argument. This does not mean, then, that the 
body is just a matter of linguistic convention, but that everything that is, is 
always already symbolically mediated, so that there is no object independent 
of the discourse. This, it seems to me, is a position beyond at least crude ver-
sions of both essentialism and social constructivism, suggesting instead that 
we need more nuanced (and historical) accounts of the intertwining of the 
linguistic and the material that do not construct these as binary oppositions. 
Among those advocating such a perspective belongs the Polish medical 
doctor and biologist Ludwik Fleck whose reflections on the social conditions 
of a scientific fact are highly pertinent to the question of a cultural under-
standing of embodiment. Fleck wrote a small book, Genesis and Development 
of a Scientific Fact, where he argued against the prevailing scientific opinion 
that facts are independent of cultural and social conditioning.15 In it, he is 
polemical against those who refuse to see how even present-day science is 
dependent upon a particular thought collective and style and by way of this 
refusal think that there is a complete discontinuity between present-day 
knowledge and past prejudice. To say that what we today believe is true ‘is 
ipso facto true,’ is making the same mistake as an Eighteenth-century French 
philologist who declared that ‘pain, sitos, bread, Brot, panis were arbitrary, 
different descriptions of the same thing.’ The difference between the French 
language and all other languages is ‘that what is called bread in French really 
was bread.’16 There is, in other words, no way of stepping out of one’s own 
intellectual context, and the privileging of one’s own context as the sole stan-
dard for truth-claims is just a case of petitio principii or begging the question, 
as this claim can only be validated by principles internal to the context. 
Against the supposedly customary view of a fact – and we might want to add 
of embodiment – as ‘something definite, permanent, and independent of any 
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subjective interpretation by the scientist,’ Fleck suggests that facts (and also 
bodies) are theory-dependent and theories are in turn dependent upon cul-
tural and social circumstances.17 In a simile, we could compare the linguistic 
dependence of the study of human embodiment with the dependence on op-
tic lenses or radio telescopes for the study of heavenly bodies that are not 
visible to the naked eye. All human knowledge is in some way contextually 
mediated, including, as the example suggests, a reliance on various practices 
and technologies. 
Along with the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this sug-
gests an understanding of the function of language as primarily a way of ori-
enting human beings in their life-world, not to create a correspondence be-
tween words and things.18 Language constitutes the world in which human 
beings understand their existence, and thus Merleau-Ponty can suggest that 
speech and gesture transfigures the human body, at the same time that it is 
the human body that talks and gestures.19 Physical reality is not left intact by 
language, and thus, in a sense, one could say that a human body is a linguis-
tic body (even the cadaver, of course, exists in a discursive field, as the exam-
ple of Chiara of Montefalco shows). Language creates all sorts of possibilities 
for bodily existence, even though language always exists through and be-
tween bodies. This, in turn, implies that the world is not primarily the object 
of human subjectivity, but something we live in and through; our subjectivity 
is not something that we can place outside of the body but instead it is 
through our bodies that we are subjects that also can reach out for something 
else. The body is always already a part of the world, and neither the body nor 
the world could be explored independent of how the subject of the explora-
tion bodily experiences the world. This mode of embodiment is a presupposi-
tion of the possibility of experiencing the body as an object to our gaze and 
therefore a more fundamental dimension of our embodiment. That we still 
tend to think of the body as an object is in part dependent upon the fact that 
we become aware of our own body through our interaction with other bodies 
in the world – but also, I might add, because our contemporary culture 
teaches us to understand the body as an object. Merleau-Ponty insists, along 
with the phenomenological tradition, that the subjective experience of being 
embodied and the biological body belong together, or even are two abstract 
aspects of some more primordial embodiment.  
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What I wish to critically suggest to such a phenomenological perspective 
on embodiment is the emphatic need to supplement it with the importance 
of the cultural representation of embodiment for the understanding of both. 
In the example of the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco above, it has become 
clear, I hope, how our experience of being embodied is dependent upon the 
cultural framework within which our bodies are thematised and become 
meaningful. The cultural representation of embodiment is not static; it is his-
torically given and therefore any talk of religious embodiment or embodied 
religion stands in need of a critical historical account. This brings me back 
from this more abstract elaboration of how I understand embodiment to the 




RE-IMAGINING RELIGIOUS EMBODIMENT 
When I broke off my historical account above, I had just explained how 
medicine through Vesalius came to establish a more prominent place in the 
early modern hegemonic conceptions of embodiment. Today, it is quite clear, 
as Park also has pointed out, that an anatomical understanding of embodi-
ment has become part of our understanding of our own embodiment. In his 
book The Anticipatory Corpse the American MD and philosopher Jeffrey P. 
Bishop tells us the story of the gradual medicalization of the understanding 
of human embodiment with the help of the Aristotelian four causes. Two of 
them are maybe not of prominent interest for our purposes: the material 
cause that tells us what a thing consists of or the formal cause that tells us 
how this matter is arranged. More important for Bishop’s argument, however, 
are the two remaining causes: the efficient cause that is the primary source of 
an entity’s movement and the final cause that is its aim or purpose. An im-
portant historical change took place in early modernity that could be inter-
preted by the changing role of the four causes: modern science including 
modern medicine repudiated or at least minimized formal and final causa-
tion at the same time as it elevated material and efficient causation. Bishop 
explains:  
Medicine’s metaphysical stance … is a metaphysics of material and efficient 
causation, concerned with the empirical realm of matter, effects, and the ra-
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tional working out of the causes for the purposes of finding ways to control the 
material of bodies.20 
This is part of the technological drift of modern science; the body loses 
its own integrity and turns into a material object, as there are no intrinsic 
aims or purposes that could be assigned to it. Bishop again:  
Bodies have no purpose or meaning in themselves, except insofar as we direct 
those bodies according to our desires. … The world – the body – stands before 
us as a manipulable object, and all thinking about the world or the body be-
comes instrumental doing.21  
Of course, there is still the ‘I’ which has desires and wishes and aims and 
purposes, but this subjectivity is now both divorced from our embodiment 
and also outside the realm of medicine, and, consequently, beyond instru-
mental reasoning. Bishop notes that modern medicine or modern science in 
general sometimes denies having a metaphysics at all, but in the sense that a 
metaphysics is a particular view of the fundamental nature of being and the 
world, there is a metaphysics at work, at least implicitly, in its way of dividing 
the world between the meaningful and the manipulable or subject and ob-
ject. 
It needs to be pointed out that Bishop is not arguing against modern 
medicine; he is well aware of the ground-breaking achievements that have 
followed in its wake. He is also careful to point out that one of the most im-
portant motives for becoming a doctor is that one has been moved by the 
suffering of the other. At the same time, his often quite generalizing talk of 
modern medicine runs the risk both of reifying modern medicine and of pre-
senting modern technology and the patient’s life-world as a dichotomy, thus 
presenting too stark a contrast between cure and care in the contemporary 
world. His main target, however, is the oblivion of all understanding of the 
body as something more than just a manipulable object. This presupposition 
is counterproductive as it obscures how we also experience ourselves as em-
bodied beings with shared histories. Medicine is, of course, not the only (effi-
cient) cause of this tendency, as this is rather a common view of the trajec-
tory of a particular modern kind of dualism.  
What space or place is left for religious embodiment in such a hege-
monic understanding of embodiment? The history of the concept of religion 
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is, I would presume, quite well known, so I will not spend too much time 
elaborating on it here.22 Suffice it to say that religion has increasingly under-
gone a process of subjectivization, correlative to the objectivization of the 
body. Among other things, in the Protestant repudiation of the Roman 
Catholic liturgy, its customs and practices – its ‘legalism’ – the essence of re-
ligion came to be located to ‘the inner human being’ where all legitimacy in 
the eyes of God depends on an inner faith, not external achievements as such. 
Religion was privatized; its domain came to encompass feeling rather than 
thought or practice. Charles Taylor has, in his A Secular Age, described this 
process with the help of the term ‘ex-carnation’ (as a contrast to ‘in-
carnation,’ ‘becoming flesh’), which means that both the religious communi-
ties as well as society as a whole lose sight of the (inevitable) social embodi-
ment of religion, as well as a forgetfulness of how even one’s personal faith is 
expressed through one’s body.23 In some ways, medicine came to replace re-
ligion in that the understanding of health came to be understood in both a 
less holistic way, with the absence of disease as its main meaning rather than 
the more comprehensive well-being, and also in a more immanent manner, 
as having no final aim over and above the individual and social body. This 
means that the contemporary configuration of discursive power where both 
religion and medicine are parts actually turns the religious body into a sub-
lime body; a sublime body that is impossible to represent, both in a spatial 
and a discursive sense. If one of the defining traits of any talk of the body is 
that it ‘takes place,’ in such a configuration of discursive power it is an open 
question whether religious embodiment actually ‘takes place’ today. Or if it 
does, maybe this is a challenge to the very modern configuration of power 
that wants to make a neat distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ or ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ but also between ‘care’ and ‘cure.’ 
The challenge to such a configuration of discursive power is hardly a lit-
eral revival of an Aristotelian metaphysics of the four causes, and as I read 
Bishop, this is not his aim. Rather, he argues that final causation could be 
understood through a contemporary phenomenology of embodiment as we 
find it in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and this is to me a 
viable way forward. Working against the modern dichotomy between subject 
and object, both philosophers tried to regard embodiment more from the 
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perspective of the life-world. Rather than trying to overcome dualisms, they 
try to show that they are not there from the beginning. There is of course a 
vast tradition of interpretation with regard to both Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty and how well they actually succeed in overcoming the subject-object 
dichotomy, but let me here just claim that one important strand in their phi-
losophies is to regard the human body not as a manipulable object for our 
desires but rather as the way we exist in the world and through which we re-
late to other bodies. The body is not a tool, but we are our bodies. It is 
through our embodiment that we are a node in a network of relations and 
stories and it is so that we become what we are. Of course our body lets us do 
things, for instance drink a cup of coffee, and in this sense it is tool-like. As 
the act of drinking coffee is not just an extrinsic occurrence that happens to 
take place to and through my body, but is (hopefully) a pleasurable experi-
ence to me as a person, an experience that also could be a shared experience 
as a participation in a – however fleeting – human community, it would be 
misleading to characterize the arm that moves the cup to my lips as a mere 
tool. It is indeed I who am drinking the coffee.  
More examples that encompass a broader horizon of human experience 
could obviously be produced here, but I hope this simple and perhaps pedes-
trian example will suffice to convince, for now, that our bodies are always 
already part of a context where our human existence is defined by our aspira-
tions and desires, who or what we love and what we are hoping for. Thus, we 
are always already engaged in practical projects that intrinsically contain 
some form of telei or final causes. For Bishop, these causes can be of different 
natures, not necessarily belonging to some grand metaphysics as in Aristotle 
or Christian theology, but are an effect of an understanding of embodiment 
that refuses to reduce the human body to a manipulable object. Projects can 
be of such a grand scale, but can also concern matters of daily living, but 
common to both long-term projects and more mundane projects is that both 
take an embodied form. To quote Bishop on this: ‘Formal and final causes are 
embodied, even as that embodiment is shaped by meaning and significance 
outside the body and directed to purposes outside of the body.’24 Our indi-
vidual bodies are not only meaningful in and by themselves, but as members 
of a social body that defines meaning beyond the borders of the individual 
body. It is important to realize that such a meaningfulness is not something 
that is added post hoc but is a part of being embodied in itself. It begins with 
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small, everyday projects that evolve into some form of community, whether 
big or small, with its own history and its own telos, but it can also be part of a 
living religion. 
This means that the body is never neutral. Not even the medical body 
that Bishop equates with the corpse is neutral. Through modern medicine, 
the human body is reduced to a more or less well-functioning machine. The 
aim of medicine, then, is to, as far as possible, maintain this machine. But to 
turn the human body into a manipulable object, it needs to withdraw it from 
its communal context, making it acontextual and ahistorical. The corpse be-
comes the paradigmatic body because death stops, ideally at least, the flow of 
time, helpfully turning the body into a stable ground for a systematic knowl-
edge. But to a living body according to the phenomenological perspective, 
death is not only about the termination of the functioning of the body-
machine, but more about the cessation of capacities, projects, plans, hopes, 
desires and so on. This gives an entirely different perspective on life, health, 
disease and illness, and, I might add, on religion. Indeed, to the ill person, the 
body can become an object, as it suddenly or gradually turns from being an 
invisible background horizon for all intentional projects to a highly visible 
cause for concern in its own right. This can be experienced as an alienation 
from one’s own body. But this is a different objectification from the one that 
is performed by the doctor in a medical examination, for whom our projects 
and purposes that we are keen to restore are more or less irrelevant. The doc-
tor considers the function of the body, something that is distinct from the 
purpose and goods of the embodied life. 
This points towards an understanding of embodiment that reaches be-
yond the manipulable object of instrumental rationality. Significant for such 
an understanding is that the body is not just a tool or an object but some-
thing that we in a more profound way are. We exist and relate bodily to other 
bodies in the world. The body can be described as a node in a network of re-
lations and stories that we share with each other and through which we be-
come those we are. This means that we share a life-world with each other 
where our existence is defined by our longings and desires. The life-world can 
be understood as a set of practical projects that all imply some kind of telos. 
Even if we cannot share or even wish to share the life-world of Chiara of 
Montefalco, where embodiment was understood within a religious, or more 
specifically a Christian, context, such contexts, be they of a more low key or 
of a more comprehensive nature, are still around in our daily projects with all 
their successes or misgivings. Different ways of imagining embodiment are 
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always already here, if one only knows where to look. It is perhaps one of the 
contributions of a philosophy of religion, a phenomenology or a theology 
today to be able to critically explore the hegemonical mode of embodiment 
in the service of suggesting a fuller, less reductive account. Heterotopias are 
already in existence alongside hegemonical places in society from where it is 
possible to challenge their account of embodiment. 
What I have tried to suggest in this article, more by showing than by ar-
guing perhaps, is that such a fuller account needs to be historically informed. 
The body has a history, not least in its cultural representations, and being 
aware of this history is, I would suggest, essential for the understanding of 
religious embodiment even today, to avoid being caught up in the objectifica-
tion of time as well as the body. Essential to any discussion of religious em-
bodiment or embodied religion is both some kind of historical genealogy of 
religion as well as of the body, and a philosophical or theological account 
that tries to lay bare how we always already exist bodily in ways that cannot 
reduce our embodiment to a manipulable object. For such an endeavour, the 
comparison between modern and pre-modern representations of embodi-
ment could be helpful, not because earlier traditions would provide us with 
standards, but with critical perspectives on our own modes of understanding. 
The task of re-imagining religious embodiment in conversation with different 
modes of embodiment suggested by politics, science or art is an interpreta-
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In phenomenology and existential philosophy the relation to the di-
vine has been understood as closely connected to the human capacity 
for transcendence. This understanding can be nuanced through a 
reading of the beguine Mechthild von Magdeburg’s Das fließende 
Licht der Gotheit, a Christian mystic text where the body, sensibility 
and erotic encounter with the divine is central. Sensibility is here un-
derstood as the meeting place between the soul and God. The article 
aims to contribute to a phenomenology of religious experience in 
which the human capacity for transcendence and human embodi-
ment are thought as intertwined.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In monotheistic traditions religion has most often been understood as a 
spiritual issue and religiosity and spirituality are understood as closely re-
lated concepts. Even if any religion, as practice, by necessity has strong em-
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bodied dimensions, the body in theory and in writings has not always had a 
very strong position. Christianity, for example, stands with one leg in a Neo-
Platonic tradition where the body is understood as the prison of the divine 
spark of the soul, which hinders the soul from returning to its divine origin.  
In modern philosophy the body has been understood as extension, a ma-
terial object among others, and as what is present here and now. Such ideas 
have been profoundly questioned in much contemporary, late modern phi-
losophy – that wants to reevaluate the body. At the same time, in phenome-
nological and existential philosophy of religion, it has been implicitly argued 
that there is a reason for the priority of the soul, since religion is born out of 
the human capacity for transcendence, the overflowing of the here and now. 
This situation begs the question: what position does the living body have in 
relation to the human capacity for transcendence? 
In the Abrahamitic religions the capacity for transcendence has been 
developed into a capacity to transgress the present world, an ability that is 
supposed to be exceptionally strong in so-called mystic traditions. In philos-
ophy, mystic traditions are often accused of trying to find that harmonious, 
clean and peaceful oneness with the divine, where all the trouble and prob-
lems of the world and the body are once and for all left behind. Such an un-
derstanding of mystic traditions can be found throughout contemporary phi-
losophy, explicitly for example in Karl Jaspers and Iris Murdoch.1 And in what 
has become known as the turn to religion within phenomenology, the capaci-
ty of transcendence – here read as a positive and most human capacity – is at 
the center, and here too, the body tends to be forgotten. In phenomenologi-
cal analysis, attention has primarily been given to Christian male mystics. But 
if we are interested in the relation between transcendence and the living 
body, maybe we should turn to a closely related, but slightly different tradi-
tion: the Christian female mystic tradition.  
Historians such as Caroline Bynum and Amy Hollywood have pointed 
out that it is exactly the relation to the body that is different in the writings 
of these female mystics.2 As women, female mystics were associated with the 
body in a more intimate way than male mystics. The figure of Christ as the 
God that becomes body was more important to female mystics, and the ques-
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tion of the body is more present in their texts. When female writers emphas-
ize the positive relation between the living body and the divine, the body of 
Jesus becomes the gateway to an intimate relation to the divine, most appar-
ent in the Holy Communion. His bleeding body feeds and gives life to hu-
manity. During the medieval period the female is connected to blood both 
through menstrual blood, which was understood as the material of which the 
child was made, and the belief that blood could be transformed into breast-
milk. The female body is the body that is perforated, gives life, and is open to 
others. The body of Christ with its bleeding stigmata is connected to these 
aspects of the female body: his pains were connected to the pain of giving 
birth, he was breast-feeding humanity with his stigmata, and he gave himself 
to the humans just as a mother gives herself to her baby. Holy capacities 
could therefore be connected to abilities of the female body. The breast-milk 
of holy women could cure the sick, female bodies opened up in stigmata to a 
larger extent than male, and some women, such as St Bridget of Sweden, re-
ceived their calling to God as the movement of a fetus in the womb. But the 
gender difference is not a total watershed: male mystics such as Bernhard of 
Clairvaux also use similar female strategies, calls themselves God’s bride and 
identify with Mary.  
The living body is closely connected to the senses, as has been shown in 
the phenomenological tradition. The living body is even constituted through 
its sensibility and its capacity to be both sensed and sensing. The senses have 
of course always been sources of knowledge, but during the high middle ages 
it was considered to be an unreliable source when it came to the relation with 
the divine. What we call the mystical tradition had up until the twelfth cen-
tury been a tradition of textual interpretation by purely intellectual means. It 
was especially the female mystics, within the strong female religious move-
ment of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which gave the senses a differ-
ent position. Mystics such as Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179) gained their 
knowledge of the divine through the senses, often in visions based on seeing, 
hearing, smelling etc. But this made them suspicious in the eyes of other 
mystics. For example, Master Eckhardt (1260–1328) and Johannes Tauler 
(1300–1361), who in many respects were greatly influenced by female mystics, 
were critical of their dependence on the senses.3 They preferred the specula-
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tio of the wise rather than the visio of the pious, since the senses could be 
treacherous: maybe the vision came from the devil rather than from the di-
vine. Instead they considered reason to be the only trustworthy source of 
knowledge. 
In the following my interest lies in how the living and sensing body is 
conceptualized in the female mystic tradition. I will start with a very short 
summary of the philosophical and phenomenological philosophy of religion 
where religion is understood as a consequence of the human capacity for 
transcendence, and of the priority of the soul at the cost of the body. Thereaf-
ter I will turn to The Flowing Light of Godhead (Das fließende Licht der Go-
theit), a Christian and mystic text from the thirteenth century written by 
Mechthild von Magdeburg. In this text the senses as well as the human body 
are given crucial roles in relation to the divine. My main focus will be on the 
relation between the capacity for transcendence and the sensing body.  
 
 
RELIGION AS THE HUMAN CAPACITY FOR TRANSCENDENCE 
In modern phenomenology as well as in existential philosophy, the abili-
ty to experience negativity is central to the human being.4 Such ability is of 
course paradoxical since its negativity is present, and its presence is an ab-
sence. But it is not an extraordinary experience, rather one that is present in 
everyday life. The world would not be a world if we only experienced pure 
presence and no negativity. In this case we would not accept that the house 
has a backside, since we do not experience it at the moment. Neither would 
we accept the other person as experiencing, since we never experience her 
experiences. The now includes thus not only what is present, but includes the 
past as well as expectations for the future. This capacity for negativity pro-
vides us in early childhood with the very first instance of play: peek-a-boo. 
Playing this game, the parent, for example, puts her hands in front of her face 
and then takes them away and reveals her face. The point of this play is that 
the baby does not alternately see the back of the hands and the face of the 
parent. Rather it sees the presence of the parent and the absence of the par-
                                                 
4
 In this chapter I build upon Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety (Princeton 1981 [1844]); 
Max Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos (Evanston 2009 [1928]); Edmund Husserl, On the Phe-
nomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time [1893–1917] (Dordrecht, 1991); and Simone de Beau-
voir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (Secaucus, 1948) etc. 
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ent. The amusing part lies in the memory and the expectation of the parent, 
which are interrupted by the presence of the parent. As such it is a play on 
what is not present, but which nevertheless is shown in the present. The feel-
ing of longing in a similar way is the strong and sometimes overwhelming 
presence of what is absent. The human being distinguishes herself in the use 
and development of this capacity, a capacity that makes it possible to make 
up plans and change both one’s surroundings and one’s own life. It also 
makes it possible for the human being to look at herself from the outside and 
reflect upon herself. In order to make up plans she needs the free space con-
stituted through the insight that life might be different, and in order to re-
flect upon herself, she needs to negate the full presence in herself. Maybe this 
last capacity is the strangest. How is it possible for her to see herself at the 
same time as she is the one seeing? One phenomenological answer, Husserl’s, 
would be that it is possible since the human being is a temporal and inten-
tional being continually directed to the world and thereby constituting ob-
jects, meaning she does not create them, but constitutes them as objects). In 
turning to itself, the self is both constituted as an object and as the constitut-
ing subject, i.e. both as body and soul. 
The body, thus, is part of the world and is subjected to all its laws. The 
soul, on the other hand, names the above discussed possibility of moving and 
transcending that which is given as present. It includes free will, creativity, 
and the ability to reflect. In existential philosophy, the human being is even 
identified with these capacities to exceed the present state and situation, i.e. 
with her transcendence. But if the body names the human being as part of 
the world, as here and now and as one object among many; where does the 
soul belong? Where does the soul stand when it looks at itself and thereby 
transforms itself into an object? It cannot be part of the world since as soon 
as it sees itself as one object among many it is no longer the experiencing 
soul. Thus, the soul cannot be part of the world – and the need to formulate 
another position, a non-worldly position, is born. Even so, the soul is still 
dependent on the body, and the world still limits its free movement. Such a 
lack in the power of human transcendence produces the idea of a pure tran-
scendent power. And since the movement of the soul names the life of the 
human being and the constituting power, a pure transcendence would also 
be the source of all life, and as such a transcendental ground. But such a tran-
scendental transcendence is exactly not part of the world and an object 
among others. It is an origin for all individual life, but itself not an individual 
creature. As such, it might be understood as given with the world, but never 
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given in itself. Therefore the divine is inexhaustible and unreachable (within 
the world), and thus impossible to fully understand or describe, since under-
standing as well as language is adapted to appearance in the world.  
In this way phenomenological and existential philosophy tries to under-
stand how ‘soul’ is separated from ‘body’ and ‘the divine’ from ‘the worldly.’ 
The phenomenological tradition also has important reflections on embodi-
ment, above all in Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but none of 
them had any greater interest in philosophy of religion. In addition, from 
those thinkers that are known for their religious reflections, such as Edith 
Stein, Max Scheler, and Michel Henry, there are intriguing analyses of embo-
diment, but when they turn to religion, the theme of the body is pushed aside 
and transcendence becomes their only quest.5 To sum up: in phenomenology 
and existential philosophy the divine is closely connected to the human ca-
pacity for transcendence and its transcendental presuppositions. I do consid-
er this to be an important contribution to the philosophical understanding of 
religion, but it is also insufficient in its tendency to further narrow the under-
standing of the body and the place of embodiment. In drawing on these phe-
nomenological theories, and scrutinizing religious texts in which embodi-
ment and sensibility are given a different role, I hope to contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of the relation between transcendence and embodi-
ment. In the following I will develop this through a reading of Mechthild von 




Mechthild belonged to the beguine movement, which was part of the 
quickly expanding female religiosity in Europe during the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries. The beguines did not take life-long vows and they stayed in 
the city in their own dwellings. Except for the money that some of the be-
guines brought with them as they entered the house, they made a living from 
taking care of the dead, nursing, teaching, the weaving industries, etc. Their 
lives were less regulated than the lives of the nuns and worldlier in the sense 
that they had much more contact with lay people. Mechthild was probably 
                                                 
5
 I develop this argument in ‘Ambiguities of the human body in phenomenology and Christian 
mysticism’ in Ola Sigurdson, Marius Timmann Mjaaland & Sigridur Torgeirsdottir (eds.), The Body 
Unbound: Philosophical Perspectives on Religion, Embodiment, and Politics (Cambridge 2010), 73–88. 
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leader for such a house in Magdeburg. She was born between 1207 and 1210 
and died between 1282 and 1294. 
The flowing Light of Godhead is a text that belongs to the mystic tradi-
tion to the extent that it is inspired by, for example, Hildegard of Bingen and 
St Augustine. Mechthild’s God, though, is not connected only to the capacity 
for transcendence, and the living body is in her writings not something that 
must be discarded in search for God. On the contrary, as many scholars in 
different fields have pointed out, her work is permeated by a rich sensory 
language and a profound eroticism. The senses are not something to be re-
jected, but a gateway to God, and a set of capacities that must be refined.6 
Her texts, which describe a personal relationship to the divine, contain sto-
ries, poems and, maybe most notable, dialogues between personifications of 
love and the senses etc. or, as in the following paragraph, between the soul 
and God: 
Soul:  
Lord, you are the sun for all eyes; 
You are the delight of all ears; 
You are the voice of all words; 
You are the force of all piety; 
You are the teaching of all wisdom; 
You are the life of all that lives; 
You are the ordering of all beings. 
[…] 
God: You are a light to my eyes; 
You are a lyre to my ears; 
You are a voice for my words; 
You are a projection of my piety; 
You are one glory in my wisdom, 
you are one life in my liveliness,  
you are a praise in my Being! 
(III:2)7 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Marilyn Webster, ‘Mechthild von Magdeburg’s Vocabulary of the Senses,’ dis-
sertation, (Amherst 1996); Margot Schmidt, ‘Versinnlichte Transzendenz bei Mechthild von Magde-
burg,’ in: Dietrich Schmidtke (ed.), ‘Minnichlichiu gotes erkennusee’: Studien zur frühen abendländis-
chen Mystiktradition (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990), 61–88; Elizabeth Alvilda Petroff, Body and Soul: 
Essays on Medieval Women and Mysticism (New York 1994); Kurt Ruh, ‘Beginenmystik: Hadewijch, 
Mechthild von Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete,’ Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum und Deutsche Litera-
rur 106 (1977), 265–277. 
7
 ‘Herre, du bist die sunne aller ogen, du bist der lust aller oren, du bist dú stimme aller worten, 
du bist dú kraft aller vromekeit, du bist dú lere aller wisheit, du bist das lip in allem lebende, du bist dú 
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This description could be understood as a dramatized and mythological 
version of a philosophical position. It can be said to describe the relation be-
tween the transcendental and transcendent presupposition (God), and the 
individual being (the soul). In this way it articulates the relation between the 
continuous and the discontinuous. Those two are however not separate in-
stances, rather the text shows a close intertwinement between God and the 
soul, although it requires a close inspection to be fully discerned. Each line in 
God’s speech to the soul corresponds thematically to a line in the soul’s an-
swer. In the following I will analyze some of these thematic couplets.  
Lord, you are the sun for all eyes, you [the soul] are a light to my eyes. 
The relation between God and the soul is addressed from two different 
perspectives: the divine and the human. In each line both these positions are 
addressed, resulting in a fourfold description of vision. At the outset, God, as 
the light of the sun, is described as the presupposition for seeing, and thus as 
the possibility for beings to see. The soul, on the other hand, is one visible 
being in front of God’s eyes. The soul has a twofold nature, since it is visible 
and seeing: visible in front of God, and seeing thanks to God. One might be 
surprised that it is the soul that is visible, since it does not appear to match 
the idea of the soul as the transcending capacity presented above. But in fact, 
in Mechthild I would propose that the soul is that part of the human being 
that is in dialog (or resists the dialog) with God. The soul is, just as in the 
phenomenological analysis, the life of the human being, but this life can be 
seen, and as such it is called ‘body.’ It is characterized exactly by its possibili-
ty to be seen, but it is seen as a light, i.e. as a seeing seen.  
The divine does not display this double character of vision, both seeing 
and seen, but it has a double nature in another way: it is both a seeing, and 
the presupposition for the seeing of the soul. As such, the divine is in need of 
the visibility of the soul, the visibility of beings, of which the divine is not 
one. The visible beings constitute the seeing of the divine, since seeing can-
not exist without something seen. The soul is in need of the divine and the 
divine is in need of something to see. This means that the divine is not in 
need of a particular being, but nevertheless of beings as such. So, how should 
the divine seeing be understood, when the divine is not a being that is possi-
                                                                                                                                         
ordenunge alles wesendes! […] Du bist ein lieht vor minen ogen, du bist ein lire vor minen oren, du bist 
ein stimme miner worten, du bist ein meinunge miner vromekeit, du bist ein ere miner wisheit, du bist 
ein lip in minem lebende, du bist ein lop in minem wesende!’ [III:2] Das fließende Licht der Gottheit, ed. 
Gisela Vollmann-Profe, (Frankfurt aM 2003). All English translations are taken from The Flowing Light 
of the Godhead, translated by Frank Tobin (New York 1998). 
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ble to see at one place, and thus not a being with a specific perspective? It 
could be understood as a kind of anonymous seeing, since it comes from eve-
rywhere and not from somewhere. It includes the possibility of the seen to be 
seen, and as such it is an anonymous capacity to be seen that goes beyond 
the individual seeing. This intertwining between seeing and seen is reminis-
cent of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of sensibility since it includes the same 
components.8 God as presupposition, as well as God’s seeing is, just as ano-
nymity in Merleau-Ponty, the seeing that goes beyond the individual and an 
element within which the individual can see. The soul as ‘a light’ for God’s 
eyes is as all sensing beings a seen seeing and a seeing seen. But does this 
mean that we should understand God’s seeing only as this anonymous seeing, 
or does it have a privileged position and thus a perspective of its own? In 
another verse she alludes to John 8:12 (I’m the light of the world) saying: 
My lover then spoke thus: ‘I shall place the light onto the lantern, and for all 
those that whose eyes look upon the light a special beam shall shine from the 
light into the eye of their knowledge.’ 
The soul then asked with great submissiveness but without fear: ‘Dearest, what 
is the lantern supposed to be?’ Our Lord said: ‘I am the light and your breast is 
the lantern.’ (III:12)9 
In this text it is clear that God is the light as such, and in order for there 
to be sight he needs to have a lantern that can be lit. Here seeing is consti-
tuted through the collaboration between God’s light and the human lantern. 
God lights the human lantern, and everyone who sees this light, and contem-
plates it – one might add – receives a light on another level, a light in the eye 
of their knowledge. I would say that this verse does not only thematize a spe-
cific knowledge of the divine, and neither is the light only used metaphorical-
ly, but it rather connects the seeing of the eyes with the seeing of under-
standing. Seeing God as one being among many is impossible, just as the sun, 
this divine light is what blinds you. To see the presuppositions is like trying 
to see the sun, where the light becomes too bright and destroys all vision. But 
this does not mean that the senses can be left. Instead the relation between 
                                                 
8
 See especially ‘The Intertwining: The Chiasm’ in: The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston 1968). 
9
 ‘Ich wil das lieht uf den lúhter setzen und allú dú ogen, dú das lieht angesehent, den sol ein 
sunderlich strale schinen in das oge ir bekantnisse von dem liehte.’ Do vragete dú sele mit grosser 
undertenekeit ane vorhte: ‘Vil lieber, wer sol der lúchter sin?’ Do sprach únser herre: ‘Ich bin das lieht 
und din brust ist der lúhter.’ [III:12] 
34 JONNA BORNEMARK 
 
God and the soul could be understood as a mutual weaving through which 
they create the element of seeing.  
In another verse Mechthild says about the soul: ‘In the most beautiful 
light she is blind to herself. In the greatest blindness her vision is the clearest’ 
(I:22).10 In order for her to relate to God, it could be argued, she needs to con-
sider the light itself, not only what is visible. In such a meditation she be-
comes blind to herself (as a ‘seen’ worldly being) but also understands herself 
(as seeing) the clearest. Here ‘vision’ clearly plays on the relation between 
visibility and the more metaphorical use of ‘understanding.’ But in doing so, 
in the transmission of visibility, it starts out from the everyday seeing, from 
the senses, and in order to ‘see’ this capacity, seeing is transformed, an invisi-
bility to ordinary seeing paves the way for another kind of seeing. So does 
this not include exactly the step from the world to another ‘heavenly’ region? 
I would say no, since this other vision is included in the everyday vision. It is 
not a move away from the senses, but a move into the senses. It is within her 
capacity to see that she meets her God. Without the senses there is no meet-
ing-place for them. 
The following sections include similar patterns, and the next two ex-
tracts include discussions on the senses, although here hearing and speaking 
are at the center. 
You are the delight of all ears, you are a lyre to my ears, 
This line points towards the enjoyment of the senses. The senses are not 
something negative that the soul should escape, but the means by which God 
and Mechthild are in contact with each other, although in radically different 
ways. Through the senses they enjoy each other. God is the joy, the pleasure 
of the possibility to hear and the individual being is the music in God’s ear. 
They enjoy each other in their sharing of the senses. This shows a mutual 
dependence, but also an asymmetric relation. They are part of the same 
weave, they both are, or have, eyes/ears/words – and together they both con-
stitute and enjoy these phenomena.  
Each line in this verse follows the same pattern and merits analysis, but I 
will end the discussion of this verse with a few words from the very last line: 
You are the ordering of all beings, you are a praise in my being! 
                                                 
10
 ’in dem schonsten liehte ist si [die brut] blint an ir selber und in der groston blintheit sihet si 
allerklarost.’ [I:22] 
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This line could be understood as articulating what Heidegger called the 
ontological difference, which in one of the versions that Heidegger proposes 
would be the difference between beings and the being of beings. Here God is 
understood as the order and structure of all beings, and the soul as one being 
that celebrates the Being of God. It is thus order and celebration that are re-
lated to each other in relation to being. It is interesting that she here con-
nects a concept (order) that we understand as metaphysical, with one that 




THE BODY AS MEETING-POINT 
Above I have borrowed Merleau-Ponty’s concept of anonymity, but 
Mechthild’s God is not anonymous. It is, as we have seen, not a distant meta-
physical order, but their relation is the enjoyment of life, which should be 
celebrated and investigated with all human means. God is not primarily a 
metaphysical order that needs rational explanation, but is connected to all 
layers of the human being. Neither is the divine a being that the human being 
could control or fully know, and in this way it is always overflowing. But this 
overflowing does not make it distant; its overflowing presence takes place in 
the body. This leads us to the second part of the above quoted verse where 
the soul says: 
Lord you are constantly lovesick for me. 
That you have clearly shown personally. 
You have written me into your book of the Godhead; 
You have painted me in your humanity; 
You have buried me in your side, in your hands and feet. 
Ah, allow me, dear One, to pour balsam upon you. 
On one dear to my heart, where shall you find the balm? 
O Lord, I was going to tear the heart of my soul in two and intended to put you 
in it. 
You could never give me a more soothing balsam than to let me unceasingly lie 
weightlessly in your soul. 
Lord, if you were to take me home with you, I would be your physician forever. 
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Yes, I want that. […] (III:2)11 
The second part, as well as the structure of the whole dialogue, shows a 
somewhat different picture than the first part. Here ‘anonymity’ becomes an 
even less appropriate category since the metaphysical order is lovesick for the 
soul. The intertwinement of the first part is further emphasized here, and is 
set out in the flesh. If the first half describes a positive and creative relation 
discussed in positive terms that celebrate the difference between them, the 
second half shows a tension and a longing to exceed the creative gap between 
them.  
Here it is God who is the weaker part. Even though he is the presupposi-
tion, he is not complete in himself or a harmonious being – rather, in order 
for God to be God, he is in need of the individual being. As a presupposition 
he is an open wound, opening up for beings to come into existence. The soul 
is said to be buried in the holy wounds. Stigmata are given a central role as 
the place where the individual being takes place and is at once separated and 
connected to God. The gap created between them also constitutes the possi-
bility of an encounter. If we stick to the idea that God and the soul together 
weave sensibility, they have to be separated in order to be what they are. Sen-
sibility always includes a splitting up in sensed and sensing, but since each 
side also within itself and in different ways duplicates this split, they find 
another closeness and possibility to come close to each other. 
The wound makes it possible for the soul to be other than God, to be 
experienced, and to experience on her own. But this means pain, since sepa-
ration is pain. But just as in childbirth it is a fruitful pain, necessary for a 
world of experience to come into being. But it is also the beginning of a poss-
ible consolation that they might give each other. So God asks her where she 
will find the balsam. The love that exists through the wound of the flesh and 
creates separation as well as erotic tension draws them together as the only 
possibility of consolation. Mechthild finds this consoling balsam by tearing 
her own heart in two, creating a gap in her flesh as she is both experienced 
                                                 
11
 ‘- Herre, du bist ze allen ziten minnensiech na mir, das hast du wol bewiset an dir. Du hast 
mich geschriben an din buch der gotheit, du hast mich gemalet an diner monscheit, du hast mich ge-
graben an diner siten, an henden und an fussen. Eya, erlobe mir, vil liber, das ich dich salben musse. 
- Ja, wa woltistu die salben nemmen, herzeliebe? 
- Herre, ich wolte miner sele herze inzwoi rissen und wolte dich dar in legen. 
- So mohtest du mir niemer so liebe salben gegeben, als das ich ane underlas in diner sele muste swe-
ben. 
- Herre woltest du mich mit dir ze huse nemen, so wolte ich iemer me din arcedinne wesen. 
- Ja, ich wil’ [III:2] 
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and experiencing. As such she duplicates in herself the gap between the two. 
She duplicates the separation to be able to join and heal him. And he says 
that she could only be a balsam if she lets him in into her soul. She can take 
place in him only if he takes place in her. If the first part includes a discussion 
on the senses, the relation here takes place in a wounded flesh that makes the 
senses possible. The presupposition for seeing is a wound in its need for 
something seen. But as something seen, the soul doubles this wound in its 
capacity to see. The soul duplicates the divine wound in its ability to both be 
seen and to see. It repeats the wound in itself. Through this wound and dis-
tance within herself, the soul alleviates the divine, maybe because its wound 
makes it possible to turn to the divine. The wound of the divine makes the 
individual being possible, the soul repeats this wound, which makes it possi-
ble to turn beyond the seen and create a relation to the divine. In this way 
the soul’s wound makes it possible to be open to the divine. It is this mutual 
seeing that functions as a balsam. 
I would suggest, here, that the soul should not be understood in contrast 
to the body, the flesh is rather the place where the wound can take place. The 
wound would then be a name for the soul. The soul duplicates or mirrors 
God, both as seeing and as seen, but mostly she duplicates God as gap be-
tween these. Because of this interweaving there is no definite split between 
man and God, but always a mutual dependence, an interweaving relationship 
where they weave each other. There can never be a ‘one element’ in life and 
being, since this ‘one’ is always an immediate split. The element of sensing is 
from the beginning divided and therefore not only itself, but it is intertwin-
ing and longing for the other.  
As a body, the human being is thus double-sided – soul, sensed and 
sensing. Most often it has been her dimension of sensing and the spiritualiza-
tion of this sensing that has connected her to the divine. But in this text it is 
the full sensing body that gives her a privileged position: 
When I reflect that divine nature now includes bone and flesh, body and soul, 
then I become elated in great joy, far beyond what I am worth. But angels are 
to some degree formed according to the Holy Trinity, but they are pure spirits. 
The soul alone with its flesh is mistress of the house in heaven, sits next to the 
eternal Master of the house, and is most like him. (IV:14]12 
                                                 
12
 ‘Swenne ich das gedenke, das gotlich nature nu an ir hat bein und vleisch, lip und sele, so er-
hebe ich mich mit grosser vrode verre úber min wirdekeit. Aber der engel ist etlicher masse gebildet na 
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Here it is obviously the embodiment of Jesus that makes the similarity 
to God complete. Jesus was body in the trinity from the very beginning, and 
his embodiment was not the consequence of the fall. In this text it is also 
clear that there is no opposition between ‘soul’ and ‘body’: ‘the soul with her 
flesh’ has the privileged position. The soul is thus not soul without her body, 
but just another angel. This is developed in another verse: 
[…] the noblest angel, Jesus Christ,  
who soars above the Seraphim, 
who is undivided with his Father.  
Him shall I, the least of souls, take in my arms, 
eat him and drink him, 
and have my way with him. 
This can never happen to the angels. 
No matter how high he dwells above me, 
his Godhead shall never be so distant  
that I cannot constantly entwine my limbs with him;  
and so I shall never cool off.  
What, then, do I care what the angels experience? (II:22)13 
The description of the communion here shows that the exteriority of the 
body, its capacity to act and to have power, is central to Mechthild. This ca-
pacity gives her a specific intimacy and relation to the divine. Once again it is 
the worldly body, a body that can be seen and that can act in the world, that 
can do what the highest angel cannot. This exteriority of the body is closely 
connected to its interiority, to the warmth, and thus the life of the body, 
which here becomes the intimate meeting with the divine. This intimate and 
interior connection with God within the body is also what constitutes the 
possibility for her to write: 
I do not know how to write, nor can I, unless I see with the eyes of my soul and 
hear with the ears of my eternal spirit and feel in all the parts of my body the 
power of the Holy Spirit. (IV:13)14 
                                                                                                                                         
der heligen drivaltekeit, doch ist er ein luter geist. Dú sele ist mit irem vleisch alleine husvro in dem 
himelriche und sitzet bi dem ewigen wirte, im selber allerglichest.’ [IV:14] 
13
 ‘Den werdesten engel Jhesum Christum, der da swebet oben Seraphin, der mit sinem vatter ein 
ungeteilet got mus sin, den nim ich minstú sele in den arm min und isse in und trinke in und tun mit 
im, swas ich wil. Das mag den engeln niemer geschehen. Wie hohe er wonet ob mir, sin gotheit wirt 
mir niemer so ture, ich musse ir ane unterlas allu mine gelide vol bevinden; so mag ich niemer mere 
erkulen. Was wirret mir denne, was die engel bevinden?’ [II:22]  
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In this text the eyes of the soul and the ears of the spirit have a spiritua-
lized or metaphorical side to them, but when she comes to the limbs of her 
body, there is no room for metaphors. Feeling here stands out as the sensing 
closest to the body. If the eyes of the soul and the ears of the spirit make 
something present, the feeling of the limbs is the presence that they start out 
from. This is the present life that makes all transcendence, creativity, and 
memory of the human being possible. This is the place where the soul is born 
and receives itself. 
 
 
THE WORLD BETWEEN US 
The senses are referred to in Mechthild’s writings as the maids and hel-
pers of the soul. She also says that her kingdom is sight, thought, speech, 
hearing and touch (I:46). In contrast to the standard five senses, smell and 
taste are here replaced by thought and speech. I do not think this is a misun-
derstanding, rather it tells us exactly how Mechthild considers sensing, 
namely as a sensible intellect or an intellectual sensibility. Her search for the 
divine is not a spiritual striving beyond or away from sensibility; rather it is 
by means of the senses that she searches for the divine: ‘The person who 
loves truth likes to pray thus: ‘Ah, dear Lord, grant me and help me that I 
always seek you in a holy manner with all my five senses in all things […]’’ 
(VII:15)15 
By means of the senses she can find God within the things and beings of 
the world, but not as a thing or being. This means neither that the transcend-
ing power leaves the senses, nor that only what can be seen or heard is ac-
cepted, rather she claims that the eyes of the soul can move beyond what is 
sensibly present (II:2 and II:3). We could understand this vision of the soul as 
exactly the transcending power where we are no longer bound to the present 
vision, but have a freedom to move within memory, visions of other and of 
fantasy, etc. Through this capacity, the human being can also turn toward the 
structure of sensibility itself and reflect upon this ability. But in Mechthild, 
                                                                                                                                         
14
 ‘Ich enkan noch mag nit schriben, ich sehe es mit den ogen miner sele und hore es mit den 
oren mines ewigen geistes und bevinde in allen liden mines lichamen die kraft des heiligen geistes.’ 
[IV:13] 
15
 ‘Der mensche, der die warheit minnet, der bittet gerne alsus: Eya lieber herre, gonne mir und 
hilf mir, das ich dich ane underlas suche mit allen minen fúnf sinnen in allen dingen heleklich’ [VII:15] 
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such reflection does not lead her to another world, rather she sees the world 
in a new way: 
Then the senses say: ‘Our lady, the soul, has slept since childhood.  
Now she has awakened in the light of open love.’ 
In this light she looks around herself to discover 
Who that is who reveals himself to her, 
And what that is that one is saying to her. 
Thus does she see truly and understand 
How God is all things in all things. (II:19)16 
The enlightened gaze upon the world thus sees the worldly beings not as 
self-sufficient and autonomous, but rather as connected to their groundless 
ground that also goes beyond them and ties them together, i.e. in relation to 
the transcendental and transcendent divine. We can also emphasize the fact 
that in the above extract, it is the senses that tell us what the soul sees. That 
the soul is awakened and sees God could be understood as an event beyond 
sensibility, but since God here is experienced within the things, sensibility is 
still active. Mechthild thus strives for the possibility to see this in all things, 
not only in some specific religious objects such as icons.  
When it is said in one verse that her kingdom of intellectual sensibility 
is threatened by external dangers and must be guarded in order not to be 
victim of the devil, this devilish moment can be understood as the tendency 
to see the beings as independent and without a connection to other things 
and to a ground. In a similar way, Mechthild warns us for greed and lust, 
which can characterize earthly living. Although, in a text that is focused on 
such warnings of the earthly, she concludes with a warning against the oppo-
site, i.e. to leave the world and love only God, as her God says: 
Those who know and love the nobility of my liberty cannot bear to love me on-
ly for my own sake. They must also love me in creatures. Thus do I remain 
what is most close to them in their souls. (VI:4)17 
A theme which is repeated throughout The Flowing Light of Godhead is 
thus the question of how one should love the worldly. This love is intimately 
                                                 
16
 ‘So sprechent die sinne: Únser vrowe, dú sele, hat gesclaffen von kinde; nu ist si erwachet in 
dem liehte der offener minne. In disem liehte sihet si sich al umbe, wie der si, der sich iro wiset, und 
was das si, das man ir zu sprichet. So sieht si werlich und bekennet, wie got ist allú ding in allen din-
gen.’ [II:19] 
17
 ‘Swer die edelkeit miner vriheit bekennet und minnet, der mag des nit erliden, das er mich al-
leine minne dur mich; mere er mus mich minnen in den creaturen; so belibe ich der nehste in siner 
sele.’ [VI:4] 
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connected to sensibility, but a sensibility that is not purely her own. It is not 
only a meeting between herself and the thing sensed, rather it is a meeting 
between herself, the divine and the created: ‘Rather, in the nobility of crea-
tures, in their beauty and usefulness, I shall love God and not myself.’ (VI:5)18 
The givenness of the world goes beyond herself to a larger givenness; what is 
given to a self is connected to a givenness beyond this individual, possible to 
access for others, and even when it is an experience that is not in any detail 
possible to access for other humans, she is not alone in this experience. Gi-
venness always transcends her.  
Mechthild’s position means that she does not stand between the world 
and God in such a way that she either has to turn her back to the beings in 
her search for God, or turn her back to God in her experience of the world. 
Rather she is positioned in such a way that her senses can go through the 
things and beings that are present here and now, towards their presupposi-
tions and interconnections, without objectifying these presuppositions. The 
senses do not have to be directed in one or other of the two opposing direc-
tions, but can embrace both at once. When she experiences the infinite she 
does not transform it into one object among many, but senses it as a central 
aspect of the finite. The change of direction that the awakening soul goes 
through does not include a move from the finite to the infinite, but she is 
directed to the created beings in their direction to God. Or with a more phi-
losophical language: toward the thing in the world in direction to its tran-
scendental, transcending ground through which the thing overflows how it is 
given to me. 
In a similar way she says in a hymn of thanksgiving that such a seeing 
should permeate all our actions. This is pointed out in a text that describes 
how the human being is always united with God, a union that does not take 
place in some distant heaven, but through the receiving of worldly gifts that 
are given to the human beings: 
Then we praise our Lord God with all the gifts that he ever gave us: our body 
and possessions, friends and relatives, and all the earthly joy that we could de-
sire. In so doing we thank God for all his generous gifts that he ever gave us on 
earth for body and soul. Then we are united with God in the love of receiving 
and in humble gratitude. We should thereby press all God’s gifts to our heart. 
Then our heart becomes full of love, our senses are opened, and our soul so 
                                                 
18
 ‘Mere der edelkeit der creaturen, ir schoni und ir nutz – da wil ich got inne meinen und nit 
mich selben.’ [VI:5] 
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resplendent that we look into divine knowledge like someone who sees his own 
countenance in a bright mirror. (VII:7)19 
God, in this instance, names a giving that we cannot control. By opening 
us up for the feeling of gratitude for having a human life, senses are once 
again transformed as they are opened up. The union with God is here a de-
lightful enjoyment of the world. There are also some formulations in Mech-
thild’s text that could be understood in a pantheistic way, as when God says: 
‘I am in myself in all places and in all things, As I always have been eternally.’ 
(II:25)20 God is in himself in the world, i.e. not in himself beyond the world. 
This is not a pantheism that means that God is exhausted in the world 
though, it is more like a panentheism in which God is present in the beings, 
but also exceeds them as their horizon of transcendence. 
This understanding of God and of the presence of God is not just Mech-
thild’s personal experience; it is connected to her choice of life as a beguine. 
Her philosophical position influences her practical life, or the other way 
around; her practical life is expressed in her writings. As a beguine she was 
most probably involved in different social and financial activities in the city, 
since the beguines did not turn their back up the world and isolate them-
selves in a convent. Their relation to the divine went through, or was expe-
rienced within, the rush of the city. Her work in the world was not only an 
act of compassion for the creatures that were stuck in the world, but rather 
an experience of the world as a place where a relation to the divine could be 
established, enjoyed and suffered.  
  
 
SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY 
In a very different text (III:9) Mechthild gives us her version of the crea-
tion. She describes the creation as originating in an erotic desire for the soul, 
                                                 
19
 ‘so loben wir únsern herren got mit allen den gaben, die er úns ie gegab: unsern lip und gut, 
vrunde und mage und alle irdenische wollust, die wir begeren mohten. Hie mitte so danken wir gotte 
aller siner milten gaben, die er uns ie gegab in ertrich an libe oder an sele. Sus sin wir aber mit gotte 
vereinet in annemmelicher liebin und demutiger dankberkeit. Da mitte sollen wir alle gotz gaben in 
únser herze druken. So wirt únser herze minnenvoll, so werdent únser sinne geoffenet und so wirt 
únser sele also clar, das wir sehen in die gotlichen bekantnisse als ein mensche sin antlize besihet in 
eime claren spiegel.’ [VII:7] 
20
 ‘Ich bin in mir selben an allen stetten und in allen dingen als ich ie was sunder beginnen.’ 
[II:25] 
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connected to Eve and Mary. The angels are said to be created as one spirit 
with the Holy Spirit, whereas the human being is created in similarity and 
opposition, as the other to God and as his bride. The human being is, as we 
have seen before, not inferior to the angel, but God’s beloved. The human is 
created in similarity to the humanity of the son, but in otherness to the fa-
ther, as his loved one. In one text God says: ‘I longed for you before the be-
ginning of the world. I long for you and you long for me. Where two burning 
desires meet, there love is perfect.’ (VII:16)21 
From the very beginning he is desire. As in any desire, there is an urge to 
both draw the beloved into oneself, and to keep a distance to the beloved in 
order for her to be herself. Before the fall the soul is God’s spouse and a God-
dess, and the angels are her servants. Through the creation the human being 
passively receives her life, but it immediately leads to the fall. The fall only 
receives attention in passing when God complains about her action saying: 
‘She decided not to remain in my likeness.’ (III:9)22 She was created in differ-
ence to him and in the fall she activates what she passively received, and acts 
out her otherness. 
Even though the Father turns away from her, the Spirit and the Son nev-
er stop loving her, and they decide to save her. The love between the soul and 
the divine is not diminished, but the erotic tension grows through the in-
creased distance. God is in this text desiring and as such demands his beloved 
to be other than himself. The human being takes on this otherness and acti-
vates it, which necessitates the fall. The distance between them is here 
created in two steps, one of passivity and one where the activity that is im-
manent in the passivity is activated. The intertwining of sensuality is here 
formulated in erotic terms. The gap within the net of sensibility is the pre-
supposition for otherness and desire is thus organized through a simultane-
ous similarity and dissimilarity. 
The full erotic meeting, where the worldly senses meet their limit is 
worked out in I:44, one of the most famous verses in The Flowing Light of the 
Godhead. This text is dramatized and mythological, and borrows its form 
from contemporary wedding songs and the poetry of courtly love. The senses 
play a central role in this verse also. The extract begins with the lover (God) 
                                                 
21
 ‘Ich habe din begert e der welte beginne. Ich gere din und du begerest min. Wa zwoi heisse 
begerungen zesamen koment, da ist die minne vollekomen.’ [VII:16] 
22
 ‘Do wolte si mir nit langer glich wesen.’ [III:9]  
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who tries to make contact with his beloved (the soul) and calls for her. The 
first one to hear his calling is the senses. They say to the soul:  
– Lady, you should dress yourself. 
– Dear ones, where am I supposed to be going? 
– We have definitely heard it whispered about that the prince intends to 
come to you in the dew and in the delightful song of the birds. Alas lady, 
do not tarry! (I:44)23 
The calling is not for the senses, but for the soul. But it is the senses that 
are attentive to the calling and they assist her as she gets dressed and puts on 
the shirt of humility, the dress of chastity and the coat of the holy calling. She 
goes to the meeting place where she meets the lover who asks her to dance 
with him. She answers that if he sings to her, her enjoyment will transcend all 
human senses. The meeting with the lover is in this text a journey beyond, or 
über. This has often been understood as a leaving of one place for another. 
But I would rather understand it in relation to the Greek hyper, meaning in-
tensification or deepening. Once the soul has become aware of the divine she 
also realizes the limitation of the senses and their abilities. The divine is in 
the perception, but cannot be experienced in one perception. This amorous 
meeting is an attempt to approach the non-given sides of the divine.  
After dancing, the soul is invited to dinner. She is tired and returns to 
the senses telling them that she needs to rest and cool down. The senses sug-
gest different Christian virtues and strategies through which the soul can rest 
and in which they can take part, but the soul is only satisfied by the erotic 
meeting beyond strategies on chastity, suffering, or wisdom, or positions of 
the saints, the angels, or of the child. But the erotic meeting is also the only 
kind of meeting that would blind the senses. In this meeting the soul finds its 
nature and even though the senses are blinded in this union, one sensation is 
still involved: he burns and he refreshes and this is still felt as she explains to 
the senses: 
– Don’t you believe I feel him intensely?  
He can both burn powerfully and cool consolingly.  
Now don’t be overly sad. 
You shall yet instruct me. 
                                                 
23
 ‘– Vrowe, ir sollent úch kleiden. – Liebe, wa sol ich hin? – Wir han das runen wol 
vernomen, der fúrste wil úch gegen komen in dem in dem towe und in dem schonen vo-
gelsange. Eya vrowe, nu sument nút lange!’ [I:44] 
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When I return, I shall certainly need your advice; 
For the earth is full of snares. (I:44)24 
And with this promise to come back it is time for the most intimate en-
counter: 
– Stay, Lady Soul. 
– What do you bid me, Lord? 
– Take off your clothes. 
– Lord, what will happen to me then? 
– Lady Soul, you are so utterly formed to my nature that not the slightest 
thing can be between you and me. Never was an angel so glorious that to 
him was granted for one hour what is given to you for eternity. And so you 
must cast off from you both fear and shame and all external virtues. Rather, 
those alone that you carry within yourself shall you foster forever. These 
are your noble longing and your boundless desire. These I shall fulfill for-
ever with my limitless lavishness. 
– Lord, now I am a naked soul and you in yourself are a well-adorned God. 
Our shared lot is eternal life without death 
Then a blessed stillness that both desire comes over them. He surrenders him-
self to her, and she surrenders herself to him. What happens to her then – she 
knows – and that is fine with me. But this cannot last long. When two lovers 
meet secretly, they must often part from one another inseparably. (I:44)25 
In this intimate amorous meeting the soul is turned away from all things 
as particular beings and she lays aside all cultural virtues as she removes her 
clothes. She leaves all particularity in order to open up for the one over-
whelming desire and sensation that is the sensation of sensing, and thus 
above (über) the ordinary sense experience to an experience of their presup-
position. This intensification erases all distinctions and makes the multiple 
                                                 
24
 ‘Went ir, das ich nit enpfinde son wol? Er kan beide krefteklichen brennen und trostlichen ku-
len. Nu betrubent úch nit ze sere! Ir sollent mich noch leren. Swenne ich widerkere, so bedarf ich úwer 
lere wol, wan dis ertrich ist maniger strikke vol.’ [I:44] 
25
 ‘“Stant, vrowe sele!” “Was gebútest du, herre?” “Ir sont úch usziehen!” “Herre, wie sol mir den-
ne geschehen?” “Frow sele, ir sint so sere genatúrt in mich, das zwúschent úch und mir nihtes nit mag 
sin. Es enwart nie engel so her, dem das ein stunde wurde gelúhen, das úch eweklich ist gegeben. 
Darumbe sont ir von úch legen beide vorhte und schame und alle uswendig tugent; mer alleine die ir 
binnen úch tragent von nature, der sont ir eweklich vulen. Das ist úwer edele begerunge und úwer 
grundlose girheit; die wil ich eweklich erfúllen mit miner endelosen miltekeit.” “Herre, nu bin ich ein 
nakent sele und du in dir selben ein wolgezieret got. Ùnser zweiger gemeinschaft ist das ewige lip ane 
tot.” So geschihet da ein selig stilli nach ir beider willen. Er gibet sich ir und si git sich ime. Was ir nu 
geschehe, das weis si, und des getroste ich mich. Nu dis mag nit lange stan; wa zwoi geliebe verholen 
zesamen koment, si mussent dike ungescheiden von einander gan.’ 
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perceptions impossible. Only one sensation is still there, the sensation of the 
desire between the two, i.e. the gap between them: a sensation of the sensual 
as such. This also includes a move beyond language and a narrator needs to 
come into the story. But the union between God and the soul is like all other 
erotic unions – temporary. Following this meeting, she will at all times carry 
the sensation of sensibility with her in her body, maybe simply because she 




The body is in many Christian practices what should be disciplined into 
silence and the senses something that should be transcended. In Mechthild’s 
text also the body is sometimes described as a prison. Her solution is not to 
abandon it, but to be more attentive to it, i.e. not to follow its desire toward a 
world of disconnected things and beings, but to go into this desiring struc-
ture of enjoyment and suffering. Such attentiveness means not only to live 
the activity of the sensing body, but also to be attentive to its passivity – how 
its sensitivity is given. Disciplining includes a holding back of the apprehen-
sions in order to find another sensing, a sensing of the sensitivity. One 
should not turn away from the world, nor should one lose oneself in the 
world. The experience of the world should rather be deepened and intensi-
fied, experiencing the interconnectedness and presuppositions of the world.  
The soul that loves the divine and lives in proximity to its own presup-
positions has a body sensitive for transcendence. It is attentive to divine di-
mensions, the non-seen in sensing, eating, suffering, etc. The sensing body as 
the presence of the here and now includes the presence of absence, of desire 
for what is not present, and the possibility to have another future as well as 
to sense differently, noticing new things in the present.  
Sensibility turns out to be the path between the body as an object, as 
static and sensed, and the transcending soul that includes what is not given 
in the present. The soul that speaks in Mechthild’s text should not be unders-
tood in opposition to a body. It is rather a sensing and embodied soul, just as 
her sensing is an intellectual sensing. In this way the lived body is present 
and activated, and its experiences are intensified in the soul’s journey to God. 
Finally in the erotic encounter, the tension field, gap and desire between the 
soul as sensed sensing and her God as (anonymous) sensing beyond sensing, 
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1. TRANSCENDENCE AND THE BODY 
By analysing a primary 13th-century religious text by the Christian mystic 
Mechtild von Magdeburg, Jonna Bornemark wants to arrive at a different 
view of the relation between transcendence and the body from the current 
one. Usually, the body and the self – insofar as it is associated with the body – 
are seen as things that should be left behind in the transcending relation to 
God (26). Bornemark wants to combine the good of the phenomenological 
tradition that is characterized by its thorough attention for the body with the 
insights from Mechtild’s text in which embodiment and sensibility are given 
a different role with respect to transcending. Thus, she also aims to compen-
sate for the notable lack of positive attention for the body in phenomenologi-
cal accounts of religion. Her general goal is to arrive at ‘a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the relation between transcendence and embodiment’ (30). 
The issue at stake in this session is thus the question: How can paying 
attention to the embodied character of religion contribute to a better, or 
‘more nuanced,’ understanding of religion? The flipside of embodied religion, 
i.e. that it may give rise to a critical rethinking of religious notions of freedom 
and responsibility, and the unique position of the human being based on it 
will be taken up in later sessions. According to Bornemark, the better under-
standing of religion that results from analysing an embodied religious per-
spective consists primarily in the fact that transcendence and the body are 
not played off against each other. The senses give access to the divine. But it 
takes effort to comprehend how this is possible. The mainstream understand-
ing of religion has not incorporated this idea of transcendence, not even 
when it was as attentive to embodiment as phenomenology and existential 
philosophy are. In spite of the importance of their ‘connecting the divine 
closely to the human capacity for transcendence and its transcendental pre-
suppositions,’ these approaches finally led to the ‘further narrowing down 
[of] the understanding of the body and the place of embodiment’ (30). There-
fore, it is necessary to tap other, non-mainstream, sources of religious reflec-
tion outside the philosophical canon, in particular those of female mystics 
like Mechtild von Magdeburg. They are not part of the official religious canon 
either. Because of their positive evaluation of the senses in relating to God, 
they aroused suspicion in the eyes of other mystics (27–28). Bornemark deals 
with a ‘suspicious’ text of this kind. 
This investigation of embodied religion ‘via the text’ is not self-evident 
among current critics of the mainstream spiritual understanding of religion. 
In the words of Manuel Vásquez, who recently launched a ‘materialist theory 
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of religion’ that has met with appreciation, modern hermeneutics has ‘despite 
giving us indispensable insights into the situatedness of the process of inter-
pretation and the materiality of texts, tended to reduce all human activity to 
the production and transmission of meaning. The result has been a suffocat-
ing textualism that approaches religions as essentially systems of symbols, 
beliefs, narratives, and cosmologies, ignoring other important material di-
mensions of religious life.’1 The idealist appropriation of phenomenology and 
modern hermeneutics are identified as the culprits of this focus. This criti-
cism on the one hand and Bornemark’s approach – to which I am very sym-
pathetic – of turning quite self-evidently to a primary religious text on the 
other induced me to try out another approach in this paper ‘via the text.’ I 
will also turn to a primary religious text that is not considered to be a phi-
losophical text as such. My use of this text is occasioned not so much through 
my dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the phenomenological tradition, 
but through the fact that I am a theologian shaped by a hermeneutical recog-
nition of the vital role of such texts in understanding religion. In particular, 
my starting point is the wager found in Paul Ricoeur’s early work to nourish 
reflection on religion by turning to primary religious texts. He suggests that 
these are closer to religious experience than the speculative ones of philoso-
phy and theology.2 In a Western context, the symbols and myths of the an-
cient Near East and Greece and, in particular the Bible, are primary texts of 
this kind because they are formative sources of Western reflection. 
When looking for a biblical text in which embodiment is somehow 
prominent, I decided to turn to a text that may also shed light on the ques-
tion why it has apparently always (Bornemark refers to the Neo-Platonic Tra-
dition) been difficult to think religion and the body together. Bornemark 
points to the tension between transcendence and the body to understand this 
difficulty. Religion is concerned with transcendence, the spirit or the soul, 
and the possibility of going beyond the givenness of the bodily. Especially in 
                                                 
1
 Manuel A. Vásquez, More than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford 2011), 12, cf. 15 
and chapter 8. 
2
 ‘Speculation / speculative’ is used by Ricoeur as a technical term that refers to reflection as 
found in philosophy or theology, as distinct from more literary forms of reflection as found in symbols 
and myths of evil (L’homme faillible, 10–11; La symbolique du mal, 168–169 (Paris 1988
2
, first edition 
1960)). The philosophical value of pre-philosophical expressions, in the form of the ‘pathétique of mis-
ery’, is something that Ricœur already recognised in L’homme faillible (21–34): philosophical reflection 
cannot equal it in depth. Nevertheless, reflection is necessary for bringing clarification and coherence 
to the darkness and complexity of the pre-philosophical expressions. Cf. my chapter on Ricoeur in: 
Petruschka Schaafsma, Reconsidering Evil: Confronting Reflections with Confessions (Leuven 2006).  
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phenomenology and existential philosophy, this tendency to associate relig-
ion entirely with the capacity for bodiless transcendence is massive (26, 29–
30). But is this simply to be understood as a one-sidedness, which can be ex-
plained at least to a certain extent by the male character of this philosophy 
(26–27)? I am in complete agreement with the project to investigate margin-
alised voices like those of female mystics who reveal a different kind of reflec-
tion and may thus open up new ways of understanding. But I am also inter-
ested in the light these marginalised voices may shed on why the body would 
cause religion trouble. Does the problem lie in not knowing if we can trust 
our senses, as emphasised in the criticism of dependence ‘on the senses’ ar-
ticulated by Meister Eckhardt and Johannes Tauler that Bornemark cites, i.e., 
their question of how we know if the mystical vision comes ‘from the devil 
rather than from the divine’ (28)? I want to incorporate this issue of the diffi-
culty with the body in religion3 by turning to the book of Hosea. In this text, 
the embodied character of religion seems obvious: Hosea has to live the rela-
tionship between God and Israel by marrying a prostitute. This book has tra-
ditionally been interpreted as dealing with the problematic character of the 
body for religion in the concrete form of a religious cult of bodily fertility as 
opposed to the true ethical religion of the Israelite God of the Covenant. 




2. MOTIVES OF EMBODIED RELIGION IN HOSEA 
In what sense do we encounter elements of an embodied religion in Ho-
sea? Obviously, in a quite unusual sense that may immediately confuse the 
reader: God tells Hosea to marry a prostitute or adulterous wife and have 
children with her. This divine command has been a stumbling block for exe-
getes of all ages. How can God ask such an obviously immoral or nonsensical 
                                                 
3
 Bornemark hints at this issue when pointing out that, in Mechtild’s text, the love of the worldly 
is connected to sensibility but sensibility ‘that is not purely her own.’ The way one should love the 
worldly is not just in ‘a meeting between herself and the thing sensed, rather it is a meeting between 
herself, the divine and the created’ (41). Also, Mechtild’s thoughts on the ‘prison character’ of the body 
relate to this topic. Mechtild does not deny this problematic character of the body but she does not 
seek the solution in transcendence as abandonment of ‘the presuppositions of the sensing body.’ 
Rather, she seeks it in being more attentive to them (44–45). This means a disciplined holding back of 
the direct sensing, the ‘apprehensions,’ to arrive at ‘another sensing.’ It does not ‘turn away from the 
world’ but neither does it ‘lose itself in the world.’ Rather it deepens and intensifies the experience of 
the world by ‘experiencing the interconnectedness and presuppositions of the world’ (46). 
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thing from his prophet? As self-evident as this question may be – in our con-
text of discussing embodied religion as well – I do not want to start with it. 
The supposedly immoral or nonsensical character of the divine command 
should not outweigh the basic fact that the relationship between God and the 
people of Israel is presented as bodily: one between husband and wife, an 
erotic relationship of faithfulness to a partner. This general sense of embodi-
ment is of course immediately accentuated by the issue of adultery, which 
implies a more specific embodiment related to sexuality and procreation. But 
the meaning of this unfaithfulness can be interpreted only in relation to the 
meaning of the embodied relationship as such. I will thus start with the lat-
ter. 
 
2.1 THE MARRIAGE 
The relationship is introduced immediately at the beginning. The first 
verse introduces Hosea as the one to whom the ‘word of the Lord’ came. In 
the second verse God4 tells him to take for himself an ’ēšet zenûmîm (znh/ 
 ’a ‘woman of fornications’ and yaldê zenûmîm, ‘children of fornications ,(זנה
(znh / hnz).5 The reason is revealed in the same verse: ‘for fornicating the land 
fornicates, away from behind the Lord.’ The Hebrew root znh / hnz is used 
four times in this verse. Znh / hnz means to commit adultery or fornication in 
the sense of being unfaithful in a marriage, but also in the sense of prostitu-
tion or being a harlot. It is often used in the Bible, especially in Isaiah, 
Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, to indicate Israel’s apostasy and unfaithfulness.6 The 
                                                 
4
 I will refer to the Tetragrammaton by the word ‘God’ and not, e.g. by the term LORD or Yahweh 
because it fits the style of a reflection on embodied religion within the context of philosophy of religion 
where the focus is on biblical religion.  
5
 I take this translation woman and children of ‘fornications’ from Alice Keefe’s study on Hosea; 
Koehler/ Baumgartner’s Lexicon translates ‘fornication.’ Keefe argues that fornication should be distin-
guished from prostitution. Prostitution was a ‘legal and tolerated activity in ancient Israel.’ The fornica-
tion of a woman in the sense of a wife, however, implied a rupture of the social order. Although there 
are also references to ‘professional prostitution’ in Hosea, the term’s translation by ‘fornication’ empha-
sises its unique character in the Bible, which indicates that it does not simply refer to a prostitute (Alice 
A. Keefe, Woman’s Body and the Social Body in Hosea (Sheffield 2001), especially 19–21, where she refers 
to Phyllis Bird for this translation). Cf. my remarks the text above. 
6
 On the specific designation in Hos.1:2 of the ‘land,’ in distinction to Israel, as fornicating, cf. 
Emmanuel O. Nwaoru, Imagery in the Prophecy of Hosea, Ägypten und Altes Testament (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz 1999) 145–146. Nwaoru regards it as ‘prolegomena to the husband-wife metaphor in Hosea 
2,’ where Israel is presented as a ‘harlotrous wife and mother.’ He distinguishes between the unfaithful-
ness of Israel as land, wife/mother, and children without indicating the possible distinction in meaning. 
This corresponds to Kathrin Keita’s remark that the wife, children and land in Hos. 1–2 are related in a 
‘semantischen Beziehungsgeflecht, das kaum zu entwirren ist.’ The meaning of the one cannot be de-
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combination ‘woman of fornications’ and that of ‘children of fornications’ is 
found only in Hosea, however. Placed in immediate succession, they form an 
even more remarkable expression and are not simply the usual designations 
of prostitution. The terms are not elucidated in the text, however. The text 
continues by narrating how Hosea obeyed the divine command: he marries 
Gomer, the daughter of Diblaim. Then God gives further instructions on the 
naming of the ‘children of fornications’ to which Gomer gives birth. The first 
is called Jezreel because God will punish the house of Jehu for the massacre at 
Jezreel (1:4). The second is called Lo-Ruhamah, which means: God ‘will no 
longer show love to Israel’ (1:6). The third is called Lo-Ammi, ‘for you are not 
my people’ (1:9). The names thus reveal God’s reaction to the fornications of 
Israel: punishment, no compassion, deeming them no longer God’s people. 
The relationship between God and Israel is declared to be terminated. But 
the text suddenly continues by painting a different time of salvation that will 
come in which the situation indicated by the children’s names will be in-
verted (2:1–3).7  
While the first chapter of the book indicates the unfaithful behaviour of 
‘the land’ , God’s reaction of turning away from his people, and the promise 
of a reversal of this punishment in a general sense, the second chapter speci-
fies these elements and may thus provide more material for understanding 
the embodied character of the relation between God and Israel. The theme of 
fornication returns in the later chapters, but it is not directly related to Ho-
sea’s marriage to Gomer and the children born of that union. Therefore, I will 
concentrate on the second chapter (the passage from verse 4 onwards) and 
relate it to similar passages in the rest of the book.8 The passage starts with a 
                                                                                                                                         
termined without referring to the meaning of the other (Katrin Keita, Gottes Land: Exegetische Studien 
zur Land-Thematik im Hoseabuch in kanonischer Perspektive (Hildesheim 2007), 55–56). 
7
 The numbering of the verses of Hos. 2 varies among the translations. I am using the the New 
International Version but refer to the numbering of the verses used in the Hebrew Bible (Stuttgarten-
sia). In the Hebrew Bible, chapter 2 starts two verses earlier than in the NIV. Chapter 14 starts in the 
NIV in the last verse of chapter 13 in the Hebrew version.  
8
 Hos. 1–3 are usually distinguished from chapters 4–14, although opinions vary on the question 
of whether it is a textual unity. For example, according to Jörg Jeremias Hos. 1–3 is a thematic collec-
tion, whereas 4–14 is a unity. As a result, the obscure chapters of Hos. 1–3 should be interpreted on the 
basis of the much more unequivocal chapters 4–14 (Jörg Jeremias, Der Prophet Hosea (Göttingen 1983), 
7). Gerald Morris investigates verbal repetition in Hosea and concludes that many verbs and combina-
tions found in Hos. 1–3 recur in the rest of the chapters. He argues therefore that Hos. 1–3 ‘act as an 
introduction to the book. Pattern after pattern is introduced in these chapters, sometimes even tempo-
rarily resolved, fore-shadowing the pattern that the word or words will take in the remaining chapters’ 
(Gerald Morris, Prophecy, Poetry and Hosea (Sheffield 1996), 114–115). Hos. 14 serves as a conclusion in 
which many words from the introduction recur.  
THE EMBODIED CHARACTER OF ‘ACKNOWLEDGING GOD’: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSCENDENCE AND EMBODIMENT  
53 
 
divine address opening with the call: ‘Rebuke your mother, rebuke her, for 
she is not my wife, and I am not her husband’ (2:4). The mother is sum-
moned to do away with her fornications under threat of harsh reprisals: being 
stripped naked and dying of thirst like a desert, or a parched land (2:5). The 
following verses elaborate further on what the fornication consists in. Three 
main motives can be distinguished that elucidate the relationship between 
God and Israel.  
1. In one of the rare passages in which Gomer, Hosea’s wife, is presented 
as speaking – albeit in the account of God – her unfaithfulness is made speci-
fic: ‘She said, “I will go after my lovers, who give me my food and my water, 
my wool and my linen, my olive oil and my drink”’ (Hos. 2:7). God will there-
fore block her path and wall her in, so that she cannot reach her lovers any-
more. Then, the unfaithfulness is stated explicitly once more in the same 
terms, when God says: ‘She has not acknowledged that I was the one who 
gave her the grain, the new wine and oil, who lavished on her the silver and 
gold – which they used for Baal’ (Hos. 2:10). The punishment corresponds to 
the betrayal. God says: ‘Therefore I will take away my grain when it ripens, 
and my new wine when it is ready. I will take back my wool and my linen, 
intended to cover her naked body’ (Hos. 2:9). ‘I will ruin her vines and her fig 
trees, which she said were her pay from her lovers; I will make them a 
thicket, and wild animals will devour them’ (Hos. 2:13). It reminds one of the 
earlier announcement of God’s judgement to make Gomer ‘like a desert, turn 
her into a parched land, and slay her with thirst’ (2:5). The unfaithfulness is 
thus specified as a denial of the true source of the wealth and sustenance a 
woman experiences in her marriage, especially in the basic, daily form of 
food, drink, and clothing, which includes a good harvest and agricultural 
thriving. 
In the depiction of the restoration of the marriage one also finds refer-
ences to this wealth and sustenance bestowed on her. As a result of her being 
unable to reach her lovers anymore, Gomer will say ‘I will go back to my hus-
band as at first, for then I was better off than now’(2:9; italics mine). The re-
newal of the marriage is subsequently painted as resulting from an act of al-
lurement by God who will lead the woman into the desert (2:16), not to pun-
ish her (cf. 2:5) but to give her back her vineyards (2:17)9 – another act in the 
                                                 
9
 In Hos. 9,10 and 13,5 the word ‘desert’ or ‘wilderness’ (midbar/ rbdm) also occurs, now as the 
place where Israel is ‘found’ and ‘known/ cared for’ by God. According to Keita, ‘desert’ functions in 
Hosea as a counterpart to the fertility of the cultivated land. In the days of its living in the desert, Israel 
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same area of being nourished by God. This continues a few verses later: ‘“In 
that day I will respond,” declares the LORD – “I will respond to the skies, and 
they will respond to the earth; and the earth will respond to the grain, the 
new wine and the olive oil, and they will respond to Jezreel. I will plant her 
for myself in the land”’ (2:23–25a; cf. 2:10). In the rest of the book of Hosea, 
the situation of the people of Israel at the start of its being called from Egypt, 
the announcement of God’s punishment for their unfaithfulness, and the re-
newed relationship are often depicted in terms of agricultural thriving or 
withering, and Israel being like fruit, or no longer yielding fruit, or flourish-
ing again like the grain and the vine, the blossoming lilies and the cedars 
with their roots and young shoots (14:5–7).10 Moreover, even God is seen as 
part of this natural prosperity: ‘I am like a flourishing juniper; your fruitful-
ness comes from me’ (14:9b).11 
This motif in the depiction of the relationship between God and his 
people in Hosea reminds some exegetes of the creation stories of Genesis 1–
3.12 I will not go into the different theories here on the age of and dependency 
relations between Hosea and Genesis 1–3, but it is argued that a common 
creation tradition underlies both. This tradition brings together many of the 
elements just mentioned. In the second chapter of Hosea, elements reminis-
cent of this tradition are the participation of the animals and plants in God’s 
punishment of Israel and in the renewal of the relationship. Animals can con-
stitute a danger, and vegetation can be sparse in Israel if God decrees that it 
shall be so. But God also announces the time in which ‘I will make a covenant 
for them [Israel] with the beasts of the field, the birds in the sky and the crea-
tures that move along the ground’ (2:20), which is also the time of the flour-
ishing of agriculture and nature in general that was just mentioned.13 Simi-
                                                                                                                                         
had to rely entirely on the care of God. Similarly, Israel will be led back to the desert (Hos. 2:16; 12:10) to 
break in on its current craving for the fertile land. Thus, God will also start a new begin in the land 
(Keita, Gottes Land, 242–243). 
10
 Other passages in which Israel is depicted as (bearing) fruit are Hos 9:10,16; 10:1,12–13; 14:6–9.  
11
 For the depiction of the situation of the restored or renewed relationship, the phrase of God as 
‘responding’ (‘nh/ hn() as used in 2:23–24 returns in 14:9a. 
12
 Cf. Keita, Gottes Land, 306, who refers to many other exegetes. Stefan Paas (Creation and 
Judgement: Creation Texts in Some Eighth Century Prophets (Leiden 2003)) also goes into the ‘creation 
texts’ and ‘motifs’ in Hosea but does not focus on the parallels with Gen. 1–3. Rather, he aims at a 
broader definition of creation, starting from ‘recognised creation texts such as Genesis 1 and 2.’ In rela-
tion to Hosea, he goes into the ‘creation texts’ on Israel as ‘forgetting their Maker’ (8:14), and a LXX 
insertion in 13:4 on ‘God as creator of heavens and earth’ and the ‘creation motifs’ in Hos. 6:2 (revival 
and restoration) and 11:1 (calling out of Egypt, cf. my main text below).  
13
 M. DeRoche (referring to J.L. Mays) points out that this is ‘a reversal of the oracle of punish-
ment in Hos. 2,14’ (M. Deroche, ‘The Reversal of Creation in Hosea,’ Vetus Testamentum 31/4 (1981), 
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larly, in the garden of Eden, the animals are placed under the dominion of 
human beings (Gen. 1:28), and all vegetation of the earth is given to them as 
food (1:29). Moreover, as DeRoche (406) points out, like Hos. 2:14 and 20, 
Gen. 1:29–30 ‘deals with the relationship between the food supply of man, and 
that of the beasts.’ In the passage in Genesis, this relationship is harmonious, 
while in Hos 2:14 animals constitute a danger. The covenant in Hos. 2:20 puts 
an end to this danger and thus depicts a ‘return to the state of harmony that 
existed between man and the beasts at the time of creation (cf. Isa. 11,6–9)’ 
(DeRoche, 407). After the expulsion from Eden, this harmony is at least 
partly disturbed: the earth would ‘produce thorns and thistles’ for them and 
they would ‘eat the plants of the field’ (3:18). The combination ‘thorns and 
thistles’ is found in the Bible only in the Gen. 3 passage and in Hos. 10:8: ‘The 
high places of wickedness will be destroyed – it is the sin of Israel. Thorns 
and thistles will grow up and cover their altars. Then they will say to the 
mountains, “Cover us!” and to the hills, “Fall on us!”.’14 The theme of naked-
ness and being clothed as expressions of God’s taking care of and punishing 
Adam and Eve and Israel is also found in Gen 2–3 and Hosea.15 A general cor-
respondence, finally, is that the betrayal of and conflict with God is put in the 
setting of a husband-wife relationship.16 One could even perhaps compare 
Gomer to Eve as the one who bears the most guilt for the betrayal.17  
                                                                                                                                         
400–409, 406). Hos. 4:3 contains a counterview to the thriving of the land and the animals, with partly 
the same phrases as in Hos. 2:20: because there is no acknowledgment of God but only sins – that re-
mind of the Decalogue, i.e., cursing, lying, murder, stealing, adultery – ‘the land dries up, and all who 
live in it waste away; the beasts of the field, the birds in the sky and the fish in the sea are swept away.’ 
DeRoche (403) argues that Hos. 4:3 is the announcement of the reversal of creation: the order of the 
words ‘the beasts of the field, the birds in the sky and the fish in the sea’ is precisely the reversal of the 
order in which they are mentioned at creation (Gen 1:20, 24) and being placed under the dominion of 
human beings (Gen 1:26, 28). They represent the three spheres of the ‘animal kingdom’ and the prophet 
thus announces ‘a total destruction’ (just like the parallel text in Zeph. 1:2–3 where the same verb jsp / 
Psjy is used).  
14
 Cf. Hos. 9:6 in which the plants also are a danger: ‘Their treasures of silver will be taken over 
by briers [brier roses], and thorns will overrun their tents.’ The unique occurrence of ‘thorns and this-
tles’ in Genesis and Hosea seems to me the only real textual ‘proof’ of any relation to the creation sto-
ries in Genesis, but Keita does not indicate this. 
15
 Hos. 2:5, 11–12. Cf. Keita, Gottes Land, 319. 
16
 Keita regards the relations between Hos. 1–2 and Gen. 3 as the most substantial and striking 
ones. Apart from the aspects mentioned so far, Keita lists other points that are, in my view, less obvious 
(319–320): – punishment in the form of spatial removal from God in Hos. 2:8 and Gen. 3:23–24 as well as 
the idea of an enclosed garden that cannot be entered; – the use of the verb grsh / #$rg, expel in Hos. 
9:15 and Gen 3:24 which also has a parallel meaning: expulsion because of betrayal of God, a meaning 
that, according to Keita, is not found elsewhere in the Bible (it is only used for the expulsion of Canaan-
ite people in favour of Israel; cf. also p. 328); the ‘you will call me “my husband”; you will no longer call 
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This first interpretive motif, or thematic group of motifs, thus relates the 
unfaithfulness of the wife to the refusal to acknowledge who it is who pro-
vides her with food, drink, and clothing: the Lord, who is like the rains that 
water the earth, and like dew.18 Israel turns to other providers, and God 
therefore punishes them by taking the harvest back, and ‘my wool and linen.’ 
But Hosea also announces the restoration of the marriage that consists in 
acknowledging God. This situation is painted as a thriving of the land and a 
flourishing of nature in which the people of Israel take part. The reminis-
cence of Gen. 1–3 confirms the idea that the relationship between God and 
human beings is not unrelated to the flourishing of nature and the produce 
of the land, and the danger posed by animals. This motif is the most elabo-
rate interpretation of Israel’s fornications, at least in Hos. 1–3, with parallels 
in the other chapters.  
2. Other interpretive motifs of Israel’s unfaithfulness are far less substan-
tial. One finds a few references in the first three chapters to something like a 
‘wrong cult.’ We just referred to ‘the silver and gold – which they used for 
Baal’ (Hos. 2:10), which seems to refer to the making of idols.19 Another verse 
specifies the punishment of the wife/mother as stopping her celebrations, 
festivals, her New Moons, her Sabbath days (Hos. 2:13). This reference to the 
religious cult is related in the following verse again to the ruining of the ‘vine 
and fig tree.’ Subsequently, the wife/mother is accused of burning incense to 
                                                                                                                                         
me “my master”’ (Hos 2:18) seems to be a revocation of the ruling of the husband over the wife in Gen. 
3:16, and a parallel to Gen. 2:23 (The man said, ‘This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she 
shall be called “woman,” for she was taken out of man.’ Keita, 305–306 quoting Frey and Hauret). Paral-
lels with Gen. 2 that Keita mentions are: Hos. 2:17, which deals, just like Gen. 2:8,15 with the human 
beings as being placed by God in a garden/land; Hos. 2:25 as parallel to Gen. 2:7–8 (3:19): the human 
being as created by God from dust/ground corresponds to God as the sower who sows Israel in the land 
(Keita, Gottes Land, 318). Cf. also Keita, Gottes Land, 330–331 on the dating of Gen. 2 before the return 
from the exile in 525 BCE. 
17
 This may seem a very tentative conclusion that is based on the (Christian) reception history of 
the Genesis story as viewing the woman as the source of evil. However, as Yvonne Sherwood points out, 
a possible underpinning for this connection may be seen in a 13th century Bible manuscript in which 
Hosea and Gomer are depicted holding each other’s arms. Gomer is decorated with a garland ending in 
a snake’s head (Yvonne Sherwood, The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea's Marriage in Literary-
Theoretical Perspective (Sheffield 1996), 67–69). 
18
 Cf. Hos. 6:3: ‘Let us acknowledge the LORD; let us press on to acknowledge him. As surely as 
the sun rises, he will appear; he will come to us like the winter rains, like the spring rains that water the 
earth.’ and Hos. 14,5: ‘I will be like the dew to Israel’; cf. also Hos. 10:12b: ‘for it is time to seek the LORD, 
until he comes and showers his righteousness on you.’ 
19
 Cf. Hos. 8:4: ‘With their silver and gold they make idols for themselves to their own destruc-
tion.’ and Hos. 13: 2: ‘Now they sin more and more; they make idols for themselves from their silver, 
cleverly fashioned images, all of them the work of craftsmen.’  
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the Baals, decking herself with rings and jewellery, pursuing her lovers, and 
forgetting her God (2:15). Another verse announces that God ‘will remove the 
names of the Baals from her lips; no longer will their names be invoked’ 
(2:19). I will come back to the meaning of these Baals and a possible Baal cult 
below. 
3. A third motif in the specification of Israel’s infidelity contains refer-
ences to war, justice, and ‘international politics.’ In the depiction of the re-
stored marriage the making of a covenant with the animals is followed by the 
announcement: ‘Bow and sword and battle I will abolish from the land, so 
that all may lie down in safety. I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth 
you in/with righteousness and justice, in/with love and compassion. I will 
betroth you in/with faithfulness, and you will acknowledge the LORD’ (2:20b–
22). More explicit references to war and politics are found in the later chap-
ters.20 Israel, or Ephraim, is accused of seeking an alliance with Assyria and 
Egypt (5:13; 7:8–9, 11; 12:2; less prominent in 8:9; 9:3), which will lead to its 
fall.21 It is obvious that this turning to the superpowers implies infidelity to-
ward God who led Israel out of Egypt. Israel is reminded explicitly of its exo-
dus tradition (2:15; 11:1; 12:9, 13; 13:4) and is warned about a ‘return to Egypt’ 
(8:13; 9:3, (6); 11:5).  
Thus, we may identify at least three lines or motifs of interpretation of 
Israel’s fornications. The first one is most extensive and therefore difficult to 
indicate via a single term. It has to do with the fault of failing to acknowledge 
God as the true source of everyday sustenance, and agricultural thriving and 
flourishing of nature. The second relates Israel’s unfaithfulness to cultic prac-
tices, and the third to Israel’s defeat in wars and its seeking alliances with the 
foreign superpowers Assyria and Egypt. The link with Gen 1–3 adds to the 
idea that the setting in which the conflict between the believers and God is 
placed is meaningful, i.e., the setting of a relationship between man and 
woman marked by infidelity.  
 
                                                 
20
 The second and third motif may go together, as in Hos. 14:3, where Israel is urged to say to 
God: ‘Assyria cannot save us; we will not mount warhorses. We will never again say “Our gods” to what 
our own hands have made, for in you the fatherless find compassion.’ 
21
 Keefe (Woman’s Body, 16–17, 211) notes that many of the atrocities of war that will befall Israel 
are depicted in terms of maternal bereavement, loss of female fertility, and death of mothers and chil-
dren (4:5; 9:11–12, 14; 10:14; 14:1). She concludes: ‘Clearly there is some resonance between these images 
of bereaved maternity, sterility and illegitimate children on one hand, and the metaphoric complex of 
the wayward mother and her rejected children of Hos. 1–2 on the other’ (17). 
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2.2 THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
The husband-wife relationship, however, is not the only setting for de-
scribing Israel’s disloyalty. The well-known passage of Hos. 11 depicts the re-
lationship between God and Israel as a parent-child relationship.22 When 
reading it after our analysis starting from chapter 2, however, this setting 
seems to show many similarities to the husband-wife (and children) setting. 
Yet the tone of the opening passage, which is resumed at the end of the chap-
ter, differs: it reflects a warm, personal relationship of love.23 God says: ‘When 
Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son.’ (11:1).24 Many 
exegetes point to the central role of ‘love’ (’hb / bh)) in this chapter. It is pre-
sented first of all as lying at the foundation of the relationship between God 
and the people, and thus also of their identity as a people ‘called out of 
Egypt.’ In the following verses, the ‘upbringing’ of Israel is depicted in 
phrases of affectionate, bodily love of a parent for its child:25 God teaches Is-
rael to walk ‘taking him by the arms’ (11:3) and leads him with ‘cords of hu-
man kindness,’ with ‘ties of love’ (11:4a). ‘To them I was like one who lifts a 
little child to the cheek’ (11:4b). The love also meant that God ‘bent down to 
                                                 
22
 This does not mean that the ‘parental model’ is the only one present in this chapter, as Eidevall 
argues, against the ‘consensus view’ (Göran Eidevall, Grapes in the Desert: Metaphors, Models, and 
Themes in Hosea 4–14 (Stockholm 1996). On the other hand, Eidevall’s conclusion (183) that the com-
plementarity of the different models present in Hos. 11 underscores the view that the central theological 
significance of this passage consists in relativising all models for the divine and the deity-people rela-
tionship lacks foundations in this text, in which the parental relationship is obviously most important. 
23
 This love for Israel is also mentioned in Hos. 3:1, but then in the context of the husband-wife 
relationship: ‘The LORD said to me, “Go, show your love to your wife again, though she is loved by an-
other man and is an adulteress. Love her as the LORD loves the Israelites, though they turn to other 
gods and love the sacred raisin cakes.”’ 
24
 Hos. 2:1 announces that the Israelites (b
e
ne-jisrael) will be called children of the living God/El 
(b
e
ne el-chi), which is contrasted to ‘not my people,’ Lo-Ammi, the name of Gomer’s third child. The 
fact that the children are already mentioned together with the mother in chapter 1 as embodying Israel 
indicates that the marriage relation is more often than only in Hosea 11 linked to the parental relation, 
which is why it seems better to speak not just of a ‘marriage’ image but of a family image. Cf. Keefe, 
Woman’s Body, e.g., 12, 15. 
25
 Several exegetes point out the human character of the depiction of the parental love: it is not 
some kind of divine family that is presented here (cf. Brigitte Seifert, Metaphorisches Reden von Gott im 
Hoseabuch (Göttingen 1996), 212–213; Nwaoru, Imagery in the Prophecy of Hosea, 108–109.) It is dis-
puted among exegetes if the self-evident interpretation of the parent in Hos. 11 as a father is correct, as 
the expression may seem quite maternal (cf. Keefe, Woman’s Body, 17, n.16; Seifert, Metaphorisches 
Reden, 198–201; Eidevall, Grapes in the Desert, 167). This discussion seems to be inspired more by cur-
rent conceptions of father and mother roles than by the Hosea text, and the conclusion seems correct 
that this was not Hosea’s problem (Seifert, Metaphorisches Reden, 201). At most, one may note that 
Hosea’s depiction of the parental love is not gendered, while this could easily have been done (Seifert, 
Metaphorisches Reden, 200).  
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feed them’ (11:4b), which recalls the depiction of God as the provider of daily 
needs in the second chapter. This reminiscence is also found in the account 
of Israel’s rejective response to God’s love. This response shows a threefold 
distinction similar to the three motifs indicated above: (1) not acknowledging 
(jd‘ / (dy) who ‘healed them’ (11:3); (2) cultic betrayal (sacrificing to the Baals 
and burning incense to images, 11:2); (3) political adultery (‘Will they not re-
turn to Egypt and will not Assyria rule over them because they refuse to re-
pent?’ 11:5).26 In what follows God first announces his wrath, but then resists 
expressing it because of compassion, repentance, or self-control (11:8b),27 ‘For 
I am God, and not a man – the Holy One among you’ (11:9). Then Israel’s re-
turn from Egypt and Assyria – ‘trembling like sparrows’ – is foretold; God ‘will 
settle them in their homes’ (11:11). Thus, the emphasis in this passage is on 
God’s love for Israel in spite of Israel’s going away. It is expressed in a very 
personal, loving relationship that is unbreakable (‘How can I give you up, 
Ephraim? How can I hand you over Israel?’ 11:8a). Again, Israel’s fault is that 
it does not acknowledge their God – who has called them out of Egypt, gave 
them loving support, healed and fed them –  but turns to other gods (Baals) 
and other powers (Assyria and Egypt).  
 
2.3 ACKNOWLEDGING GOD 
In the whole of Hosea the element of not ‘acknowledging’ God returns 
as a kind of summary of Israel’s fornication.28 The Hebrew root jd‘ / (dy indi-
                                                 
26
 Seifert (Metaphorisches Reden, 212) also arrives at this threefold characterisation of Israel’s re-
action in Hos. 11, which she, moreover, relates to other chapters of Hosea. She summarises the central 
problem of Israel’s behaviour as presented here as ‘Liebe die ins Leere geht,’ which recalls the tenor of 
Hos. 2:4ff and 3:1, although anger prevails in these verses, while grief is dominant in Hos. 11 (Seifert, 
Metaphorisches Reden, 215). 
27
 According to Jeremias (Der Prophet Hosea, 145) the verb hpk / Kph ‘overthrow’ should not be 
interpreted as ‘Reue,’ and in particular not as ‘Mitleid’ because this conceals that what is at stake here is 
a ‘Willenswandel … die Rücknahme einer zuvor gehegten Absicht,’ i.e. of God’s justified wrath. The 
verse is about ‘Selbstbeherrschung,’ which is grounded only in God, not in Israel’s behaviour. Note the 
contrast between the human depiction of the love (cf. note 26 above) and this emphasis on ‘being God, 
not a man.’ 
28
 Several exegetes note the central role of this term in Hosea. Jeremias regards it as ‘eines der 
zentrale Stichworte der Theologie Hoseas, das besonders in Kap. 4 eine tragende Rolle spielt’ (Der 
Prophet Hosea, 44). The object of this knowledge is, according to Jeremias, ‘wesenhaft die Geschichte 
Gottes mit Israel und der Wille Gottes.’ According to W. Schottroff, it is a ‘Schlüsselbegriff der prophe-
tischen Verkündiging’ in Hosea and Jeremiah (lemma jd‘ / erkennen, in: Jenni and Westermann, The-
ologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament, (Munich/Zurich 1984), 682–701, in particular 695–
697). Schottroff suggests, primarily on the basis of Hos. 4:6 (and parallel texts in Jer. 2,8; 28,9 and oth-
ers), that it may refer to ‘das priesterliche Berufswissen … dass … als gegenwärtiges Wissen jah-
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cates knowing, understanding, acknowledging, realizing, noticing, and here 
mostly has as its object God (2:6.18; 4:1; 5:4; 6:3.6; 8:2; 11:3; 13:4). The first line 
of interpretation indicated above, in which the word also appears for the first 
time in Hosea, is illuminating as to the meaning of this ‘acknowledging’ of 
God. It specifies it as acknowledging God as the giver of grain, new wine and 
oil, silver and gold (2:6), as the one who comes like the winter and spring 
rains (6:3), and who heals his child Israel (11:3). The other uses of the word 
are less specific. Knowing God is placed in parallel with faithfulness and love 
(4:1) and contrasted with ‘burnt offerings’ (6:6). Not knowing God is placed 
alongside ‘prostitution in the heart’ (5:4) and ‘rejecting what is good’ (8:3). It 
is related two times to reminding Israel of its being led out of Egypt (11:3; 
13:4). Finally, knowledge is also mentioned without an object, as something 
that is lacking to Israel (4:6), and as something to which they are summoned 
(14:9, the final verse). Thus, the recurrence of the root jd‘ / (dy as a summary 
of the right relationship with God, confirms the importance of the first line or 
motif of interpretation.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
What has our examination of the embodied relationship of Hosea and 
Gomer yielded regarding the bodily character of the relationship between 
God and Israel? One may distinguish between 1) the relationship in its ideal 
form, i.e. as it should be, and as it is announced it will be when God restores 
the marriage, 2) Israel’s view of the relation to the divine, which is attacked 
by Hosea, and 3) God’s punishment as consequence of Israel’s unfaithfulness 
in their relationship.  
 The bodily character of the ideal relationship, which revolves around 
acknowledging God as the provider of daily sustenance, may be 
specified in three ways. They overlap or merge into one another in 
becoming more and more specific: 
a. The relationship between God and Israel is first of all one in which 
God should be acknowledged as the one who provides Israel’s ne-
cessities: food, drink, and clothing. This includes God’s taking care 
of the thriving of the land and the harvest: ‘Your fruitfulness 
comes from me’ (14:9). These aspects can be regarded as ‘embod-
ied’ in the sense that basic bodily needs are taken utterly seriously. 
                                                                                                                                         
wegemässes Verhalten überhaupt erst ermöglicht.’  On the possible sexual connotation of ‘knowing’ as 
associated with God in Hos. 2:20 cf. Keefe, Woman’s Body, 47, n. 11. 
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These are the first and foremost things in which the relationship 
with God is found. God’s maintenance is directed at this basic 
level first of all. This language is prominent also in the imagery 
used to depict Israel’s situation and even God. 
b. God’s maintenance should also be acknowledged in a more spe-
cifically human sense. God heals Israel, raises them from child-
hood onwards. These elements also clearly have a bodily charac-
ter, as was clear from the warm expressions of human, bodily love 
in Hos. 11. 
c. In line with this remembrance of their being taken care of in their 
‘childhood,’ Israel should acknowledge God as the one who called 
and led them out of Egypt, took care of them, and fed them in the 
‘land of burning heat’ (13:5). This aspect has to do with Israel’s re-
lationship with God as a people. The foundation of this relation-
ship is depicted in bodily terms, in the sense that God put an end 
to their physical presence in Egypt and warns against their return-
ing to it, and provided for their physical needs during their exo-
dus. 
 Such is the relationship with God in which Israel finds itself. But they 
do not acknowledge it. They turn to other gods for their daily suste-
nance which is imagined as a bodily act of fornication. This fornica-
tion implies bringing sacrifices to the gods, building altars and 
adorning sacred stones, holding festivals, and making idols. The cult 
expands when the land prospers (10:1). Moreover, Israel turns to the 
superpower from which God had liberated them: Egypt. Israel asks 
Egypt and Assyria for help. In sum, they have ‘depended on their own 
strength’ (10:13b).29 Israel does not want the ‘embodied relationship’ 
with God to which God has called them. They prefer a different kind 
of religion and politics and view of the source of their daily suste-
nance.  
 The punishment that is announced is also put in bodily terms: it is 
portrayed as a reversal of the relationship as it should be: no more 
fruitfulness, no personal love, no longer being God’s people etc. The 
                                                 
29
 The NIV translates the noun Derek / Krd by ‘strength.’ The basic meaning of the word is ‘way’ 
or ‘road’; Koehler-Baumgarner’s Lexicon translates the word in this verse as ‘way’ in the sense of ‘condi-
tion’ and parallels it to ‘determining one’s own destiny.’ In combination with the verb bth / h+b, ‘trust,’ 
the translation ‘way’ seems possible as well, which the NIV apparently rephrases as ‘depending on one’s 
own strength.’ 
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bodily character is obvious in a penetrating sense, especially in the 
foretelling of the atrocities of the war that Israel has called down on 
itself.  
Thus, the ideal relationship with God, Israel’s different idea of the rela-
tionship to the divine, and the announcement of God’s punishment may all 
be called bodily. Reading the book of Hosea with an eye to embodiment cer-
tainly yields something. The positive relationship between the living body 
and the divine, for which Bornemark is searching, is found in particular in 
the elaboration of the acknowledgement of God as the giver of daily, bodily 
sustenance. But the depiction in itself of the personal, loving relationship 
with God as a husband-wife or parent-child relationship also contradicts any 
easy narrowing down of religion to a purely spiritual understanding.  
 
 
3. A LITERAL KIND OF EMBODIED RELIGION IN HOSEA 
Our search for embodied religion in Hosea started quite broadly or open 
with an investigation into the bodily way the relationship between God and 
the people of Israel is presented: as that between husband and wife. But at 
the outset of this broad analysis, I already indicated that the immoral or non-
sensical character of the divine command to take a woman and children of 
fornications may attract much more attention than this bodily character of 
the relationship as such, especially when searching for embodied religion. In 
line with this peculiarity of embodiment in Hosea, many interpreters have 
focused on a quite literal sense of embodiment in Hosea: the reality of prac-
tices of fornication in a sacred setting, i.e. some kind of temple prostitution 
as part of a fertility cult. This illustrates the fact that a ‘search for embodi-
ment’ may still be a rather unspecific search, which may yield quite divergent 
results. A brief outline of these interpretations may illustrate the rather un-
specific character of the category of ‘embodiment.’ I will do this from the per-
spective of a recent study of Hosea by the Old Testament scholar Alice 
Keefe.30 She is sympathetic to Bornemark’s project of revaluing the body in 
our reflection on religion with special attention to the female perspective. 
But she also points out that the revaluation of the bodily as such may not yet 
lead to getting beyond the dualistic opposition of spirit and matter or soul 
and body in relation to religion, i.e. to a more embodied understanding of 
(the capacity for) transcendence.  
                                                 
30
 Cf. note 5 above. 
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Keefe starts her analysis of Hosea by pointing out the ‘long-standing 
scholarly consensus’ (5) that regards Hosea as prophesying against Israel’s 
participation in a Canaanite or syncretistic ‘fertility religion.’ As we have seen, 
there are references in Hosea to apostate cultic practices: mention is made of 
Baal worship (2:15, 17; 11:2, 13:1), calf idols (8:5–6; 10:5; 13:2), feasts and festivals 
(2:13; 5:7), sinning priests (4:7–9; 6:9; 10:5), altars and sacred stones (8:11,13; 
10:2; 12:12). This idea of a Baal cult is further specified by combining it with 
the references in Hosea to prostitution and adultery.31 The ‘fertility religion’ is 
outlined as worshipping the rain god Baal, perhaps together with goddesses 
of sex and fecundity. Natural procreation and regeneration are sanctified in 
these gods.32 It is suggested that participation in this fertility religion includes 
practising sexual rituals of temple prostitution or even participating in wild 
orgies. If this fertility cult is actually what Hosea’s prophesies against, then 
the reason why Hosea needs to live the relation of the people to God via the 
scandal of marrying a woman of fornications is clear: the adultery ‘represents 
the apostasy of Israel both figuratively and literally. The marriage metaphor 
is more moving than a mere allegory, because “Gomer’s misconduct is not 
just like the sin of Israel that infuriates God and breaks his heart; it is that 
sin.”’33 Hosea embodies religion to attack ‘embodied religion.’ 
The tenor of this traditional interpretation is explained by Keefe as the 
product of a dualistic way of opposing spirit and body. The dominance of this 
dualistic view has been denounced by feminist exegetes in particular, who 
revealed its relationship with patriarchy, and the evaluation of the feminine – 
and the female body and sexuality in particular – as the other and as sinful. 
Hosea is indicted as one of the earliest sources that advanced this view. Some 
of these exegetes argue that Hosea’s polemics against the fertility religion 
implies that such a religion actually existed and that Gomer was a woman 
who practised it or represents those women.34 This cult granted them the 
opportunity to explore their own feminine sexuality and fertility, by conceiv-
ing a partner of their choice. Investigating this cult may therefore contribute 
                                                 
31
 Especially Hos. 4:13b–14: ‘Therefore your daughters turn to prostitution and your daughters-in-
law to adultery. I will not punish your daughters when they turn to prostitution, nor your daughters-in-
law when they commit adultery, because the men themselves consort with harlots and sacrifice with 
shrine prostitutes – a people without understanding will come to ruin!’ 
32
 Cf. Keefe, Woman’s Body, 43 n.8 for a list of mainstream commentaries with such a version of 
Canaanite religion, including ‘great names’ like Von Rad and Ringgren.  
33
 Keefe, Woman’s Body, 47, quoting Francis I. Andersen & David Noel Freedman. 
34
 Keefe, Woman’s Body (62–64, 148–150) refers to Helgard Balz-Cochois, Fokkelien van Dijk-
Hemmes, and T. Drorah Setel.  
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to reconstructing and reappropriating a kind of embodied religion that has 
remained out of sight in the dominant views of religion as purely spiritual. 
After analysing this criticism of traditional Hosea interpretation and the plea 
for a revaluation of the body in religion, Keefe asks if they really go beyond 
the opposition of spirit and body. She concludes that the traditional and the 
feminist interpretations are each other’s counterparts: whereas the one fo-
cuses on the problematic character of the bodily in relation to religion, the 
other regards the body as a primary source of religious experience and relat-
ing to the divine. But they remain heirs to the same dualist separation of 
spirit and body. This exegetical debate may thus illustrate the drawbacks of 
the plea to pay more attention to the embodied character of religion: the 
spirit-body opposition remains intact, and the focus is on quite extreme 
kinds of embodiment (prostitution, orgies etc.).  
In order to undermine the dominance and authority of the dualistic in-
terpretation, Keefe tries a different interpretation, without claiming to arrive 
at the only ‘correct’ reading of Hosea.35 She aims to examine Hosea in its own 
context by taking into account historical and archaeological findings and by 
means of an intertextual reading of similar texts in the Bible. Such a reading 
reveals a relation between acts of sexual transgression on the one hand and 
social disintegration and violence in the land on the other. That Hosea faced 
a situation of social disintegration can be confirmed from what we know 
about Hosea’s time: it was a time of bloodshed by the king, internal war, and 
the threat of Assyrian occupation. But more important for Keefe’s interpreta-
tion is the socio-economic and political transitions that took place in that 
time. Israel changed, according to Keefe, from a locally organised, tribe- and 
kinship-based society of small farmers to a centralized market economy of 
cash cropping and international trading under monarchical control.36 In this 
                                                 
35
 Keefe, Woman’s Body, 13, 221. Other interpretations that show resemblances to Keefe’s ap-
proach are the studies by Keita and Sherwood mentioned above. Keefe also refers to Sherwood as to the 
question of claiming the ‘correct’ reading. Sherwood characterises her approach as a ‘metacommen-
tary’: this does not follow the traditional strategy of criticising and displacing the criticism of one’s 
predecessors before introducing a new improved account (38). Her aim is not to reveal the ‘truth’ or 
‘error’ of specific interpretations, but the dominance of certain interpretations and their claiming of 
‘objectivity.’ She does not claim to introduce a reading that is free from ideology but wants to bring 
‘different ideological interests into play and relativise the dominant (apparently natural) descriptions of 
Hos. 1,2 by introducing an alternative, more marginal perspective’ (39). 
36
 These processes are called ‘latifundialization.’ Keefe bases this interpretation on many studies 
of Israel and Judah in this period from a socio-scientific perspective (cf. Keefe, Woman’s Body, e.g., 27–
29, where she refers especially to Devadasan N. Premnath, Bernhard Lang, Marvin Chaney, and John 
Andrew Dearman). 
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new situation, the traditional importance of the local family and the interde-
pendence of different families in a tribe for their survival diminished. A new 
class of wealthy rulers came into existence who exploited farmers for the sake 
of larger interests. Moreover, the class of rulers also tried to control the reli-
gious cult and thus reinforce the centralized, monarchical power. It is to this 
situation that female fornication refers in Hosea: an Israel that is out for 
profit and is prepared to be unfaithful for the sake of that aim. Thus, Israel 
eventually puts its own continuity as a people on the line. In the Israelite 
patrilineally organised society, family is the essential social unit and sacral 
locus, based upon paternal legitimacy. In this setting the ‘imagery of a forni-
cating wife and her illegitimate children signifies the disintegration and end 
of that society.’ (206) Keefe summarises her interpretation by concluding that 
‘at stake in Hosea’s discourse is the loss of the sacred as it was manifest in the 
relationship of people to the land, its produce, and to each other, that is, in 
their relationships to the materiality of their existence’ (221). 
Keefe thus finds the embodied character of religion not so much in the 
extreme forms of a fertility religion with matching sexual practices but in the 
general idea of ‘religion as a mode of orientation to the material and corpo-
real bases of human existence’ (12). The interpretation of this orientation in 
Hosea contributes, according to Keefe, to a better understanding of religion.37 
This seems a sensible correction of an important tendency in interpreting the 
place of the body in religion. But the correction also shows that the project of 
revaluating the material or bodily as such is not a guarantee for arriving at a 
broader und thus better understanding of religion. For it cannot be denied 
that the feminist interpretation of religion takes the body seriously. And, in a 
precisely opposite sense, the traditional interpretation of Hosea did not deny 
the possible bodily character of religion, although it vehemently rejected it. 
How can the rather unspecific character of the search for a more embodied 
view of religion be overcome while still taking the problem of the spirit-body 
dualism seriously? In my view, my analysis of Hosea may itself indicate a dif-




                                                 
37
 Keefe does not elaborate systematically on this contribution and thus does not go beyond her 
exegetical confines. A few general suggestions are found however, that indicates that this role of her 
study interests her. (Keefe, Woman’s Body, 12–14, 73–78, 111, 220–221).  
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4. DEPENDENCE AND DISCERNMENT 
One of the central points to which my analysis of the relationship be-
tween God and Israel led was the acknowledgement to be in a relationship 
with God who cares as the giver of daily sustenance. This was contrasted with 
securing one’s needs by turning to other gods in sacrificial rituals as well as in 
trusting one’s own strength in battle and turning to international superpow-
ers for help. I would like to dub the point of this difference in attitude be-
tween acknowledging and not acknowledging ‘dependence.’ Dependence on 
God to whose care one may commend oneself is clearly understood in Hosea 
as a bodily thing. This is contrasted with experiencing the body as a source of 
disquiet and concern that is to be safeguarded by human effort. This contrast 
could be easily interpreted in line with a classical criticism of religion, i.e., 
that it makes people passive and hinders them from having control over 
themselves. But the difficulty Hosea addresses seems to be that this ‘control’ 
needs orientation. The body as such cannot provide this orientation, as un-
deniable and strong as its need for food, drink, clothing and shelter may be. 
Israel should find its orientation in being taken care of as a people called out 
of Egypt by God. Acknowledging this God is paralleled with faithfulness and 
love and contrasted with ‘cursing, lying and murder, stealing and adultery,’ 
and bloodshed (4:2). It is a dependence that is not to be conceived as a ‘spiri-
tual kind of thing’ but as one in which the bodily is fully incorporated. It is 
the reciprocal dependence of a partner-relationship or a parent-child one. 
This love is one that asks for an answer, an active participation. If it is not or 
no longer answered, the grief is deep, but the relationship not simply an-
nulled. One remains related, albeit in a very different way. 
The thrust, however, of ‘this dependence in love’ in Hosea is not simply 
whether Israel participates in it or not but also whether the relationship with 
God as such is acknowledged as a ‘loving’ one or not. Hosea confronts Israel 
not only with their own unfaithful behaviour but also with their hopes and 
fears concerning how God will respond to this behaviour. Does their being 
dependent on God mean that God will destroy them, or that God cannot give 
them up and will renew the loving relationship with them? At times, the Ho-
sea text seems to oscillate between these views of God. But in the end, the 
announcement of the restoration of the relationship is strongest, as is de-
picted expressively in God’s ‘change of heart’ in Hos. 11:8. Precisely against 
the penetrating depictions of the possible punishments, the loving character 
of the relationship stands out. Nevertheless, the unrest concerning how God 
will respond, and thus about who God is, is intensely present in Hosea. By 
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emphasising the centrality of this struggle to understand or ‘acknowledge’ 
God, I do not mean to waive the bodily character again. Rather the moment 
of understanding, or acknowledging God as the loving, the moment of faith, 
contains a primordial bodily moment.  
This may be illuminated by referring to Richard Kearney’s notion of ‘dis-
cernment.’ Discernment is one of the components of Kearney’s ‘anatheist 
wager.’ With this phrase, he indicates the invitation to revisit in the current 
situation – i.e. ‘in the wake of our letting go of God’ (5) – what might be 
termed a ‘primary scene of religion,’ in order to get beyond the opposites of 
theism and atheism. This is the primary scene of ‘the encounter with a radical 
Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God,’ a choice between faith 
or nonfaith (7).38 This moment of choice is further explained in terms of dis-
cernment. Discernment is present in an exemplary way in the lives of the 
prophets, saints, and mystics, but it is also common in the sense that a dis-
cernment is always to be made where faith is concerned. Kearney emphasises 
the carnal character of this discernment. The ‘choice’ is made in a moment 
and, as such, is pre-reflective, before it becomes ‘a matter of reflective cogni-
tive evaluation’ (46). But in spite of its pre-reflectiveness it is choice or inter-
pretation; it is actively responding ‘in the moment’ to the visiting Stranger, to 
say ‘yes’ or ‘no.’39 Discernment is difficult, but never completely impossible. It 
is possible to discern between ‘the other who kills, and the other who brings 
life’ (45).40 Moreover, it is a risky affair:41 many invoke the voice of God to 
                                                 
38
 Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God After God (New York 2010). Kearney does not 
mean that the ‘event of the Stranger’ is the only ‘primary scene of religion’ (7). Others are creation, 
salvation, miracle, sovereignty, and judgement. But it is at the core of the anatheist wager, which Kear-
ney regards as the viable option in a current analysis of religion. He indicates five main components of 
the anatheist wager: imagination, humour, commitment, discernment and hospitality. They should not 
be regarded as ‘sequential moments’ but rather as ‘equiprimordial aspects of a single hermeneutic arc’ 
(40).  
39
 By emphasising the choosing, interpretative character of the primary moment of meeting the 
divine Stranger, Kearney opposes the view of Jean-Luc Marion who understands the moment of ‘satura-
tion’ as a being overwhelmed completely. Discernment comes only afterwards, according to Marion. Cf. 
Kearney, Anatheism, note 6,  197–199. 
40
 Kearney opposes this view to that of Derrida who says, in Kearney’s words, ‘we have no way of 
knowing the difference between one kind of other and another’ (Kearney, Anatheism, 45 and note 5, 
196–197). 
41
 The risky character of faith that lies in its being first of all an act of ‘pre- or hyper-linguistic re-
sponse’ is also central to the thinking of Ricoeur by whom Kearney is profoundly influenced (e.g., Paul 
Ricoeur, ‘Philosophy and Religious Language,’ in: Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagina-
tion, transl. by David A. Pellauer, ed. by Mark Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1995), 35–47, 46–47; 
cf. Kearney, Anatheism, 44–45). 
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commit atrocities. Kearney emphasises this chance of being mistaken, but 
argues that the risk is not ‘groundless’: ‘Love – as compassion and justice – is 
the watermark.’ (47) These are the difficulties and the risk of the ‘drama of 
discernment.’  
This drama is experienced by the prophet Hosea who must decide on 
the voice he hears. And it is the situation of the reader of the book Hosea, 
who becomes confronted with the God to whom Israel has to respond, the 
God on whom they depend and who is first experienced as the one who may 
punish them or restore their relationship. The book of Hosea also shows that 
the difficulty and risk of this discernment is never something that can be left 
behind after having said ‘yes’ or having converted to the faith. Rather, the 
‘yes’ is ‘in the moment.’ This difficulty or tension is part of religion, but it is 
not ‘groundless.’ It comes down to not only the question whether I relate to 
God or not but also that of whether I want to be dependent on a loving God. 
The momentary character of the answer to this question relates to its embod-
iedness: it is a response, by the body, ‘the ear and eye’ (46), by ‘emotion and 
affect, before any theoretical reflection’ (40). As such it is already interpreta-
tion. It may be rethought and reinterpreted in a more cognitive sense end-
lessly, as we do in reinterpreting the discernment present in Hosea. 
 Is this discernment an entirely personal thing, something between God 
and the individual believer? Kearney points out that ‘great saints and mystics 
… scrupulously insisted upon disciplined criteria of discernment, chief among 
them being the distinction between the divine visitor who brings compassion 
and counterfeits who bring confusion’ (47). This idea of ‘disciplined criteria’ 
presupposes some kind of discerning community who reflects on them, sup-
ports them and passes them on. Moreover, responding to the divine Other is 
very much a question of being and acting in the world, of ethics. It is about 
‘giving a cup of cold water to a thirsting stranger’ (153). Therefore, Kearney 
concludes his book with a reference to the lives of three exemplary figures 
who respond to the stranger in a life of ‘sacramental action’: Dorothy Day, 
Jean Vanier, and Gandhi. The disciplined approach of discernment and the 
ethical practices of discernment in everyday life underscore the bodily char-
acter of the discernment. Thus, the concept of the discernment character of 
faith as going back to a level of primordial, pre-reflective, carnal response 
allows for thinking spirit and body together. It is more specific than the con-
cept of ‘embodied religion’ and as such gives a more specific contribution to 
the understanding of religion. Moreover, it sheds light on the issue indicated 
in the introduction of a religious ‘difficulty with the body.’ 
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5. DIFFICULTY WITH THE BODY OR WITH DISCERNMENT? 
The search for a more embodied view of religion is presented as a way to 
gain a better understanding of religion. But there is also a critical side to it 
insofar as it implies that from time immemorial there has been a reluctance 
to recognize the bodily character of religion. This should be overcome by 
turning to the body explicitly and consciously. If we confine ourselves to the 
current, post-secular Western context, is it the body that stands between 
ourselves and religion, that hinders our understanding of religion? Or is it 
rather a specifically religious idea of embodiment, with its moment of fun-
damental dependence and responsive discernment? In my view, our current 
difficulty with the bodily in relation to religion is not Eckhardt’s or Tauler’s, 
i.e., the untrustworthiness of the senses, which cannot discriminate between 
a vision of the devil or God. What they indicated sounds very much like the 
difficulty of discernment. They emphasised that this difficulty cannot be 
solved by turning to the body or the senses. In comparison, the current issue 
is first of all that of arriving at, becoming sensitive to this moment of dis-
cernment. A focus on the difficulty of making sense of the embodied charac-
ter of religion may fail to recognise that our search for a better understanding 
of religion presupposes a being at a loss at a more primary level of, for exam-
ple, the primary religious scene of discernment. In my view, the idea that we 
are in a fundamental sense dependent on God is one of the most difficult to 
relate to in our times of autonomous choice and control – not just over ‘wine, 
grain, and oil’ but also over being a family or not, our health, or international 
politics. But it is important to reappropriate what this dependence may mean 
and not reject it beforehand because of an assumed one-sided emphasis on 
passivity, resignation, or humility. Kearney’s notion of discernment unravels 
the active moment in this dependence: the moment of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ In 
my view, this is also what is at stake in Hosea’s struggle for the acknowledg-
ment of God as the giver of daily sustenance.  
Understanding oneself in the face of a text, like that of Mechtild von 
Magdeburg or that Hosea, thus does not mean that important material di-
mensions of religious life are ignored, as Vásquez and other hard core mate-
rialist theorists of religion argue. It does point out the interpretative moment 
inherent in the response of faith, which may not come to light if one focuses 
on the apparent obviousness of the body, as if it were a phenomenon without 
interpretation. Interpretation is a very bodily thing. Because texts intend a 
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world, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, they ‘call forth on our part a way of dwelling 
there.… Understanding oneself in front of the text is not something that just 
happens in one’s head or in language.… [T]o understand the world and to 
change it are fundamentally the same thing.’ 42 This idea of interpretation as a 
both active and bodily responding, dependent upon an ‘initiative that always 
precedes me,’ supports, I hope, Bornemark’s search for ‘a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the relation between transcendence and embodiment.’ 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I follow the conference theme, by considering how ‘ri-
tuals and sacraments’ may function as ‘material expressions of a spiri-
tual reality’ and even as ‘embodiments of God’. I begin by noting 
some of the ways in which human beings can be attuned in bodily 
terms to place-relative ‘existential meanings’. I then extend this case, 
and relate it to the religious domain, by examining the nature of sa-
cred sites and the role of religious concepts in aesthetic experience. I 
also consider what sense we might make of the idea that transcen-
dent ‘meanings’ may be not only imaged in the sensory appearances, 
but encountered in them. Overall, the paper seeks to identify some of 
the ways in which bodily demeanour and habits of perception, and in 
general sensitivity to materially embedded existential meanings, are 
integral to the religious life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this session of the conference, we have been invited to examine the 
idea that ‘rituals and sacraments’ may function as ‘material expressions of a 
spiritual reality’ and even as ‘embodiments of God’. We have also been given 
an opportunity to consider what a treatment of these issues might imply for 
our understanding of ‘magic’, and in concluding I shall touch on that ques-
tion too. 
I would like to approach these themes by turning, first of all, to the 
question of how ‘existential meanings’ may be presented to a person in their 
bodily interaction with a material context. Assuming that we do encounter 
such meanings in this sort of way, then we might suppose that ultimate, or 
religiously important, existential meanings may be presented to us similarly, 
that is, via an appropriate bodily engagement with a relevant material con-
text. And if all of this is so, then, so I shall argue, we have one way of elabo-
rating upon the thought that ‘spiritual realities’ may be ‘embodied’, and en-
countered through ‘ritual’ and in general via an appropriate bodily engage-
ment with material forms. 
My remarks will throughout have a rather programmatic character, 
since my object here is to offer an invitation to conversational exchange, ra-
ther than to construct a perspective which is hedged about by qualifications 
for the sake of pre-empting objections! 
 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF PLACE-RELATIVE EXISTENTIAL MEANINGS 
In recent years, philosophers of religion in the analytic tradition in par-
ticular have been much occupied by the thought that our understanding of 
God might be likened to the kind of understanding which derives from scien-
tific enquiry, or the kind of understanding which is rooted in our everyday 
experience of the sensory world. Such strategies are well known and there is 
no need to document them here. While undoubtedly of interest, these ap-
proaches do pose a number of difficulties, it seems to me, in regard to their 
conception of the mode and also the object of religious understanding. For 
example, they may lead us to think of religious understanding as basically 
theoretical and inferential (if we pattern religious understanding on scientific 
understanding) or as straightforwardly observational. So neither approach 
looks like a very promising starting point if our concern is (as ours is here) 
with the question of how religious understanding may be realised in bodily 
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and ritual terms. Of course, the body is integral to sensory experience, and in 
its way it is also integral to scientific forms of enquiry, but sense experience 
and scientific enquiry do not look much like ritual forms of engagement with 
the world, above all because they do not require the same sort of attunement 
of the whole body – an attunement in which all of the senses are implicated – 
to a value-saturated context. Moreover, if we take scientific understanding, or 
sensory observation, as a starting point for our reflections upon the nature of 
religious understanding, then there will presumably be some pressure to 
think of God’s reality by analogy with the reality of particular objects – as-
suming that we take scientific theorising to have as its goal the identification 
of fundamental entities which are not themselves observable but postulated 
to explain the data of observation, and to the extent that everyday observa-
tion of the world concerns, as philosophers are wont to say, ‘tables and 
chairs’. But it is of course a commonplace of theological enquiry that the con-
ception of God as some kind of ‘thing’, whatever its attractions may be in ab-
stractly philosophical terms, is religiously problematic. So on this count too, 
we have some reason to consider whether other ways of apprehending the 
world may present a more promising route into the question of how religious 
understanding is to be conceived. 
I would like to suggest that we can make some headway with these 
questions by turning to our appreciation of place-relative existential mean-
ings. (Certainly, place-relative meanings are not ‘things’, and their identifica-
tion is standardly a matter neither of theorisation nor of ‘just looking’.) This 
kind of understanding is so basic to our capacity to orient ourselves in the 
world that it is easily overlooked from a theoretical point of view. It is per-
haps for this reason that in the history of philosophy (and by contrast with 
the kind of understanding that is grounded in simple sense observation, or in 
scientific theory construction), understanding of ‘place’ often seems to drop 
out of view, despite its fundamental role in our practical dealings with other 
people and the material world in general. To take just one example, in his 
discussion of the nature of virtue, Aristotle famously remarks that the person 
of good character is able to regulate their feelings appropriately; and he adds 
that this is a matter of ‘having these feelings at the right times, about the 
right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way’.1 
But if we take a particular example of the regulation of feeling, say the feeling 
of gratitude, it is evident that it matters not only that this feeling should be 
                                                 
1
 Nicomachean Ethics, Book II; I am following Terence Irwin’s translation, reproduced in Russ 
Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology (Oxford 2007), 678. 
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had at the right time, in relation to the right thing, and so on for the re-
mainder of the items on Aristotle’s list, but also that it should be had, and 
expressed, in the right place. A person could in some abstract sense have the 
feeling at the right time, and so on, but there would be little merit in that if 
the feeling were had or expressed at the wrong place. We might prefer to say 
then that time-relative rightness, and rightness measured against these other 
dimensions of appraisal, cannot really be disentangled from rightness with 
respect to place: rightness in temporal terms is in effect rightness in temporal 
terms relative to rightness in respect of place. 
It may also be that we are apt to overlook the significance of rightness in 
respect of place when we are operating in a theoretical mode because very 
often achieving this sort of rightness is a rather untheoretical and even unref-
lective sort of matter. Whether I am in a lecture theatre, or standing at a bus 
stop, or entering a church, or whatever it might be, I am all the while cali-
brating my bodily movements to the space in which I am located. And this is 
not just a matter of making those bodily adjustments which are necessary to 
negotiate the space from a physical point of view, as when I raise my foot in 
the way required to surmount the dais at the front of the lecture theatre. It is 
also and more fundamentally a matter of my calibrating my bodily move-
ments so that they are fitted for this particular space in existential terms. And 
this sort of calibration is necessary because the action which is constituted by 
a given stretch of bodily movement will vary with place. To put the point 
briefly, waving my hands will count as one sort of action, with one kind of 
existential significance, when I am looking towards a friend who is departing 
on a train, and another when I am standing on the Kop and Liverpool have 
scored a goal, and another when I am drifting out to sea, and so on. But typi-
cally this regulation of bodily movement in relation to context is not re-
hearsed reflectively: if I wish to say farewell to my friend as she leaves on the 
train, I do not work backwards from the thought that my action should be 
one of bidding farewell, to a consideration of the gestures which relative to 
this particular material context might carry that sort of significance, to the 
performance of the relevant gesture. Instead, in normal circumstances, I just 
wave. 
So all of us are all of the time calibrating our bodily movements to spa-
tial context, in recognition of the ‘existential meanings’ which are embedded 
in these contexts, and the sense which attaches to various stretches of bodily 
behaviour given those meanings. There is no achievement more basic to our 
capacity to function as agents in society than this. And again, when we en-
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gage in this sort of calibration of bodily response to context, we are guided 
often enough by a kind of intelligence in the body – rather than the body be-
ing directed by a set of instructions which are the product of some process of 
ratiocination. When I walk into a room of people, I adjust my bodily move-
ments to the space taking into account its dimensions, the apparent mood of 
the group, the disposition of people and objects in the space, and so on, 
without any of these considerations becoming, in the normal case, the object 
of focal awareness. The capacity to orient oneself in these terms is more akin, 
then, to the capacity to ride a bike than it is to the capacity to rehearse a ma-
thematical or scientific proof, or to determine whether the object at the other 
side of the room is a bookcase or a cupboard simply by looking. But by con-
trast with the bike-riding case, this is not just an achievement of physical 
dexterity: what is required is a capacity to bring one’s body into appropriate 
alignment with the existential demands of the context, and not only with its 
demands considered from an abstractly physical point of view. 
So in this thoroughly familiar (even if, from a theoretical point of view, 
sometimes rather opaque) sort of way, we are all of us used to recognising 
existential meanings as they are embodied in particular material contexts; 
and we are all of us used to adjusting our bodily movements to these mean-
ings, and to being guided by the body’s own ‘intelligence’ in these matters. If 
all of this is so, then we have, I think, the beginnings of an account of how a 
sacramental appreciation of the material world might work. Let’s see if we 
can move a little closer towards such an account by considering next the case 
of ‘sacred sites’. 
 
 
THE EMBODIMENT OF EXISTENTIAL MEANINGS AT THE ‘SACRED SITE’ 
The phenomenological literature on ‘sacred space’ suggests that such 
places are marked by a number of features which recur across cultures. For 
instance, the sacred site is often deemed to have a ‘microcosmic’ significance. 
(That is, the existential meaning which is embedded in the site is thought to 
represent or embody in miniature the significance of reality as such.) And 
whether because of its remoteness or because of its intrinsic physical charac-
ter, the sacred site also poses, typically, a degree of challenge to the body. 
And lastly, such places are often associated with religiously important events. 
These events may have occurred at the site; or it may be that while the site is 
not itself the locus of some such event, it houses objects such as relics which 
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once played an integral role in the unfolding of events of religious impor-
tance.2 These accounts ground the sacred significance of a site in rather dif-
ferent features, and these features need not co-vary. For instance, in so far as 
it is the sensory qualities of a place which mark it out as religiously signifi-
cant, then a further place which replicates those qualities will, to that extent, 
share the same religious significance. But in so far as the religious signific-
ance of a place is relative to its history, then even a perfect replica of the 
place will fail to reproduce in full its religious import, in so far as the replica 
has in relevant respects a different past. These various dimensions of a site’s 
religious import are also capable of interaction. Most obviously, a place’s sen-
sory qualities or history may be deemed religiously significant because the 
place is conceived in microcosmic terms, so that these qualities, or this histo-
ry, are taken to bear not simply some localised importance, but an ultimate 
or divine significance. 
These truths concerning sacred sites have a counterpart in our dealings 
with everyday, secular spaces. Here we seem to be responsive to these same 
varieties of existential meaning in ways which require acknowledgement, 
once again, in the form of an appropriate bodily response. For example, a 
place may acquire a particular existential significance on account of its histo-
ry, and that significance may call for acknowledgement in bodily terms. It is 
for this reason that we can be drawn intelligibly into debates about what sort 
of building, for what sort of purpose, it would be appropriate to erect at the 
site of the 9/11 attacks – and so on for many other, more everyday kinds of 
example. So a site can in some respects store up the significance of what has 
happened there, so that this significance exercises an enduring claim upon 
us, in so far as it invites, or requires, a certain kind of bodily response when 
we are located at the site in the present. And we might suppose that the same 
kind of connection is at work when the significance of a sacred site is 
grounded in its history. 
Similarly, we can also encounter microcosmic meanings in our expe-
rience of secular spaces. The places of childhood often bear this sort of signi-
ficance. I recently returned to some of the places of my own childhood in Li-
verpool. And standing again where that child once stood, and assuming at 
that place, so far as I could, his perspective on things, I found myself review-
                                                 
2
 For an account of broadly this kind, see for example Lindsay Jones, The Hermeneutics of Sacred 
Architecture: Experience, Interpretation, Comparison, Volume Two, Hermeneutical Calisthenics (Cam-
bridge MA 2000), and Thomas Barrie, Sacred Place: Myth, Ritual, and Meaning in Architecture (Boston 
MA 1996). 
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ing later episodes in my life story from the vantage point of his aspirations 
and sense of the world’s significance. In this way, the place was able to as-
sume for me a microcosmic significance, by providing a window on to the 
sense of my life as a whole. Of course, it would be possible in principle to 
take up such a stance on my life anywhere, simply by rehearsing the relevant 
thoughts. But if we revert to the idea that behaviour can be more or less con-
sonant with the history of a place, then we might say that at the places of 
childhood, it’s not just that we can think certain microcosmically significant 
thoughts (thoughts which we could in principle think anywhere), but also 
that we can acknowledge the microcosmic meaning of the place in our 
enacted responses, by virtue of what we do in bodily terms when located at 
the site, and also by virtue of what we think when we are there. Minimally, 
we might suppose that it is fitting that I should think microcosmic thoughts 
about the meaning of my life when located at the places of my childhood (es-
pecially if I have been away from them for some considerable time), and the 
failure to act in this way would signify a kind of unresponsiveness or blind-
ness to meanings which make some genuine claim on me. So there is some 
sense in the idea that we can not only think about but also encounter, or be 
claimed by, a microcosmic meaning when located at the relevant place. And 
when the relevant microcosmic meaning is particularly encompassing, when 
it concerns the significance of reality in general, then we may suppose that it 
is fundamentally religious in character. 
The case of sacred sites also reveals something of the variety of precon-
ditions which are relevant to the recognition of place-relative existential 
meanings. It is notable that the approach to a sacred site often poses a degree 
of challenge to the body: because of its inaccessibility, the site may require 
the believer to undertake a long and relatively arduous journey; or because of 
its use of threshold walls or other such structures, the believer may be re-
quired to submit to various bodily disciplines as a condition of penetrating to 
the inner precincts of the site. The recurrence of such features of spatial or-
ganisation across traditions suggests that an appropriate attunement of the 
body is integral to the believer’s capacity to apprehend the existential import 
of the sacred site aright. To put the point briefly, we might say that the struc-
ture of many sacred sites suggests that their existential import cannot be 
grasped in straightforwardly observational terms, just by turning up and 
looking around, let alone by constructing some sort of inference from the 
data of observation. Rather, to grasp, or be grasped by, the import of the site, 
the believer must first take on the relevant bodily and existential condition – 
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broadly, one of heightened seriousness about the meaning of the site, and 
heightened attentiveness to that meaning as it is presented in the sensory 
qualities of the site. The physical challenges posed by the site ensure that 
such seriousness is presupposed and at the same time cultivated: given these 
challenges, only the person who is already serious about the prospective 
meaning of the site will persevere in their resolve to reach the site; and in 
negotiating the physical demands of the space, such a person will be required 
to take on a correlative bodily state, and to enter thereby into a condition of 
focused awareness and heightened seriousness. 
Given the need for this sort of preparation of the body, we would expect 
the believer to be addressed in bodily terms upon arrival at the site. And this 
is what we do find, in so far as the significance of the site is communicated 
through its imposing scale, its use of intense light or equally of visual obscur-
ity, and so on for other visual features of the site and for other sensory mod-
alities. The recurrence of such qualities across traditions suggests that to 
some extent the import of the sacred site is communicated directly in theory- 
or tradition-independent terms, by virtue simply of its brute impact upon the 
senses. If we had to generalise, we might say that, in many cases anyway, the 
site works, at least in part, by imposing a degree of strain upon the senses, so 
leading the person to an intensified bodily awareness of the space, and in 
turn to a condition of rapt absorption in the place and its import.3 
So the recognition of the existential meaning of the sacred site is rea-
lised, in some measure, in the body’s responsiveness to its sensory qualities; 
and given the structure of such sites and their surroundings, we should sup-
pose that this sort of bodily responsiveness cannot always be counted on as a 
matter of course, but has instead to be cultivated, by the adoption of the re-
quisite physical discipline. We might suppose, once again, that the same sorts 
of connection hold in secular contexts. To take an everyday kind of example, 
suppose that the light of the low trajectory winter sun, as it streams towards 
me from the periphery of my visual field, irradiates the long grasses in the 
meadow in which I am standing, so that the silhouettes of their bobbing 
heads are brought into sharp relief and wrapped in a warm glow. All of us (I 
think I can say) will have been gripped at some time or other by the sensory 
qualities of some such scene, in a relatively theory-independent way, and re-
duced thereby to a condition of quietened, rapt attention. Sacred sites seem, 
in some cases, to aim at inducing a similar sort of bodily response, in so far as 
                                                 
3
 I expand on these matters in the discussion of conversion experience below. 
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they invite the believer into a state of heightened sensory awareness, in 
which certain material things become compellingly present. But of course, it 
would be all too easy for me to pass by this scene of sun-lit grasses without 
further thought, observing in some sense the sensory qualities of the scene, 
but without being engaged by them. For engagement, and fuller apprehen-
sion of these qualities we need, as well as mere observation, the requisite fo-
cused attunement of the body, and a quietening of the mind’s absorption in 
other, competing concerns. And the sacred site, in its own way, ensures that 
these same conditions are realised. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF CONCEPTS IN THE RECOGNITION OF MATERIALLY EMBEDDED MEANINGS 
In everyday contexts, a person’s recognition of materially embodied val-
ues can also depend of course upon their capacity to deploy appropriate con-
cepts. Let’s think about this case next. Once the difference between a swift 
and a swallow and a martin has been explained to me, then my experience of 
these swooping forms becomes newly focused and newly informed. And we 
might suppose similarly that while the significance of sacred sites is to some 
extent communicated in theory-independent terms, the apprehension of 
their import can also depend upon the capacity to read them in terms of a 
relevant doctrinal scheme. And this scheme may work not simply by allowing 
the believer to provide doctrinally informed comment upon a given expe-
rience of the site, but also by entering into that experience, so that the phe-
nomenology of the experience is shaped accordingly. Roger Scruton provides 
an example of this possibility when he notes how the experience of a Gothic 
church can be inhabited, or structured from within, by the thought that such 
churches were intended to present an image of the heavenly city. When our 
experience is guided by such a thought, he notes, it is possible to apprehend a 
Gothic church not as a single thing subdivided into various components, but 
as a composite entity, assembled from parts (by analogy with the way in 
which a city is a composite entity, assembled from the various buildings and 
other structures of which it is comprised). So the conceptual distinction be-
tween thinking of the church as a composite entity and thinking of it as a 
single entity subdivided has, Scruton is suggesting, a phenomenological 
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counterpart. And the person who is acquainted with this conceptual distinc-
tion can, in principle, organise their experience accordingly.4 
It is notable that when the experience of a Gothic church is inhabited in 
this way by the thought of the heavenly city, then the building as experienced 
can function as an image of the heavenly city: the building so experienced 
will share the structure of a city, and will therefore be able to image a city. 
This possibility suggests a further way in which religious meanings may be 
materially mediated: when it penetrates or inhabits an experience in this sort 
of way, a religious thought can be embodied in the sensory appearances, ra-
ther than serving simply as commentary upon them. And in such cases, the 
content of the thought will then be imaged by the appearances, so that it is 
possible to be addressed by and reckon with the thought through one’s en-
gagement with the relevant material forms. 
Of course, the example of the Gothic church is a relatively easy case: 
here one spatially extended thing (the church) is taken to image another spa-
tially extended thing (the heavenly city) once the appearance of the first 
thing has been organised appropriately. And there is no great mystery about 
how this is possible. As anyone who has had to entertain small children on a 
car journey will know, it is possible to take cloud shapes as images of just 
about any material object you might care to mention: here, the thought of a 
given object, as named by the child, is inscribed in the appearance of the 
cloud so as to produce a relevant perceptual gestalt, with the result that the 
cloud’s appearance now images the object. This sort of example works 
straightforwardly because here we are configuring the appearance of one spa-
tially extended thing by reference to the structure of another spatially ex-
tended thing. But we might suppose in addition that abstract thoughts, and 
not only thoughts of spatially extended things, can be inscribed in the sen-
sory appearances. 
Strikingly, many reports of conversion experience seem to suggest some-
thing of this kind. If we turn to William James’s classic treatment of these 
matters in his Varieties of Religious Experience, we find converts reporting 
that, post-conversion, it is not simply that they feel a new intimacy with God, 
or that they have come to some deepened doctrinal insight, but rather that 
the sensory world in general has now taken on a new appearance for them, so 
that it seems to be in some way glorified, or newly ‘real’. And some converts 
say of their post-conversion condition that the sensory world is now able to 
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 Scruton develops this example in his book The Aesthetics of Architecture (Princeton NJ 1979), 
74–75. 
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image the divine nature. For example, Jonathan Edwards, who is not noted 
for levity in his use of theological language, remarks of his own conversion 
experience that: ‘The appearance of everything was altered; there seemed to 
be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory, in almost eve-
rything. God’s excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear 
in everything; in the grass, flowers, and trees; in the water and all nature…’5 
The experience which Edwards reports here is like Scruton’s example of expe-
riencing a Gothic church in so far as, in each case, the appearance of some 
relevant stretch of the material world is taken to image something else – only 
here it is the divine nature which is said to be imaged in the appearance of 
the sensory world in general, rather than the heavenly city being imaged in 
the appearance of a Gothic church. How is it possible, we might wonder, for 
the sensory world to image the divine nature in this way? I’ll allude just brief-
ly to three possibilities. 
First of all, following the drift of Scruton’s example, we might suppose 
that the thought of the divine nature can enter into the appearance of the 
sensory world, with the result that the sensory world now presents an image 
of the divine nature. In Scruton’s example, the thought of the heavenly city is 
able to enter into the appearance of the Gothic church because city and 
church share certain qualities. Notably, they share the property of spatial or-
ganisation; and accordingly, the appearance of the church can conform to the 
thought of the heavenly city once the organisation of the church, as it is pre-
sented in the relevant perceptual gestalt, is isomorphic with the organisation 
of the heavenly city. Taking up Edwards’s remarks, we might suppose similar-
ly that the qualities of ‘calmness’, ‘sweetness’ and ‘glory’ can be found in the 
world and also, in some suitably adjusted sense, in the divine nature. And in 
turn, we might suppose therefore that the thought of the divine nature can 
inform the appearance of the sensory world in so far as these qualities (of 
calmness and sweetness and glory) assume the requisite prominence in our 
experience of the sensory world. 
We might suppose, secondly, that it is not only the organisation of the 
perceptual field that is relevant here but also its ‘hue’. If I discover that the 
meat which I am chewing derives from Shuttlecock, the pet rabbit, it is not 
only that the taste of the meat will now assume new salience in my expe-
rience of the world. Its intrinsic phenomenal feel will also change, as it comes 
to be experienced as revolting. Here ‘hue’ and salience work together to 
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 Edwards’s remarks are cited by James in The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Hu-
man Nature (London 1911), 248–249. 
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communicate the existential import of this stuff. Edwards is clearly talking 
about a change in the ‘appearance’ of the sensory world, so he has in mind, I 
take it, some transformation in the sensory phenomena, and not simply some 
new assessment of the significance of a given body of sensory appearances. 
And perhaps this transformation can be understood in terms of the ideas of 
salience and also of hue: relevant features of the world (such as its ‘calmness’) 
may now be newly salient, and also the world may come to seem (not revolt-
ing but) newly meaningful, or it may be presented with a new intensity, 
where this quality of meaningfulness or intensity is given directly in the vi-
vidness of the sensory appearances. (Compare the experience of the person 
who has fallen in love, and the associated transformation in the appearance 
of the sensory world in general which is often reported in such cases.) 
Edwards also talks of ‘glory’ in nature. Perhaps this possibility can be 
understood in some measure by reference to the sort of heightened aware-
ness of the natural world which I mentioned before, where the salience of the 
grasses in my perceptual field and their ‘hue’ are both potentially relevant to 
the experience of the scene as compellingly present. I take it that something 
of broadly this kind is also what Hopkins has in mind when we writes that: 
‘The world is charged with the grandeur of God / It will flame out like shining 
from shook foil.’ (These are of course the opening lines of his poem ‘God’s 
Grandeur’.) In this sort of way, we might argue that the thought of God’s na-
ture can enter into the appearance of the sensory world not so much because 
of some isomorphism of spatial structure which unites that nature and the 
relevant perceptual gestalt, but because certain qualities which we might also 
associate with the divine nature can become newly prominent in the sensory 
appearances, and because the sensory world can undergo a correlative shift in 
‘hue’. 
So here are two ways (relative to the ideas of salience and hue) in which 
we might understand how it is possible for the sensory world to image the 
divine nature. A further, related approach to this question might draw on the 
thought, commonly expressed in reports of conversion experience, that the 
sensory world post-conversion is somehow newly ‘real’.6 Perhaps this intensi-
fication in its reality is to be understood simply in terms of its appearing new-
ly glorified in the sense we have just explored. But we might also try to un-
derstand this case by analogy with our experience of everyday sensory things 
when the practical possibilities which they afford are taken to be somehow 
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 Compare the experience of religious melancholiacs who find that reality is in some fashion ‘un-
real’. See James, Varieties, 151. 
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truncated. Matthew Ratcliffe takes up this case in this thought experiment: 
‘Consider experiencing a table without co-included possibilities like seeing it 
from another angle, moving it or sitting on a chair in front of it. Without the 
possibilities of its being accessed from different perspectives, or acted upon, 
it would appear strangely distant, intangible and incomplete.’7 Here, the table 
comes to seem in some measure unreal (or intangible and incomplete) when 
some of the practical possibilities which we would normally associate with it 
fall away. And in a ready sense, the table in that case is indeed less real (than 
it would have been if it had the normal range of potentialities for a table), in 
so far as it is not so capable now of contributing causally to the further un-
folding of the world. In a similar vein, perhaps we can understand the con-
vert’s experience of the sensory world as newly real as a matter of their com-
ing to a new assessment of the causal potentialities of the sensory world, 
where this newly intensified sense of its reality is registered directly in expe-
rience, just as the diminution in the reality of the table in Ratcliffe’s example 
(in the understanding of the subject of the experience) is registered directly 
in experience. And how might religious conversion involve a new assessment 
of the sensory world’s causal potentialities? Well, minimally, perhaps the 
convert has a new sense of God’s activity in the sensory world, and a new 
sense therefore of how the sensory world is caught up into a divinely or-
dained telos. 
This account suggests a third way in which we might understand the 
idea that the world can image God. When it is experienced as newly real, 
perhaps the sensory world can then image God in so far as God is supremely 
real, or ipsum esse subsistens. Here it is not so much that a given concept 
(such as the concept of the divine nature) comes to inhabit the appearance of 
the sensory world in so far as certain features of the world acquire a correla-
tive salience or hue; it is, rather, that our experience of the sensory world is 
now set within a new assessment of its possibilities, and that its appearance 
in general is transformed for this reason. This way of putting the matter sug-
gests that the new assessment of the sensory world’s possibilities comes first, 
and then a consequent change in its appearance. (And this is the ordering of 
things which is suggested by Ratcliffe’s example.) But we might also suppose 
that it is possible to move in the other direction: in Ratcliffe’s terms, a change 
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 Matthew Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality (Ox-
ford 2008), 156. Although he does not use the expression ‘unreal’ in this passage, Ratcliffe associates the 
example he is developing here with the case where a thing is experienced as ‘unreal’. See for example 
the passage which he quotes on the following page. 
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in the appearance of the table may issue in the thought that its causal possi-
bilities have been in some way truncated. 
If we can make some sense of the idea that the divine nature may be im-
aged by the sensory appearances in these various ways, then we might sup-
pose that a similar kind of account can be developed for the believer’s expe-
rience of the sacred site. Here too, the sensory appearances undergo a trans-
formation, with the result that certain material objects become compellingly 
present; and here too, the believer may suppose that the sensory appearances 
now provide a window onto the divine nature.  
In the first section of this paper, we considered the idea that existential 
meanings can be embodied in material contexts, and can be identified and 
appropriately acknowledged in the responses of the body. We have now ex-
tended this discussion by considering the role of sacred sites, of conversion 
experience, and of certain kinds of thought-infused ‘seeing’, in mediating re-
ligious meanings. In these ways, we can make sense of the idea that not only 
‘secular’ meanings but also religiously germane existential meanings can be 
embedded in material contexts, and can be apprehended and acknowledged 
in the requisite habits of seeing and responses of the body. So we have now 
identified a number of ways in which we might elaborate upon the idea that 
there can be ‘material expressions of a spiritual reality’ which can be encoun-
tered and engaged in bodily terms. But this account is still some way re-
moved from the thought that these ‘expressions’ can be taken in relevant cir-




SENSORY EXPERIENCE AND THE EMBODIMENT OF GOD 
In my discussion of Jonathan Edwards’s conversion experience, I con-
centrated on his suggestion that, following his conversion, the divine nature 
was in some fashion imaged in the appearance of the sensory world. But Ed-
wards is interested in more than simply the idea that the sensory world can, 
under appropriate conditions, image the divine nature. As we have seen, he 
remarks that ‘God’s excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to 
appear in everything; in the grass, flowers, and trees; in the water and all na-
ture…’ And although he does not make this point explicitly here, I take it that 
the divine nature’s capacity to appear in these terms is, for Edwards, a conse-
quence of the fact that this same nature sustains the world in being, so that 
SACRAMENTAL SENSIBILITY AND THE ‘EMBODIMENT OF GOD’ 87 
 
its character is in some fashion impressed upon the sensory world. So the 
imaging relation with which Edwards is concerned derives from the fact that 
the thing imaged (namely, the divine nature) is causally present in the image. 
On this point, his example differs from the case where a Gothic church im-
ages the heavenly city. We would be reluctant to say, I think, that the hea-
venly city is present in the Gothic church when the church serves as an image 
of the city. But on Edwards’s account, it makes good sense to say both that 
the divine nature is imaged in the sensory world, and that the divine nature is 
present in the sensory world as that which appears or is made manifest there. 
There is perhaps a rough analogy here with the case where I press a 
piece of cloth to my face so that it reveals the lineaments of my face. In this 
case, the cloth images my face. A second piece of cloth which has just by 
chance fallen into the relevant shape would also present an image of my face. 
But we would not wish to say in this second case that my face ‘appears’ in the 
cloth, or that my face is present in the cloth. But these ways of speaking seem 
to be perfectly in order in the first case, assuming that there is here not only 
an imaging relation, but also a relation of causal sustaining. Suppose that 
there is a third piece of cloth which owes its shape to being pressed to my 
face, but which does not, even so, image my face. (Perhaps it has been 
pressed to my face in a somewhat haphazard way.) Of this cloth too, we 
would be reluctant to say, I think, that my face appears in the cloth. But if we 
can affirm both that the cloth owes its shape right now to the impress of my 
face right now, and that it thereby images my face, then we have some reason 
to use Edwards’s kind of language, and to say that my face ‘appears’ there. So 
here we have one way of developing the thought that it is not simply that the 
divine nature (or some associated reality) may be imaged by the material 
world, but also that the divine nature can appear in, or be bodied forth in, or 
‘embodied in’, the material world in so far as that nature is imaged by the 
material world and is here and now the source of that imaging relation. 
Let me consider briefly one further way of elaborating upon the thought 
that God can be embodied in the sensory world. In Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus 
says to those who have fed the hungry, clothed the naked, and visited prison-
ers that ‘as often as you have done this to one of these my lowliest brothers 
and sisters, you have done it to me’.8 Some commentators have wanted to 
take this passage at its word, and to suppose that when we treat such people 
decently, it’s not just that we treat people who are in the relevant respect like 
                                                 
8
 Matthew 25: 40. I have based this translation on the English rendering of the text given in Ul-
rich Luz, Matthew 21–28: A Commentary, tr. J. E. Crouch (Minneapolis MN 2005), 264. 
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Jesus with decency, but that we treat him decently. To take one example, 
Gregory of Nyssa supposes that since Christ and other human beings share a 
single nature, a person who fails in their regard for another human being will 
thereby fail in their regard for Christ, and for all who can be counted as hu-
man.9 We might put this point by saying, for example, that to insult (gratuit-
ously) a given human being is to insult human nature, and thereby to insult 
each and every human being. On this account, it is not only afflicted human 
beings (those who are hungry and so on) who are drawn into the relevant 
moral relation to Christ, but all of us in so far as we share a single nature. It is 
not difficult to multiply examples of this stronger reading of our text, which 
takes it to mean more than simply ‘like me’, from across the Christian tradi-
tion, though no doubt it remains a minority view.10 Let’s suppose for the sake 
of argument that this reading is warranted. In that case, we have another 
perspective on the thought that God can be embodied in the material world. 
Of course, Christians in general have wanted to say that the Word became 
flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. But on this reading of Matthew’s text, we can also 
say that in our dealings with other human beings in general (and perhaps 
especially in our dealings with afflicted human beings), we encounter Christ 
himself, and therefore God, in so far as Christ is both human and divine. And 
in this extended sense, we may say that God is embodied not only in Christ, 
but in humankind in general. Let’s see if we can press this thought a little 
further. 
We can distinguish the case where I experience another human being as 
a person who is embodied from the case where I experience them as a body 
while bracketing out or perhaps even suppressing any thought of their per-
sonal significance.11 We might take pornographic experience, in so far as it 
brackets out the personhood of the other, to illustrate the second of these 
                                                 
9
 See for instance Gregory’s comment: ‘In condemning the sickness that preys upon the body of 
this man, you fail to consider whether you might be, in the process condemning yourself and all nature. 
For you yourself belong to the common nature of all. Treat all therefore as one common reality.’ The 
passage appears in Gregory’s sermon ‘On the Saying, “Whoever Has Done It to One of These Has Done 
It to Me”’ and is reproduced in Susan R. Holman, The Hungry are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman 
Cappadocia (Oxford 2001), 201. I am grateful to Morwenna Ludlow for this reference. 
10
 A well-known medieval example of the same sort of view can be found in the story of Martin of 
Tours. Having given half his tunic to a beggar, Martin had a dream in which Christ said that it was he 
who had received the tunic. See Luz, Matthew 21–28, 272. See too Sarah Coakley’s discussion of Gregory 
of Nazianzus’s reading of the same passage from Matthew: ‘The Identity of the Risen Jesus: Finding 
Jesus Christ in the Poor’, in Beverly Roberts Gaventa and Richard B. Hays (eds), Seeking the Identity of 
Jesus: A Pilgrimage (Grand Rapids MI 2008), 301–319. 
11
 As Roger Scruton comments, we can distinguish between ‘an interest in a person’s body and an 
interest in a person as embodied’: Scruton, Beauty (Oxford 2009), 47. 
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kinds of experience. Such an experience is evidently very different morally 
and phenomenologically from one which is infused by the recognition of the 
person as a person. So while as a matter of fact, it is a person whom I encoun-
ter in my experience of another human being, this truth may not be manifest 
to me directly in the sensory appearances. Similarly, we might suppose (fol-
lowing Gregory’s reading of our text) that while it is in fact Christ whom I 
encounter in my dealings with another human being, it is a further matter for 
that person’s identification with Christ to be presented to me in the sensory 
appearances. But to the extent that this truth about their relation to Christ 
can be rendered in the person’s appearance, then we may say not only that 
God can be encountered in another human being, by virtue of the incarna-
tion, but also that God can be presented to me as God, or as Christ, in the 
appearance of the person. On this second perspective, God is embodied in 
the sensory order in a particularly radical sense, in so far as the fact of divine 
embodiment is itself manifest in the sensory appearances. 
What would it take for Christ to be presented in the appearance of 
another person? I am not going to pursue this question at any length here, 
but by analogy with the case of the convert who takes the divine nature to be 
presented in the sensory appearances, we might suppose that this Christ-
relative construal of another human being’s identity can be rendered in the 
appearances in some measure in so far as the person and their needs become 
appropriately salient in my perceptual field, and in so far as relevant portions 
of this field take on an appropriate hue. And perhaps my sense of the per-
son’s Christ-relative identity may even mean that they appear to me as more 
fully real, in so far as this conception of their identity also involves a new and 
extended assessment of their causal potentialities. 
 
 
SACRAMENTAL SENSIBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD 
In concluding, let me try to draw out some of the implications of the 
picture we have been exploring for the following themes: the idea of a sacra-
mental sensibility; a conception of the sacraments and ‘ritual’ more narrowly 
defined; and the question of how we should think of ‘magic’. 
I have been arguing that just as in familiar, non-religious cases, we can 
identify and acknowledge existential values through our enacted relationship 
to particular material contexts, so we can identify and acknowledge religious 
values through our relationship to places with relevant histories, sensory 
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qualities and microcosmic significance. In both the secular and the religious 
case, the relevant values will sometimes be apprehended directly in the res-
ponses of the body, as when the sensory qualities of a sacred site have a rela-
tively brute or theory-independent impact on the body, and communicate 
some religious meaning thereby. These values can also be given due ac-
knowledgement in the responses of the body, as when our bodily demeanour 
at a site is calibrated to what we know of its history. The history of a site may 
not be identified directly in bodily terms, but the value which attaches to the 
site in virtue of that history can be acknowledged in our bodily demeanour, 
when we are present at the place; and in some cases our appreciation of what 
kind of bodily demeanour would be most congruent with this history may 
depend upon an intelligence ‘in the body’, rather than upon any process of 
ratiocination. For the more metaphysically adventurous, this sort of account 
can be supplemented by supposing that in sustaining the world, God im-
presses something of the divine nature upon the world, or by supposing that 
by virtue of the incarnation, it is Christ whom we encounter in our relations 
with other people. And we might add that these truths too can be acknowl-
edged and reckoned with not only in abstractly doctrinal terms, but in the 
sensory appearances, in so far as the appearances display the right kind of 
salience or hue, or manifest the right degree of ‘reality’. 
If we understand the idea of a sacramental sensibility in these terms, 
then we can make some sense of the thought that a person’s religious or spi-
ritual life may be realised not simply in what they think in some relatively 
abstract sort of way, but also in their bodily demeanour, and in the sensory 
phenomenology of their experience, in so far as bodily demeanour and phe-
nomenology both constitute ways in which we can recognise and appro-
priately acknowledge ‘material expressions of a spiritual reality’. And in this 
way, we can also make sense of the idea that ‘spiritual practice’ is integral to a 
sacramental sensibility, to the extent that this sort of bodily and experiential 
sensitivity is likely to depend in some measure upon the person’s participa-
tion in relevant bodily disciplines, upon their acquisition and careful dep-
loyment of the requisite concepts, and in general upon a training of their 
powers of attention. 
I have been talking of how religiously significant existential values may 
be embedded in particular material contexts, and speaking of a ‘sacramental 
sensibility’ in this regard. But what of the sacraments more narrowly con-
strued? Thomas Aquinas writes that the sacraments: 
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touch the body and so produce upon it the sort of effects which are connatural 
to them as physical entities. But in the very act of doing so they may also oper-
ate as instruments, producing effects upon the soul in the power of God. For 
instance the water of baptism, by the very fact of washing the body of its own 
connatural power, washes the soul too in virtue of being an instrument of the 
divine power.12 
On this view, in baptism, for example, God does not suspend or displace 
the powers which are ‘connatural’ to water, but instead uses those powers so 
as to bring about an effect that is beyond their unaided reach. So on this 
perspective, water achieves in baptism a kind of heightened reality, in so far 
as it now participates in a more encompassing, divinely ordained network of 
causes. (By contrast, if the powers which are connatural to water were to be 
suspended or displaced in baptism, then there would be a sense in which, in 
the sacramental context, its reality would have been diminished.) So in bapt-
ism, and in the other sacraments, the material order takes on a new and 
heightened significance. And the account we have been developing suggests 
that this sort of truth, here as elsewhere, can be registered and appropriately 
acknowledged not only in discursive terms, as it is in Aquinas’s text, but also 
in our bodily demeanour and in thought-infused experience. So we should 
expect baptism and the other sacraments to be surrounded by relevant forms 
of bodily and conceptual preparation. And this is, we might suppose, part of 
the point of ‘ritual’ in this context. The stylised gestures and forms of words 
which we associate with baptism and the other sacraments do not serve 
simply to instruct us in abstractly conceptual terms of what the sacrament 
signifies. They also help to inform us perceptually, so that in our experience 
of the sacramental scene, and in our registering of its significance in bodily 
terms, the sacrament is fittingly received. Although I shall not develop the 
point here, we might add that the history of the sacraments (and perhaps 
especially of the Eucharist) also calls for acknowledgement in the form of 
relevant gestures and habits of seeing. 
Aquinas’s doctrine of ‘connaturality’ (as he develops it here, in relation 
to the sacraments) points towards a broadly sacramental picture of reality as 
a whole: God acts we might say by setting material things within a larger, 
God-directed teleology, which does not subvert the natural tendencies of 
those things, but draws out those tendencies into a more encompassing set of 
possibilities. This is we might say the nature of divine love: we are invited 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 3a. 62. 1, ad 2, in Summa Theologiae, Vol. 56, The Sacra-
ments, tr. D. Bourke (Blackfriars 1975). 
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hereby into a new set of potentialities which calls for the completion or ful-
filment or perfection (and not the displacement or annihilation) of the po-
tentialities which are ours by nature. And in so far as material things in gen-
eral have that sort of significance (and not only the sort of significance that 
we recognise when they are understood from a purely secular point of view), 
then we should expect there to be a form of life and experience (consisting in 
the relevant kinds of bodily demeanour and habits of perception) in which 
these truths are fittingly identified and acknowledged. 
Lastly, what should we make of magic in that case? Well, the term ‘mag-
ic’ admits of course of many meanings. But if when we think of magic, our 
focus is upon the capacity of words and gestures to effect some transforma-
tion in the material world, then perhaps we should allow that there is a sense 
in which we can speak of, for example, a ‘Christian magic’. This ‘magic’ in-
vites us to engage in certain practices of intellectual and bodily formation, 
and to enter thereby a correlative perceptual world – one which is characte-
rised by its own patterns of salience, and by its own ‘colouring’ and sense of 
reality. And we might add that this sort of magic is especially remarkable – 
for here we are concerned not with a change in some narrowly delimited 
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ABSTRACT 
Within a scientistic view of the world, rituals and sacraments are sus-
pect. They are often invoked as proof of the incompatibility of reli-
gion and modernity. Mark Wynn employs important theoretical and 
phenomenological arguments against this widespread view. These ar-
guments allow for a non-reductionist understanding of everyday and 
religious experience. In my reply I reconstruct these considerations in 
the context of a symbol theory that incorporates insights of philo-
sophical anthropology and the contemporary theory of emotion. In 
this light, metaphorical language about rituals and sacraments as 
embodiments of God or religion can be approached with interpreta-
tive strategies that can take criticisms into account.   
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This paper presents some critical (but constructive) remarks, directed 
less at the arguments put forward by Mark Wynn than at the dismissive atti-
tude toward religious symbols implied by this session’s subtitle, ‘Beyond a 
purely symbolic religion.’ I aim to show that rituals and sacraments make 
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sense as embodiments of God only within – not beyond – symbol theory. My 
approach to symbol theory relies on a framework that departs from symbol 
theory proper, encompassing a whole set of methods for understanding em-
bodied religion. The plausibility of my claim will be measured in large part by 
whether I succeed in reformulating the sense of ‘purely symbolic’ in terms of 
symbol theory.  
Before sketching out my position, I consider Mark Wynn’s nuanced ar-
guments for a theory of religious experience that he believes paves the way 
for an understanding of rituals and sacraments as embodiments of God. I be-
gin with our (many) points of agreement. I then identify some problems that 
lead me to pursue a symbol theory approach to embodied religion.  
 
 
1. MEANINGS AND EMBODIMENTS OF GOD 
Mark Wynn’s text begins with a germane – and, in my view, spot-on – 
observation: the scientistic worldview has the coercive tendency to see rituals 
and sacraments as deficient forms of engagement with the world. According 
to scientism’s naturalist epistemology, rituals and sacraments originate in a 
prescientific stage of civilization superseded by modern empiricism. In this 
view, not only rituals and sacraments but also positive religion itself (of 
which rituals and sacraments are essential embodiments) represent hold-
overs from an outdated era. 
A recent court ruling in Germany offers a forceful example of scientism 
at work. A four-year-old Muslim boy was hospitalized due to complications 
arising from a circumcision procedure he underwent a few days earlier, lead-
ing a local prosecutor to file criminal charges against the doctor who per-
formed the operation. The judges at the regional appellate court in Cologne 
who presided over the case ruled that non-therapeutic circumcision inflicts 
permanent and irreparable damage to the body and without consent is tan-
tamount to criminal assault. A political uproar followed the court’s decision, 
with the vast majority of Germans supporting the legality of ritual male cir-
cumcision. The ruling and the strong public reaction it provoked exemplify 
the conflict between the naturalist epistemology of modern medicine and a 
belief system that makes exceptions for traditional religious rituals. 
According to Wynn, this conflict affects the very foundations of a theory 
of religious experience, and once again I agree. He argues that our idea of 
religious experience must, therefore, reject the assumptions of scientism. 
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That is to say, a philosophy of religion cannot be grounded on a concept of 
experience borrowed from naturalist epistemology. If we did, then religious 
values would wind up becoming isolated phenomena in a scientistic ontology 
and we’d be forced to see them in pejorative light. 
Wynn attributes scientism’s reductionist approach to the analytic tradi-
tion, which, as we all know, was greatly shaped by logical positivism. Before 
anyone raises objections – pointing out the variety of views within the ana-
lytical philosophy of religion and the numerous corrections to logical positiv-
ism that have been offered over the years – we should see Wynn’s claim for 
what it is: a pointed generalization, and in this sense it can hardly be denied; 
quite the contrary. Something like a scientist tendency accompanies the 
West’s entire religious history. In every period of Western civilization, 
movements arose that overemphasized the discursive side of religious experi-
ence and that provoked counter movements in return. For instance, medieval 
scholastics such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham warned against the 
convergence of knowledge and faith, a concern that culminated in Luther’s 
ideas about religious belief. When the intellectualism of Protestant ortho-
doxy grew too powerful, the Pietists sought to ground faith in personal de-
voutness. Any remaining rationalist hopes of securing religion through meta-
physical knowledge were dashed once and for all by Kant, who claimed that 
an unbridgeable gap separated knowledge and faith – a tenet Schleiermacher 
would later take up as well, albeit in an entirely different way. 
How should we address today’s scientist approach to religious experi-
ence, which is far more virulent than its historical manifestations? I want to 
highlight two basic methodological premises made by Wynn that I find su-
premely helpful in this regard. First, Wynn couches his approach to religion 
in a theory of meaning. Religion – however we understand it – has always 
been bound up with meanings we can access through understanding. That is, 
religious or spiritual beliefs always reveal themselves to us as meanings we 
can understand. One particular advantage of seeing religion this way is that it 
spans philosophical traditions, uniting positions in continental theories of 
consciousness, in language philosophy, in theology and in hermeneutics. 
Connected to this approach is Wynn’s second premise: religious under-
standing must be distinguished from everyday understanding. For Wynn, this 
holds true – especially so – even when we acknowledge the structures they 
have in common. 
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This twofold approach shapes Wynn’s very notion of meaning. His con-
cept of ‘existential meanings’ takes into account the fact that we understand 
meanings not only theoretically, discursively and inferentially but also practi-
cally. In our everyday dealings with the world we have a special access to 
meaning that grounds our interactions with the environment. We can at-
tempt to describe these existential meanings abstractly, but such descriptions 
never capture the actual richness of meaning we experience, and, at any rate, 
we rarely think about such everyday meanings on a meta-level. 
For Wynn, existential meanings are tied to two central elements: bodily 
movements and place-relative contexts. Both these elements are crucial for 
religious experience. Just as existential meanings are ‘embedded in particular 
material contexts’ (90) to which we adjust our bodily movements, so too are 
sacraments and rituals. In the second section of his paper, Wynn specifically 
considers the phenomenology of sacred sites. He identifies many parallels 
between the meanings experienced at sacred sites and existential meanings 
in general, which leads him to conclude that the former are a special case of 
the latter. That is to say: not all existential meanings have religious meaning, 
but all religious meanings have existential meaning – the kind we register via 
bodily interactions with a specific place. For Wynn, religious meaning is a 
kind of microcosmic meaning in that it contains a holistic perspective. Mi-
crocosmic meanings may reveal themselves at sacred sites but also in per se 
nonreligious contexts where we feel a spatial relationship to our biography as 
a whole (places of childhood) or where we experience nature in a certain 
light.  
The link between existential and microcosmic meanings forces Wynn to 
consider the epistemic structure of existential meanings in general and of 
microcosmic meanings in particular. In a somewhat surprising move given 
his initial arguments, Wynn does this by turning to the role of concepts. He 
argues that sensory phenomena represent religious meaning only when ab-
stract concepts (divine nature, say) participate in the experience. Yet this 
does not contradict his basic idea that religious experience is not primarily 
theoretical or doctrinal; our abstract religious concepts must inhabit the sen-
sory world and be registered by us directly in experience, which is why on 
several occasions he speaks of the body’s own intelligence (77, 90). Wynn 
seeks to further support his argument with the notions of ‘salience,’ ‘hue,’ and 
the ‘newly real,’ but, to my mind, the main argumentative burden for Wynn 
lies on the previous claims that I reconstruct above and that ultimately 
ground his understanding of sacramental and ritual practice. 
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This brings me to some criticisms of Wynn’s position. I begin with his 
section on ‘Sensory Experience and the Embodiment of God.’ There, if I un-
derstand him correctly, he draws a distinction that tries to account for the 
attitude expressed in the beyond a purely symbolic religion of the session sub-
title. The distinction he makes is between a simple imaging relation and an 
imaging relation in which ‘the thing imagined . . . is causally present in the 
image,’ i.e. one in which divine nature, say, ‘can appear in, or be bodied forth 
in, or “embodied in”, the material world’ (87). In traditional Christian dog-
matics, the later phenomenon concerns the question of God’s ‘real presence,’ 
a question that arises with particular vehemence in the doctrine of the sac-
raments. Wynn supports this distinction with several allusions to creation 
theology – he speaks of ‘causal sustaining’ and God’s ‘sustaining the world’ 
(87, 90) – but the main thrust of his argumentation springs from incarna-
tional Christology.  His claim goes somewhat like this: if Jesus is the incarna-
tion of God, then the sensory appearance of human beings is the embodi-
ment, or manifestation, of God in a real sense. The moral lesson from this 
claim is poignant: the dignity of all persons must be acknowledged based on 
their sensory appearance alone. But this moral argument does not provide a 
sufficient theological justification for Wynn’s position, as it can be argued 
from a universalist standpoint, which needs no theology. Neither does the 
doctrine of incarnation, beset as it is by a whole nest of philosophical prob-
lems. Wynn’s final section, which applies his view to sacraments and rituals, 
provides no additional attempts at justification. Rather, Wynn describes his 
account as something ‘for the more metaphysically adventurous’ (90). With-
out denying in principle the possibility of such a metaphysics, I see Wynn’s 
ontological assumption as unproven. Moreover, the idea of a supernatural 
causality, which runs through medieval theology, contradicts Wynn’s initial 
idea: eschewing the scientistic paradigm when developing a philosophical 
theory of religious rituals and sacraments. 
In the following section, I turn to symbol theory to provide an alterna-
tive account, especially regarding the reality of rituals and sacraments. I be-
gin by asking what exactly Mark Wynn means when he says that existential 
meanings are inhabited, or embedded, in material contexts. In conclusion, I 
offer some thoughts on Wynn’s question about the epistemic character of 
nondiscursive understanding.  
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2. THREE APPROACHES TO EMBODIED RELIGION 
2.1. How do we explain the phenomena of pre-discursive understanding 
described by Wynn, in which we comprehend existential meanings via bodily 
interactions with the world? A good place to look for answers is 20th-century 
philosophical anthropology. One reason its insights are important today is 
that they draw on natural and social sciences to overcome philosophical du-
alism and in doing so unintentionally provide biblical anthropology (espe-
cially Old Testament anthropology) with a new theoretical language. The 
basic tenet of philosophical anthropology is that human beings are ‘open to 
the world.’ Unlike animals, which are rooted in a specific environment, hu-
man beings must actively build a world in response to the challenges of exis-
tence. Culture – the habitat human beings engineer – is their ‘second nature.’ 
Crucially, human interactions with the world rely on mind and body as a sin-
gle unit.1 Sensomotoric feedback loops, an especially important aspect of 
early child development, guide our actions in a mutually reinforcing system 
of sensory perception and motoric orientation.2 Over time, these somatosen-
sory operations lend the objects we perceive a symbolic character: we imme-
diately grasp their usefulness without having to interact with them directly; 
so unburdened, we can focus on adjusting our bodily movements to the exi-
gencies of space. For example, we all know just by looking at a whitewashed 
wall which tactile or gustatory qualities it possesses without having to touch 
or taste it anew. This elementary symbolization takes place already at the 
optical level. Though these optical symbols form at the prelinguistic, or pre-
discursive, level (similar to Wynn’s existential meanings), they can also de-
velop into more complex symbols such as language. 
 
2.2. According to the view of philosophical anthropology, our physical 
orientation in the world is mediated by symbols that do not necessarily start 
                                                 
1
 The sense of body as understood by Wynn and the conference organizers conflates the human 
body as physical object with the human body as a vehicle for experience. The German language 
distinguishes between Körper (the physical object) and Leib (the living body). In Husserl’s 
phenomenology, the concept of Leib plays a central role in  overcoming dualistic anthropology. For 
more on the German notion of Leib, see Emmanuel Alloa a.o. (eds.), Leiblichkeit: Geschichte und 
Aktualität eines Konzepts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 
2
 For more on feedback loops, see Arnold Gehlen, Man, His Nature and Place in the World, trans. 
Clare McMillan and Karl Pillemer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). For more on Gehlen’s 
anthropology and its influence on the philosophy of religion, see Friedrich Ley, Arnold Gehlens Begriff 
der Religion: Ritual – Institution – Subjektivität (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). 
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out linguistic or discursive. Do such symbols play a role in our religious un-
derstanding? Let us recall Mark Wynn’s premise that specific differences exist 
between nonreligious and religious forms of understanding. If symbols make 
religious understanding possible, then there must exist similar differences 
between symbols as well. Now the anthropological notion of the symbol I 
have sketched so far is quite broad. It is equivalent to the definition of cogni-
tio symbolica in the enlightened hermeneutics of Scholastic philosophy, 
which understood the symbol as a cognition mediated by a sign. This unspe-
cific understanding can be found in Schleiermacher’s idea of symbolic action 
or in Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. But there also exists a 
narrower idea of the symbol that restricts it to a certain kind of sign. The bulk 
of this tradition goes back to Immanuel Kant, who understood symbolic cog-
nition as a specific subclass of intuitive cognition (cognitio intuitiva) rather 
than its opposite, as argued by the Scholastics. For Kant, the true antithesis of 
symbolic cognition is discursive cognition, i.e. cognition through concepts.3 
In addition to linking symbolic cognition with intuitive cognition, Kant 
emphasized religion’s need for symbols. Not surprisingly, further contribu-
tions to the philosophy of religion have taken much inspiration from Kant’s 
ideas. For instance, Paul Tillich and Paul Ricœur both essentially argue that 
the language of religion consists of symbols.4 Although Tillich and Ricœur 
start from very different premises,5 they agree for the most part that symbols 
are a class of signs whose indirect and intuitive meaning points beyond itself 
to a secondary, transcendent meaning. Symbols, thus, have a double inten-
tionality. They represent everyday objects but also render sensible that which 
transcends representation. The transcendent meaning of symbols, like 
Wynn’s religious forms of understanding, is not entirely irrational; it displays 
a certain inner logic, which, traditionally, has been understood as a form of 
analogy. The transcendent meaning ultimately exceeds the finite horizon of 
discursive imagination. Here lies the affinity between symbols and religious 
                                                 
3
 On the intellectual history of the symbol, see Andreas Kubik, Die Symboltheorie bei Novalis: 
Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie in ästhetischer und theologischer Absicht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2006), 25–80. 
4
 See Paul Tillich, ‘The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,’ in Writings in the 
Philosophy of Religion (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987), 417 and Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967), 8. 
5
 Tillich relies on a theory of the unconditional; Ricœur takes a phenomenological approach. 
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understanding – and, on the other hand, the reason transcendent meaning 
must be rendered sensible.6 
It should be clear from my brief sketch so far that the phenomena Mark 
Wynn analyses contain classic examples from symbol theory. A distinguish-
ing feature of religious meaning is its ability to transport an experience of 
totality that affects reality as such or signifies in it a deep dimension that 
transcends everyday experience. Religious meaning is not intuitive in itself; 
to be able to imagine it at all, we must register it in sensory form. When 
Wynn argues that meanings ‘are embodied in material contexts,’ he describes 
the basic mechanism of the symbol. 
This why we find at the heart of Wynn’s ideas about the relationship be-
tween sensory appearance and religious understanding the classical topos of 
religious aesthetics: the experience of grandeur, also known as the sublime. 
Kant believes the sublime comes in two forms: the mathematical sublime 
(things that have great magnitude) and the dynamic sublime (things that 
have great power).7  According to Tillich and Ricœur, not only linguistic signs 
can be understood as symbols in the narrower sense of the term; cultic acts 
and rituals can as well. Such activities and objects are made comprehensible 
by virtue of the symbolic function of language. 
Although more can be said about the sublime and its relationship to 
symbolic cognition, I now want to address the suspicion that symbols are 
‘purely’ symbolic – that they inadequately describe God’s reality – as this ses-
sion’s title appears to insinuate. This suspicion is nothing new. As early as 
1925, Tillich addressed misgivings about symbols, and he almost succeeded in 
eliminating them. In his view, the ‘nothing more’ of the symbolic was, in 
truth, a ‘nothing less,’ as without symbols we misjudge actual religious prac-
tice, if not close ourselves off to religious meaning entirely. But the actual 
argument used by Tillich and Ricœur to explain the symbol’s dialectic was 
this: religious meaning can only appear in the form of symbols.8 And, as I 
                                                 
6
 See Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil, 10–18; and Paul Tillich, ‘The Religion Symbol,’ in Writings in 
the Philosophy of Religion, 213–28. 
7
 For more on Kant’s notion of the sublime, see Jean François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of 
the Sublime: Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 23–29, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 98–146. Wynn’s concept of ‘hue’ corresponds to that of the sublime (12); his 
notions of ‘salience’ (11) and ‘the newly real’ (12–13) describe the mathematical sublime and the dynamic 
sublime, respectively.  
8
 Tillich implies so much in his Religionsphilosophie when he chooses to discuss symbolic action 
and language not in the first part (‘The Essence of Religion’) but in the second, titled ‘The Philosophical 
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have argued, religious meaning is embodied in actions, objects and words 
whose intuitive meanings are finite. Indeed, on close examination, we dis-
cover that symbols need reality. It is precisely in this sense that we refere to 
the transcendent through symbols without representing the transcendent as 
itself as ‘purely’ symbolic. This paradox between the infinite meaning of con-
tent and the finite meaning of form explains also the need from within posi-
tive religion to criticize its own finite manifestations. Think of the positions 
taken in the Jewish prophecy movement, in Early Christianity, in Monasti-
cism, in the Christian sects, in Protestantism, or in the conflicts about the 
status of the sacraments. The telos of religious history in this respect is the 
full awareness of the symbol as symbol in the symbol. For Tillich it is at least 
the concrete, Christological symbol of a self-sacrificing intermediary that is 
paradigmatic; but so too are rituals, which as active performances prevent 
symbolic meaning as it pertains to objects from coagulating, so to speak. 
Both these examples – Christ as sacrifice and rituals as active performances – 
make explicit that even the most inverted symbols need a meaning in every-
day reality to express transcendent meaning. This point was best emphasized 
by Ricœur, who in his hermeneutics of symbols also demonstrated its truth.  
 
2.3. We are left with the question as to the epistemology of symbolic 
understanding. As I mention above, Wynn too poses this question and hints 
that its answer lies in concepts, which he believes both inform our sensory 
experiences of religious meaning and develop from them. But this suggestion, 
as well as Wynn’s idea that we are guided by the ‘body’s own intelligence,’ 
does not identify the specific epistemic form of religious understanding.  
The beginnings of a real answer, I argue, can be taken from recent stud-
ies in the philosophy of emotion, and I believe Wynn would follow me in this. 
Unlike previous generations of theorists, in the last 15 years or so philoso-
phers have sought to prove that emotions posses a specific form of rationality 
or intelligence.9 Despite their many differences, they all agree that emotions 
neither result from propositional or discursive beliefs nor represent subjec-
                                                                                                                                         
Doctrine of Appearance.’ See Paul Tillich, Religionsphilosophie, in Gesammelte Werke, I (Stuttgart: 
Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959), 294–364.  
9
 See, for instance, Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1987); Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: OUP, 2000); and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). 
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tive states or desires. Rather, emotions are states that represent and evaluate 
objects in a specific sort of way. But what these philosophers deliberately 
overlook is that this understanding of emotions was already put forth in the 
classic texts of religious phenomenology. The German theologian Rudolf 
Otto, for instance, rejects the idea that the emotion of the numinous is an 
irrational condition existing only in opposition to rationality. Instead he ar-
gues that it is a ‘category of value and [...] a definitely “numinous” state of 
mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied.’10 In our emo-
tional response to experience, the world – and with it, our very selves – ap-
pears in a new ‘hue,’ to borrow Wynn’s expression. From this perspective, 
emotions can be seen as mental correlates of religious symbols and as forms 
of religious understanding. Neither for Otto nor for recent philosophers of 
emotion does this perspective speak in favour of irrationalism. Rather, it pro-
vides a more complete idea of rationality, including the rationality of reli-
gious symbols. And since emotions belong to the embodied soul we have a 
quite narrow sense of embodied religion. 
                                                 
10
 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the 
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In this contribution I explain what the libertarian conception of free 
will is, and why it is of moral and religious importance. Consequently, 
I defend this conception of free will against secular and religious 
charges. After that, I present and evaluate neuroscientific experi-
ments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s experiments. I argue 
that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate between compati-
bilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will; that is a conceptual 
issue and not an empirical one. Nor do Libet’s experiments count 
against the libertarian conception of free will that I defend, because 
they deal with arbitrary actions rather than actions that we do for a 
reason.  I conclude by summing up the case for a libertarian concep-
tion of free will, giving attention especially to a religious reason for 
preferring this conception. 
 
KEYWORDS 
free will, libertarianism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, Benjamin Libet 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the 21st century, neuroscience is booming and in its 
wake, belief in free will is on the decline. In this contribution I will inquire (1) 
how free will and morality are connected and (2) how free will and Christian 
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faith are connected. Moreover, (3) I will give a brief survey of neuroscientific 
findings on free will. Consequently, (4) I will discuss the claim that Christian 
faith and/or morality are threatened by neuroscientific findings on free will. 
To what extent is this the case? In light of the complexity of the field, it is 
inevitable that I simplify some of the issues. If, however,  I succeed in provid-
ing a conceptual map of the main issues, in demythologizing some contem-
porary myths and in indicating what are the main issues that deserve further 
discussion in the philosophy of religion, I will consider my mission for this 
contribution to be completed. 
 
FREE WILL: INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATIONS 
A quarter of an hour ago, at 7:30 on 27 February 2012, I have begun to 
write down my paper for the ESPR conference 2012. Though the deadline for 
this paper has already elapsed and the second speaker of the ESPR session on 
neuroscience and free will is eagerly awaiting my first paper, I might have 
postponed the writing of the paper even further. I decided, however, that fur-
ther postponement would be irresponsible and I started writing. Now let’s 
step back and take a look at what I have just said. I have claimed that the fact 
that I started to write this paper did not just happen to me, was not the result 
of a chain of events inevitably leading to it (e.g., mail exchanges with Peter 
Jonkers and Aku Visala), but was the result of my decision. In my experience, 
it was I who took the decision; I am in charge and responsible, both for the 
fact that there is a delay and for the fact that there is to be no further delay. I 
am aware, of course, that external factors have influenced me. If I had not 
received reminders I would probably have given precedence to yet another 
paper. Nevertheless, the fact that I have begun today is the result of my deci-
sion.  
This is, I submit, what is involved in a common sense view of free will. 
Note that the word ‘will’ does not appear in this account. It is not needed. 
The point is that ordinarily, I take my decisions and commit my actions. I just 
added ordinarily, because most people would claim that this is the default 
position, but would have no problem in admitting that there would be excep-
tions. Under the influence of alcohol, for instance, people apparently do 
things that they would ordinarily not have done: Alcohol reduces our control.  
That is one of the reasons why we should control our consumption of alco-
hol. Medicine may have a similar effect – even though we may not be aware 
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of that when taking it – and so may some psychological conditions. These 
exceptions do not endanger the default position that I am in control. Moreo-
ver, most people would readily admit that even under ordinary circums-
tances, they do not control themselves entirely. Our actions are rooted in a 
bodily basis, a physiological pattern that is given to us, perpetuating itself 
automatically. This stable pattern of bodily activity – heart beat, respiration, 
blood circulation – may be under our control to a very limited extent only (if 
I stop these processes, that is the end of my career as an agent), but that is 
not considered as threatening my control. As Thomas F. Tracy has argued, 
‘this stable pattern of bodily activity provides the foundation for the life of an 
agent because it permits a margin of intentional variation.’ 1 In other words, 
our actions are rooted in a bodily substrate that is to a large extent given to 
us; this does not threaten our being agents but enable it, as long as we are 
able to control our body to some extent. The more control, the more freedom 
to act. That is why we take trouble to increase the control of our bodies 
(whether it is in learning to walk or in learning to play the piano): it increases 
our range of actions. 
The above may be summarized as follows: freedom is always freedom of, 
freedom to and freedom from, and freedom involves control. Freedom of: A 
free act is not an arbitrary act; it is the act of someone. My action is explained 
by me, by my decision. In many cases those who know me can to a certain 
extent predict me. Freedom to: It is the freedom to start writing a paper or to 
delay that start; more generally, it is the ability to do something or to abstain 
from it. Freedom from: Freedom is always freedom from compulsion: when I 
am free, the causal antecedents of my action do not make that action inevita-
ble. Control: If the agent does not control the action, but the action is ran-
dom, it is not free. Absolute freedom, then, does not exist.  
In our daily lives, we consider freedom to be important. Why? On a se-
cular level, I think, because we see freedom as a necessary condition for re-
sponsibility: No responsibility without control. If an agent does not act freely, 
she cannot be held responsible for her actions. In other words, persons who 
are not free from compulsion or who did not have alternatives, cannot be 
held responsible. This also means that our legal system is based on the as-
sumption that in principle, people are free. To the extent that they are not, 
they are in a state of diminished responsibility and qualify for reduction of 
                                                 
1
 Thomas F. Tracy, God, Action and Embodiment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 104. 
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sentence. Freedom is important in other domains of life as well. Our whole 
way of thinking about love and friendship assumes that we are free to chose 
with whom we will have these relationships. The fact that a person freely 
chooses me for a friend is one of the things that makes his friendship valua-
ble for me. And the fact that I am free to return his friendship or not is one of 
the things that make my positive response valuable to him. Moreover, one of 
the most influential ideals in contemporary society, that of autonomy, pre-
supposes that we are free. We can be autonomous only to the extent that our 
actions are truly our own and are not caused by factors outside our control, 
i.e., in so far as we are free. The same applies to the political ideal of democ-
racy: people are allowed to choose their own government on the presupposi-
tion that when they choose, this choice is their choice, so that the resulting 
government expresses the will of the people. 
On a religious level, freedom and responsibility are not less important. 
Theists generally think that it matters what we believe and that it matters 
that we live according to our beliefs. They may even think that our final des-
tiny depends upon it. Now if that is the case, we must again be responsible 
and therefore free. Even those who do not think that our final destiny de-
pends upon the decisions we make during our lives, however, will often argue 
that it is of paramount importance that we return the love of God and that 
we love our neighbors. And here again, love requires freedom. Moreover, free 
will may – but need not – play a role in various contexts in theology and phi-
losophy of religion, for example in a free will defence, an attempt to reconcile 
the existence of evil with the existence of a good, omnipotent and omniscient 
God by arguing that evil is due to human free actions for which God cannot 
be held responsible. 
 
FURTHER CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATIONS: THREATS TO BELIEF IN FREE WILL2 
Free will may be important, but there are a number of reasons not to be-
lieve that we actually have free will. These reasons again fall apart into two 
groups: secular reasons and religious reasons.  
                                                 
2
 For the philosophical distinctions introduced in this section see current introductions to free 
will like Joseph Keim Campbell, Free Will (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); T.J. Mawson, Free Will: A 
Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2011); Ted Honderich (ed.), The Determinism and Free-
dom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm (visited 5 May 2012). 
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Secular reasons for not believing in free will are motivated by science. 
Science seeks to explain things, and in the course of doing so it lays bare 
causal sequences: chains of cause and effect. It is useful to be aware here of 
the fact that causal explanation hardly ever involves single causes: mostly, it 
is a causal condition rather than a single cause that explains an effect. If I 
turn the light switch, that may be called the cause of the room becoming il-
luminated; nevertheless, the room would still in darkness if the Electricity 
Company would not supply electricity, if my wife would not have paid the 
bills, etc. etc. A full causal explanation is almost always complicate rather 
than simple. A full causal complication, moreover, does not only include 
causes, but also the causes of these causes etc. In principle, for each cause 
science may legitimately ask for the cause of that. It is here that a tension 
with belief in free will emerges, for as we have just seen, this belief supposes 
that the explanation of free actions has an end in the person who acts, or in 
that person’s free will. If I claim that I did a certain action, I do not claim my 
act of will is a full explanation for that action; circumstances like those just 
mentioned (e.g., there being electricity) will invariably figure in full explana-
tions of my actions. But I do claim that my choice is not explained by a chain 
of cause and effect that stretches back for an indefinite time: It was I who 
made the choice or committed the action, and if this is merely an appropria-
tion of a particular part of a chain of causes and effects that in no way differs 
from other chains of cause and effect like those determining the weather or 
the orbits of the planets, it becomes meaningless to claim that my act is a free 
act.  
This comes down to the claim that free will and determinism are in-
compatible, a claim that I would like to defend. I defend indeterminism with 
respect to human choices and actions, therefore; I do not take position here 
with respect to the choice between determinism and indeterminism in a 
more general or cosmic way. Indeterminism with respect to human choices 
and actions is compatible both with cosmic determinism and cosmic inde-
terminism, I submit.3 It is important to note, however, that in the philosophi-
cal literature on free will and determinism another position is frequently de-
fended: Simultaneous acceptance of determinism and free will, made possible 
by a revised, more limited definition of free will. Because this view of free will 
                                                 
3
 In that case, of course, cosmic determinism becomes determinism with an exception: Free will. 
From now on, I will use ‘(in)determinism’ in the limited sense of (in)determinism with respect to hu-
man choices and actions only, not in the wider sense of cosmic (in)determinism. 
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is compatible with determinism, it is called the compatibilist view of free will. 
Compatibilists assert that if an action is voluntary in the sense that we are not 
compelled to do it against our will, that action is free. Most philosophers 
would admit that determinism leaves room for actions that are free in this 
sense: Determinism asserts that insofar as we have a will, that will is the ef-
fect of a causal sequence (genetic factors and environmental factors) as well, 
but it does not assert that our actions take place against that will. For these 
philosophers, this compatibilist form of free will is sufficient for responsibil-
ity. For them, I would say, appropriation of the action is more important than 
control or origination (in the sense of having done the action while being 
able not to do the action). 
The opposite of compatibilism is incompatibilism; incompatibilists de-
fend libertarian free will, that is to say they defend that if a person freely 
commits an action, this person should have been able to act otherwise as 
well. Mere identification with an action is insufficient for full responsibility, 
incompatibilists hold. We generally hold that this applies to other persons’ 
actions: identifying with someone else’s terrorist attack is morally repugnant, 
but does not bring full moral and legal responsibility for that attack with it. 
Incompatibilists hold that this also applies to one’s own actions: if one could 
not avoid one’s own actions because these are fully causally determined, 
identification with or appropriation of these actions does not suffice to make 
one fully morally and legally responsible.  I am not going to argue in full for 
this view here. I suggest, however, that most compatibilists will to a certain 
extent share my intuition with respect to identification being insufficient for 
responsibility; the reason they nevertheless reject a libertarian view of free 
will is that they judge that it is either indefensible in light of the findings of 
science, or has never yet been articulated in a philosophically acceptable way. 
By confronting some of the scientific findings that are the most difficult to 
accommodate within a libertarian view of free will, those of the Libet experi-
ments, later on in this paper, I hope to take away at least part of their objec-
tions to libertarian free will. 
Religious reasons for not believing in free will are motivated by the 
Christian understanding of either God’s foreknowledge, providence or pre-
destination. Providence and predestination, if they are well understood, con-
stitute no problems for free will, I submit.  When we say that God is provi-
dent, we say that God guides nature, history and individual lives in accor-
dance with God’s goals. If we are determinists as outlined above, we may be-
lieve that God can fully determine nature, history and individual lives; if we 
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are not, we can interpret God’s providence in terms of a salvific influence that 
in no way hinders free will. Predestination is about one’s eternal destiny 
rather than about one’s free choices; this doctrine wants to assert that human 
salvation is entirely dependent upon God, not upon human choice. Contrary 
to what is often thought, even the strictest form of predestination, double 
predestination, is compatible with libertarian free will. Predestinatarian the-
ologies do assert that there are limits to free will, of course: one cannot will 
oneself to salvation. That there are limits to free will, however, is a general 
given of experience: I cannot by the exertion of free will jump to the moon or 
become a marathon champion either, because the first is impossible and the 
second is impossible for me, given my lack of talents in this field.  
Foreknowledge is a different cup of tea, I think, because the assertion of 
full foreknowledge does create problems for libertarian free will. If God 
knows all free acts in advance, these acts are determined when God knows 
them and the actors lack the ability to act otherwise. For determinists this is 
not a problem; it is merely another argument against libertarian free will. 
Incompatibilists like myself have two options available. Firstly, they may – 
with Augustine and Boethius – assert that God does not exist in time but 
eternally, which means that He lacks temporal location and extension. Fore-
knowledge is then no longer foreknowledge; God does not know in time. In-
genious attempts have been made to show how eternal existence can yield 
omniscience with respect to temporal events and (free) actions even if de-
terminism is not true.4 Personally, I don’t believe that these attempts work; as 
soon as one uncovers their hidden inconsistencies, a hidden determinism is 
uncovered as well.5 That is why I opt for another possibility: God has limited 
knowledge of the future only: ‘It is logically impossible for God to know with 
certainty the future choices to be made by free persons. This should not be 
seen as a denial of omniscience, any more than it is a denial of omnipotence 
that God cannot perform actions that are logically impossible.’6  
Though there is a tension between divine foreknowledge and libertarian 
free will, then, there is no need to resolve this tension in such a way that lib-
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 Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann, ‘Eternity,’ The Journal of Philosophy 78/8 (August 1981), 
429–458, reprinted in: Thomas V. Morris (ed.), The Concept of God (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 219–252. 
5
 Marcel Sarot, ‘Omniscient and Eternal God,’ in: M. Wisse, M. Sarot & W. Otten (eds.), Scholas-
ticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of Willem J. van Asselt (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 280-302. 
6
 William Hasker, ‘Analytic Philosophy of Religion,’ in: William J. Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 421–446, quot. 437. 
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ertarian free will is denied. Since I have argued above that libertarian free will 
is important to theism, the upshot of the religious considerations concerning 
libertarian free will seems to be in favour of it. It seems that the findings of 
science are a more serious problem for those who want to ascribe libertarian 
free will to human beings than the beliefs of Christendom. Let us now turn, 




BENJAMIN LIBET’S EXPERIMENTS ON FREE WILL 
Benjamin Libet’s experiments on free will did not come out of the blue. 
In these experiments, he built on earlier experiments that suggested that 
conscious awareness of certain brain processes was delayed by 500 millisec-
onds, and that people in hindsight often think that their conscious experi-
ences took place at an earlier moment than they in fact did (‘backward refer-
ral’).7 In the most famous experiment in which Libet brings empirical evi-
dence to bear on the question whether we have free will,8 he starts from the 
fact that if people perform self-initiated voluntary acts, like a quick flexion of 
the fingers or wrist, a DC system with an active electrode on the scalp can 
measure a slow electrical change at the vertex that precedes the actual 
movement by up to 1 second or more. This electrical change is called the 
readiness potential (RP). In other words, approximately a second elapses be-
tween the first perceptible brain change (RP) and the actual movement. Libet 
knew, as we all know, that our conscious decision to move precedes our 
movements. He doubted, however, whether the time between conscious de-
cision and actual movement is as long as a second. If the time was smaller, 
that would mean that brain changes leading to the movement were begin-
ning before the conscious decision was made. In order to ascertain whether 
this really is the case, he devised an ingenious clock, an oscilloscope timer, 
which has a dot that moves at approximately 25 times the speed of the 
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 On these experiments, see Adina L. Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free 
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sweep-second hand of an ordinary clock. The ‘seconds’ at the dial of this 
clock were equivalent to about 40 milliseconds. Experiments show that sub-
jects using such a clock can report the actual time at which a weak electrical 
stimulus was delivered to their skins with an error of only -50 milliseconds. 
When Libet asked subjects to indicate the moment of their actual conscious 
decision at this clock, he found that RP started 550 milliseconds before the 
act, human subjects became aware of the intention to act 350–400 msec after 
RP and 200 msec before the actual motor act. Even admitting an error of -
50msec, this would still place the conscious decision firmly after the RP.  
Many scholars conclude from Libet’s experiments to free will scepticism, 
so much so that Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith Sutherland 
write that  
Much of the contemporary case for the illusory nature of free will is derived 
from the experimental work of Libet and his colleagues9 
and Tim Bayne calls  
Libet’s studies concerning the neural basis of human agency … the most influ-
ential rebutting [of free will – MS] objection in the current literature.10  
Libet’s alleged objection is reinforced by more recent experiments, that sug-
gest that we can view the process leading to free acts begin up to ten seconds 
before the act.11 Thus, the indications that free will – if we may continue to 
call the process through which we make our decisions thus – is rooted in 
brain processes that precede (and partly elude) consciousness, become 
stronger and stronger. On the other hand, as John Searle has noted, ‘This ex-
perience of free will is very compelling, and even those of us who think it is 
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an illusion find that we cannot in practice act on the presupposition that it is 
an illusion.’12 
Libet himself is a clear example of this. He concludes from his experi-
ment:  
The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious 
function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is there-
fore not excluded. These findings put constraints on views of how free will may 
operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act, but it could control performance 
of the act.13 
In other words, Libet suggests that free will is not nonexistent, but operates 
in a different way: it does not generate our decisions but controls them. If it 
wants to, free will interrupts the process leading to our acts and thereby pre-
vents them. If it endorses the act, free will gives in to the process leading to 
it. In the literature this is sometimes characterized as freedom of won’t rather 
than freedom of will.14 
There’s a host of technical questions that could be asked about the reli-
ability of Libet’s experiments. Libet may have been the first to engage in sig-
nificant empirical research on free will, but novel research designs are prone 
to contain errors that have to be corrected by later generations of research-
ers. There’s the technical question, for example, if subjects who are required 
to divide their attention between their own action and position of the clock 
face are not likely to make errors in temporal order judgements.15 There’s the 
not less technical, but crucial question whether RP reflects processes in-
volved in initiating a movement or in forming a conscious intention.16 Since 
we are often unaware of our intentions (e.g., I am aware of driving, steering, 
accelerating, changing gear, etc. but not of the intentions to do all these 
things), becoming conscious of the intention (as required in Libet’s experi-
ments) may often temporally follow the intention itself – even though we 
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would ordinarily call the intention itself a ‘conscious intention.’ If that is the 
case, we can ask: Is Libet measuring the interval between conscious intention 
and movement, or between consciousness of conscious intention and move-
ment?17 While all of these questions on Libet’s experiments can be seen as 
throwing doubt on his results and thus supporting libertarian free will, some 
empirical questions go in the opposite direction. For example, if brain proc-
esses precede our conscious decision to act, is it not likely that brain proc-
esses also precede our conscious processes to veto an act? In what sense do 
we have ‘free won’t,’ then?18 I abstain from an in-depth discussion of these 
questions for three reasons. (1) Scientists themselves have not come to defini-
tive decisions on these. (2) As long as scientists disagree, philosophers cannot 
do much more than pick and choose, and that with less authority than a sci-
entist making such a choice would have. (3) We don’t need answers to all of 
these questions for our purposes. 
The main reason why we don’t need these answers is that the type of ac-
tions that is studied in Libet’s experiments and the like, is neither morally 
nor religiously relevant. Spontaneously generated simple motor movements 
that have no real consequences do qualify as free acts for those who believe 
in free acts; there is no question about that. Nor is it difficult to understand 
why Libet studies this type of movements:  In order to shed experimental 
light on the genesis of free actions, Libet focuses on the simplest examples. 
The whimsical movements that he studies, however, are hardly meaningful 
examples of free agency. It is not even clear that Libet studies the relation 
between the intention to act and the act itself. The subjects in Libet’s experi-
ments are in fact invited to adopt a certain mental set, namely move wrist at 
random moment. The decision they have to make after this is not whether to 
move, but when to. And there are no reasons that govern this decision.19  
It is not with pointless movements that religion and morality are con-
cerned. They are concerned, rather, with our ability to act for a reason, and 
for a reason that we consider good. They are concerned with acts that are 
rooted in our deepest convictions and are the result of conscious delibera-
tion. It is not clear that Libet-experiments shed any light on these. Adina 
Roskies concludes: 
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Arbitrary action is, at best, a degenerate case of freedom of the will. … Suppose 
… that it turned out that in purely arbitrary cases in the absence of reasons (in-
cluding foreseeable consequences of those actions), actions were the results of 
random fluctuations in the nervous system, and suppose further that in all 
cases in which there are reasons  relevant to the decision to act, we responded 
appropriately to these reasons, deliberating and weighing them, and then regu-
lating our actions so as to bring them in line with our deliberations.  Would we 
conclude on the basis of the random mechanisms that caused actions in cases 
where our actions had no consequences that we lacked freedom?20 
The answer is, of course: No. If this is how things stand, in the cases that 
matter we do have the relevant form of freedom. Consider the following ex-
ample: While dusk is beginning to fall, a couple is taking a stroll in the forest 
near their home. Towards the end of their walk, one of them believes that she 
has heard a women crying. They stand still and listen together, briefly discuss 
what might be the case and then run together into the direction from which 
the voice is coming. Up to then, their walk did not have a moral significance; 
even if their route had been the result of random fluctuations in their nerv-
ous systems, that is hardly relevant to the question whether they really have 
free will. The decision they make when they hear the cries, however, is mor-
ally relevant; and it this decision turned out to be the result of random fluc-
tuations rather than conscious deliberations, this would be very relevant to 
the question whether they have free will. On this type of decisions, however, 
Libet-type experiments do not shed much light. 
 
 
THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON FREE WILL 
Benjamin Libet is perhaps the most prominent among those who bring 
empirical research to bear on questions of free will, but he is certainly not the 
only one: Robert Kane, Daniel Dennett and Daniel Wegner should be men-
tioned here as well.21 The reason that I don’t analyse their views here is that 
the above discussion of Libet’s experiments suffices to give us some insight 
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into both the value and the limits of empirical research on free will. Discus-
sion of more scholars and their positions would in this respect yield no new 
insights. 
We have seen that empirical research sheds some light on the question 
to what extent acts that in ordinary life we would call ‘free’ are causally de-
termined by processes other than conscious decisions. I write ‘some light’ 
because we have seen that Libet’s research concerns only a limited class of 
free actions – random and pointless bodily movements – and not the type of 
free actions that we would ordinarily consider of paramount importance: acts 
of moral or religious significance that are preceded by serious conscious de-
liberation. The current limitations of empirical research into free will, how-
ever, are not limitations of principle but of practice. This type of research is 
still in its infancy and we have good reason to suppose that in the long run it 
will provide fuller and more reliable data about Libet-type of actions and, 
moreover, will provide data about more central examples of exertion of the 
free will as well. It may well be the case, then, that in the long run the issue of 
determinism versus indeterminism will be empirically decidable. 
This, however, does not apply to the issue of compatibilism versus in-
compatibilism. The issue that is at stake here is not to what extent our ac-
tions are in fact determined,  but under which circumstances we are prepared 
to call an action free (and blame of praise a person for it) and under which 
circumstances not. That’s an issue on which we have to make up our minds 
on philosophical grounds and that cannot be decided by empirical research. 
Empirical research should settle the question to what extent our actions are 
determined; philosophy should help us settle whether we should call our ac-
tions free.22  
We have seen above that absence of coercion is insufficient for incom-
patibilists. Incompatibilists assert that an action is free only if the actor might 
have acted otherwise if s/he had wanted to. In other words, incompatibilists 
assert that an action is free if and only if (1) it is at least partly explained by a 
conscious decision of the actor, (2) the actor was capable of deciding other-
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wise, so that the action in question would not have taken place, and (3) the 
decision of will itself cannot restlessly be explained from its causal antece-
dents. Incompatibilists therefore assume that free agency requires conscious 
states to be causally efficacious in producing an action in a way that cannot 
be restlessly explained in terms of genetics, environment, etc. Whether this is 
really required for free agency is a conceptual question to be discussed in phi-
losophy; whether this type of freedom actually obtains in our world, is an 
empirical question to be settled by science. 
Given the current scientific state of affairs, where does this bring us? 
Firstly, above I have distinguished between cosmic determinism and deter-
minism with respect to human will. On the standard interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, cosmic determinism has been proven false, with quantum 
indeterminacy as the exception.23 Secondly, quantum indeterminacy does not 
suffice to prove that we have libertarian free will. It is not clear that quantum 
determinacy leads to indeterminacy at the level of phenomena that are ob-
servable with the naked eye, while that is the level at which we would like 
our free will to have effect.24 Moreover, even if higher level indeterminacy 
could be proven, that could be explained by chance rather than by volitional 
control. The fact that there is an exception to cosmic determinism does un-
dermine determinism, however. Thirdly, as I have shown in my discussion of 
Libet’s experiments, science is still a long way off from proving key examples 
of libertarian free will an illusion. In the absence of decisive scientific evi-
dence, other considerations should guide our decision on the issue of free 
will. Fourthly, one such consideration may be introspection, which – in the 
absence of scientific evidence to the contrary – provides a ‘very compelling’ 
argument in favour of libertarian free will. Fifthly, a second such considera-
tion is provided by the conceptual link between moral responsibility and lib-
ertarian free will. Until now, no convincing example has been given in which 
we would without hesitation hold someone without libertarian free will re-
sponsible for her actions.  
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FINAL CONSIDERATION 
Those who reject libertarian free will mostly do so because of scientific 
reasons: they believe that science rules out the possibility that conscious de-
cisions that are themselves at least partly independent of (material) causal 
antecedents, decide our courses of action. However, while it is true that sci-
ence has not proven that conscious decisions are causal factors, it cannot rule 
them out either. And while it is true that on scientific grounds one cannot 
rule out the possibility that conscious decisions are epiphenomena of other 
conditions that can be studied empirically, one cannot prove them to be so 
either. Empirically, it is impossible to prove that consciousness is always and 
under all circumstances consciousness of  a body and originated by that body. 
Moreover, for those who believe in a conscious God or other supernatural 
conscious beings, this seems a very unpromising position to adopt. For it 
would imply that God could be no more than a function of this world (aliquid 
mundi)25, that He could in no way act or know or be independently of the 
world, and that He could neither begin to exist before creation began to exist, 
nor continue to exist after creation had stopped to exist. Therefore it seems 
that those philosophers of religion who defend the existence of a God who 
exists independently of the world, have good reason to defend the existence 
of libertarian free will as well. 
We have seen above that both morality and theism seem to require lib-
ertarian free will. Contrary to what is often thought, neuroscientific experi-
ments on free will like those of Benjamin Libet give us little reason to reject 
the idea that human beings have libertarian free will. Therefore these find-
ings do not undermine morality and religion either. 
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I take it that Christian theology affirms human free will and moral 
responsibility. Thus, Christians need to reject all views that entail either hard 
determinism or fatalism. If hard determinism is true, we have no free will or 
moral responsibility. If fatalism is true, there is nothing we can do to influence 
how the future will turn out. Against these views, Christian theologians affirm 
that we are indeed responsible and free and can influence the future. Now, two 
questions are before us: first, do we need libertarian free will to account for 
what Christians affirm or is compatibilism enough; and second, will 
neuroscience make any difference in this issue. 
In his paper, Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience, prof. Marcel 
Sarot argues that we need not give up our belief in libertarian freedom 
because of theological or neuroscientific reasons. On the theological side, he 
argues that God’s providence and foreknowledge do not conflict with 
libertarian free will. With respect to foreknowledge, he adopts the Open 
Theist position: namely, that propositions about future free actions do not 
have truth-values, so even God cannot know them. On the scientific side, 
according to him, one major reason for rejecting libertarian free will is the 
work of Benjamin Libet (and other neuroscientists). He then presents 
arguments for the conclusion that Libet’s experiments only deal with actions 
that are morally irrelevant; morally relevant actions, Sarot claims, are much 
more complicated than the actions that Libet studies, so Libet’s experiments 
say very little about moral responsibility. Major threats to libertarian free will 
are thus removed. 
Although I agree with the general thrust of Sarot’s paper – especially his 
criticisms of Libet’s experiments and their interpretation – I am prepared to 
play the devil’s advocate here. I will argue that Sarot lets the libertarian off the 
hook a bit too easily and simplifies the compatibilist position unjustifiably. So, 
I think that a much stronger case for theistic compatibilism can be made – a 
case that is not so easily defeated. I will not present a complete case for 
Christian compatibilism here, but I will be presenting some reasons for it. 
Before I go on, I want to say that I am not a card-carrying Christian 
compatibilist (or at least not yet). But I do think that there are some good 
reasons for Christians to be compatibilists and that there are good arguments 
against theistic libertarianism. I also want to highlight the fact that 
neuroscience does not, I think, feature in these arguments. Whether these 
arguments – all things considered – warrant compatibilism over libertarianism 
or whether the libertarian position could be formulated in such a way to make 
it immune to criticisms I will present I am not sure. 
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My article has three parts. In the first part, I will argue that there are 
some theological reasons for compatibilism. These reasons have to do with 
providence, grace and human sin. Further, I will present some criticisms of 
Sarot’s solution to the problem of free will and foreknowledge. In the second 
part, I will take issue with some of the more philosophical aspects of Sarot’s 
libertarianism. Sarot has failed to discuss the biggest obstacle to a libertarian 
theory of free will, the issue of randomness or arbitrariness. Finally, in the 
third part I will present some arguments in support of Sarot’s position on 




As I said, the contest is in between libertarians and compatibilists. For 
the sake of clarity, let me briefly say what I mean by these views.1  
First of all, determinism is the view that for any S’s action A (or choice or 
decision) at some time is necessitated by antecedent factors. What is meant by 
‘necessitated’ here is that there are some conditions such that if those 
conditions occur, then S’s action A will always occur. In other words, the 
conditions – whatever they are – make it necessary for S’s action A to occur.  
This way of defining determinism has the benefit of being rather liberal 
as to what the necessitating antecedent factors are. In the scientific case, these 
factors would be antecedent physical events and physical laws, but there 
might be other conditions as well. More specifically, some neuroscientists 
think that our actions are not necessitated by general physical laws and events, 
but instead our brain events and laws governing those events. Finally, a 
religious person could believe that there is a God that necessitates our actions. 
Or one might believe in some other, non-personal force, like fate. Let us call 
these views scientific determinism, neurodeterminism and theological 
determinism respectively.2  
Generally speaking, a compatibilist claims that for S to be free and 
morally responsible in performing action A is compatible with action A being 
ultimately caused by factors outside S’s control. In other words, despite the 
fact that our actions and choices are caused by factors outside our influence, 
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Will (New York 2005) and the introduction to Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will 
(Oxford 2011).  
2
 Notice, that these three types of determinism are independent of each other.  
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let us say our brain states plus psychological laws, we are still free and morally 
responsible. Of course, some causes remove moral responsibility – let us say 
external coercion or some other external constraint – but other causes do not. 
These causes are usually understood to involve the subject’s own reasons and 
desires for acting. Furthermore, the compatibilist has to deny that for S’s 
action A to be free, S had a power to do action B instead of A. In other words, 
S’s action A can be considered free even when S could not have done 
otherwise. This is why the compatibilist thinks that freedom and determinism 
are compatible. 
Equally roughly, a libertarian argues that for S to be free and morally 
responsible for performing action A is incompatible with action A being 
ultimately caused by factors outside S’s control. In other words, in order to be 
free and responsible for A, S has to be in some sense control of the factors that 
ultimately cause A. Thus, most libertarians affirm that free actions are indeed 
caused, but those causes are such that they themselves are under the control 
of the agent. A libertarian would say that although my reasons for acting cause 
my actions in some particular situation, I could reflect and change my beliefs 
that constitute my reasons for acting. Further, a libertarian insists that free 
actions require the power to do otherwise. If determinism of any kind is true, 
then S could have not done otherwise. Since freedom requires the power to do 
otherwise and determinism entails that S cannot do otherwise, determinism is 
incompatible with freedom. 
 
 
2. THEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR COMPATIBILISM 
Sarot seems to think that libertarianism is required to make sense of the 
core Christian conviction that human beings are free. What I find surprising, 
however, is how easily Sarot rejects the theological case for compatibilism. I 
think the theological case for compatibilist free will is rather strong. 
Compatibilism (or something like it) is, after all, a venerable Christian 
tradition. Theologians, such as Augustine, Luther, Aquinas and Calvin are 
much closer to compatibilism than libertarianism. One reason for this is that 
all these thinkers are theological determinists of some kind or another. 
Further, embracing compatibilism would solve many problems that have to do 
with providence, predestination and God’s foreknowledge. 
In what follows, I will briefly discuss two topics: first, I will give some 
reasons to think that traditional Augustinian-Lutheran views of providence, 
grace and sin suggest compatibilism (or at least do not require libertarianism); 
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second, I will present a few arguments against Open Theism and its view 
about God’s foreknowledge and providence. 
 
2.1. PROVIDENCE, GRACE AND PREDESTINATION 
I was surprised by Sarot’s claim that neither providence nor 
predestination present problems to libertarian free will. With respect to 
predestination, he does not even give an argument for his conclusion. 
Contrary to this, it seems to me that classical ideas of providence and the 
justification by grace strongly suggest, a compatibilist notion of free will.3 
Since I have little space, let me just talk about Luther here. I am no 
Luther-scholar so permit me to simply quote one:  
Luther asserted God’s complete freedom and complete control of his creation, 
his total responsibility for all that happens within it. God has predestined and 
provides for all his creatures according to his decisions, conditioned by nothing 
else. Nothing impedes or impairs the power of his will to make happen what he 
has decided. Preparing to treat human creatures as totally responsible within 
the sphere God gives them, Luther did not flinch before the logical necessity of 
the Almighty Creator’s being totally responsible for all things. Luther was 
determined to hold these two total responsibilities in tension and not 
harmonize or homogenize them, as had his teachers. Therefore, he rejected 
their finely honed logical distinctions framing God’s almighty power with the 
maneuvering room of contingency, which permitted human freedom. God’s 
‘immutable, eternal, and infallible will’ foresees, plans, and enacts all things that 
ensue in the course of creation. His foreknowledge is creative and 
determinative, not passively observing human actions and decisions but 
governing and affecting their thoughts and actions.4 
For Luther, it seems that the causal influence of God necessitates human 
action and thinking so as to remove the power to do otherwise, but he still 
maintain that humans are free in the space that God has given them. Recall 
that libertarian free will entails the power to do otherwise. For Luther, such a 
power seems impossible: God determines everything, including our wills. 
Since Luther nevertheless maintains that humans are morally responsible, his 
freedom is surely of the compatibilist kind.  
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We can put the problem in the form of a brief argument. Let us imagine 
that God’s providential plan for the world entails that I become a good person. 
God being omnipotent and being in full providential control I cannot choose 
to act against God’s plan. Thus, given that libertarian freedom requires the 
power to do otherwise, I am not free regarding whether I will become a good 
person or a bad person. Further, I am neither morally responsible nor 
praiseworthy when I finally become a good person. So, I think that there is a 
dilemma here for the libertarian. Either (1) the libertarian has to give up the 
notion that freedom requires the power to do otherwise and become a 
compatibilist; (2) loosen God’s providential control of the creation, or (3) try 
to combine libertarian free will with God’s providential control in some 
roundabout way. Something is got to give here. Given what Sarot says about 
providence, I take it that he goes with (2), that is, loosening God’s providential 
control over creation.  
A similar dilemma emerges in the case of grace and salvation. Luther 
argued in his De Servo Arbitrio against Erasmus that if humans have 
libertarian free will, they could resist God’s providential plans and possibly 
reject or earn God’s grace. For Luther as for Augustine, earning God’s grace 
through human actions is a non-Biblical idea. God’s grace is a pure gift that 
requires nothing from the recipient. If it did so, it would not be a free gift. 
Taking a strong stance on original sin, Luther argued that it is impossible for 
humans even to turn towards God without God first causing their will to act 
this way. So no previous act of will to turn towards God is even possible for 
sinful humans. Contrary to Luther, Erasmus insisted that although humans 
cannot by their own will save themselves, the human will can co-operate with 
God’s grace in order to cause salvation. 
So, the dispute between Erasmus and Luther was between these two 
theses (among other things): 
 
1. Luther: God’s unwarranted grace is both necessary and sufficient for 
salvation. No libertarian act of the will is needed. 
2. Erasmus: God’s unwarranted grace is necessary but not sufficient for 
salvation. A libertarian act of the will is needed.  
 
Notice, that both of these views are orthodox, as I understand orthodoxy. Both 
rule out what I take to be the Pelagian position: 
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1. Pelagius: God’s unwarranted grace is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
salvation. Libertarian actions are enough. 
 
Notice, that if (1) is correct and the power to do otherwise is required for 
freedom, then none of us is free or morally responsible for our salvation or the 
lack of it. The argument can be put, very roughly, like this. If I am predestined 
to heaven, there is nothing I can do to prevent this. I cannot choose not to go to 
heaven. Thus, my going to heaven or hell is not under my control, nor have I 
the power to choose otherwise. There is nothing we can do to change God’s 
plan to save (or not to save) us. This conclusion, it seems to me, entails the 
doctrine of double predestination and the rejection of libertarian free will. 
Again, the libertarian is faced with a dilemma here. They either need to go with 
Erasmus and concede that at least some libertarian acts are required for 
salvation or go with Luther and reject the idea that freedom requires the power 
to do otherwise and accept double predestination.  
 
2.2. SOME PROBLEMS IN OPEN THEISM 
Sarot wisely distinguishes the issues of providence and predestination 
from the issue of God’s foreknowledge. Sarot wants to solve the problem of 
freedom and foreknowledge by adopting Open Theism. According to Open 
Theism, God is everlasting, not timeless, and has limited knowledge of the 
future, especially about future contingent events, such as free actions. God 
can, however, predict what is going to happen, but he cannot know it. For the 
Open Theist, this does not hinder God’s omniscience, because there are no 
truths to be known about future contingent events.5 
Despite its relative popularity, Open Theism has various problems. 
Instead of developing them fully, I will simply mention a few. The first is, of 
course, that it is an innovation: the traditional view is that God is atemporal or 
eternal and has full knowledge and providential control over the past, present 
and future. Further, on the Open Theist view, God would be subject to change 
and influence from the outside through our actions and the increase and 
decrease of His knowledge. God would also need to be complex for these 
reasons. For the classical theist, none of the above is acceptable. But going 
against the tradition might not be that bad, especially if you have good reasons 
for it. 
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Second, on Open Theism, some of God’s beliefs could end up being false. 
Indeed, this is rather likely.6 God’s beliefs about the future are based on the 
knowledge that He now has. God can know a lot about the future by 
predicting on the basis of His full knowledge of the present. This way God 
knows truths about what free beings are likely to do in the future and what 
contingent events are likely to occur. But given that there is an infinite set of 
libertarian free actions that free beings could do in the future, it is likely that a 
small subset of God’s beliefs about what free beings do in the future turn out 
to be false when the time comes. So it seems that the Open Theist has to 
accept that God has false beliefs. But this is problematic. First of all, it flies 
against the face of the tradition of omniscience. Second, the opponent of 
Open Theism is now free to argue that it is possible that a being exists who 
does not have false beliefs but is in all other ways similar to the God of Open 
Theism. Thus, the God of Open Theism would no longer be the most perfect 
being.  
Third, the claim that propositions about future contingent events have no 
truth-values is contested among philosophers. The main reason for this is that 
if this is true, we can have no knowledge about future actions or contingent 
events. If there is no truth to be known about whether I will go to the bar 
tomorrow, I cannot now know whether I will go to the bar tomorrow. This is a 
high price to pay. However, the Open Theist might have a response here: 
William Hasker, for instance, has argued that propositions about future free 
actions do have truth-value, but the truth-value is in principle unknowable 
before the time of the action. This seems to me to be a more promising avenue 
for the Open Theist to take.  
Finally, Open Theism has problems with God’s providence. For the Open 
Theist, God is like a chess master playing against a novice. The master does 
not know what the novice is going to do, but he has a plan for every possible 
contingency. No matter what the novice does, the master can counter that and 
win. Now, the problem is that this is not certain. It is not metaphysically 
impossible for the novice to win against the master. In the case of the God of 
Open Theism, it is possible that His plans for saving me are thwarted because 
of the choices that other people make. This seems very unlikely but it is not 
impossible. Although God can control events, the inherent contingency of the 
world can, in principle, prevent his plans coming into fruition. The Open 
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Theists must acknowledge that their God is a risk-taker and that his plans are 
not necessarily realised.  
 
 
3. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES WITH LIBERTARIANISM 
I have now given a few theological reasons for compatibilism and 
discussed some problems with libertarianism. In what follows, I will discuss a 
few philosophical issues that have to do with compatibilism and 
libertarianism. I do this because I think that Sarot has neglected a few good 
philosophical arguments for compatibilism and also failed to discuss some of 
the central problems of libertarianism.  
As I said before, a decent theological case for compatibilist free will can 
be made. The question then is whether there are insurmountable 
philosophical barriers to overcome. Most contemporary philosophers do not 
seem to think so. Almost 60% of contemporary analytic philosophers accept 
compatibilism – the claim that determinism and freedom and moral 
responsibility are compatible.7 If some compatibilist position is workable, and 
I think that at least some of them are, this would clearly support the case for 
theistic compatibilism.  
 
3.1. COMPATIBILISM AND THE POWER TO DO OTHERWISE 
I think Sarot might not be challenging the strongest forms of compat-
ibilism. When he describes compatibilism, he presents it as a view according 
to which an action is free if it proceeds from a person’s desires and is not 
subject to external constraints. This is the view of classical compatibilism. He 
then claims that classical compatibilism is not enough for moral 
responsibility. But this is something that most contemporary compatibilists 
would agree with anyway, so it is not enough to refute compatibilism as a 
whole.  
So for the classical compatibilist, we are free to the extent that we have 
the power to do what we want and are not constrained by external factors. 
Notice how this way of defining freedom says nothing about alternative 
futures or the origins of our desires. But there is a well-known problem with 
classical compatibilism: it cannot accommodate compulsive, deviant or 
artificially engineered desires and motivations. On the classical compatibilist 
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analysis, a person who has been genetically engineered to wanting to become a 
fighter pilot would come out being free when becoming one. He is acting 
according to his desires and is not subject to some external constraint. But the 
problem is that his desires are manufactured for that very purpose. Our 
intuition is very strong on this: this person is not free when he decides and 
becomes a fighter pilot.  
To distinguish such cases from genuine freedom, contemporary 
compatibilist have adopted a more nuanced idea of hierarchically ordered 
desires. These new compatibilists insist that it is not enough for freedom to 
have the power to act on one’s desires; one also needs the power to reflect, 
evaluate and control one’s own reasons and desires for acting. This involves 
making a distinction between first-order and second-order desires. In the case 
of our fighter pilot, the compatibilist can now insist that he is not free. It is 
true that in becoming a fighter pilot he is acting according to his desires, but 
he is unable to reflect upon the reasons for his actions and he lacks the power 
to control and shape them on the basis of his reflection. In other words, his 
first-order desires are not in control of his second-order desires. Thus, he lacks 
rational self-control and so is not free.  
Notice that second-order desires and reflections can be causally 
necessitated by antecedent factors, which means that such an account is 
compatible with determinism. On the basis of such analysis, the compatibilist 
is able to give an account of reason or desire-based actions – an account that 
does not entail that the person has the power to do otherwise.  
But for the libertarian, the power to do otherwise is necessary for freedom 
and responsibility. Surprisingly, Sarot claims that no good example of morally 
responsible action where the person lacks the power to do otherwise has been 
presented. I think this is false. I think there are rather good arguments for the 
conclusion that the power to do otherwise – the principle of alternative 
possibilities – is not necessary for moral responsibility. 
A well know defender of compatibilism, Harry Frankfurt, has various 
examples, known as the Frankfurt examples that seek to establish this.8 Let me 
simply adopt one. Suppose that Dr Jones wants his patient Mr Smith to kill 
one of their mutual acquaintances, Mr Black. When Mr Smith comes to Dr. 
Jones for brain surgery, Dr Jones installs a microchip in the head of Mr Smith. 
This microchip can detect the neural correlates of Mr Smith’s decisions and 
direct them. Now, Dr Jones’ plan is to send instructions to Mr Smith’s 
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microchip as to make him kill their acquaintance, Mr Black, when they next 
meet. But when they meet the next time, Mr Smith has himself decided to kill 
Mr Black. Dr Jones then does not need to exert control over Mr Smith via the 
microchip and is happy when Smith kills Mr Black. Now, it is clear that Mr 
Smith does not have the power to do otherwise. He could not have decided not 
to kill Mr Black, because if he had tried, Dr Jones’ microchip would have 
overridden his decision. Does this mean that Mr Smith is not morally 
responsible for killing Mr Black? It seems to me that it does not: Mr Smith 
killed Mr Black in cold blood without any external or internal compulsion. Yet, 
he could not have done otherwise. If this is correct and the power to do 
otherwise is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility and freedom, 
then the compatibilist is in the clear: he can say that an action is free when the 
action is caused by well-reflected desires and reasons of the subject.  
 
3.2. LIBERTARIANISM, REASONS AND ARBITRARINESS 
In addition to not backing up his claim that the power to do otherwise is 
necessary for freedom, Sarot does not give an account of how reasons cause 
actions in the libertarian scheme. For the compatibilist, free actions are those 
that are determined by properly reflected reasons and desires. For Sarot, a 
libertarian free decision cannot be causally necessitated by anything. But is it 
not the case that reasons for action are causal factors in our actions and 
decisions? The compatibilist can accuse the libertarian here as follows: if one’s 
action is not causally necessitated by well-reflected reasons, then the action is 
random or arbitrary; it has no reason whatsoever.  
Sarot says that libertarian actions are not arbitrary because they are 
actions of someone. But this is not enough to establish the conclusion that 
actions are not arbitrary. Arbitrary actions, it seems to me, are actions that are 
done by someone but without any reason. If an action is done without any 
reason, without any desire, it is hardly a free action, hardly an action at all. 
Sarot also says that non-arbitrary actions are explained by be the decision that 
the person makes. This is true, but, again, it is not enough to make the 
arbitrariness objection go away: we need a reason or an explanation for the 
decision that the person made. It is not the decision to act that removes 
randomness, but the fact that the decision is grounded in reasons and desires. 
As I already pointed out, the compatibilist can make sense of reasons and 
desires causing actions, but it seems that if Sarot claims that all antecedent 
conditions that cause our actions make those actions less free, for him having 
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reasons and desires for action actually take your freedom away. So if I have 
good reasons to act in a certain way, I am not really free in a libertarian sense. 
Surely, this cannot be the case.  
Sarot could now respond in two ways. First, he could deny that reasons 
relate causally to our actions. Some libertarians do this and the result is called 
non-causal libertarianism. The problem here is that the non-causal libertarian 
has to account for reason-guided actions somehow without causation. Most 
philosophers think that this is extremely difficult and implausible. The 
arguments are in the literature, if anyone wants them.9 But I do not think that 
Sarot wants to go this way. He might want to take the second route, namely, to 
argue that reasons do causally contribute to actions but they do not 
necessitate them. In other words, our reasons do operate as causal factors in 
our actions but they do not determine our actions. Fair enough, but I can still 
insist that the causal influence that the decision has on the action apart from 
reasons and desires is random. It must be, since Sarot has to insist that they do 
not ultimately cause the decision. Since he is an indeterminist, he must insist 
that there is a causal gap between whatever causes an action has and the 
decision to act. What the compatibilist can say here is whatever fills that gap is 
bound to be random and arbitrary.  
Imagine a world in which you are faced with a choice. You have been 
offered a job in, let us say, Princeton University. You consider the reason for 
going and not going. For the libertarian who insists that a power to do 
otherwise is necessary, there must be one possible world in which you take the 
job and another in which you do not take it. But notice that these worlds are 
identical before the actual decision is made. In other words, at the moment of 
the decision you have access to exactly the same reasons and deliberations and 
have exactly the same desires, but in one world you choose differently than in 
the other. If this were not the case, there would be no causal gap between the 
decision and the action would not be a free action, as the libertarian 
understands it. But, as I pointed out, it is extremely difficult to see what could 
fill that gap, since it cannot be any reason or desire or a deliberation that the 
person has. What we have here is a metaphysically brute, non-grounded, non-
caused decision.  
What I am trying to say here is that if we endorse causal indeterminism, 
we have difficulties in explaining how our actions can be anything else than 
random or arbitrary. Causally indeterministic actions are not determined by 
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anything apart from some kind of ungrounded decision. Notice that the causal 
indeterminist cannot simply resort to reasons here: if he did, he would no 
longer be an indeterminist. The compatibilist has no such problems, since, for 
him, actions are determined by people’s desires and reasons for acting (among 
other things).  
 
 
4. AVOIDING NEURODETERMINISM: ALTERNATE ACCOUNTS 
Finally, I want address the issue of neuroscience and determinism. Now, 
both Sarot and I agree that with respect to free will, there is a gap in science. 
The question is what kind of a gap this is. Sarot concludes that, as 
neuroscience currently stands, it does not explain morally relevant actions. 
Thus, there is no threat to libertarian free will. This, however, leaves open the 
possibility of the gap closing in the future. Sarot has given us no reason to 
think that neuroscience is unable to explain morally relevant actions and 
threaten free will in the future. In other words, some day a genius 
neuroscientist might come up with an experimental setting in which she could 
explain morally relevant actions. Sarot’s position would be stronger if he could 
give a reason why this is unlikely or impossible. But he thinks that the issues 
surrounding free will and determinism might be, at least to some extent, 
empirically tractable. 
I, on the contrary, think that there are some reasonably good arguments 
against such a conclusion. To be more specific, I think that there are some 
reasons to think that the issue of free will and determinism is not a scientific 
issue at all and that any amount of experimental data will not solve it. The first 
reason has to do with what the sciences of the mind are actually like and the 
second with the nature of freedom itself. But before I can get to these 
arguments, I will claim that the issue of neuroscientific determinism goes 
deeper than to Libet’s experiments. 
 
4.1. NEURODETERMINISM: THE DEEP PROBLEM 
Sarot identifies Benjamin Libet’s studies as potentially problematic for 
libertarian free will. He then argues that they are only potentially problematic 
because they do not deal with morally relevant free actions. The problem, I 
think, goes much deeper than this. Not only are specific experiments in 
neuroscience problematic for libertarian free will, but also the whole thrust of 
the enterprise of neuroscience, if it is interpreted in a certain way. Libet’s views 
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are only a symptom of a comprehensive view that many neuroscientists share. 
Here is one example by Colin Blakemore: 
The human brain is a machine, which alone accounts for all our actions, our 
most private thoughts, our beliefs … All our actions are products of the activity 
of our brain. It makes no sense (in scientific terms) to try to distinguish sharply 
between acts that result from conscious attention and those that result from our 
reflexes or are caused by disease or damage to the brain.10 
The basic idea seems to be that there is a closed flow of physical events 
caused by other physical events in our brains. This is what neuroscience sees 
when it looks at the brain. It follows that an active self or any other process of 
conscious decision-making cannot influence what goes on in the brain. We see 
no selves actively controlling neural circuitry, no acts of the will, nothing like 
that. The conscious choice seems to be a mere epiphenomenon instead of 
being causally efficacious. Since freedom requires something like conscious 
decisions or choices to be found by neuroscience in the brain, free will is an 
illusion.  
The problem can also be stated in a more philosophical way. Most 
contemporary neuroscientists and philosophers are physicalists. As 
physicalists, they believe that for all events there are sufficient physical causes 
(that is antecedent physical events governed by physical laws) for that event to 
occur. This thesis is usually called the causal closure thesis. It entails that an 
ideal science, complete and true physics, can explain all mental events and 
actions that are supposedly caused by those events in terms of physical 
interactions and physical laws that make no reference to any events or objects 
of mental kinds. If physicalism and the causal closure thesis are true, it seems 
that there can be no free will in the sense of the subject herself determining or 
causing her actions on the basis of her mental states. Instead, antecedent 
physical events and the universally quantifiable neuroscientific / 
psychological laws necessitate the mental states and actions of the subject. 
 
4.2. NEUROSCIENCE AND LAWS 
Now, the question is whether neuroscience can ever tell us that 
neurodeterminism is true. In other words, could neuroscience tell us that 
antecedent brain states and universally quantifiable neuroscientific / 
psychological laws determine all human actions? I, and many others, do not 
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think so. This is because neuroscience can never give us the kind of universally 
quantifiable laws that neurodeterminism requires.  
In his book Laws, Mind and Free Will (2011) Steven Horst argues that the 
problems with free will have to with our ideas about neuroscientific / 
psychological laws. As we have already seen, when formulating the notion of 
determinism laws are understood ‘strictly’ or universally quantifiable and 
exceptionless. Among several others, Horst has argued that at least 
neuroscientific / psychological laws are not like this at all. Instead these laws 
resemble ideal models that abstract away numerous causal factors and are 
highly context sensitive. Thus, 
one can embrace the truth of individual laws, or indeed any set of such laws, 
without any implication of determinism, because the idealization conditions of 
each law are essentially open-ended. … Likewise, psychological laws, as 
idealized laws, do not claim to govern all possible behavior, but only extract a 
partial list of real invariants in psychodynamics. In no way are further lawful 
invariants or voluntary anomic spontaneity excluded.11  
Psychological / neuroscientific laws are, thus, idealizations that abstract away 
‘from facts about other parts that may matter crucially in vivo in modulating 
the behaviour of the system we are studying.’ In this sense, laws of 
psychology and neuroscience are far more complicated than physical laws that 
benefit from a very small number of physical forces and variables.    
Horst’s view of laws is based on his more general framework he calls 
cognitive pluralism. According to cognitive pluralism, our representations of 
the world depend on our cognitive processes. Our models and representations 
indeed represent the world, or at least have realistic intent, but they are not 
simply reflections of how things are in the world. They are idealised 
representations of some highly specific parts of the world for a certain purpose 
and are entertained by some specific cognitive systems. This dependency of 
our models from our cognitive systems creates a situation that Horst calls 
pluralistic: we have numerous models in representing the world, but no 
unambiguous way to reduce them into one single ‘super-model’ of the world 
that would allow us to explain everything. This plurality of non-reducible 
models, Horst suggests, is not an immature state of science, but a permanent 
feature due to our cognitive limitations.  
Horst’s account of scientific and psychological laws leads to the 
conclusions that neuroscience can no longer be seen as producing laws that 
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force us to accept any kind neurodeterminism. The laws in neuroscience are 
not universally quantifiable, but instead highly context specific and have 
ceteris paribus clauses. ‘The motivation for determinism must, thus, be found 
either in misunderstanding of the laws we have received from the scientists or 
else in a commitment to some additional type of principle.’12 These additional 
principles are usually metaphysical in nature – the most common being the 
causal closure thesis that I just mentioned.  
 
4.3. FREEDOM AS TRANSCENDENTAL 
Horst’s argument can be supported by arguments coming from other 
sources. For Horst, the necessary plurality of our models of human minds and 
behaviour entails that we cannot get from neuroscientific models to 
neurodeterminism. One supporting line of argument could be that freedom is 
not the kind of phenomenon that neuroscience can say anything about 
anyway. Raymond Tallis and Roger Scruton, among many others, have argued 
that the concept of freedom is not really an empirical notion, but rather a 
transcendental one. Freedom is, in this view, something that is beyond 
neuroscience.  
Both Tallis and Scruton argue that the issue of human freedom has to do 
with what human selves are and how intentionality, aboutness, works. Further, 
they argue that neurodeterministic interpretations of neuroscience threaten 
not only freedom, but all our mental concepts based on intentionality: selves, 
consciousness, responsibility, duty, purpose and all such notions that are 
irreducibly teleological, or purpose-driven. Teleological notions cannot be 
translated into the notions of science because science, in principle, rules them 
out. This does not mean that the phenomena they refer to are not real.  
Let us think of mental states as propositional attitudes towards certain 
propositions. Let us further say that propositions can be understood as 
representing some states of the world being such and such.13 When I am aware 
of, let us say, a hat in front of me, I have a certain propositional attitude 
towards it, namely, the attitude of believing that there is a hat in front of me. 
On the one hand, there are all sorts of causal processes connecting the hat and 
my awareness of it – processes that neuroscientists study. These involve light 
rays hitting my eyes, them being converted into electric impulses and 
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processed in a certain way in my cerebral cortex. But this is not everything that 
is going on. According to Tallis, there is another process, intentionality, which 
reaches from the causal effect of the hat to the cause, the hat itself. Not only 
does my perception consist of the hat causing certain things in me, there is my 
awareness of the hat as an object with certain properties that proceeds from 
me towards the hat. Without this ‘reaching out’ of intentionality, there would 
be no awareness or aboutness that connects my propositional attitudes to the 
hat. Thus, with respect to persons and the way that they relate to themselves 
and their surroundings, there is always two-way traffic: causal influences from 
the objects of awareness to the experiencer that the sciences can track and 
intentional influence from the experiencer towards the object of awareness.14 
According to Scruton, this intentionality makes it impossible to replace 
our everyday mental concepts with those of neuroscience. Our mental 
concepts do not provide us with causal explanations of our actions; rather they 
represent others and us in the light of rationality. Scruton writes: 
Our way of representing the Lebenswelt is not replaceable by the theory that 
explains it. Our world is the world of appearances, ordered by concepts that are 
rooted in dialogue, and therefore in the first-person perspective. But that 
perspective will not feature in the data of any science.15  
Our life world interpreted through intentional concepts is, thus, not 
understandable in causal, scientific terms: 
People can be conceptualized in two ways, as organisms and as agents. The first 
way employs the concept of ‘human being’ (a natural kind); it divides our 
actions at the joints of explanation, and derives our behavior from a biological 
science of man. The second way employs the concept of ‘person,’ which is not a 
concept of a natural kind, but sui generis. Though this concept, and the 
associated notions of freedom, responsibility, reason for action, right, duty, 
justice, and so on, we gain the description under which a human being is seen, 
by those who respond to him or her as a person.16  
Thus, for both Scruton and Tallis, the capacity for first-person awareness and 
intentionality allows us to see ourselves and other people from a non-scientific 
and non-causal point of view, from the point of view of reasons and freedom. 
In other words, humans are special because they acts as agents in a human 
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world created and sustained by first-person awareness and sharing of that 
awareness through numerous social interactions and behaviours.  
Freedom, as Tallis and Scruton understand it, is the human capacity to 
‘own’ one’s actions and take actions as representing what one is. Free actions 
are actions that can be made sense of in terms of a person’s reasons for action. 
Notice, that reasons for actions are irreducibly intentional:  
The countless events that are subsumed in reasons cannot be generated – 
requisitioned, orchestrated – by ordinary causation by processes of the kind that 
are described in neuroscience. … Wishes, intentions and other propositional 
attitudes are not simply caused, nor simply causes. … Actions are not – and 
could not be – caused in the narrow, atomic, linear sense implied in the term 
‘cause.’ To see actions aright, we have to invoke the notion of an explicit 
purpose, which pulls us towards goal, which we have ourselves envisaged and 
articulated, and shapes the succession of action-components we undertake.17 
And because of the peculiar aboutness of intentionality, reasons cannot be 
made sense in causal terms. Thus, all attempts to see human actions in purely 
causal, neuroscientific terms will fail: they remove the whole context of 
meaningful action and the agent’s reasons for acting thus losing the possibility 
to judge whether an action was a free action or not.  
Given their analysis of freedom, one need not be particularly bright to 
predict what Scruton and Tallis say about Libet’s experiments. Although their 
solution to the problems presented by Libet’s research is somewhat similar to 
Sarot’s, the difference is their insistence that intentional phenomena cannot 
be studied the way in which Libet set up his experiments. Scruton and Tallis 
argue that Libet’s experimental setting is naïve and simplified because it 
attempts to address the issue of freedom by tracking the neural correlates of 
simple hand movements and removing their intentional context. This is to 
forget the immense network of decisions, goals and reasons that go into the 
whole situation in the lab itself: what is expected from the participants, what 
they think is going on, what they want by participating in those experiments, 
and so on. Flexing one’s hands is not the goal of the participant’s action, rather 
the participant’s reason for flexing his hand is that he wants to do what Libet 
says, that is, respond accordingly to what he is asked to do. Thus, the fact that 
there is a physical-causal antecedent for the participant’s hand flexing before 
                                                             
17
 Tallis, Aping Mankind, 251.  
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the conscious awareness of it, is neither here nor there as to the question 
whether that action was free or not.18  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this article, I have presented some theological and philosophical 
reasons for Christian compatibilism. I have also argued that despite all the 
(pop) science fuzz, the nature of our freedom and what is required for it are 
outside the sciences. In this sense, I think, I am willing to go as far as saying 
that not only is it the case that current neuroscience does not eliminate 
libertarian free will, but it seems that it is not even possible for any conceivable 
theory of neuroscience to do this. What neuroscience can do, however, is to 
highlight the fact that some of our actions are driven by causal factors which 
we have not previously recognised and which we have no control over. Thus, 
neuroscience (as well as cognitive science and cognitive psychology) gives us a 
reason to reflect whether we are actually as free as we think we are. This might 
lead us to consider the theological and philosophical reasons for 
libertarianism and compatibilism. 
  
                                                             
18
 For Tallis’ view on Libet, see Tallis, Aping Mankind, chapter 7.  
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ABSTRACT 
‘Dignity’ holds a controversial place in contemporary debates in ethics, poli-
cy, and studies in human personhood. Is ‘dignity’ a property predicated of 
something called ‘human’? Is it something humans have by virtue of being 
human, or by virtue of existing as humans? Can it be damaged, or taken 
away? And does discussion of the term add anything at all to our under-
standing of how to treat other human beings, or is it a useless term? Here we 
see that when viewed from a Kantian and Christian perspective, ‘dignity’ is 
best understood as an orienting term which distinguishes not the or a basic 
set of features which separate humans from everything else, or some humans 
from some others, but rather an orientation which calls attention to the hu-
mane vs. inhumane way of life to which we commit ourselves when we as-
cribe dignity to others and ourselves. From a Christian point of view, this 
humane way of life is a consequence of acknowledging the basic passivity of 
human life with respect to what is made possible in and for us through the 
gift of the love of God. 
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1. A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE 
In recent years human dignity has become a central and controversial is-
sue in legal, political, moral, philosophical, and theological debates. Some 
take human dignity to be the fundamental ‘right to have rights’ that under-
pins all our other rights and duties, whether laid down in a written constitu-
tion or not.1 Others dismiss it as a useless and harmful notion that adds noth-
ing substantive to the understanding of our rights but rather obfuscates the 
ideas of human rights, freedom, justice, and equality.2 In democratic societies 
‘our rights are constrained by respect for the rights of others. My rights corre-
late with your duties; your rights correlate with my duties. So when rights are 
equal, each person has duties in regard to the rights of others.’3 This correla-
tion of rights and duties among members of modern society is an important 
insight. But all we need to state and justify it are the ideas of freedom, justice, 
and equality, but not, however, the ‘Reappraisal of an Ancient Legal Concept’ 
such as human dignity.4 We can do without it; and we should. 
However, the history of human rights discourse in the 20th century tells 
a different story. Respect for human dignity is a central idea in The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It plays a foundational role in a growing num-
ber of national constitutions, most notably in Article 1 (1) of the German Basic 
Law. It lies at the center of many contemporary debates in bioethics, the eth-
ics of war, or the ethics of care. It plays the key role ‘in the emerging interna-
tional biomedical law.’5 And it is invoked by human rights groups and net-
works across the world who ‘wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and 
locally, to open space for dignity and mutual respect and esteem to take root 
and grow, thus ending humiliating practices and breaking cycles of humilia-
tion throughout the world.’6 The history of the idea reaches back through the 
enlightenment (Immanuel Kant) and renaissance humanism (Pico della Mi-
randola) to Roman antiquity (dignitas, honor, potestas, maiestas, decus). It 
                                                     
1
 Cf. David Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of Justifi-
cation’ (October 1, 2011). 23rd McDonald Lecture (2011) [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029818, 2]. 
2
 Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity is a useless concept. It means no more than respect for persons or their 
autonomy,’ in British Medical Journal  327 (2003) 1419–1420; Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity,’ 
[http://richarddawkins.net/articles/2567]. 
3
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities,’ Max Weber Lecture EUI: May 2010, 
[http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710759], 4. 
4
 Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A Human Dignitas? The Contemporary Principle of Human 
Dignity as a Mere Reappraisal of an Ancient Legal Concept’ [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303427] . 
5
 Roberto Andorno, ‘Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioeth-
ics,’ in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (2009), 223–40,  esp. 226. 
6
 Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies [http://www.humiliationstudies.org]. 
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did not function centrally in the Christian tradition before the 20th century. 
But since the Second World War it has won growing public momentum by 
playing a major role in constitutions and international legal declarations.7 
This is where we must start if we want to understand the contemporary de-
bates about human dignity. What exactly is the role it plays in those constitu-
tional documents, and what does ‘human dignity’ mean there? 
 
 
2. A RIGHT TO DIGNITY VS. RIGHTS BASED ON DIGNITY 
The answer is not easy. There is no clear legal definition of the term in 
any of these documents,8 and the way they refer to it is ambiguous. In the 
preamble of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights the ‘recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family’ is called ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world.’9 Similarly Article 1 states: ‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’10 But then we 
are also told to make every effort to safeguard the inherent dignity of human 
beings and make it the fundamental right of rights, the right that grounds all 
others.11 Thus, on the one hand, dignity ‘is what some of our rights are rights 
to,’ on the other hand, ‘dignity is also what grounds all of our rights.’12 Hu-
man rights are said to, ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human per-
son,’13 but people are also held to have a right to be protected against ‘degrad-
ing treatment’ and ‘outrages on personal dignity.’14 
                                                     
7
 Cf. the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (October 19, 2005) 
[http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html]. 
8
 Bartha Maria Knoppers, Human Dignity and Genetic Heritage: Study Paper (Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada, 1991) 2: ‘Those provisions concerning human dignity have not been authoritatively 
interpreted or applied by any of the competent, independent, international institutions.’ 
9
 The Un i versa l  Declara t ion of  Hum an Rights ,  Preamble  
[http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml] (accessed September 7, 2012). 
10
 Ibid. Article 1. 
11
 According to Klaus Dicke, ‘The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights,’ in: David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds.) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (Leiden 2002), 111, ‘dignity’ conveys ‘a formal, transcendental norm to legitim-
ize human rights claims’: it is the right to have rights and as such grounds (all) other rights. 
12
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley’ 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461220, 5] 
13
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble 
14
 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3. 
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To some this ‘blurring of the distinction between content (“a right to 
dignity”) and justification (“rights based on dignity”)’15 looks like an equivoca-
tion similar to the one Jeremy Bentham made fun of with respect to ‘liberty.’ 
To quote a recent commentator:  
Defenders of natural rights would say that men are born free, Bentham obser-
ved, but then complain in the name of rights that so many of them were born 
into slavery. If challenged to justify their demands for liberty, they would cite 
human liberty as the ground of these demands. But liberty, which they were 
citing as an existent justification for rights, was also what they were demand-
ing, and because they thought they had to demand it, they were acknowledg-
ing that men were not free. So what became of the alleged justification for their 
claim? ‘Men ought to be free because they are free, even though they are not’ – 
was that the claim? Such reasoning, which Bentham called ‘absurd and misera-
ble nonsense,’
16
 seemed to veer between the incoherent and the tautological. 
And the dual usage of ‘dignity’ appears to partake of this logic ... As Bentham 
said (not specifically about dignity but in an analogous context): ‘It is from be-
ginning to end so much flat assertion: it neither has anything to do with reason 
nor will endure the mention of it. It lays down as a fundamental and inviolable 
principle whatever is in dispute.’
17
 
But this dispute is spurious. It is perfectly possible to understand human 
dignity as a fundamental right (the right of rights) on which other rights are 
based without falling into inconsistency, but whether one can or should 
claim that all other rights are based on dignity is a different matter. But 
rights can only function as rights if they are clearly defined: Unclear formula-
tions and vague terms make an alleged right pointless. If we do not know 
what the statement of an alleged right means or involves, we cannot use it in 
legal practice or in deciding cases. However, the term ‘dignity’ or ‘human 
dignity’ is not defined in the legal documents cited nor does there seem to 
exist a canonical definition of the term in the law.18  
 
 
                                                     
15
 Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights,’ 4. 
16
 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in: Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense upon Stilts: Ben-
tham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London 1987), 50. 
17
 Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights,’ 4–5, quoting Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, 74. 
18
 Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,’ American Journal of International 
Law, 77 (1983) 849: ‘We do not find an explicit definition of the expression “dignity of the human per-
son” in international instruments or (as far as I know) in national law. Its intrinsic meaning has been 
left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measure by cultural factors.’ 
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3. HUMAN DIGNITY VS. THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN BEINGS 
This has been lamented as a highly problematic deficiency (especially by 
criminal lawyers and judges who have to decide cases), or defended as an 
important feature of the functioning of the term in a constitutional context 
(especially by constitutional lawyers who look at the moral foundation and 
political role of constitutions in state and society). The German Grundge-
setz,19 one of the first and most influential constitutions using the term ‘hu-
man dignity,’ states without much ado in Article 1 Paragraph 1: ‘Human digni-
ty shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority.’20 The German version puts it even more categorically by using 
indicative language: ‘Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar . Sie zu achten 
und zu schützen ist Verpflich tung aller staatlichen Gewalt’: ‘Human dignity 
[the dignity of the human being] is inviolable [or ‘untouchable’ or ‘non-
negotiable’]. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.’ It is 
clear that the first sentence states an absolute principle in a categorical way. 
However, we are not told what ‘human dignity’ means. 
There was conflict about this from the beginning. Carlo Schmid, one of 
the most influential members of the Parliamentary Council that drafted the 
Constitution, insisted that the term ‘should be defined.’21 Theodor Heuss, on 
the other hand, the first president of the republic, defended the first sentence 
as a ‘non-interpreted thesis.’22 The term, he insisted, should not be defined. 
He declared that ‘Human dignity must rest in itself. It must not be derived 
from any governmental position.’23  
This opened the door to an ongoing dispute in German constitutional 
scholarship and jurisprudence.24 In 1952 Günter Dürig argued that ‘Having 
                                                     
19
 For the following cf. Christoph Groos, Innere Freiheit. Eine Rekonstruktion des grundgesetzli-
chen Würdebegriffs (Göttingen 2011). 
20
 I follow the official translation of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany published 
by the Bundestag in October 2010 (80201000.pdf).  
21
 He understood it to be ‘a quality, an attribute that determines the human and that distinguish-
es humans from other creatures.’ 
22
 Theodor Heuss in: Parlamentarischer Rat, Akten und Protokolle, vol. 5, 72. Cf. Christoph Goos, ‘Wie 
die Würde des Menschen zum bedeutungslosen Rechtsbegriff wurde – und wie sie eigentlich gemeint war …’ 
[http://www.jura.unibonn.de/.../Goos_Thesenpapier_Menschenwuerde_Goettingen_1._Juni_2011.pdf] (ac-
cessed February 15, 2012). 
23
 Heuss, Parlamentarischer Rat, vol. 5, 72: ‘No one in power should have the prerogative to de-
fine it. Definitions are ruled or governed by interests, and it is better to leave the term “human dignity” 
undefined than to tailor it to the interests of a government.’ 
24
 Max Schreiter , ‘Gehorsam für automatische Farbzeichen . Ein Beitrag zum Roboterproblem,’ 
Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 1956, 692–694; Josef Wintrich, ‘Die Bedeutung der “Menschenwürde” für die 
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dignity means: being a personality,’ and a person becomes a personality by 
affirming and serving the basic values of being related to the eternal ‘you’ of 
God, the ‘you’ of others, and the ‘we’ of the community.25 Ten years later, in 
1964, Peter Badura criticized this interpretation because it did not see human 
beings as they are but as they should be according to the ideal of an auto-
nomous personality.26 This had the unfortunate effect that one had to give 
reasons for somebody being an autonomous person in this sense in order to 
be a subject of dignity, and this made it difficult for precisely those who were 
most in need of it to claim the protection of Article 1 of the Basic Law (little 
children, the mentally disabled, people suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, 
the unborn and the deceased). Badura therefore suggested what came to be 
                                                                                                                                                     
Anwendung des Rechts,’ Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 1957, 137–140; Bernhard Giese, Das Würde -
Konzept. Eine normfunktionale Explikation des Begriffes Wü rde in Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG, 1975; Christian 
Starck, ‘Menschenwürde als Verfassungsgarantie im  modernen Staat,’ Juridische Zeitung 1981, 457–464; 
Norbert Hoerster, ‘Zur Bedeutung des Prinzips der Menschenwürde ,’ Juristische Schulung 82/2 (1983), 
93–96 ; Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Verfassungsbegriff ,’ Juridische Zeitung 1985, 
201–209; ‘Die Spur zu verfolgen, wo er seinen Weg nahm,’ in: Zum Ge denken an Professor Dr . iur. 
Günter Dürig 1920-1996, Tübinger Universitätsreden N.F. Bd. 27, 1999, 37ff.; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenför-
de/Robert Spaemann (ed.), Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde . Historische Voraussetzungen – säku-
lare Gestalt – christliches Verständnis, 1987; Klaus Stern, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Fundament der 
Grundrechte,’ in: Staatsrecht, Vol. III/1, 1988, § 58; Werner Holzhüter , Konkretisierung und Bedeu-
tungswandel der Menschenwürdenorm des Artikels 1, Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes, 1989; Tatjana Geddert-
Steinacher, Menschenwürde als Verfassungsbegriff  (Berlin 1990); Hasso Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene 
Menschenwürde,’ Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 118 (1993) 353–377; Ralph Alexander Lorz, Modernes 
Grund- und Menschenrechtsverständnis und die Philosophie der Freiheit Kants (Stuttgart 1993); Peter 
Häberle, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Grundla ge der staatlichen Gemeinschaft,’ in: Handbuch des Staats-
rechts I, 2. A. 1995, § 20; Wolfram Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde ,’ Juristische Schu-
lung 1995, 857–862; Kurt Bayertz, ‘Die Idee der Menschenwürde : Probleme und Paradoxien,’ Archiv für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 81 (1995) 465–481; Christoph Enders, Die Menschen würde in der Ve r-
fassungsordnung, Zur Dogmatik des Art. 1 GG, Tübingen 1997; Horst Dreier, Art. 1, GG-Kommentar, 
1998; Michael Kloepfer, ‘Leben und Würde des Menschen,’ in: Peter Badura & Horst Dreier (eds.), Fest-
schrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bd. II, 2001, 77–104; Thomas Veit, ‘Würde als absoluter und 
relationaler Begriff,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 87 (2001) 299–310; Franz Josef Wetz, ‘Die 
Würde des Menschen – Ein Phantom?,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 87 (2001), 311–327; 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Menschenwürde als normatives Prinzip ,’ Juridische Zeitung 2003, 809–
815; Dunja Jaber, Über den mehrfachen Sinn von Menschenwürdegarantien (Frankfurt/London 2003); 
Horst Dreier, ‘Menschenwürde in der Rechtspre chung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts,’ in: Eberhard 
Schmidt-Aßmann u.a. (ed.), Festgabe 50 Jahre Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2003, 201–222; Kurt Seelmann 
(ed.), Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (Stuttgart 2004); Martin Nettesheim, ‘Die Garantie der Men-
schenwürde zwischen metaphysi scher Überhöhung und bloßem Abwägungstopos,’ Archiv des öffentli-
chen Rechts 130 (2005), 71–113. 
25
 Günter Dürig , ‘Die Menschenauffassung des Grundgesetzes,’ Juristische Rundschau 1952 259–
263; ‘Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde ,’ Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 81 (1956), 117–157; . 
Christoph Groos, ‘Human dignity and the German Basic Law: A Historical Perspective’ (unpublished 
paper at Berlin, Wissenschaftskolleg, November 17, 2011). 
26
 Peter Badura, ‘Generalprävention und Menschenwürde,’ Juridische Zeitung  (1964), 336–344. 
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called “the negative interpretation method”: One should concentrate on inju-
ries of human dignity and clear violations but not try to define it positively. It 
is easier to agree on what the principle of human dignity excludes and pro-
hibits than on what it states or defends. For to agree on violations of human 
dignity is possible even where we differ in our positive accounts of it. 
However, the debate is confused because it does not distinguish be-
tween two different readings of the term ‘human dignity’ (Würde des Men-
schen). One is to take it to mean a complex property human dignity that can 
truly be predicated of everything that fulfills the conditions summarized in 
its definition: ‘human dignity’ =def. XYZ. The other is to construe it as refer-
ring to the dignity of human beings, i.e. to a particular aspect of human be-
ings called ‘dignity.’ In the first case we talk about a complex property (hu-
man dignity), in the second case about a particular aspect or characteristic of 
human beings27 (the dignity of human beings). However, the property human 
dignity can be meaningfully defined whether or not there is somebody of 
whom it can truly be predicated, and so can dignity. But to speak affirmative-
ly of the dignity of human beings is to assume that there are human beings 
who have dignity or to claim that if there are human beings, then they have 
dignity. The claim is not that they have human dignity: For every x, if x is a 
human being, then it has human dignity, but rather: For every x, if x is a hu-
man being, then it has dignity.  
The first sentence of Article 1 of the Basic Law is not about a property 
human dignity that is said to be inviolable. Rather it starts from the fact that 
there are human beings, it ascribes dignity to them, and it strictly prohibits 
any violation of it to anybody, not only to the state. The dignity of human 
beings is non-negotiable for anyone in any situation and under any cir-
cumstances. The point of this principle is not the mistaken claim that bearers 
of this dignity (i.e. persons) cannot be harmed (they can), nor the highly am-
biguous claim that a person’s dignity cannot be violated whatever one may 
do to a person (even if human dignity cannot be violated directly or per se, it 
is violated indirectly by harming the bearers of it). However, the first sen-
tence of the Basic Law does not speak of human beings (the bearers of digni-
ty) but of their dignity (an essential characteristic which they cannot lose). It 
                                                     
27
 As I shall argue below, it is not a property in the sense of a defining characteristic of human 
beings but rather an indicator of how we ought to relate to them, that is, how we ought to determine 
ourselves to behave towards human beings: in a way that is not in conflict with our common humanity. 
Because human beings qua human beings have dignity, we ought to determine ourselves to treat them 
(and us) with dignity. 
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is not stated that only human beings have or can have dignity.28 But the term 
‘dignity’ is not defined. It cannot be used to identify those to whom it is 
rightly applied but rather presupposes that those to whom it is applied are 
rightly identified as human beings – whatever this may mean. Human beings 
are bearers of a dignity which is said to be inviolable. Thus, in an important 
sense the principle is not about human dignity but about human beings who 
have dignity: What is at stake is not a property but the bearer of it. And the 
property human beings are said to have in an inviolable way is not human 
dignity but dignity – the dignity that is characteristic of human beings as hu-
man beings.  
 
 
4. PREDICATE VS. DESIGNATION 
Thus, the descriptive phrase ‘die Würde des Menschen’ (the dignity of 
the human being) must not be confused with the predicate phrase ‘Men-
schenwürde’ (human dignity). The second is a predicate that can (in prin-
ciple) be defined by enumerating the features that together characterize the 
property human dignity; and this property can be predicated of something 
(wrongly) or somebody (truly) in propositions such as ‘Peter has human dig-
nity’ or ‘There is an x and x possesses human dignity.’ The first, on the con-
trary, is not a predicate but a condensed predication or proposition ‘Human 
beings have dignity’ or ‘Human beings qua human beings possess dignity’ 
which cannot be predicated of something else because it is not a property but 
a proposition used as a designation29 to refer to those who are said to have 
this dignity: human beings.30 It is true to say that human beings have this 
                                                     
28
 Kant used it not for human beings but for the moral law or morality: ‘Morality, and humanity 
as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity.’ I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Andrea Di-
em/David Lane (Walnut 2008), 58. And Pope Benedikt XVI has used it recently not merely for human 
beings but for the earth when he spoke of ‘the dignity of the earth.’ 
29
 Cf. Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting,’ Mind 14 (1905) 479–493; M. Devitt, Designation (New York 
1981). 
30
 Whereas it is meaningful but false to say ‘Chimps possess human dignity’ (i.e. that which we 
mean by the predicate ‘human dignity’) because Chimps may possess dignity, but not human dignity, it 
is meaningless to say ‘Chimps possess that which we mean by the proposition ‘Human beings have 
dignity.’ Human dignity is a property that can be predicated of someone, and so is dignity, but the digni-
ty of the human being is an abbreviated proposition used as a designation that cannot be predicated of 
something else. It does not refer to a specific human dignity (that can only be ascribed to humans) but 
to a dignity (not necessarily only of human beings) ascribed to human beings; and it is stated that the 
truth that humans possess this dignity is seen and accepted as a principle that must never be violated 
by anybody. 
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dignity, whatever may happen to them or whatever they may do. Hence, 
whatever we may do to other human beings or to ourselves must not conflict 
with the fact that we all possess this dignity – not because of what makes us 
different from other beings (being human) or from other human beings (be-
ing a particular human being) but by the sheer fact of existing as human be-
ings. 
But what exactly does this mean? Are we said to have this dignity be-
cause we are human beings or because we exist as human beings? Is the as-
cription of dignity tied to what or who we are (our essence31) or to the fact 
that we are (our existence)? In the first case even a merely possible human 
being would possess dignity: To possess dignity would be analytically true of 
anybody who is human. In the second case the possession of dignity would 
be contingent on actually existing as a human being: To possess dignity 
would be synthetically true only of those human beings who exist (have ex-
isted or will exist).  
The latter understanding seems to be closer to our actual practice. Exis-
tence seems to be an essential requirement for ascribing dignity to human 
beings. Someone who doesn’t exist cannot claim a right to have rights. The 
claim is not that if x is a human being, then x possesses dignity, but rather 
that if x is a human being and exists, then x possesses dignity. The ascription 
of dignity does not depend on being human, but on existing as a human be-
ing.32 That is to say, the dignity of human beings is not a particular human 
dignity which they have insofar as they are humans (‘If x is a human being, 
then x has human dignity’) but rather the dignity they have insofar as they 
exist as humans (‘If x is a human being and exists, then x has dignity’ or ‘If x is 
a human being, then x has dignity, if x exists’). It is not an analytic truth that 
humans have this dignity but a synthetic truth that if they exist, then they 
have it: their dignity comes with their existence, not with their essence. 
                                                     
31
 I use the term in a broad sense to signify everything that provides a defensible answer to the 
question ‘What are human beings?’ 
32
 If we construe dignity as an essential property of human beings (i.e. as human dignity) then it 
belongs to the set of determinations of what humans are so that it is impossible for anyone to be hu-
man and not to possess human dignity – whether he or she exists or not. If, on the other hand, we con-
strue dignity not as a property of what humans are but of the fact that they are (if they are), then it is 
impossible for any human being to exist and not to have this dignity. Possible human beings do not 
possess any dignity but at best possible dignity: If they exist, then they have dignity, if they don’t, then 
they don’t. Actual beings, on the other hand, are not human beings because they possess human digni-
ty but rather they possess dignity (not human dignity) because they are human beings who exist. 
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Merely possible human beings have at best a possible dignity. Only actual 
human beings, i.e. human beings who exist, have dignity. 
 
 
5. WHO WE ARE VS. THAT WE ARE 
This allows for a different way of distinguishing between human dignity 
and the dignity we have as human beings: If the dignity of human beings 
comes with their existence (the fact that they are), not with their essence 
(that which they are), then their dignity should not be construed as a neces-
sary property of their essence (human dignity) but as a contingent property 
of their existence (the dignity of humans). This dignity (whatever it is) need 
not be restricted to humans (the dignity only of humans). Rather, the term 
‘human dignity’– and this is a different reading from the one discussed above 
– may be an abbreviation of the human way or mode in which human beings 
have dignity: They do not possess a special human dignity but they have the 
dignity they have in a special human way. The decisive point of this special 
way is that humans have this dignity not simply by being human but by being 
human beings who exist. Dignity is not a feature of their humanity per se 
(their essence) but rather of their existence as human beings (their actual 
presence with others in situations of communication and interaction). That is 
to say, it is impossible for human beings to be and not possess this dignity 
but not because their being human analytically implies this property but be-
cause it is impossible for them to be and not to have this dignity. We do not 
need to know what this dignity involves, nor what exactly we mean by ‘hu-
man being,’ but we can say that human beings (whatever that may mean) 
have dignity (whatever that may mean) not because of who or what they are 
(human beings) but because of the fact that they are: ‘For every x, if x is a 
human being, then it has dignity if it exists.’ 
 
 
6. DENIALS OF HUMANITY, DENIALS OF EXISTENCE, AND DENIALS OF PERSONHOOD 
If we start from here, then we must distinguish not merely between hu-
man dignity and the dignity of humans but also between three ways of deny-
ing the dignity of humans: denials of their humanity, denials of their exis-
tence, and denials of their personhood. If we construe human dignity as an 
essential property of human beings, then to be human is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for having this property: To be human is to have human 
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dignity, and to deny it of someone is to deny that she or he is human. We 
may still see them as something interesting or useful for us, but we would not 
treat them as humans, i.e. as one of us. On the other hand, if we construe 
dignity as a property tied to the existence of human beings, then to be human 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for having it: Other beings may have digni-
ty as well, and humans have it only if they exist (have existed or will exist). 
However, if they exist, then they exist as human persons, i.e. as beings who 
deserve to be treated in the same way as we and all other persons want to be 
treated. A person is a being that exists as a member of a community of per-
sons, i.e. by communicating and interacting with other persons as persons, 
and a human person is a being that lives his or her humanity in communicat-
ing with and interacting with other human persons, i.e. as a member of the 
community of those with whom we interact as persons. Thus, to be a person 
is to put a demand on other persons to be treated as a person, and it involves 
a commitment, obligation, or duty to treat other persons as persons. We 
cannot see someone as a person and deny the demand on us to treat him or 
her as a person. And we cannot see ourselves as persons and deny the duty to 
relate to other persons as persons. We may fail to do so, but this failure is not 
merely a failure with respect to the other, but also with respect to ourselves: 
We fail to be true to who we are as persons. 
A denial of dignity is then not merely or always a denial of being human 
(at least not necessarily so) but a refusal to see someone as a human being 
that actually exists together with us or to refuse to relate to somebody as a 
person who lives as a person among us: It is not his or her humanity that is 
ignored but the fact that he or she exists as a member of our community of 
persons. We deny their existence and personhood, not necessarily that they 
are humans. Just as in the first case we do not take them to be humans but 
mistake them for something else, so in the second case we ignore that they 
exist at all (existence) or that they are present to us as one of us (person): We 
treat them like the dead, i.e. someone who is no longer with us, or like fic-
tional characters, i.e. someone who was never with us, or like a thing or ob-
ject that we use, but we do not relate to them as partners with whom we may 
or should or could communicate and interact as persons among persons. 
All these are ways of mistreating the other. But it is one thing to be mis-
taken for something else (not a human being), another to be simply ignored 
(a non-existing entity) or to be excluded from the community of persons by 
being treated as an unperson or non-person. If we construe violations of hu-
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man dignity as an offense against the humanity of a person, then we treat 
him or her not as a human being: We de-humanize the other by ignoring his 
or her humanity. If we construe violations of human dignity as a denial of the 
existence of a person, then we treat him or her as a non-existent entity, or as 
a non-person: We de-personalize the other by excluding him or her from the 
community of those who exist and with whom we communicate as persons. 
In the first case we act as if there were not a human being but only something 
else. In the second we act as if there were nobody or nothing at all or no per-
son with whom we would and ought to interact as a person. All these are in-
humane ways of relating to others: to deny what they are (their humanity), to 
ignore that they are (their existence), or to disregard who they are (persons). 
All this is incompatible with the dignity of human beings. However, none of 
this can do away with the fact (if it is a fact) that the other is a human being, 
that he or she exists, and that he or she is present to us as a person. We may 
deny the one, ignore the other, and disregard the third. We may behave in 
ways that flatly contradict them. But we cannot do away with them. 
 
 
7. VIOLATING PERSONS VS. VIOLATING DIGNITY 
Is this the meaning of the first sentence of the German Basic Law ‘The 
dignity of the human being is inviolable’? Hardly. It is true: Nobody ceases to 
be human by being treated in inhumane ways or by living under inhumane 
conditions. Human beings do not stop being human by being treated in ways 
that contradict their dignity or by being forced to live under conditions that 
are inhumane. But these ways and conditions are incompatible with their 
irrevocable dignity as human persons. A state that prides itself on serving and 
protecting the welfare of its citizens cannot put up with this.  
Thus, although the first sentence in German uses the grammatical indic-
ative, i.e. is rather than shall, it states a norm, not merely a fact – or perhaps 
one could say: it states a norm with respect to human beings and a fact with 
respect to their dignity: You can violate the first (human beings) but not the 
second (their dignity), yet you ought not to violate the first because of the 
second. Dignity is indeed not something that can be ‘touched;’ only things, 
bodies, animals or human beings can. And whereas you can touch a human 
being, you cannot, at least not in the same sense, touch his or her dignity. But 
this is not to say that Article 1 allows us to do what we want to human beings 
because their dignity will stay untouched. On the contrary, just because the 
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human bearers of dignity are violable, the principle of the inviolability of the 
dignity of human beings states that this shall not be the case: The human 
bearers of dignity – not the bearers of human dignity – must not be touched in 
a way that conflicts with their dignity as human persons. The principle is not 
about human dignity (Menschenwürde) but about the dignity human beings 
have in an irrevocable way if and insofar as they exist as persons among per-
sons (Würde des Menschen), and their dignity defines the scope and limit of 
what is acceptable, or not acceptable, in our dealings with human beings. Just 
because human beings are violable, and indeed are violated often to a shock-
ing degree, the principle states that everybody must respect the dignity of 
human beings in dealing with them. Not only must the state do so, but also 
each individual must respect the dignity not only of others but also of him- 
or herself.  
Therefore, the German constitution commits the German people axi-
omatically to the absolute principle of not violating the dignity of human be-
ings, i.e. of not treating human bearers of dignity in ways that are incompati-
ble with their dignity as human persons. This implies negatively not to allow, 
or put up with, any violation of those who are human bearers of dignity that 
conflicts with their dignity as human persons. And it implies positively to do 
everything to create conditions for humans to live their lives among and to-
gether with others as bearers of this dignity. This is clear from the second 
paragraph of Article 1: ‘The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable 
and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and 
of justice in the world.’ The dignity of human beings is not the same as hu-
man rights. But as the ‘therefore’ indicates, human rights are guaranteed be-
cause of the dignity of human beings, and they are necessary to protect hu-
man beings against violations that conflict with and are contrary to their dig-
nity. The right to have rights is restricted to human bearers of this dignity, 
i.e. to human persons. Human beings who exist cannot lose their dignity 
even when they are treated in inhumane ways. Since they cannot lose it as 
long as they live, and even beyond (because if they have been persons, it will 
always be true that they have been persons), they will always be bearers of 
the fundamental human rights that unfold the normative content and point 
of their dignity. This dignity is said to be inviolable just because its bearers 
can be, and often are, violated. 
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In this sense the first sentence of Article 1 states an absolute principle 
not to be violated by anybody. To torture anybody is strictly prohibited, even 
if it may help to save the lives of many. Torture of whatever sort harms not 
merely the body but contradicts the dignity of a person. The same principle 
has been invoked in decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
against life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the shooting 
down of aircrafts that are used as weapons by terrorists, abortion of embryos, 
peep shows where the performer cannot see those who are watching, or hor-
ror movies and video games such as the Mortal Kombat series. Actions of this 
sort are strictly forbidden not only to the state but to anyone.  
The second sentence addresses the state explicitly and states two public 
duties that require action: The state has to respect the dignity of human per-
sons, i.e. has to design the entire legal system in a manner that does not con-
flict with the dignity of persons. And it also has to protect this dignity, i.e. has 
to take appropriate measures if other people or poor living conditions endan-
ger or undermine the dignity of persons. Whereas the prohibition of viola-
tions of the dignity of human persons in the first sentence of Paragraph 1 Ar-
ticle 1 is strict and without exception, the state duties mentioned in the 
second sentence are such that they require consideration of all interests af-
fected, all parties concerned, and even of political preferences. Here balanc-
ing is not merely a possibility but a duty, whereas all balancing of principles 
is excluded in the first sentence.33 The dignity of human persons is not some-




8. VALUE VS. DIGNITY 
But is it? If it is a value it cannot be absolute because all value or worth 
(Wert) is the polar opposite of worthlessness or non-value (Unwert) and thus 
can come by degrees: it has more or less value as its price indicates. But this 
is not so with dignity as Kant emphasized: 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity. Whatever has a 
value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the 
other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dig-
nity.  
                                                     
33
 Cf. Nils Tiefke, Das Prinzip Menschenwürde: Zur Abwägungsfähigkeit des Höchstrangigen (Tü-
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Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a 
market value; whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain 
taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a 
fancy value; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone any-
thing can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value, 
but an intrinsic worth, that is, dignity.  
Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an 
end in himself, since by this alone is it possible that he should be a legislating 
member in the kingdom of ends. Thus morality, and humanity as capable of it, 
is that which alone has dignity… This estimation therefore shows that the 
worth of such a disposition is dignity, and places it infinitely above all value, 
with which it cannot for a moment be brought into comparison or competition 
without as it were violating its sanctity.
34
 
Dignity is here explicitly contrasted to and distinguished from all value 
discourse. Something may be more or less valuable, and no value can be ab-
solute because it is always positioned on a scale between 0 and 1. Values are 
necessarily relative because the value of something depends on comparison 
and a particular judgment of that thing. Not so with dignity. Dignity is abso-
lute, its ascription is not based on comparison, and it does not come by de-
grees. Either one has it, or one doesn’t, and if one has it, one has it in exactly 
the same way and to the same extent as everybody else who has it. Dignity is 
not a relative value but an absolute, exclusive and complete distinction: If any 
human being has it, every human being has it. But human beings have it not 
because of any empirical trait or biological characteristic but only in so far as 
they are moral beings, i.e. capable of autonomy – of determining their own 
will (i.e. themselves) independent of any actual context according to the 
maxim of the good will. For to be autonomous in the Kantian sense is not 
merely to be able to choose between available options or courses of action in 
terms of what is more pleasant, or more useful, or more conducive to a great-
er happiness of many. Rather it is to be able to determine oneself to will only 
that which is willed by anybody who determines herself or himself to will 
only that which is willed by anybody who determines herself or himself to 
will only that which … – in short, to be one who wills nothing that cannot be 
willed by anyone who puts not his own interests but the requirements of our 
                                                     
34
 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Andrea Diem/David Lane (Walnut 2o08), 57–8.; cf. I. 
Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge 1996), 42–
43. 
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common humanity first. Kantian autonomy does not hinge on the capacity 
for deciding or choosing between options – this is something we find in one 
way or other everywhere among living beings. Nor is it to be identified with 
the specifically human capacity for rational decision, that is, for deciding be-
tween options motivated by reasons and not merely by desires, interests, or 
conventions – this distinguishes humans from other beings only by degree. 
Rather, it hinges on the moral capacity for deciding how to decide, or willing 
how to will, or choosing how to choose, in terms of the good, that is, by 
orienting the way one decides how to decide to the (morally) good, which is 
not defined by the individual interests of those who choose but which is the 
same for everyone. I am autonomous not because I can choose between op-
tions for reasons but because I can choose how to choose and determine the 
how of my choosing by orienting it to the good which is universally valid for 
everyone (the moral law). In choosing how to choose I am not determined by 
the actual options at hand, or by what I think or perceive to be the options in 
a given situation, or by reasons that appeal to some end that I desire. Rather, 
I can determine my way of choosing how to choose independently of the con-
tingent (causal) actualities of a given situation and subjective interests in a 
situation by orienting it to the (morally) good. For the morally good does not 
vary with different situations or subjective interests but is the same, and mo-
tivates per se in the same way, in all possible situations of human choosing, 
deciding, and acting.35  
 
 
9. THE DIGNITY OF MORALITY 
Therefore – and this is perhaps the most important point which Kant 
makes about dignity – dignity is not ascribed to human beings qua rational 
animals, at least not primarily and directly, but to morality, and through mo-
rality to humanity: ‘morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which 
alone has dignity.’ Morality has dignity in an absolute sense: There is not mo-
rality without dignity, and no dignity that is not tied to morality. Humanity, 
on the other hand, has dignity in a relative sense in so far as it is capable of 
being informed by morality: Humanity, i.e. that which characterizes human 
beings and distinguishes them from all other beings, can be viewed and the-
matized in many different ways: from empirical, biological, psychological, 
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sociological, historical, philosophical or theological perspectives. But only if 
we regard humanity from a moral perspective as something capable of moral-
ity can we ascribe dignity to it. Morality has dignity under any description, 
humanity only when viewed from a moral perspective. 
For Kant this is not the only perspective for understanding human be-
ings but it is an indispensible one if we really want to be true to the way we 
experience our lives and ourselves. From the moral perspective, to be human 
is to be capable of orienting one’s life to the good, that is to say, to be able to 
live in a morally good or morally evil way. However, we are not merely capa-
ble of living a moral life but we cannot avoid doing so: A morally neutral life 
is not one of our options. As human beings it is possible for us to choose be-
tween good and evil (we can determine our willing or choosing by orienting 
it to the good, or by not doing so) but we also must do so and hence always in 
fact do: It is not possible for us not to choose between good and evil. If we 
can choose, we must choose, and there is nobody, as Kant elaborates in his 
doctrine of radical evil, who will not have to admit upon careful examination 
that he or she has in fact chosen not to live in a morally good but rather in a 
morally evil way.  
Without going into detail, we may summarize Kant’s account of human 
personhood as follows: Human beings are persons. As persons they are moral 
beings capable of orienting their willing how to will to the good, or of not 
doing so, and as human persons they are not capable of not orienting their 
willing in either of these two ways: It is impossible for humans to live in a 
morally neutral way. To be human is to be capable of morality: It is impossi-
ble to be human and not to be able to live a moral life. And to be a human 
person is necessarily to actualize this capability: It is impossible to live as a 
human person and not to live in either a morally good or a morally evil way. 
As it happens, all of us in fact actualize our human capacity for morality in a 
way that misses the possibility of the good. We all live in fact by not orienting 
our lives to the good, or to the good only, or primarily to the good. We all live 
in fact in a way that is morally problematic, far from perfect, or outright evil. 
 
 
10. THE DIGNITY OF BEING CAPABLE OF MORALITY 
However, this does not infringe on our dignity. We do not possess digni-
ty because we live a morally good life but because we have the potential and 
capacity to do so. The capability of morality, not the actuality of a morally 
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good life is Kant’s basis for ascribing unrestricted dignity to human persons. 
The ascription of dignity is not restricted to those who live a morally good 
life, or denied to those who live in a morally evil way. It is tied to our capacity 
to live morally, and since every human person necessarily actualizes this ca-
pacity in a positive or negative way, there is no human being who cannot 
rightly be viewed and judged from a moral perspective. 
Thus, Kant’s account of dignity has two important implications. First, 
since dignity is ascribed to human beings in terms of the moral capacity of 
our common humanity, it does not allow us to distinguish between human 
beings or to classify human beings into groups, sets or classes of those who 
have or don't have dignity: Dignity is not a concept that defines a class of 
human beings but a general feature of human beings as such. Human beings 
qua human beings have dignity, i.e. the right to be treated with dignity by 
everybody because every human being is capable of morality and in fact lives 
a morally good or evil life. Recourse to dignity does not allow us to draw a 
distinction between different sorts, groups, ranks, or classes of human beings 
(one group of humans vs. another group of humans) but only to distinguish 
humans from non-human beings in terms of the capacity for morality that 
humans share with all other moral beings.  
However, and this is the second point, dignity is not a property that to-
gether with others defines our common humanity. Whatever we take to be 
the essence of humanity, i.e. the set of properties that together constitutes 
our common humanity, it will not include dignity but only our capacity for 
morality. This capacity is the basis for ascribing dignity to us, but dignity is 
not identical with it. Dignity is not a defining feature of humanity but rather 
humanity is capable of manifesting morality that alone has dignity. It does so 
because we cannot enact our humanity concretely without in fact living in a 
moral way, whether good or evil. However, our dignity does not depend on 
how we live in fact, but on the fact that we can live in a morally good or evil 
way and cannot live without in fact living in the one way or the other. Since 
we can orient our lives to the morally good we ought to do so, but even if we 
fail to do so and miss our end as moral beings we still have dignity because, 
as humans, we are capable of morality. Whereas morality has dignity, we par-
take in it by living a morally good or a morally evil life. As humans we can do 
this because we, and we alone among all living animals, are capable of moral-
ity and thus can live in a humane (morally good) or inhumane (morally evil) 
way. We are moral ends in ourselves, and this is true of us even if we fail to 
live in a humane way. The dignity of humans as moral beings is that they are 
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faced with the challenge and task of existing as persons, that is, not merely as 
means to an end but as moral ends in themselves. Kant makes the point ex-
plicitly: ‘Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being 
exists not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; 




In short, dignity is not a feature of what we are (humans) but of the way 
in which we live as human beings who can and must determine ourselves 
morally (moral beings or persons). Not our actual moral self-determination 
(how we in fact orient our lives) but the possibility and necessity of such a 
determination is decisive for our dignity: As finite moral beings (human per-
sons) we are capable of orienting our lives to the good or of not doing so, and 
at the same time we are not capable of not orienting our lives either to the 
good or not to the good. In this sense, dignity hinges not on our actual moral 
character but on the possibility of having a moral character (as humans) and 
on the impossibility of not actually having a positive or negative moral cha-
racter (as persons). Here as elsewhere Kant puts the emphasis on our real 
possibility (we are capable of morality) and not on our concrete actuality as 
moral beings (we in fact live in a morally evil or in a morally good way). Thus 
for Kant, to be human is, from an empirical perspective, not to be a rational 
animal (animal rationale) but an animal capable of rationality (animal rati-
onabile) and, from a moral perspective, not to be morally good or to be moral-
ly evil but to be capable of morality. Human beings manifest the dignity of 
morality by living as moral beings, ends in themselves, or persons. They may 
fail to live up to their full potential as persons in their actual way of living by 
not orienting themselves to the good, and in one way or other we all in fact 
fail to do so. But this does not stop us from being persons who manifest the 
dignity of morality. If we can live in a morally good way, then we ought to do 
so. And we know that we can precisely because the moral law tells us that we 
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 Ibid. 79 (Grundlegung 4, 429) Not humanity per se (i.e. that which makes us human beings) 
nor any other essential determination (such as the one of rational beings) but only the inescapably 
moral way of existing or living our common humanity as persons among persons is the basis for ascrib-
ing dignity to us: Dignity is true of us not because of our common humanity (essence) but only because 
we are able to live our common humanity in a moral way (mode of existence). 
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11. RATIONAL VS. ACCOUNTABLE BEING 
It is obvious that Kant does not argue within the parameters of the clas-
sical definition of the human being as rational animal (animal rationale) or 
embodied rationality.37 He does not merely discriminate between our ani-
mality, which we share as our genus proximum with other living beings, and 
our rationality, which is the differentia specifica that marks us off from other 
living beings; nor does he merely discriminate from a reverse perspective be-
tween our rationality, which is the genus proximum that we share with all 
rational beings, and our animality, which is the differentia specifica that 
makes us embodied creatures in the realm of rational beings. Rather, Kant 
operates with a threefold distinction with respect to what we are between our 
biological (animality), rational (humanity) and moral dimensions (persona-
lity) which corresponds to his distinctions between sensuality (Sinnlichkeit), 
understanding (Verstand), and reason (Vernunft): We are not merely living 
beings (our ‘predisposition to animality’), nor merely living and rational be-
ings (our ‘predisposition to humanity’) but rational and at the same time ac-
countable beings (our ‘predisposition to personality’).38 The traditional duali-
ty between our animal and rational natures is thus incorporated into a new 
duality between our phenomenal (animality and rationality) and noumenal 
side (accountability or personality). We are individuals as organisms (biolog-
ical animality) and rational agents (rationality), but we are necessarily mem-
bers of a moral society as persons (moral accountability). Persons are not par-
ticulars of a shared commonality or general nature (humanity or rationality) 
but singular beings in a society of singular moral beings.39 As living beings we 
belong to the system of nature or, more precisely, to the physical realm of 
animals. However, compared with other animals we are not excellent and 
outstanding but rather a weak, vulnerable and endangered kind of animal. 
On the scale of physical values we do not figure very high: ‘Man in the system 
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 Cf. I. U. Dalferth, Umsonst: Eine Erinnerung an die kreative Passivität des Menschen (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2011). 
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 I. Kant, Religion within the limits of reason alone, book 1. 
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 This also enlarges and deepens the notion of human embodiment’ (the metaphor is proble-
matic because it wrongly suggests that ‘we’ – whoever we may be – live in our bodies, that is, are dis-
tinct from our bodies in such a way that our bodies are only the contingent temporal manifestation of 
our true eternal reality). But we are bodies, not merely in a biological sense but also, and in many con-
texts more importantly, in a social, cultural, moral, religious or political sense. To be part of a moral 
(religious, cultural, social, political, ecclesial) community is to be a body of a particular sort, and as 
human persons we cannot be who we are without being such a body. In this sense, we do not merely 
have a body but are bodies – in more than one respect. 
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of nature (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being of slight impor-
tance and shares with the rest of the animals, as offsprings of the earth, a 
common value (pretium vulgare).’40 
This is not much different when we turn to our much-praised rationali-
ty. As rational agents we can set ends for ourselves and rationally choose be-
tween options because of our capacities of understanding and will. However, 
as such we are still part of the animal world and only relatively but not in 
principle different from other living beings. ‘Although man has, in his reason, 
something more than they and can set his own ends, even this gives him only 
an extrinsic value in terms of his usefulness (pretium usus). This extrinsic 
value is the value of one man above another – that is, his price as a ware that 
can be exchanged for these other animals, as things. But, so conceived, man 
still has a lower value than the universal medium of exchange, the value of 
which can therefore be called pre-eminent (pretium eminens).’41 Only in the 
third respect, i.e. as persons, we radically differ from other animals: ‘But man 
regarded as a person – that is, as the subject of morally practical reason – is 
exalted above any price; for as such (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued 
as a mere means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end 
in himself. He possesses, in other words, a dignity (an absolute inner worth) 
by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the 
world: he can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value 
himself on a footing of equality with them.’42 
That is to say, persons are not just rational agents who can set ends for 
themselves. Humans are not merely rational deciders and individual agents 
but persons who are accountable to others, i.e. who can be held responsible 
by others for what they do or fail to do or, even more importantly, how they 
do what they do and how they will what they will and do. As rational deciders 
and agents we can be compared with other animals or other humans accord-
ing to the degree of efficiency in which we achieve our ends. Humans are 
generally more efficient than most other animals, and some humans are more 
efficient than others. As persons, however, we cannot be compared with oth-
ers, whether animals or humans. With regard to personhood, we are not 
‘higher animals’ than others (speciesism) and some of us do not rank ‘higher’ 
than others (elitism). Accountability is not a matter of degree, and it is not 
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ascribed on the basis of comparing our effectiveness as rational deciders with 
that of other species (great apes, chimps, rats, dolphins) or other members of 
our own species (the educated vs. the uneducated, the rich vs. the poor, those 
in power vs. those without power, the aristocrats vs. the herd-people). Its 
ascription is based on a simple and absolute alternative: Are we able to live a 
moral life, or aren’t we? We, and we alone among all living beings, have the 
capacity to do so, and since we can, we must because we cannot live in a mo-
rally neutral way. For Kant, morality is not a system of values based on gut 
feelings but on our capacity for autonomy, i.e. our potential to determine 
ourselves independently from any stimuli in our actual environment or state 
of our feelings by the maxim of the good will alone; and this capacity is such 
that we cannot live without in fact exercising it by either living, or failing to 
live, a moral life. 
This potential for autonomy is the basis for the absolute respect we owe 
each other – a respect that does not depend on our rationality, physical 
strength, attractiveness, sociability or anything else that comes in degrees, 
i.e. can be increased or decreased, but on the mere capacity to live as moral 
beings according to the practical law. We are not merely rational animals 
(Verstandeswesen) but persons (Vernunftwesen). As such we are intrinsically 
related to a community of persons (rational spirits) who can hold us account-
able for how we determine ourselves and live our lives, and who therefore 
owe us the same respect which we owe them. As Vernunftwesen we are not 
merely rational individuals but singular members of a moral society of per-
sons or spirits. This moral society of free spirits does not coincide with any-
thing in the physical world of animal life or the rational world of human 
knowers, deciders, and agents. As rational beings we differ from other ani-
mals only by degree. But as moral beings or persons we differ from them ab-
solutely or qualitatively. 
 
 
12. ELITIST VS. UNIVERSAL CONCEPTIONS OF DIGNITY 
For Kant, dignity can only be predicated of moral beings, i.e. of beings 
capable of autonomy, and no moral being, whether finite or infinite, can be 
excluded from having it. Thus, with respect to humans the concept of dignity 
is intrinsically universal: If it is true of any person, then it is true of every per-
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son. You cannot be a person and not have dignity.43 Moreover, dignity does 
not come in degrees: Either one has it or one doesn’t. Either you are a person, 
or you are not. Dignity is an absolute, exclusive and complete distinction of 
persons. The concept of dignity does not allow us to draw distinctions be-
tween human beings or classify humans into groups, sets or classes (those 
who have dignity and those who don’t). Kant’s conception of dignity is strict-
ly universal. 
The contrary is true for Nietzsche.  Following ancient elitist conceptions 
he sees an ‘order of rank between man and man,’44 and a gap between those 
few human beings who have true worth (rulers) and the average human be-
ing (slaves). For him, dignity is not the highest human value shared by all 
human beings. His understanding derives from the ancient notions of dig-
nitas, auctoritas, maiestas or nobilitas. Dignity is not an intrinsic human val-
ue but rather an earned nobility. In the past one had it by being born into the 
right social class, and today one gets it by breaking away from the democratic 
egalitarianism of modern resentment driven herd culture through radical 
self-making, i.e. the willingness to stand in solitude over against the corrupt 
moral majority of the many. ‘Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual,’45 
not that which distinguished persons from all other beings. ‘We, “the few and 
true ones” want to become those we are – human beings who are new, 
unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.’46 
In short, dignity is not a universal character-trait of human beings but rather 
an indicator of social class (nobility vs. herd culture) that is not applicable to 
everybody. 
It is easy to see how this can be found in religious and cultural traditions 
as well, especially where questions of religion and questions of national iden-
tity are so closely intertwined as in the Jewish tradition. As Susannah Heschel 
has pointed out, where human dignity is seen as a distinction or an honor of 
a particular group or nation (such as Israel) or of a particular group of people 
within a nation (such as male Jews) it is used in fact as an elitist concept that 
is not applicable to women and gentiles. ‘In Judaism, as in most religious tra-
ditions …, dignity, like religion itself, is not universal.’47  
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This is Nietzsche’s view, not Christianity’s – at least not in an ideal 
world. It is precisely because it can be (mis)understood in this elitist way that 
Protestant theologians in the 19th century have shied away from using this 
category.48 ‘Image of God’ was their term for expressing the universal charac-
teristic of human persons, whereas ‘dignity’ was used only, if at all, when ad-
dressing a general non-Christian audience, as in Schleiermacher. Only 
against the backdrop of such an elitist conception of dignity does it make 
sense to say that ‘claims that base human dignity on God and divine creation 
or imago Dei make human rights derivative, rather than primary.’49 And only 
then does it makes sense to denounce dignity discourse as ‘a religious foun-
dation clothed in secular garb,’ by insisting that ‘What must be primary is the 
human being as such, period.’50 The point of modern dignity discourse is pre-
cisely to make the human being primary – the very fact of being human and 
not the possession of a particular quality or the belonging to a particular reli-
gious, political, or social group, class or orientation. 




13. THE FAILURE OF THE FACTOR X APPROACH  
1. In 2002, Francis Fukuyama searched for that ‘Factor X’ which makes us 
human, without which, he believes, human dignity can't have a foundation.51 
In ‘the political realm we are required to respect people equally on the basis 
of their possession of Factor X.’52 He is not satisfied with either the religious 
answer that all souls are equal before God,53 nor with Kant's answer that right 
is based on our capacity to make rational choices,54  (which isn’t Kant’s an-
swer) nor with the Darwinian position ‘that species do not have essences’ as a 
species is merely a snapshot at the moment between what came before and 
what will come afterwards.55 Rather, he argues, ‘Factor X cannot be reduced 
to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or sociability, or 
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sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been 
put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all these qualities coming to-
gether in a human whole that make up factor X.’56 It is not clear whether he 
uses the term ‘human dignity’ as a short formula of this complex set of fea-
tures, or whether he understands the set of features to be the necessary 
(and/or sufficient?) condition for applying the term ‘human dignity’ to a be-
ing. But it is clear, that for him there must be a set of features that mark off 
humans from other beings if the ascription of dignity is to have a legitimate 
foundation. 
2. A year later, in 2003, Ruth Macklin, professor of medical ethics at the 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, argued that ‘Dignity is a 
useless concept. It means no more than respect for persons or their autono-
my.’57 ‘Why,’ she asked, ‘do so many articles and reports appeal to human 
dignity, as if it means something over and above respect for persons or for 
their autonomy?’58 And she concludes: ‘Although the aetiology may remain a 
mystery, the diagnosis is clear. Dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics 
and can be eliminated without any loss of content.’59 
3. Another 5 years later, in 2008, the President's Council on Bioethics 
tried to put dignity on firmer conceptual ground in a 555-page report, titled 
Human Dignity and Bioethics. The report came under heavy fire, especially from 
the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science. Steven Pinker at-
tacked it in a paper on ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ as ‘conservative bioethics’ 
latest, most dangerous ploy.’60 ‘The problem is that “dignity” is a squishy, 
subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to 
it.’61 He criticizes that many of the 28 essays are written by ‘vociferous advo-
cates of a central role for religion in morality and public life,’62 and that some 
‘align their arguments with Judeo-Christian doctrine’ which he finds shock-
ing in a secular context.63  
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It comes as little surprise when Pinker concludes that ‘the concept of 
dignity remains a mess.’64 For him, dignity  
has three features that undermine any possibility of using it as a foundation for 
bioethics. First, dignity is relative. One doesn't have to be a scientific or moral 
relativist to notice that ascriptions of dignity vary radically with the time, 
place, and beholder. Second, dignity is fungible. The Council and Vatican treat 
dignity as a sacred value, never to be compromised. In fact, every one of us vo-
luntarily and repeatedly relinquishes dignity for other goods in life. … Third, 
dignity can be harmful. … Indeed, totalitarianism is often the imposition of a 
leader's conception of dignity on a population, such as the identical uniforms 
in Maoist China or the burqas of the Taliban … So is dignity a useless con-
cept? Almost. The word does have an identifiable sense, which gives it a claim, 
though a limited one, on our moral consideration. Dignity is a phenomenon of 
human perception … certain features in another human being trigger ascripti-
ons of worth. These features include signs of composure, cleanliness, maturity, 
attractiveness, and control of the body. The perception of dignity in turn elicits 
a response in the perceiver. Just as the smell of baking bread triggers a desire to 
eat it, and the sight of a baby's face triggers a desire to protect it, the appear-
ance of dignity triggers a desire to esteem and respect the dignified person.65  
Dignity is clearly seen here as a descriptive concept, and an elitist one.  
This explains why dignity is morally significant: We should not ignore a phe-
nomenon that causes one person to respect the rights and interests of another. 
But it also explains why dignity is relative, fungible, and often harmful. Dignity 
is skin-deep: it's the sizzle, not the steak; the cover, not the book. What ulti-
mately matters is respect for the person, not the perceptual signals that typical-
ly trigger it. Indeed, the gap between perception and reality makes us vulnera-
ble to dignity illusions. We may be impressed by signs of dignity without un-
derlying merit, as in the tin-pot dictator, and fail to recognize merit in a person 
who has been stripped of the signs of dignity, such as a pauper or refugee.66 
‘Exactly what aspects of dignity should we respect?’67 Pinker gives two an-
swers, one positive, the other negative.  
For one thing, people generally want to be seen as dignified. Dignity is thus 
one of the interests of a person, alongside bodily integrity and personal proper-
ty, that other people are obligated to respect. We don't want anyone to stomp 
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on our toes; we don't want anyone to steal our hubcaps; and we don't want 
anyone to open the bathroom door when we're sitting on the john ... There is a 
second reason to give dignity a measure of cautious respect. Reductions in dig-
nity may harden the perceiver's heart and loosen his inhibitions against mist-
reating the person. When people are degraded and humiliated, such as Jews in 
Nazi Germany being forced to wear yellow armbands or dissidents in the Cul-
tural Revolution being forced to wear grotesque haircuts and costumes, onloo-
kers find it easier to despise them. ... Note, though, that all these cases involve 
coercion, so once again they are ruled out by autonomy and respect for per-
sons. So, even when breaches of dignity lead to an identifiable harm, it's ulti-
mately autonomy and respect for persons that gives us the grounds for con-
demning it.68 
Thus, according to Steven Pinker, dignity is a psychologically (or scien-
tifically) useless concept: everything we want to say can be expressed by au-
tonomy talk; it is a category of religious fanatics; and it is a phenomenon of 
human perception (what we conceive as ‘dignified’) that can bar us from see-
ing what is really important about persons. For all those reasons we should 
not continue dignity-discourse but rather decry this neoconservative idea as a 
scientifically useless notion. 
4. In 2010, Peter Augustine Lawler, a member of the President’s Council 
on Bioethics attacked by Pinker, replied in his Modern and American Dignity: 
Who We Are as Persons, and What That Means for our Future69 by drawing a 
sharp distinction between the ‘modern’ and the ‘American’ view of dignity. 
The ‘modern’ view of dignity, as he calls it, denies what’s good about who we 
are by nature, understanding human dignity to mean moral autonomy (free-
dom from nature) or productivity (asserting our mastery over nature by de-
vising ingenious transformations). This new understanding of dignity stands 
at odds with the ‘American’ view, which depends on the self-evidence of the 
truth that we are all created equally unique and irreplaceable. The American 
view, which is indebted to classical, Christian, and modern sources, under-
stands that free persons are more than merely autonomous or productive 
beings—or, for that matter, clever chimps. It sees what’s good in our personal 
freedom and our technical mastery over nature, but only in balance with the 
rest of what makes us whole persons—our dignified performance of our ‘rela-
tional’ duties as familial, political, and religious beings. 
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The modern view, as Lawler calls it, is based on a problematic methodo-
logical prejudice.  
It seems clear enough that human dignity must consist in what is unique about 
man as compared with other beings. That is to say, we must compare human 
beings with something else. Now, in a culture which has little or no conception 
of the supernatural, man cannot avoid comparing himself primarily with other 
visible beings (as opposed to invisible or spiritual beings) in determining where 
his uniqueness lies. Especially in a scientific culture, preoccupied as it is with 
natural studies and the alleviation of natural problems, it is not hard to see 
why many would reasonably conclude that what is unique about us humans is 
our ability to reflect on and alter our own nature. Animals cannot do this. You 
will never find even the noblest ape attempting to do things that it cannot do 
given its natural (or material) constitution (to fly, for example, or to develop 
electronic means of communication), nor will an ape attempt to make itself 
something other than it is by nature. Yet because of our unique abilities for in-
tellection and self-reflection, we humans do extend our abilities beyond what 
nature has equipped us to do (that is, our physical limitations), and we also 
dream of improving ourselves in other ways, including overcoming our own 
mortality. Human persons, in other words, have a strong tendency to find their 
uniqueness precisely in their autonomy with respect to nature, including their 
own nature.70 
Thus, for all his differences from Pinker, Lawler also agrees that dignity 
is a descriptive notion whose ascription is to be based on comparison. Not, 
however, on the comparison with other animals but on the comparison with 
supernatural beings. Since our culture has lost touch with this tradition, we 
look for dignity where it cannot be found (in our freedom from nature) in-
stead of concentrating on what is good about who we are by nature. We need 
to be more Aristotelian and less modernist in our understanding of dignity if 




14. DESCRIPTIVE VS. ORIENTING CONCEPTIONS 
However, Lawler shares too much common ground with the views he 
repudiates. He construes dignity as a descriptive concept based on compari-
son just as his opponents do, and he criticizes his critics only for arguing 
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from a wrong naturalist comparison with animals instead of from a compari-
son with supernatural beings. But this ties the problem to the problematic 
distinction between naturalism and theism and forgoes the opportunity to 
benefit from the Kantian insight that is neither naturalistic nor theistic. For 
Kant, ‘dignity’ is not a descriptive but an orienting concept. What does this 
mean? 
Descriptive concepts can be predicated of subjects, defined, and used to 
classify phenomena into sets on the basis of particular features, traits, or cha-
racteristics. The traditional definition of ‘human being’ as ‘rational animal’ 
(animal rationale) is a case in point: It describes humans as animals, and it 
marks them off from other animals by their rationality as their distinguishing 
characteristic.71 
Orienting concepts, on the other hand, cannot be defined because they 
have no semantically fixed meaning but only a pragmatic use whose rules or 
grammar can be described. They provide a scheme of orientation in terms of a 
set of distinctions and a means of locating ourselves and others by using that 
scheme that allow us to orient ourselves and others in real or symbolic spac-
es. Thus, we use schemes of spatial distinctions (left/right; above/ below; in 
front/behind etc.) to orient ourselves in space; or schemes of temporal dis-
tinctions (past/present/ future; earlier/later than etc.) to orient ourselves in 
time; or schemes of communication (personal pronouns) to orient ourselves 
in communicative contexts; or schemes of salutary distinctions 
(healthy/unhealthy; good/bad; medicine/ poison; etc.) to orient ourselves in 
health situations; or schemes of emotional distinctions to orient ourselves in 
bodily situations (pleasant/unpleasant; frightening/reassuring; etc.); or 
schemes of moral distinctions (good/evil) to orient ourselves in moral con-
texts; or schemes of interpersonal behavior (dignity/value) to orient ourselves 
in the mode of relating to others. These schemes are different and each has 
its own internal logic. For example, the spatial distinction between left and 
right can only be applied from a neutral position that is neither left nor right, 
whereas the temporal distinctions between past, present, and future can only 
be applied by being places in the present and not in the past or the future. 
But for all these differences, they have a common set of pragmatic functions 
that can be summarized as follows: 
1. These distinctions are not descriptive distinctions ‘in the world’ but 
orienting distinctions in how we relate to the world: There is no ‘here’ 
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and ‘now,’ ‘left’ or ‘right,’ ‘present’ or ‘past,’ ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in the world, 
but only with respect to us as we relate to the world around us in these 
ways. 
2. These distinctions orient by not allowing for degrees or exceptions: If 
anything is present, past, or future in a given discourse, everything is 
present, past, or future.  
3. These distinctions are only relevant, i.e. effective, by being used: Unless 
we orient ourselves in space in terms of left and right, there is no ‘left’ 
or ‘right.’ 
4. One cannot use any one of these distinctions without using the whole 
scheme: Nobody can say ‘I’ or ‘you’ without being able to say ‘he,’ ‘she,’ 
‘it,’ ‘we,’ ‘you’ and ‘they’ as well. Take one element of the scheme away 
and the whole scheme stops functioning. 
5. One cannot use these distinctions without at the same time applying 
them to oneself, i.e. to locate oneself and others within the scheme: We 
cannot say ‘you’ without using (implicitly or in fact) ‘I’ or ‘we’ for us; 
and we cannot use ‘dignity’ for us without using it of others, and vice 
versa. 
Thus, whereas elitist conceptions of dignity are either rank- or hie-
rarchy-relative (as in Nietzsche or – in a different and more complex way – in 
Thomas) or description based, i.e. require a particular set of features to be 
instantiated by someone to whom they are applied legitimately, dignity used 
in a Kantian sense is not a generalized description or universalized elitist 
conception (i.e. an elitist conception with unrestricted scope) but an orient-
ing device for a particular practice of human life, i.e. the practice of relating 
to others in moral contexts, in communication, and in other forms of social 
interaction. The basis for a legitimate ascription of dignity is not a ‘Factor X,’ 
whether understood as a single feature or a complex set of features, but a 
practice of (moral) communication. We ascribe dignity to those with whom 
we communicate as human beings: If they are human persons, we treat them 
with dignity. This we do not because of any particular feature or set of fea-
tures in them, but solely because we commit ourselves in principle to view 
and relate to anyone who is a human person in such a way that certain types 
of behavior are not acceptable (negative notions of dignity), whereas others 
are appropriate, desirable, required, or imperative (positive notions of digni-
ty). How we conceptualize dignity changes over time and from culture to cul-
ture, but to use dignity as a basic device or idea for orienting our ways of re-
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lating to those who communicate with us in human interactions and practic-
es is or can be (relatively) stable over time.  
What is important here is that practice comes first, not dignity. Without 
a humane practice of living together with other persons, there is no dignity. 
We destroy or harm this practice if we ascribe dignity only to us and not to 
others as well, or only to some humans, and not to all, or only sometimes, 
and not always, or not only to humans but also to other animals. Conversely, 
we further this practice if we commit ourselves to viewing and treating every 
human being, not merely family and friends but also strangers and enemies, 
as human persons with an untouchable dignity. In this sense, dignity is an 
orienting concept of a particular human practice – the practice of living a 
humane rather than an inhumane life together with others (before God – as 
Christians, Jews, or Moslems will add). The rule of dignity defines a practice 
that encompasses all human beings to whom we can or could relate in com-
municative interactions as persons, it comprises all dimensions of our lives 
from the biological and corporeal through the social and political to the mor-
al and religious,72 and it states that we commit ourselves to relate to other 
persons in the same way as we relate to ourselves as persons. To be a human 
person is enough for sharing this dignity – not to be human in a particular 
way, or to be genetically close or very similar to humans. The ascription of 
dignity is not based on comparison, and it is not relative to or dependent on 
a set of features in a human being, but merely on the fact that we see and 
identify the other as a human person73 with whom we interact in a common 
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15. THREE DIMENSIONS OF DIGNITY DISCOURSE 
Thus, if we construe dignity discourse as orienting discourse, then the 
basic problem is not how to define dignity (in a naturalistic or theistic, a 
modern or an American way), but rather who is to count as a human person 
so that he or she is a potential partner of human dignity practice. For empi-
ricists this seems to be primarily a biological problem, but it is not. Through-
out Western history the character and identity of human beings has been ex-
plored by drawing on three basic contrasts or comparisons: the biological 
contrast between humans and non-humans (humans vs. other animals); the 
theological contrast between humans and super-humans (humans vs. gods); 
and the anthropological contrast between humans and humans (inhumane 
vs. humane ways of living).  
Against the backdrop of these approaches three distinct sets of differ-
ences have been used to determine the content and function of the concept 
of dignity. For many it ‘seems clear enough that human dignity must consist 
in what is unique about man as compared with other beings.’74 However, this 
can be spelled out in naturalistic, theistic or anthropological terms.  
 Naturalists understand dignity to be a relative distinction based on a set of 
biological features that can be found more or less clearly in (some) hu-
mans and to some degree also in (some) other great apes; and sometimes 
more clearly in apes than in humans. Dignity can legitimately be ascribed 
to those who manifest these features, whether human or not. 
 Theists, on the other hand, base their account of dignity on a comparison 
of humans with deities or the divine. Whereas humans are deficient with 
respect to perfect being, they are more perfect than any other non-divine 
beings because of their sense of the divine – a sense allegedly unique to 
them (sensus divinitatis).75  
 Anthropological accounts of dignity, finally, compare humans with other 
humans and understand dignity as a distinct mode of living a human life – 
a mode that differentiates between inhumane und humane ways of living. 
The ascription of dignity here depends on a conception of the good life 
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that serves as the touchstone for judging the actual life of humans if they 
live up to this standard or fail to do so. Those, and only those, who live 
their lives in a humane way, however this may be defined, manifest digni-
ty. 
Thus, whereas naturalistic accounts ascribe dignity to some humans and some 
other apes, theistic accounts ascribe it to all humans and only to humans, and 




16. DIGNITY AS A DISTINCTION OF PERSONS 
In the anthropological sense, dignity is not a natural property or trait, 
nor a set of natural properties or traits that can be identified in an organism 
(naturalism), but a moral category: It is a short formula for the human self-
determination to treat other persons with the respect they deserve because of 
our common humanity.  
However, what is this common humanity? Answers differ widely. Biolog-
ical accounts elaborate the differences between humans and other animals. 
But this by itself will never be enough. It will always result in identifying 
merely gradual differences, and this is not enough for the absolute ascription 
of dignity because it misses the moral point and orienting function of dignity 
discourse. 
In order to avoid the naturalistic fallacy of searching for a Factor X in 
Fukuyama’s sense, moral answers understand our being human not simply as 
a natural fact but as a way of basing our lives on a normative decision about 
what we want to be and how we want to live as humans. We can live, or fail 
to live, our lives in a humane (as opposed to an inhumane) way, and if we 
can, then we should. From a moral perspective the decisive feature of being 
human is not to be what one is, but rather to have the potential, the duty and 
the obligation to become what one can be as a human being by living a hu-
mane rather than an inhumane life. 
The religious answer goes beyond the moral answer by defining a hu-
mane way of life in a specific way, i.e. by viewing, placing, or locating human 
life in relation to God. The theological argument behind this can briefly be 
summarized as follows: We are all different, but as the different individuals 
we are, we are all equal before the law. However, the set of those who are 
equal before the law comprises those, and only those, who are equal before 
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God. Equality before God is the non-natural distinction we all share as per-
sons, and this is the basis for the ascription of dignity to us. Personhood and 
equality are not something that can be ascribed to humans on the basis of a 
comparison, but rather are presupposed in comparing humans with others. 
The logic of comparing requires reference to a third in order to compare two: 
to compare A with B is to compare A to B with respect to C. From a religious 
perspective, humans are equal with respect to the law because they are equal 
with respect to the presence of God; and they are equal with respect to God 
not because they chose to live in the presence of God but rather because God 
freely becomes their loving neighbor and in doing so opens the space and 
time for humans to live their lives in a humane way – or to fail to do so.  
That is to say, dignity is not ascribed to us tout court but to us as per-
sons, and not just in any sense of ‘person’ but in so far as we as persons ma-
nifest or express the presence of God. As persons we are more than we appear 
to be: We are signs that point beyond ourselves to the presence of the one 
without whom we would not be, and we can become signs that manifest the 
presence of God to others, not necessarily by intentionally trying to do so but 
rather, and normally, without knowing it, or learning about it only retrospec-
tively. To be able to signify God’s presence to others is what distinguishes us 
from other beings. As persons we are personae of God’s presence.  
Thus, to respect the dignity of persons is to respect the presence of God 
in the other and myself. This is more than the Kantian principle that human 
beings should never be treated merely as a means, but always as ends in 
themselves. It is to insist that we – each and every one of us – are more than 
we appear to be because we are personae dei, i.e. somebody in and through 
whom God makes his presence manifest to others. Persons in this sense are 
not only the powerful and rich, as a misconceived doctrine of analogy might 
suggest, but even more so the poor and oppressed, those without rights and 
possession, those whom we don’t like, even our enemies: They are all poten-
tial occasions of the manifestation of God’s presence to us, and hence should 
be treated with the respect those deserve who are dignified by God to be-
come occasions for manifesting his presence.  
That is to say, everybody, simply by being a human person, is dignified to 
become an occasion of manifesting God’s presence to others. This is the 
Christian origin and foundation of the universalist idea of human dignity 
with respect to humans, which is based on an elitist understanding of dignity 
with respect to God: Dignity is first and foremost the dignity of God the cre-
ator, maker of heaven and earth. God’s dignity is transferred and extended to 
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the creature when and in so far as God makes them bearers and revealers of 
his presence to others. It is a dignity in which creatures participate by receiv-
ing it as a gift of God without ever possessing it. And since they do not pos-
sess it, they cannot lose or be robbed of it. This is why the dignity of human 
persons is universal and untouchable, and yet they can be treated in ways 
that ignore and contradict it. Their dignity can be offended by treating them 
in inhumane ways. But this offends the dignity of the source and origin of all 
dignity, i.e. the one who has chosen to make human beings his representa-
tives and to manifest his presence to us in and through each and every hu-
man person, not merely, as the elitist notion has it, through some of us but 
not others.  
 
 
17.  PROPERTY ESSENTIALISM VS. DYNAMIC PERSONALISM 
The three basic contrasts for comparing human beings result in three 
different approaches to human dignity. The first concentrates on comparing 
humans and non-humans (animals), and seeks to explicate dignity as an indi-
cator of biological excellence. But this approach is a failure. Naturalism is no 
help in understanding dignity. 
The third concentrates on comparing humans with humans and sees the 
real difference at stake not in the biological difference between humans and 
other animals but rather in the anthropological difference between humane 
and inhumane ways of living a human life.  Dignity here indicates a mode of 
human living – a humane as distinct from an inhumane mode of living. This is 
the proper locus of dignity discourse as developed in the 20th century.  
The central question then becomes what we mean by a ‘humane way of 
living a human life.’ Here the second approach as worked out in the Christian 
tradition offers two importantly different answers. 
The first is property essentialism: Dignity is a property that distinguishes 
humans (and angels) from other creatures or distinguishes a religious view of 
the world as creation (Pope Benedict XVI: ‘dignity of the earth’) from secular 
views. Thus humans have dignity because they are rational beings or at least 
beings who have the potential of being rational beings. They are rational 
souls in a body, and whereas the latter signifies their commonality with other 
creatures, the former signifies their (analogical) commonality with their 
Creator. The problem of this approach is that it collapses two distinctions 
into one: the distinction between God and creature, and the distinction be-
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tween human and other creatures. Reason or rationality are taken to consti-
tute the decisive difference between humans and other creatures on earth, 
and they are at the same time taken to be that which show us, and only us, to 
be related to God. The feature or property that singles humans out among 
creatures is at the same time that which singles humans out in their relati-
onship to God.  But this is in no way obvious and results in an over-
determined notion of reason: Reason is what distinguishes us from other an-
imals (animal rationale) and as such constitutes our (relative) sameness with 
God according to the analogical difference between God as the source of rea-
son and dignity and humans as the created occasions of reason and dignity. 
However, why should that which distinguishes us from other animals be at 
the same time that which manifests our special relationship with God? Prop-
erty essentialism uses the theological comparison between the human and 
the divine to interpret or elucidate the biological difference between humans 
and other animals. It gives a theological answer to a biological problem, and 
in doing so it fails to locate the problem of dignity where it ought to be lo-
cated: in the difference between humane and inhumane ways of living a hu-
man life. 
The second and very different answer is given by a dynamic personalism: 
Dignity is seen as divine gift that empowers us to become what we can be 
because of the gift given to us. It is a distinction that enables us to become 
the persons we can be by living up to who we are as persons: God’s freely 
chosen neighbors. We are all born as humans who can live as persons, and 
we do this in the fullest sense open to us if we orient our lives to the way God 
relates to us. By relating to us as our neighbor, God gives us the potential to 
become what we cannot become from our own powers: humans who live a 
humane life as persons among persons before God. The theological contrast 
between human and divine is used here not to elucidate the contrast between 
humans and animals but rather the anthropological or ethical contrast be-
tween humane and inhumane ways of living our life. The point of departure 
is not what humans are, do, or have but rather what God does to and for 
them. From a human perspective this means emphasizing the basic passivity, 
dependency or (in more positive terms) enrichment and empowerment of 
human life by the way God relates to and becomes present in it. Dignity is 
and remains God’s property and hence cannot be taken away from us who 
participate in it as a divine gift. This gift can be spelled out without reference 
to dignity. Indeed, this category may explicitly be avoided because it lends 
itself to naturalist or essentialist misunderstandings, i.e. as signifying some-
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thing in our biological, natural or cultural make-up that marks us off from 
other creatures. But the point of the dynamic personalist understanding of 
dignity is that we are unique not in what we are but in what we become em-
powered to show or indicate about God (creator) – i.e. that God is present to 
his creation in a particular way, a way spelled out as love in the Christian tra-
dition. Thus, the criterion of a properly humane humanity is to accept one’s 
basic passivity, i.e. our empowerment to mediate and manifest the presence 
of God to others. This empowerment is something beyond our control: we 
cannot give it to anyone nor can we take it away from anyone: It is a pre-
given of all our acting and doing. This in turn grounds our respect for each 
other – a respect that is always a respect for the respect of God for others. 
That is to say, we respect others because we respect that God respects every-
one as his neighbor, not merely those who belong to a particular nation, 
group, or tradition, but unrestrictedly everyone: God is the neighbor of every-
body. This constitutes the dignity of human persons as the humane mode of 
living a human life in the presence of God. Humans acknowledge and respect 
this, as Christians say, by living according to the rule of love: To live in this 
way is to see God (or God’s presence) in everybody and hence tailor what we 
do not merely to our own interests or the requirements of the other but also, 
and even more so, to the gift that he or she represents as much as we do: to 
be those whom God has chosen to be his neighbors. 
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The inalienable dignity of all human beings is independent of circumstances, 
capacities, or qualifications. Kantian autonomy (construed as the rational 
will, or the ability to exercise it) cannot ground such a notion. The roots of 
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1. THE PROBLEMATIC CONCEPT OF DIGNITY 
In his fascinating paper, ‘Religion, Morality and Being Human,’ Ingolf 
Dalferth reminds us of the Kantian conception of a person. In qualifying as 
persons, we are something very special.1 We are not just animals, which 
                                                 
1
 See above, 158–159. I am grateful to Professor Dalferth, and the other participants at the ESPR 
Conference on ‘Embodied Religion’ held in Soesterberg, Netherlands, September 2012 for stimulating 
discussion and comments. 
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would give us only a common value shared by any natural living being or 
‘offspring of the earth.’ We are not even just animals with the distinctive fea-
ture of rationality; for this, though entailing that we can chose between op-
tions, and set goals for ourselves, sets us apart only in degree, not in kind, 
from the manifold animal species that manifest purposive activity. What 
makes us ‘exalted above any price’ is the fact that we are persons, that is to 
say, subjects who engage in moral reasoning (or ‘morally practical reason’). 
This alone, says Kant, gives us dignity – in German Würde – an ‘absolute in-
ner worth.’2 And Professor Dalferth glosses this by saying that ascribing per-
sonhood to someone is not a matter of degree, but a matter of a simple 
yes/no question: are we able to live a moral life or aren’t we? 
It follows, on Dalferth’s analysis, that this Kantian notion of dignity is a 
‘strictly universal’ notion: it can never be a matter of classifying humans into 
groups or classes. And he contrasts this universality with more elitist concep-
tions, such as that of Nietzsche, which ascribes a certain greatness or nobility 
to those capable of extraordinary acts of self-overcoming, and also with more 
recent accounts which make dignity depend on the instantiation of certain 
descriptive features. He suggests that dignity should better be understood as 
an ‘orienting concept’: it fosters, or encapsulates, a humane way of living with 
others, one in which ‘we commit ourselves to viewing and treating every hu-
man being, not merely family and friends, but also strangers and enemies, as 
human persons with untouchable dignity.’ Or expressed theologically, ‘we – 
each and every one of us – are more than we appear to be, because we are 
persons in and whom God makes his presence manifest to others.’3 
Clearly the conception being articulated here is to some extent prescrip-
tive. It does not merely purport to describe how the notion of dignity is in 
fact commonly used in ordinary moral and political discourse, but instead 
puts forward a kind of ideal regulative or normative principle: that we should 
be committed to living in a moral community – a community of self-
respecting human agents who accord respect to every one of their fellows 
simply in virtue of their humanity. 
One of the interesting things about this conception is that it leads us in 
a rather different direction from the one we should take if we were explicat-
                                                 
2
 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals [Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797], trans. M. Gregor (Cam-
bridge1996), 186 (Akademie edition, VI, 435). Quoted in Ingolf Dalferth, ‘Religion, Morality and Being 
Human: The Controversial Status of Human Dignity,’ 163. 
3
 Dalferth, ‘Religion, Morality and Being Human,’ 176. 
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ing dignity by focusing directly on the central Kantian notion of autonomy. 
Autonomy, for Kant, is ‘the basis of the dignity of human nature and of every 
rational nature’ [Autonomie is der Grund der Würde der menschlichen und 
jeder vernünftigen Natur], as that aspect of our will whereby it must be consi-
dered as selbstgesetzgebend (‘giving the law to itself’).4 What this suggests is 
that the independent power of exercising the rational will is what gives us 
our human dignity. To have human dignity is to be able to make decisions 
independently of the arbitrary will of another, acting in the full light of rea-
son, free from internal or external interference with one’s rational processes. 
Hence, to be autonomous I must be free from external tyranny (my status as 
a rational agent must be respected) and also from internal interference, such 
as arises from the contingencies of appetite and mere inclination.5 I must be a 
fully rational, self-legislating being.  
The Swiss euthanasia clinic Dignitas, which offers, for a fee, to terminate 
the lives of those with incurable and irreversible medical conditions, appears 
to focus above all on this aspect of autonomy. The ‘dignity’ that the clinic 
purports to promote and respect is above all the dignity of exercising the ra-
tional will; and this explains the elaborate procedures designed to make sure 
that the patient is rationally choosing to end his or her life, without confu-
sion or external pressure. Clients are carefully interviewed on arrival at the 
clinic to ascertain that they are there of their own volition, and understand 
what they are doing. They are then interviewed again, after a ‘cooling off’ pe-
riod of one day, to check that they are steadfast in their resolve to end their 
lives. And finally, on the day of the killing, they are again questioned about 
whether they know what is about to happen, what will be the effect of the 
drugs administered, and so on.6 Now of course there are good legal reasons 
why an organisation involved in the business of killing7 should want to make 
                                                 
4
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten, 1785], ch. 2, ed. Thomas E. Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig, (Oxford 2003), 236, 232 (Akademie edition, 
IV 436; 431). 
5
 Thus, for Kant, moral imperatives cannot be construed as conditional on whatever contingent 
desires one happens to have, for ‘in these cases the will never determines itself directly by the thought 
of an action, but only by the motivations which the anticipated effect of the action exercises on the will 
– I ought to do something because I want something else.’ (Groundwork, ed. Hill and Zweig, 244; Aka-
demie edn IV 444). Because of its dependency on the contingencies of inclination, action of this kind is 
always for Kant heteronomous. 
6
 James Ross, ‘One Last Helping Hand,’ The Independent (London), 24 April 2012, 44–5. 
7
 The use of the term ‘killing’ may strike some readers as hostile or critical, but there is no such 
necessary implication. It is a matter of simple factual accuracy to describe the clinic’s work as that of 
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sure that those who use its services are doing so in full knowledge and of 
their own volition. But the relevant point for the purposes of the present dis-
cussion is that the qualifications the patient has to display in order to pass 
these tests are very far from being a matter of simply belonging to the com-
munity of human beings. Something much more active is required – articula-
cy, moral responsibility, ability to respond to searching questions at inter-
view, and so on. And these are not ‘all or nothing’ matters: they are matters 
of degree. One can clearly imagine many confused, distressed or disabled 
terminally ill patients failing the tests. So the ‘dignity’ that is the focus of at-
tention in the Clinic’s operations is by implication a property pertaining only 
to a qualified subset of human beings. 
If we are to make acceptable use of the concept of human dignity, it 
seems clear that it needs to be a more ‘universalist’ notion than this (here I 
would wholeheartedly agree with what I take to be the conclusions of Dal-
ferth’s paper). It needs to be something that is possessed by all of us, qua 
human, and which should be recognized as an inalienable and absolute hu-
man attribute, independent of our circumstances, capacities, group-
membership, qualifications or faculties. It is notorious that the principal 
forms of modern secular consequentialism cannot ground such a universal 
notion of dignity (Peter Singer’s ‘preference utilitarianism,’ in its attitude to 
the unborn and to infants, makes this abundantly clear);8 and as the Dignitas 
example illustrates, it also seems that Kantian autonomy (construed as the 
rational will, or the ability to exercise it) cannot ground it either. Even Dal-
ferth’s heroic attempts to ground dignity in a universalist Kantian notion of 
membership of the moral community do not quite seem to work; for mem-
bership of the moral community presumably requires certain abilities. Dal-
ferth bases his argument on the idea that Kantian dignity is ‘ascribed not to 
the individual human being directly but to morality, and through morality to 
humanity’;9 but this ‘indirect’ Kantian strategy seems to me to problematic 
for a number of reasons. First, it is the individual who needs the protections 
of dignity, not humanity in general (it would hardly be comforting to be told: 
‘don’t worry that we are sacrificing you – we are protecting the dignity of the 
                                                                                                                                         
killing people, or, perhaps, helping them to kill themselves. The euphemistic (not to say Orwellian) 
term ‘assisted dying,’ used for example by Mary Warnock, should cause disquiet precisely because it 
attempts to divert attention from what is actually being done in such cases. See Warnock, Easeful 
Death: Is There a Case for Assisted Dying? (Oxford 2008). 
8
 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge 1979, 3
rd
 edn. 2011). 
9
 Dalferth, ‘Religion, Morality and Being Human,’ 158. 
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human race in general!’). And second, ascribing dignity to the institution of 
morality seems to gloss over the fact that we participate in the institution to 
differing degrees (young children, for example, clearly participate less, since 
they are involved merely as recipients of moral action but not as fully fledged 
agents). So on the ‘dignity-as-belonging-to-morality-in-general’ argument, we 
seem to need a further reason why the protecting embrace of dignity should 
extend to all humans, independent of their capacities, their rational will, and 
their degree of participation in the moral domain. 
  
 
2. HOW IS WORTH CONFERRED? 
The Latin word dignitas has connotations which partly overlap with 
those of the German term Würde. In its Classical usage, it most frequently 
refers to some exalted or honoured status that attached to someone in virtue 
of their rank or position – the dignity of a consul, for example, or of a patri-
cian as opposed to a plebeian. This usage spills over into English term ‘digni-
ty,’ so that when Prince Florizel in Shakespeare’s Winter’s Tale leaves the roy-
al palace in disguise to woo the humble Perdita, a courtier describes him as 
one ‘who has his Dignity and Duty both cast off, Fled from his Father, from 
his hopes, and with a Shepherd’s daughter.’10 (Of course it eventually turns 
out that Perdita, unbeknownst to anyone, is actually herself a King’s daugh-
ter, so the threat to Florizel’s dignity which would have been occasioned by 
his marrying someone of low birth is happily avoided.) 
In this conception, status is conferred by birth or high office. But as so 
often in Shakespeare, the idea is no sooner developed than it is subverted. 
When the lovers are discovered, and Florizel is subjected to the furious wrath 
of his royal father for having risked his dignity, Perdita refuses to be cowed: 
 
I was not much afeard; for once or twice  
I was about to speak and tell him plainly,  
The selfsame sun that shines upon his court  
Hides not his visage from our cottage but  
Looks on alike.11 
                                                 
10
 William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale [c. 1610], Act V, scene 1, line 182. 
11
 Winter’s Tale, Act IV, scene 4, lines 434–7. 
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Just as the sun shines on all, high and lowly alike, so, she seems to be saying, 
distinctions of rank and status are irrelevant to someone’s true worth. This 
conception comes not from the Classical or pagan world, where considera-
tions of ‘dignity’ as rank were all-important, but from the Judaeo-Christian 
worldview. In the words of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ‘the dignity 
of the human person is rooted in his or her creation in the image and likeness 
of God.’12 Or again, ‘All human beings, in as much as they are created in the 
image of God, have the dignity of a person.’13 
Nicolas Wolterstorff, in an impressive recent study, has underlined the 
roots of this idea in the Hebrew Bible, where he argues, with a wealth of sup-
porting evidence, that there is a clear recognition of the equal value of all in 
the sight of God. Throughout the Old Testament, what Wolterstorff aptly 
calls the ‘quartet of the vulnerable’ – widows, orphans, resident aliens, and 
the impoverished – make repeated appearances. And in the injunctions of the 
law and the prophets, and the poetry of the Psalms, God is seen as calling on 
his people to ‘loose the bonds of injustice’ by rescuing these vulnerable 
groups who have been wronged: to ‘raise the poor from the dust, and lift the 
needy from the ash-heap’ (Psalm 113 [112]). Injustice is seen both as wronging 
God and as wronging the victims of injustice by failing to recognize their in-
herent human worth.14 
The New Testament continues the same message, though Wolterstorff 
argues that it often comes to our ears in distorted or diluted form, owing to 
difficulties of translation. Jesus in Matthew’s Gospel (5:6) says ‘Blessed are 
those who hunger for dikaiosune.’ The latter term is often translated ‘righ-
teousness,’ which today may suggest some sort of personal rectitude, whereas 
the Greek stem (dik-) has a much more interpersonal and social flavour and 
connects directly with justice. The ‘kingdom’ which Jesus was to inaugurate 
was to be a kingdom of ‘justice and righteousness’ – the very combination 
that so frequently occurs in the Old Testament (in the Hebrew terms mishpat 
and tsedeqa). And the righteous king or Messiah foretold in the Hebrew 
Scriptures was to be one who (in the words of Psalm 72 [71]), ‘judges the poor 
with justice and … saves the lives of the needy.’ On Wolterstorff’s reading, 
Jesus’ words and actions (consorting with outcasts, touching and curing 
those who were ritually unclean, explaining why it was right to heal on the 
                                                 
12
 Catechism of the Catholic Church [1997], Part III, section 1, Ch. 1; §1700. 
13
 Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church [2005], §66. 
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 Nicolas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, 2008). 
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Sabbath) were designed to ‘appeal to our worth as human beings to explain 
God’s care for each and every one of us.’15 
Not only does Wolterstorff trace the origins of the idea of universal hu-
man dignity back to early Jewish and Christian moral thinking, but he also 
makes the striking and controversial claim that without such theistic re-
sources we will be left without any satisfactory grounding for dignity: no se-
cular worldview can do the job. Now while it is impossible to deny the deci-
sive influence of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the development of West-
ern moral thought, the majority of contemporary moral philosophers would 
nevertheless strongly resist the suggestion that our modern conceptions of 
justice, human dignity and rights require a theistic underpinning. Many 
would regard Kant’s principle of respect for persons (referred to many times 
in Dalferth’s paper) as providing a fully secularized basis for the modern con-
ception of inherent human dignity – the right of each of us to be treated as an 
end in him or her self, never merely as a means. And this in turn is often seen 
as the origin of the modern idea, found in the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity …’ 
(Article 1). Wolterstorff is adamant, however, that ‘it is impossible to develop 
a secular account of human dignity adequate for grounding human rights.’16 
This is because Kantian respect hinges on the capacity for rational action; yet 
if human worth depends on this, then those who lack that capacity (infants, 
those born with severe mental impairment, Alzheimer’s patients) risk being 
excluded from the domain of right-holders. The point is a familiar one in the 
debates over Kantian ethics, and Wolterstorff makes repeated use of it to 
pose a powerful challenge to a variety of secular moral theorists (including 
Alan Gewirth and Ronald Dworkin): if rational choice (Gewirth) or mental 
creativity (Dworkin) is the criterion, how can this explain why every human, 
qua human, should be regarded as having inherent worth?17  
In the Christian worldview, by contrast, ‘God loves … each and every 
human being equally and permanently’; and if this is true, then ‘natural hu-
man rights are grounded in that love,’ since they ‘inhere in the bestowed 
worth that supervenes on being thus loved.’18 The idea has a certain intuitive 
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 Wolterstorff, Justice, 131. 
16
 Wolterstorff, Justice, 325 
17
 See Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (New York 1993); Alan Gewirth, Human Rights (Chicago 
1982). 
18
 Wolterstorff, Justice, 360. 
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plausibility, since our experience of human parental and conjugal love does 
seem to give some support to the idea that attachment or commitment to 
someone can endow that person with a certain moral status. Nevertheless, 
philosophical critics are sure here to raise the question of how exactly love 
can ‘bestow worth.’ The question is related to the vexed issue of the Euthyp-
hro problem (which, perhaps disappointingly, is not directly addressed by 
Wolterstorff); the crucial worry is whether love in itself can make something 
valuable.  
One is reminded here of the arguments of Harry Frankfurt that by lov-
ing something, or caring about it, we imbue it with worth or value.19 Value, 
on Frankfurt’s picture is a matter of our exercising our will, our choice, to 
care about something or someone. The resulting picture is one where, in a 
certain sense, it is we who create values by our own authentic choices. By 
deciding what we care about we bring value into the world. But there is a se-
rious problem with this view, together with many other ‘internalist’ views 
(compare Bernard Williams’s idea that value is generated by my commit-
ments to certain ‘projects’ that I make my own)20 – namely that they seem to 
put the cart before the horse. I cannot, surely, create value or worth merely 
by caring about something (or else I could bestow worth on a pile of worth-
less rubbish merely by choosing to care about it); on the contrary, it seems 
that my caring about something is only justified if that thing is already worth 
caring about. Caring, in other words, depends on worth, rather than creating 
it. 
Perhaps, however, the status of the person caring makes a difference. 
Wolterstorff uses the analogy of a great monarch bestowing her friendship on 
a courtier: the courtier is now ‘honoured and envied in ways she was not be-
fore.’21 Unfortunately for this argument, it still leaves open the question of 
whether the courtier ought to be so honoured. Has genuine worth been bes-
towed – is the courtier now genuinely fit to be honoured – or is any resulting 
‘honouring’ that may occur merely a prudently deferential recognition of the 
monarch’s arbitrary power? (Analogies here abound with the Euthyphro 
problem: the mere arbitrary commands of a God, however powerful, cannot 
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 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton 2004), 40ff. 
20
 See Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley 1993), Ch. 5. For more discussion of the 
positions of Frankfurt and Williams, see J. Cottingham, ‘Integrity and Fragmentation,’ Journal of Ap-
plied Philosophy 27/1 (2010), 2–14. 
21
 Wolterstorff, Justice, 259. 
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create moral obligation). If, however, we add the premise that the aforesaid 
Queen is supremely good and wise and just, then her bestowing of her 
friendship will make not just a causal but a normative difference: there will 
now be genuine reason to honour the courtier, namely that in the eyes of one 
who is wholly good and wise and just the courtier in question is an object of 
affection and delight. 
I conclude that there is reason to think that the impartial love of a su-
premely good and just God for all his creatures does indeed give us reason to 
honour them all alike. In the eyes of a supremely loving, good and wise hea-
venly father, each of us, as Wolterstorff puts it, is ‘irreducibly precious.’ As for 
whether there can be viable alternative secular groundings for the idea of 
universal dignity and worth, in the light of Wolterstorff’s arguments that 
seems doubtful but still open. He has made a strong case for thinking the 
standard Kantian-derived attempts to provide such grounding are not prom-
ising, but this evidently leaves open the logical possibility that a better secu-
lar alternative might be round the corner. 
 
 
3. DIGNITY AND EMBODIMENT 
In the final section of this paper, I should like to connect some of the 
ideas so far broached to the question of embodiment, bearing in mind the 
theme outlined in the general rubric for this conference, that ‘religion is al-
ways embodied in various ways.’ The contrast, discussed at various points in 
Ingolf Dalferth’s paper, between secular and religious approaches to human 
dignity leaves it open how far either conception might be understood as irre-
ducibly body-involving. Certainly, the Kantian approaches seem to lay stress 
on rather abstract notions – dignity as attaching to an abstract human insti-
tution (morality), rather than to individual embodied creatures; dignity as a 
function of purely ‘noumenal’ properties, such as the exercise of rational 
choice, rather than as depending on our situatedness in the embodied biolog-
ical world. What of the religion-based approaches? The one that Dalferth 
adumbrates at the close of his paper again seems to abstract somewhat from 
the context of our embodied human existence. We are born as humans, he 
suggests, but we have the power to become something more – to become per-
sons ‘capable of living a humane life as persons among persons before God.’ 
The focus of attention is not on our similarities with (or differences from) 
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other animals, but on ‘the … ethical contrast between humane or inhumane 
ways of living.’22 (The latter contrast is actually described by Dalferth as 
‘anthropological or ethical,’ but the former term does not seem to play any 
role, at any rate if one understands ‘anthropology’ to involve an irreducible 
reference to our biological and embodied nature as a species.) 
The concluding sentences of Dalferth’s paper, however, point directly to 
the importance, in elucidating the theistic ground for dignity, of a relation-
ship – the relationship of being a neighbour. ‘We respect others because we 
respect that God respects everyone as his neighbour… God is the neighbour 
of everyone.’ Now this relationship, it seems to me, is one that has to be pri-
marily understood in terms of embodiment, and indeed in terms of physical 
location. A neighbour in the most basic sense is someone who lives next-door 
– in physical proximity to you. 
When talking of God, we may be inclined to ‘spiritualize’ all this, on the 
grounds that God is supposed to be incorporeal, and so to have no physical 
relationship with anyone. But that, I think, would be too swift. In the first 
place, the fact that God cannot be comprehended in physical terms does not 
licence the inference that we can comprehend him better as a ‘non-physical’ 
kind of Cartesian ghost. It is surely better to admit, with Nicolas Male-
branche, that the deity must wholly transcend any anthropomorphic concep-
tions: just as we should not imagine God to be corporeal, Malebranche ob-
served, so we should not really describe him as a Mind or Spirit, since that 
invites comparison with a human mind. Rather, Malebranche suggested, we 
should think that ‘just as He includes the perfections of matter without being 
material, so He includes the perfections of created spirits without being spirit 
– at least in the manner we conceive spirit.’23 All we can really say of the 
‘neighbour’ relation between God and his creatures – the only analogy we 
have for it – is that of physical proximity: God is somehow close to us: close 
to us in the closest possible way – closer within me than I am to my inner 
self, as St Augustine put it.24 
In the second place, in speaking of the relationship between God and 
human beings as ‘personal,’ we should not be too swift to ‘spiritualize’ the 
central feature of personhood which is ascribed both to God and to human-
kind made in his image. On the contrary, both modern philosophy (one 
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thinks here particularly of Wittgenstein) and traditional Christian doctrine 
(the conception of God as supremely revealed in the human life of Jesus of 
Nazareth) concur in supposing that personal attributes are to be understood 
primarily in term of the embodied beings who manifest them. In general, our 
handle on personhood, despite perennial philosophical tendencies to abstrac-
tify it, is an irreducibly corporeal one, and we need to beware of following 
John Locke down a long road of philosophical errors and confusions, in trying 
to define a ‘person’ in terms of something abstract called ‘consciousness.’ As 
Anthony Kenny has persuasively argued, ‘the concept of a human being – an 
animal of a particular species with particular capacities – provides us with the 
only concept of a person that we can really understand.’25 The latter claim 
might seem something of an exaggeration if it were taken to mean that only a 
human being could count as a person (we can certainly make sense of the 
idea of a Martian being a person); but it remains true, as Kenny implies, that 
it the concept of a person is most fundamentally at home in the context of 
our human, biological status as a certain kind of embodied species, and that 
it is from here that any possible understanding of the concept must begin. 
We need to keep these points in mind when reflecting further on the 
concept of a neighbour. The story in Luke (10: 29–37) of the Good Samaritan, 
told in response to the question ‘But who is my neighbour?’, shows that my 
neighbour need not be understood simply as the guy next door. But the story 
nonetheless depends crucially on the idea of a physical, locatable encounter, 
on the road going up from Jerusalem to Jericho – as the Samaritan comes 
upon someone who had fallen among thieves, tends to him physically, bind-
ing up his wounds, takes him to the inn, and arranges for him to be cared for. 
To be a neighbour to someone is to be there for him, not to simply wish him 
well in some disembodied haze of general benevolence. 
The importance of physicality and location in religious thought has been 
brought out recently in Mark Wynn’s illuminating study Faith and Place. 
Many theologians and philosophers in the past have been very wary of con-
ceptions that seem to ‘localize’ God and his action – something that is con-
nected with the so-called ‘scandal of particularity.’ Why should the eternal 
creator of the universe have a preference for a particular tribe on an insignifi-
cant planet revolving round a very average star? Why should he manifest 
himself as a human being in an unprepossessing town in a remote corner of 
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the early Roman empire? In Catholic Christianity, with its traditional empha-
sis on relics and pilgrimage sites, the problem has seemed to many people to 
be particularly acute: why should an omnibenevolent creator dispense fa-
vours specifically to those who travel to Lourdes or to Santiago de Composte-
la? 
An uncompromisingly ‘metaphysical’ answer offered by the hard-line 
traditionalist believer would be that God miraculously exercises his power 
precisely by intervening, or by being present in an especially immediate way, 
in particular locations. At the other end of the spectrum would be a psycho-
logical or pragmatic answer of the kind that might be offered by theologians 
of a more ‘progressive’ stripe: it just so happens that some places put people 
in a beneficial frame of mind, perhaps because of their natural beauty, or 
moving architecture, or historical associations. But the latter view might 
seem to smack of reductionism – the attempt to purge theology of reference 
to anything not readily explicable in natural terms; while the former position 
could leave one wondering at the theological coherence of the idea that the 
activity of an omnipresent, omnipotent God is ‘localised’ in this way. 
Wynn ingeniously steers a middle course between these two extremes. 
To explain how particular places can be religiously significant, we neither 
have to venture into the murky realms of metaphysical speculation about 
God’s mode of intervention in the natural world, nor do we have to reduce 
the value of a sacred space to no more than its subjective effects in the minds 
of those who visit it. How might such an intermediate strategy work? In the 
case of pilgrimage, rather than grounding its meaning in miraculous or su-
pernatural events on the one hand, or just in the interior life of the believer 
on the other, Wynn suggests that we need to take note of the physicality of 
the practice: it is the ‘relations of physical continuity and proximity that ex-
plain the sense of pilgrimage practice.’26  
These features certainly seem important in many religious contexts. A 
highly successful exhibition at the British Museum in Summer of 2011 ex-
plored what the curators described as ‘the spiritual and artistic significance of 
Christian relics and reliquaries in medieval Europe.’ The ‘artistic’ element was 
clear enough: many of the reliquaries are extraordinarily beautiful, their 
craftsmanship exquisite. But the religious significance, for many of those vi-
siting the exhibition, surely had something to do with the ‘physical continui-
                                                 
26
 Mark Wynn, Faith and Place (Oxford 2009), 152. 
DIGNITY, AUTONOMY AND EMBODIMENT 193 
 
ty and proximity’ underlined by Wynn. You are now, at this moment., stand-
ing in front of the very casket that contains the remains of the revered man 
or woman who so many centuries ago suffered and died for their faith. Mere 
superstition, or (its even more degenerate cousin) mere touristic gawping? 
No doubt there can be elements of both, but it would take a very cynical crit-
ic, faced with the extraordinary devotion manifested in these lovingly 
wrought works of art, to suppose this to be the whole story. 
The point has application beyond the purely religious sphere. Wynn 
points out that in visiting the grave of a loved one ‘it matters to us … that we 
should be physically alongside the remains of the dead person.’ And describ-
ing some crucial episodes in his own friendship with the poet Edmund Cu-
sick, who died in 2007, he argues that the development of human relation-
ships is often rooted in a shared sensibility for place – a sensibility which, in 
turn, is closely bound up with ‘bodily movement and affectively informed 
perception.’27 Part of Wynn’s agenda here is to counter, or at least supple-
ment, the highly abstract and intellectualistic framework within which much 
philosophy, especially the philosophy of religion, is typically carried on. 
When friends revisit a favourite place where they have often walked and 
talked together, the place itself may have a distinctive character, a genius loci, 
which allows them to interact and converse in a distinctive way, and to ‘af-
firm … their commitment to certain values, by means of embodied interac-
tion with the [place], rather than by way of explicit articulation.’28 This is an 
argument that needs a specific personal narrative, such as Wynn provides, to 
make it vivid. But the case for such an ‘embodied epistemology’ seems very 
persuasive. Wynn does not mention Thomas Hardy’s poetry, but anyone who 
has responded to masterpieces like ‘At Castle Boterel’ (1913) will understand 
something of what is meant. Everything hinges on a physical, locatable en-
counter:  
Myself and a girlish form benighted  
In dry March weather. We climbed the road  
Beside a chaise. We had just alighted  
To ease the sturdy pony's load  
When he sighed and slowed …  
Primaeval rocks form the road's steep border,  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And much have they faced there, first and last,   
Of the transitory in Earth's long order;   
But what they record in colour and cast  
Is – that we two passed … 
I look and see it there, shrinking, shrinking,   
I look back at it amid the rain  
For the very last time; for my sand is sinking,   
And I shall traverse old love's domain  
Never again … 
The poet’s grasp of the significance of his relationship with his former 
love is intimately bound up with his knowledge of the place where they once 
alighted from the pony cart, their physical orientation as they climbed the 
steep hill together, flanked by the ‘primeval rocks’ that have witnessed so 
much of ‘the transitory in Earth’s long order,’ and which now see the poet 
physically present at the scene in old age, knowing that he will ‘traverse old 
love’s domain never again.’ 
 I would submit that there are important lessons to be learned here 
about the general structure of human relationships. Love for friends is not an 
abstractified flowing of benevolence or even of individuated commitment, 
but a dynamic process that unfolds in corporeally and physically mediated 
ways, through what we do together, how we walk and talk together, where 
we go, and the trajectory of embodied memories of shared dwellings and 
journeys. To be a friend or neighbour with someone is to go with them along 
these paths, and to be prepared to have one’s own space encroached on by 
them, as they will reciprocally be prepared to receive us. If we were purely 
rational disembodied agents or mere ‘persons,’ in some quasi-Cartesian sense 
of mere ‘thinking things’ or ‘conscious beings,’ true relationships as we un-
derstand them would be inconceivable: they would be reduced to detached 
interchanges of information, interactive exercises of intellection and volition, 
but without all the vulnerabilities of embodied particularity that make love 
and friendship truly precious. For in true relations of neighbourliness, friend-
ship and love, we abandon our austere self-sufficient autonomy, and accept 
our ‘passivity’ (to use a term aptly deployed by Dalferth at the close of his 
paper): we know our need, our dependency, and need it to be recognized by 
others. And once we know this, we can see at once that our dignity and worth 
cannot depend on our rational powers and capacities, nor our ability to de-
termine our choices as moral lawgivers, nor any other intellectual endow-
ment, even that of consciousness (which may of course be dormant, or de-
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activated, as in a coma), but simply and solely on our need for others to reach 
out to us, as we need to reach out to them. This is a need that applies to every 
single human being on the planet. To mature morally is to come to realize 
that we gain nothing by insisting on our status, or ‘standing on our dignity’ 
(as the English idiom has it), but that we gain everything by recognizing the 
dependency we share with all our neighbours. 
Finally to the issue which has been involved, explicitly or implicitly, 
throughout this paper, and which I take to be central to Ingolf Dalferth’s 
concerns also, namely the relative merits of religious versus secular accounts 
of dignity. The focus on passivity and vulnerability that has just emerged 
seems to me to be a clear point in favour of the religious account; for it is not 
clear that our human weakness and dependency provides any purely secular 
reason why dignity or worth should attach to us all qua human. If anything, 
the reverse seems true. For on a standard Darwinian view of human nature, 
our nature is simply a set of contingent features that have emerged out of a 
blind nexus of forces, shaped by random mutation and the struggle for sur-
vival. So selecting any one of these features, such as our frailty and depen-
dency, as the basis for according inherent worth to us, seems pretty arbitrary, 
or at any rate no more or less warranted than ascribing true dignity on the 
basis of strength, following Nietzsche, or ‘great-souledness,’ following Aris-
totle.29 
On the Judaeo-Christian view, by contrast, human beings, despite their 
frailty (formed of the ‘dust of the earth’) are, as the Hebrew Bible has it, made 
in the image and likeness of God.30 So simply in virtue of our human status 
we participate in some way in that infinite worth that is God. (Again, we 
should beware of ‘spiritualizing’ this – the creation language of Genesis is 
robustly corporeal.) And building on this foundation, the Christian vision 
takes the extraordinary further step of declaring that our corporeal human 
nature is actually ‘divinised’ – raised up to the fullest dignity by Christ’s 
humbling himself to take our bodily nature upon him. As the poet and priest 
Gerard Manley Hopkins so vividly puts it: 
In a flash, at a trumpet crash, 
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and 
This Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood, immortal diamond, 
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Is immortal diamond.31 
Nothing, on the face of it, could be more undignified than this ‘Jack’ – a 
common, ordinary fellow, of undistinguished worth; this ‘patch,’ a mere fool 
or ninny; this potsherd, a broken fragment, like that with which the wretched 
Job, reduced to the utmost indignity, scraped his sores (Job 2:8); weak and 
feeble, as perishable as matchwood. Yet all at once, by Christ’s sharing in our 
bodily nature, this paltry individual becomes ‘immortal diamond’ – of infinite 
worth and dignity. 
None of this, of course, counts as a philosophically watertight theistic 
grounding of the concept of human dignity, since it depends on the revealed 
truth of the Incarnation. But for those who accept that truth, it does indeed, 
as Hopkins beautifully expresses it, raise every human being, ‘all at once,’ to 
infinite, Christlike, worth. The secularist can, to be sure, resolve to treat every 
human being as if they were of such infinite worth; but it is entirely unclear 
what might ground that resolve, since there is nothing in the way things are, 
on the naturalist worldview, that underwrites it; there is only a plurality of 
diverse specimens of a certain species of featherless biped, some stronger, 
some weaker, some outstanding and splendid, some defective and wretched, 
all subject to infirmity and eventual decrepitude. The universal dignity of 
humankind is the pearl of great price in our ethical culture. But torn out of 
the religious seabed that nurtured it, it may not take very long to be swept 
away on the advancing tide of secularism. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article sets out to question the understanding of religion as a purely spiri-
tual relationship with God by focusing on the mystical experience of ecstasy, 
an experience that has often been described as leaving the body behind in a 
moment of spiritual rapture. Using psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s work, this 
article will set out to show that it is not the body that is left behind in mystical 
ecstasy, but rather a certain understanding of selfhood constituted by auto-
nomous reason that will come to be conceptualized as the Cartesian cogito. 
The body figures as the site of an unknown that accepts having been consti-
tuted by another unknown, a God that cannot be sublated or grasped by rea-
son alone. In this sense, the goal of psychoanalysis will be shown to overlap 
with an apophatic and embodied relation to the divine. 
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‘The psyche is extended.’ 
Freud1 
 
The opening paragraph of the ESPR call for papers for the Embodied Re-
ligion Conference spoke indiscriminately of all religions as, and I quote, ‘be-
longing to the sphere of the spiritual, since for most religious traditions 
(Christian as well as non-Christian) God is a spiritual being and relates to 
humankind spiritually.’ By positing such a separation between the spiritual 
and the material, the soul and the body, this description reiterates a 
longstanding dualist tradition that separates the spiritual and the material, 
the transcendent and the immanent, placing religion on the side of the spirit, 
where it has traditionally been accompanied by God, man, reason and hea-
ven, thereby relegating the immanent and embodied to a lesser sphere where 
it has found the company of women, the passions and hell.2 The conference 
description then goes on to describe the ways in which these religious tradi-
tions nonetheless come down to earth to deal with embodied issues. Here, a 
list of a variety of these embodied religious practices are given, dealing with 
rituals related to sexuality and reproduction, eating, propitiation and sacri-
fice, birth and death, art and liturgy, sacraments and asceticism. Yet one 
wonders, after reading the list of embodied practices of religion, what a list of 
‘spiritual practices’ might look like?3 Though Christianity is an orthodox reli-
gion, giving central importance to creed, both of the other monotheisms, to 
name just those, are orthopraxes, giving central importance to ritual practice. 
But even in the case of Christianity, is not belief, is not faith, always instan-
tiated in a way of life (in certain political and ethical choices, in a gaze, a way 
of speaking) and inseparable from that embodied life? Are not prayer, rituals, 
sacrifices and forms of asceticism also spiritual practices? 
In fact, notwithstanding its orthodoxy, embodiment is perhaps the most 
defining characteristic of Christianity, the very trait that sets it apart from all 
other religions. Christianity differs from other monotheisms by believing in a 
                                                     
1 This phrase was published as a posthumous note. Cited in Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus (Paris 2006), 
22. 
2 For a detailed description of how women used their association with the lesser part, that of 
embodiment, frailty, humanity, to identify with Christ, see Caroline Walker Bynum’s wonderful book, 
Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley 1988). 
3 It is easier to understand the role of the spiritual in certain Indian traditions, notably Advaita 
Vedanta, which posits consciousness as outside the individual, and outside the mind. Consciousness is 
thus disembodied. 
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God who is at the same time man, who suffered, ate and slept, in a body, who 
was born, died, and resurrected in and as a body. Though many traditions 
believe in anthropomorphic gods, who live embodied lives, they are normally 
endowed with immortality, and placed in a realm outside of human contin-
gency. Hence, amongst all religions, Christianity is set apart precisely due to 
its embodied God, who did not escape from human contingency, who was 
misunderstood and left to die at a particular time, as one among many pris-
oners in the Roman colony of Jerusalem in the first century. Jesus Christ thus 
places Christianity in a special relationship to embodiment, one that has a 
unique claim to the suffering and joys of the flesh, setting it apart from the 
Greek condemnation of the flesh, as well as from the many rival forms of 
Christianity that attempted to interpret Christ’s body as an illusion, or to 
place Christ lower than God the Father in the divine hierarchy, precisely be-
cause he was born into time and hence not understood as being eternal.4 
Showing that the transcendent is embodied in the here and now of contin-
gent existence, the being here of what is beyond, the Incarnation is certainly 
Christianity’s most distinctive trait. The novelty of this event in the history of 
religions is brought home by Jesuit historian of religions Michel de Certeau in 
an interview he gave to France Culture. I quote:  
Something, in my opinion, can be found at the center of a Christian faith, 
which can be called, in Christian jargon, the incarnation, in other words, the 
fact that God is man. I would say that with this idea there is a fundamental 
rupture in relation to the ways in which God was represented as a sun, as 
something or someone somewhere who escaped from contingency, from his-
tory, from death, from the avatars of circumstance. What Christianity brought 
with this idea that God is man, is the fact that he is but a person in history 
named Jesus, it is the bursting of the sun. This sun is stained and dispersed in a 
thousand pieces in the accident of daily life [le quotidien]. At bottom, God is 
the stained sun, is the stain in the sun. If we can look for God somewhere, it is 
not in a paradise, in a cloud or in an exteriority in respect to history, but on the 
contrary in everyday human relations.5 
So, to come back to our question, what might a purely spiritual event 
look like in the Christian tradition? Mystical experiences immediately come 
to mind, as a place where we might find a means of bypassing the mediated 
word of Scripture for an immediate and direct spiritual communication with 
                                                     
4 I am thinking here of Arianism, Docetism and Monophysitism in particular. 
5 France Inter, 19 December, 1975, in: F. Dosse, Michel de Certeau: Le marcheur blessé (Paris 
2002), 462 (translations here and in the rest of the text are my own unless otherwise noted). 
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a risen Christ. This is indeed the way mystical experience is described by 
many mystics themselves, and one of the primary reasons for the persecution 
of many of these mystics by the Church, as they stood directly under God’s 
authority, rather than that of the Pope and his interpretation of Scripture. 
During the phase of apologetic, perennial philosophy of religion epito-
mized by Rudolf Otto, Aldous Huxley, Evelyn Underhill, William James and 
Mircea Eliade, this is often the interpretation given to mystical experience, 
and particularly mystical ecstasy (from ec-stasis, to stand outside) which 
came to be seen as a universal and direct experience of transpersonal union 
with the divine that transcended religious differences and particular embo-
died practices.6 Though this approach is still defended, especially among pro-
fessors schooled by Eliade, much scholarship has been done deflating such a 
universal and disembodied interpretation of mystical experience.7 But if re-
cent interpretations of mysticism convincingly refute these perennial claims, 
what, we might ask, does the mystic transcend, when she speaks of herself as 
outside herself in ecstasy, if it is not her body? 
Examples of Christian mystics describing ecstasy as an event at which 
they were absent abound. Mechthild Von Magdeburg gives an excellent ex-
ample of becoming absent to herself by describing her soul in union with 
Christ in the third person voice: ‘Then a blessed stillness/ That both desire 
comes over them./ He surrenders himself to her,/ And she surrenders herself 
to him./ What happens to her then – she knows –/ And that is fine with me.’8 
Who is this knowing ‘she,’ and this unknowing ‘me?’ Hadewijch similarly 
writes: ‘It weighs me down that I cannot obtain/ knowledge of Love without 
renouncing self’; and again: ‘After that I remained in a passing away in my 
Beloved, so that I wholly melted away in him and nothing any longer re-
mained to me of myself.’9 John of the Cross similarly describes abandoning 
himself in order to experience his Beloved: ‘I abandoned and forgot myself/ 
laying my face on my beloved; All things ceased; I went out from myself, / 
Leaving my cares Forgotten among the lilies.’10 All of these passages describe 
the experience of a divided self, where a knowing narrative self is abandoned 
by an unknowing self who melts away in God. The ‘I’ who narrates the expe-
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 More recent scholars who defend this position include Walter Stace, and Robert Forman. 
7 Steven J. Katz, Wayne Proudfoot, Richard King and Russell McCutcheon are good examples 
here. 
8 Cited in Mechthild von Magdeburg, The Flowing Light of the Godhead (NY 1997), 61–62. 
9 Cited in Hadewijch, The Complete Works (NY 1981), 187 and 280–282.  
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rience remains behind, below, and is not able to take part in an experience of 
which it ‘knows nothing.’ If the conscious knowing self is left behind, who is 
the subject of this unknowing ecstasy, and how are we to understand its rela-
tionship to the embodied self? 
I would like to venture a reply to this question by looking at the work of 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, focusing particularly on his Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis and his Seminar XX, ‘Encore.’ By choosing to call 
the experience of ecstasy by the French term ‘jouissance,’ which simultane-
ously connotes both joy and intense physical pleasure, Lacan stands firmly in 
the postmodern camp, understanding mystical ecstasy as an embodied and 
contingent spatio-temporal experience. As he puts it in Seminar XX, ‘Encore,’ 
‘for jouissance to occur, there has to be a body.’11 I will use the Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psychoanalysis to provide an interpretation of his Semi-
nar XX on mysticism, interpreting Lacan as showing that it is a form of rea-
son, which sees itself as autonomous and self-supporting, that is transcended 
during moments of mystical jouissance, when the mystic accepts having been 
constituted by an Other beyond her understanding, and beyond her control. 
Identifying the self with a vulnerable and embodied desire for a vulnerable 
and embodied God, the mystic abandons the inviolability of the ego and its 
sublation of the other, and opens herself to an encounter with the other in its 
own terms. Lacan, this paper will argue, uses mystical subjectivity as a tool in 
order to reveal the untenability of Descartes’ cogito,12 thereby undermining 
the modern construction of an autonomous subject. It is thus in the mystical 
tradition that Lacan will find the model for an embodied subject who, by 
abandoning the ‘all,’ the ‘whole,’ for what he calls the ‘not all,’ opens herself 
to an Other, who, instead of mirroring and thereby reinforcing the ego, un-
                                                     
11 Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XX: Encore (NY 1998), 26. 
12 Although the modern subject, characterized by autonomous and rational self-representation, 
can be traced to a visual source in the mechanization of vision and Brunelleschi’s invention of artificial 
perspective, it remains the case that many postmodern thinkers, including Heidegger and Jacques 
Lacan, used Descartes as a foundational example of this modern and reflexive subject, though he is of 
course merely emblematic of a shift that can be attributed to no single person.
 
As Charles Winquist 
puts it in his article ‘Person’: ‘There is no one event or thinker that can be definitively identified with an 
epochal epistemic shift in a culture. However, it is convenient to read Descartes’ Meditations on the 
First Philosophy as synechdochially emblematic of the epistemic shift initiating the Age of Reason. The 
heuristic use of radical doubt to clear away any uncertainties was, as Descartes suggested, a removal 
from below of the foundation of the whole edifice of thinking and believing.’ Cited in Mark Taylor 
(ed.), Critical Terms for Religious Studies (Chicago 1998), 227. One of the unfortunate results of this 
shift, most evident in Descartes, is the Manichaean divide between mind and body that has plagued the 
Christian West. 
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ravels it. Mirroring the unknowability of God, the body will be understood as 
the site of the unconscious, a site that remains always alien, always un-
known.13 
By placing Lacan’s critique of Descartes in his Four Fundamental Con-
cepts alongside his celebration of mystical jouissance in ‘Encore,’ I am not 
making an ahistorical claim that the cogito was somehow already constitutive 
of medieval subjectivity. Rather I am using Lacan to show how Descartes’ 
cogito can be understood as a defence mechanism, which actually resembles 
in interesting ways the foundation of the ego in the psychological develop-
ment of the child. In this sense, the experience of ecstasy as described by me-
dieval mystics coincides with Lacan’s understanding of the Real, as an experi-
ence of ex-istence, beyond language and the symbolic constitution of the self 
as subject. The cogito, one might say, develops as a natural defence of the 
subject against this Real, which is beyond our cognitive understanding, and 
hence a source of anxiety. According to Lacan’s analysis, only certain apo-
phatic mystics, then and now (and Lacan would include himself here), can 
accept this unknown as the very nature of the embodied self. 
 
1. THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY 
Descartes has become emblematic of a certain reflexive subject who is 
constituted through his own rational thought and hence understood as 
somehow independent of the world and the people in it.14 And like Descartes, 
many of us choose to understand ourselves as somehow whole and inde-
pendent, self-created through the activity of our own autonomous reason. As 
phenomenologist and Catholic theologian Jean-Luc Marion has pointed out, 
this hubris can lead to the positing of an Other who comes to function as an 
idolatrous mirror, guaranteeing our individuality, our fictive wholeness and 
                                                     
13 It is important here to differentiate Lacan’s analysis of the body as constituted in the imaginary 
and symbolic phase, where it is a cultural construction, rather than something we are born with, from 
the body as the Real, the organism that is the site of jouissance, separate from the subject and its con-
structed identity. 
14 In his third meditation, Descartes expresses himself as follows: ‘I am a thinking (conscious) 
thing, that is, a being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant of many, – [who 
loves, hates], wills, refuses, – who imagines likewise, and perceives; for, as I before remarked, although 
the things which I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me, I am nevertheless 
assured that those modes of consciousness which I call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as 
they are modes of consciousness, exist in me.’ Descartes, (Meditations, III, pg. 119) cited in The Ratio-
nalists (NY, 1960), 128. 
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autonomy as real. Marion describes this mirror as a prison, locking the sub-
ject in a world inhabited exclusively by his own reflection:  
Man becomes obsessed when he can see only images modelled on himself; 
from constantly seeing without being seen he can finally only see images that 
mirror his unique gaze. The obsidian obscenity of a universe of idols can toler-
ate no exit, since the gaze will always and only reproduce its idols.15 
Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has explained how the function of this in-
visible mirror develops during childhood when an actual and visible mirror 
leads the subject to identify itself with its mirror image, thereby limiting its 
identity to a visible appearance which saturates the gaze with an illusory uni-
ty. Lacan calls this reflection the ego. This interface between seeing oneself 
seeing and ego formation is described by Lacan as constituting the subject. 
He describes what he calls a mirror stage, when a young child (between six 
and eighteen months) first recognizes a mirror reflection as representing it-
self. When this recognition occurs, a disjointed identity, characterized by 
undisciplined motor functions, is replaced by a ‘proper body,’ a gestalt, a 
whole that the gaze appropriates as itself in its encounter with its mirror ref-
lection. Because the mirror reflection lies outside the self, the ‘I’ as well is 
alien or other, constituting the subject as self-different, split. Michel de 
Certeau comments as follows: 
Though the child has only dispersed, successive and mobile corporeal experi-
ences, he receives from the mirror the image that makes him one, but accord-
ing to a fiction. With a ‘jubilatory activity’ [affairement], he discovers that he is 
one (primordial form of the I), but by means of an alienation that identifies 
him with this thing that is other than him (a mirror image). The experience 
could be called: I am that. The I is formed only at the price of alienation. Its 
capture begins with its birth… From the start, it installs the I as ‘discordance of 
the subject with its own reality,’ and it calls forth the work of the negative (‘It is 
not that’) by means of which the subject closes itself within the lie of its iden-
tity (‘I am that’).16 
The mirror closes the subject within the lie of its unicity. Seeing itself as 
other to itself, the subject effaces its own self-difference, its own relationality. 
This identification with the fiction of the mirror thus creates an alienated 
subject, who arms himself with the specter of unity, thereby giving rise to the 
                                                     
15 Jean-Luc Marion, ‘Le prototype de l’image,’ in François Boesflug & Nicolas Lossky (eds.), Nicée 
II 787–1987: Douze siècles d’images religieuses (Paris 1987), 465. 
16
 Michel de Certeau, Histoire et psychanalyse: entre science et fiction, (Paris 1987), 223–224. 
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unconscious as the memory of its fragmented embodied nature, its lack of 
singularity. Lacan writes:  
The mirror stage is a drama… that machinates the phantasms that replace [se 
succèdent] a fragmented image of the body with a form that we will call ortho-
pedic of its totality, and with the finally assumed armor of an alienating iden-
tity…17 
In the mirror reflection, the ‘I’ is thus already constituted as ‘ideal I’ and thus 
already as ego:  
This form situates the instance of the ego [moi], even before its social determi-
nation, in a line of fiction that is forever irreducible for the individual alone.18  
It is the ego as an illusion or fiction of undivided totality that experiences a 
solitary exultation in recognizing itself as the independent object it has ca-
thected. Caught in the mise-en-abyme of the mirror, self-consciousness is 
imprisoned in an identity that is ‘whole,’ ‘one,’ and ‘autonomously consti-
tuted,’ forcing it to suppress its own lived experience of embodiment as un-
knowable, vulnerable and constituted by alterity. The unconscious, we could 
say, is the lived experience of the body, both intimate and alien, one’s own, 
yet constantly eluding the conscious mind and its constitution of itself as 
subject, as ego. This Real is lost to consciousness when the child enters into 
the symbolic, but returns in moments of trauma and moments of jouissance, 
experiences that exist in the realm of non-meaning, where they remain 
stranded, outside of language and cognition. 
This need to be ‘all,’ to enframe the self as a controllable image attests to 
what Lacan calls, in psychoanalytic jargon, ‘the phallic function,’ understood 
as the need to appropriate, label and hence control ‘that obscure object of 
desire’ to ensure that it reflects back to us our autonomous and inflated ego. 
This other who is transformed into a mirror, can be God (and more often 
than not the signifier ‘God’ seems to take on this function), just as it can be 
Woman, who reflects his maleness back to man, his self-esteem. Phallic 
jouissance thus reduces the other to an object that is imputed with causation, 
with having caused our desire (Lacan calls this object objet petit a).19  
As Bernard of Clairvaux told us long ago in his sermon ‘On Loving God,’ 
because our desire is infinite, it can never find satisfaction in a finite object of 
desire. Similarly, for psychoanalysis, and I quote, ‘phallic jouissance is the 
                                                     
17 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (Paris 1966), 96. 
18 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, ibidem. 
19 According to metonymy, objet petit a can be cathected as a breast or penis for instance. 
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jouissance that fails us, that disappoints us… it always leaves something more 
to be desired…’20 Moving beyond phallic jouissance, then, would leave the 
subject facing an infinite unknown that cannot be reified or sublated.21 The 
name that Lacan gives to this unknown is ‘the obscure God,’ thereby identify-
ing an apophatic experience of the divine with the end of the subject’s alien-
ation from her own embodied nature.  
 
 
2. THE OBSCURE GOD 
In his Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan provides his 
critique of the autonomous Cartesian cogito in order to elucidate his central 
claim that the self is constituted by and as this unknown alterity. Just as Eck-
hart calls for God to think in and for man, so Descartes, according to Lacan, 
founded his thought outside himself by turning to a malin génie. Thus his I 
think therefore I am cannot fulfill its intended self-sufficient autonomy, for its 
negation of the world, of the body and of others is at the mercy of his malin 
génie’s whim. Even the fact that he is certain, that is, that he has a clear and 
distinct idea that he is doubting and therefore that he is a thinking thing, has 
a cause exterior to his thought.22 This cause, because it cannot be overridden, 
fulfills Descartes’ idea of God, and as such destroys it, for as infinite and per-
fect signifier of truth, its role can no longer be distinguished from that of the 
malin génie, for both can manipulate the real. According to this reading, Des-
cartes’ other is neither clear nor distinct, and though he cannot think it, it 
necessarily thinks him. In letting the génie possess his interiority, Descartes is 
unwittingly saying that only the other can think for him, and thus that he 
doesn’t think (‘je ne pense pas’). Jean-Luc Marion’s extensive exegesis of Des-
cartes is in fundamental agreement with Lacan, leading him to refer to the 
cogito as being constituted a-posteriori, as a res cogitans cogitate. Using Des-
cartes’ thought experiment, which begins with the cogito being thought 
                                                     
20 Bruce Fink, ‘Knowledge and Jouissance,’ in: Bruce Fink & Suzanne Bernard (eds.), Reading Se-
minar XX (NJ 2002), 37. 
21 Roland Barthes describes this unknown other quite well in the secular context of love: ‘…That 
the other is not to be known; his opacity is not a screen around a secret, but instead, reality and ap-
pearance is done away with. I am then seized with that exaltation of loving someone unknown, some-
one who will remain so forever: a mystic impulse.’ Fragments d’un discours amoureux (Paris 1977), 42. 
22 ‘For how could I know that I doubt, desire or that something is wanting to me, and I am not 
wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I 
know the deficiencies of my nature?’ Descartes (Meditations III) cited in The Rationalists, 137. 
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(whether by the evil genius or by God changes little), and thinking only as a 
response, Marion describes the subject as fundamentally delayed, always ar-
riving late to the event of its own constitution.23 Descartes’ supposedly solita-
ry and self-sufficient subject is thus able to think itself only relationally, to a 
transcendent Other.24 Thus for Lacan, Descartes’ I think therefore I am de-
constructs itself in two important ways. Since the two I’s it cites cannot be 
grounded in a united subject, Lacan dissociates the infamous conjunctive 
‘therefore’ from the ontological clause that follows it, replacing it with what 
he calls the vel, the ‘or’ that separates the two clauses and reveals the subject 
to be fundamentally split (subject = $).25 ‘I think or I am,’ we could say, or ‘I 
think therefore I am not,’ or even ‘I am because the other thinks me.’ Accord-
ing to psychoanalyst Gerard Miller, the Lacanian question thus becomes 
‘what am I in the desire of the Other?’26 The answer, for Lacan, is given in his 
famous and oft-repeated phrase ‘le désir de l’homme c’est le désir de l’autre,’ 
which can be rendered: ‘Man’s desire is the desire of/for the other […] which 
is to say that it is as the Other that he desires.’27 Saint Francis could not have 
agreed more, for it was what Bonaventure called his ‘burning desire’ that led 
him to an identification with Christ such that Christ desired and suffered in 
him, as him.  
In infinitely desiring an infinite Other, the mystic desires an apophatic 
God from the site of its own apophatic unknowing: the body. Lacan calls this 
unknown other who cannot be reduced to a mirror image, ‘the obscure God,’ 
thereby using the apophatic tradition to illustrate a relation to the Other be-
                                                     
23 ‘I am insofar as originally thought by another thought [pensé par une autre pensée] that al-
ways already thinks me, even if I cannot yet identify its essence or prove its existence. I am already a res 
cogitans, but only understood as a thought that someone else thinks, a thinking thought thought by 
another thinking thought – res cogitans cogitata… The first thought of the ego is, in fact, not about an 
object (certain or false), nor about itself, but about the thought by means of which another (or even an 
alterity [voire un autrui]) thinks it (persuades or fools it). The ego is thus instituted as originally a pos-
teriori.’ Jean-Luc Marion, Etant donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation (Paris 2005), 378–379. 
Marion discusses this more specifically in his article ‘The Original Otherness of the Ego: A Rereading of 
Descartes’s Meditatio II,’ in: E. Wyschogrod & G. McKenny (eds.), The Ethical (Oxford 2003), 33–53. 
24 ‘We can say that if we ignore God, we can have certain knowledge of no other thing.’ Des-
cartes, Principes I, 13, cited in Jean-Marie Beyssade, ‘Descartes,’ in : Francois Chatelet (ed.), La philoso-
phie du monde nouveau (Paris 1972), 108. 
25
 This split subject, according to psychoanalyst Bruce Fink, ‘consists entirely in the fact a speak-
ing being’s two ‘parts’ or avatars share no common ground: they are radically separated (the ego requir-
ing a refusal of unconscious thoughts, unconscious thought having no concern whatsoever for the ego’s 
fine opinion of itself).’ Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject (Princeton 1995), 45. 
26 Gerard Miller, Lacan (Paris 1987), 29. 
27 Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan (Bruxelles 1977), 261. 
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yond the caption of the thinking self. I quote from his Four Concepts of Psy-
choanalysis: ‘…in the object of our desires, we try to find the witness of the 
presence of the desire of that Other that I will here call the obscure God.’28 
In seminar XX, ‘Encore,’ Lacan clarifies how the subject is constituted by 
the desire of this obscure God, explicitly placing his own work among the 
classics of the mystical canon, and thereby equating the goal of psychoanaly-
sis and mysticism. He writes:  
These mystical ejaculations are neither idle gossip nor mere verbiage, in fact 
they are the best thing you can read – note right at the bottom of the page, add 
the Ecrits of Jacques Lacan, which is of the same order.29  
Lacan’s argument centers on replacing phallic jouissance with what he calls a 
‘supplementary jouissance,’ which can be experienced only when one stands 
on the side of the ‘not all.’30 He identifies this ‘supplementary jouissance’ as 
the goal of psychoanalysis, in that it acknowledges that we are founded by an 
Other that we cannot possess and know. The mystico-psychoanalytic cure 
can occur only when, rather than obscuring this obscure origin, we can 
achieve jouissance by means of it, accept it as our origin and our destination. 
We, frail, needy, immanent creatures experience life and its joys only in rela-
tion to, and thanks to, others. The subject ($) thus comes to experience jouis-
sance not through controlling and possessing, but by accepting embodied 
finitude by means of dispossession, surrender and unknowing. This, for La-
can, is what the mystics were able to achieve, for the most part women, but 
                                                     
28 Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 306. 
29 ‘God and the Jouissance of The (barred) Woman,’ in: Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose (eds.), 
Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne, (NY 1985), 147. This discourse places Lacan 
in a quandary that draws him even closer to the mystics, for the radical unknowing of the cogito is 
undermined by his own position as ‘sujet supposé savoir.’ The difficulty of reading Lacan, then, is pre-
cisely analogous to that of mystical texts, for he is constantly using both kataphasis and apophasis to 
gain and then cross out his own authority. Jacqueline Rose thus writes: 
‘Much of the difficulty of Lacan’s work stemmed from his attempt to subvert that position from 
within his own utterance, to rejoin the place of ‘non-knowledge’ which he designated the unconscious, 
by the constant slippage or escape of his speech, and thereby to undercut the very mastery which his 
own position as speaker (master and analyst) necessarily constructs. In fact one can carry out the same 
operation on the statement ‘I do not know’ as Lacan performed on the utterance ‘I am lying’… – for, if I 
do not know, then how come I know enough to know that I do not know and if I do know that I do not 
know, then it is not true that I do not know. Lacan was undoubtedly trapped in this paradox of his own 
utterance.’ Jacqueline Rose ‘Introduction II,’ in: Feminine Sexuality, 50. 
30 He develops this idea using the cultural distinction between man and woman, a distinction 
that has historically placed the (barred) woman on the side of the ‘not all’ because she has been under-
stood by man as lacking the wholeness that is symbolized by the phallic function.  
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also men, for just as women can identify with the phallic function, so can 
men identify with the ‘not all.’ He writes:  
There is a jouissance… of the body which is, if the expression be allowed, be-
yond the phallus… There is a jouissance proper to her and of which she herself 
may know nothing, except that she experiences it – that much she does know… 
The mystical is by no means that which is not political. It is something serious, 
which a few people teach us about, and most often women or highly gifted 
people like Saint John of the Cross – since, when you are male, you don’t have 
to put yourself on the side of the phallus. You can also put yourself on the side 
of not-all. There are men who are just as good as women. It does happen… De-
spite, I won’t say their phallus, despite what encumbers them on that score, 
they get the idea, they sense that there must be a jouissance which goes be-
yond. That is what we call a mystic…31 
Lacan characterizes a mystic as experiencing jouissance not from the to-
tality and presence of the cogito, but from the detachment from this grasp-
ing, the acknowledgment that desire is always desire for what is beyond our 
grasp as ‘I,’ as ‘ego.’32 In this sense, the Other, whether human or divine, will 
play the role of the apophatic God, remaining transcendent and ever beyond 
our caption. If the mystic does not know, it follows that she must be experi-
encing jouissance from a place that is necessarily other to the cogito, the 
cogito’s other, which is to say, the body. 
Should we then consider Lacan an apophatic mystic of sorts? The 
prophet of a postmodern apophatic theology? The relationship between La-
canian psychoanalysis and Christian phenomenology is not as tenuous as it 
might at first appear.33 In a certain reading, both seek to rehabilitate fallen 
man: Christianity by means of a transcendent God, with the help of Scripture 
which relates a revelation; psychoanalysis by means of the transcendent (or 
subscendent) unconscious, with the help of language which betrays a mem-
ory of Adam before his Fall into the symbolic. Instead of Christ, psychoanaly-
sis offers humanity the psychoanalyst, who is, like Christ, a present absence, 
                                                     
31
 Jacques Lacan in Feminine Sexuality, 146–147. 
32
 I quote from Lacan once more: ‘As regards the Hadewijch in question, it is the same for Saint 
Teresa, – you only have to go and look at Bernini’s statue in Rome to understand immediately that she’s 
coming, there is no doubt about it. And what is her jouissance, her coming from? It is clear that the 
essential testimony of the mystics is that they are experiencing it but know nothing about it.’ Jacques 
Lacan in Feminine Sexuality, 147.  
33 Michel de Certeau noticed this correlation, and comments extensively on the monotheistic re-
ligion that ‘haunts the house’ of psychoanalysis in his work Histoire et psychoanalyse: Entre science et 
fiction (Paris 1987). See especially pages 258–260. 
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and like Christ the instigator of a revelation that his invisible gaze (the pa-
tient is seen but does not see) helps to disclose. After stating that his own 
book should be treated as a mystical text, Lacan clarifies what it is that he 
believes in:  
…naturally, you are all going to be convinced that I believe in God. I believe in 
the jouissance of the woman in so far as it is something more… Might not this 
jouissance, which one experiences and knows nothing of, be that which puts us 
on the path of ex-istence? And why not interpret one face of the Other, the 
God face, as supported by feminine jouissance?34  
The psychoanalytic cure then, involves the ability to identify with the site of 
jouissance, the body as organism, which is to say the unconscious, before it 
has been transformed into an ‘ideal I,’ by means of language. As Bruce Fink 
explains, ‘The I is not already in the unconscious. It may be everywhere pre-
supposed there, but it has to be made to appear.’35 Lacan can thus be seen as 
using a mystical technique to show that the subject is precisely where it can-
not constitute itself as a thinking thing. The ‘I’ must associate with this un-
thinkable site and learn to speak in the first person in ‘its’ name. The ‘I’ that is 
to say, can only find itself where thinking does not go. ‘The real is here that 
which always returns to the same place – to the place where the subject in so 
far as it thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it.’36 The real, then, as 
the certainty that the ‘I’ will always find itself where thinking does not go. In 
this experience of jouissance, where the subject ex-ists, the mystic finds her-
self before that ‘essential object which is not an object any longer, but this 
something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object 
of anxiety par excellence.’37 To accept this experience as the moment of truth 
is what the mystic and the cured psychoanalytic patient share in common. 
We are now in a position to answer the question with which we began. If 
we are to take seriously Lacan’s analysis of ecstasy as an embodied jouissance 
that is an opening to an Other that cannot be utilized by reason as one more 
object to be understood and mastered, what is left behind by the mystic is 
not the body, but the cogito as set over and against our embodied vulner-
abilities, over and against the Other in its radical otherness. If we hope to live 
                                                     
34 Jacques Lacan in: Feminine Sexuality, 147.  
35 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 68. 
36 Lacan, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (Paris 1990), 59. 
37
 Jacques Lacan, Seminar II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 
1954–1955 (NY 1991), 164. 
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a life of jouissance and intersubjective sharing, perhaps it is time to listen to 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers a critique of empirical tests of the free will, aiming at a pre-
supposition underpinning the experiments’ methodology. The presupposition 
is that the artificial reporting of machines is prima facie directly congruent 
with the first-person perspectival report of the participant. A critique of the 
method reveals the problematic nature of this methodological set-up. The 
phenomenological critique, however, also carries implications for a theoretical 
framework dealing with ‘embodied’ religion; these implications will be dis-
cussed via reference to the article by Marcel Sarot. 
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Empirical experiments testing the free will supposedly prove that the 
human agent is controlled by an unconscious urge to act. Many philosophical 
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critiques criticize only this result, thereby implicitly accepting the methodol-
ogy itself as unproblematic. I propose, however, that the methodology itself is 
seriously problematic from the start. Therefore, in this paper I pursue a diffe-
rently aimed critique, one that examines exclusively the methodological set-
up of the experiments. It is my hope to show that a prima facie presupposi-
tion underpins the methodology, which engenders a 1:1 comparison between 
artificial elements and phenomenological elements. This presupposition po-
sits congruency where, instead, one finds evidence of fundamental, categori-
cal differences, and is ipso facto unfounded. Granting this presupposition 
leads inevitably to a comparison of apples and oranges on the one hand, and 
pictures or videos or long exposure shots of apples and oranges on the other 
hand. Moreover, and of pronounced importance in the context of embodied 
religion, these considerations resonate with a modern theoretical account of 
religious experience at the crossroads of empirical science. 
The paper divides into four parts. My attempt to describe the basic me-
thodological structure of the experiments constitutes the first part. In the 
second part, I unpack the basic presupposition underlying this methodologi-
cal structure. Then, the third part is the space in which I argue (via pheno-
menological considerations) against this prima facie presupposition of the 
congruency supporting the experiments’ results. Finally, in the fourth part I 
move the discussion in the direction of philosophy of religion, by focusing on 
the philosophical-theological position of Marcel Sarot. 
 
 
2. A BREAKDOWN OF THE EXPERIMENTS’ METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE 
I want to describe the basic structure of the free will experiments con-
ducted by Benjamin Libet1 and by John Dylan-Haynes.2 These experiments 
used different equipment but utilized the same basic method to arrive at the 
same general result, namely that the brain ‘decides’ unconsciously to act be-
fore the person does. This result arose out of a comparison of two reports 
from independent operations. First, a programmed device measured and rec-
orded the participant’s relevant brain activity (this is the ‘artificial’ opera-
tion). Second, the participant made a movement and reported when she was 
                                                 
1
 Benjamin Libet et al., ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Ac-
tivity (Readiness-Potential),’ Brain 106 (1983), 623–642. 
2
 John Dylan-Haynes et al., ‘Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain,’ Na-
ture Neuroscience 11/5 (May 2008), 543–545. 
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consciously aware of her intention to act (this is the voluntary and, thus, ‘in-
tentional’ operation). The artificially generated report showed activity in the 
brain preceding the participant’s conscious intention to move spontaneously. 
The preceding electrical activity in the brain has been dubbed ‘readiness po-
tential.’3 
Let us examine these operations. The artificial operation of reporting 
measures brain activity precisely by capturing linear, static moments. In the 
experiments by Libet, a reading of electrical impulses in the brain occurred 
via electroencephalography (EEG) readings, which showed brain activity 
about 500 milliseconds before the participant’s reported time of conscious-
urge. In Dylan-Haynes’ experiments, the investigators used functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (or, fMRI) to track brain activity, by noting regions 
of the brain needing more oxygenated blood during the participant’s comple-
tion of the assigned task. The fMRI readings showed brain activity preceding 
the time of the conscious urge to act by 7–10 seconds and could be used to 
predict roughly which hand the participant would move.4 Both artificial 
techniques record the when and the where of activity occurring in the brain 
by precise measurements of time in a linear (or objective) series of static 
moments. 
The second report (in both experiments) is a self-reported, intentional 
moment of the participant. The participant should make an intentional 
movement fulfilling a conscious urge, and then report the time that she was 
conscious of this ‘urge.’ In the Libet experiment, the participants reported the 
time by taking note of the position of a rotating, blinking light. In the Dylan-
Haynes experiments, they were asked to remember a projected letter of the 
alphabet flashing on a screen before their faces. The action and the concomi-
tant operation of reporting is completely embedded in the first-person pers-
pective; the temporal framework is necessarily one of conscious time – the 
subject must be able to say, that in her present, her conscious urge happened 
before her intentional act. 
A problematic prima facie presupposition, however, underpins the com-
parison of these operations. To understand this presupposition upon which 
                                                 
3
 Libet, ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act,’ 623: ‘The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded 
by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act.’ 
4
 Dylan-Haynes, ‘Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions,’ 544: ‘Indeed, we found that two 
brain regions encoded with high accuracy whether the subject was about to choose the left or right 
response prior to the conscious decision.’ 
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the comparison is grounded, let us examine this methodological structure 
with a philosophical gaze. 
 
 
3. THE PROBLEMATIC PRESUPPOSITION 
Neuroscience of this kind attends the person as both an object and as a 
subject. As such it assumes necessarily that one’s neurological activity corre-
lates in some ordered way to one’s thinking. In many instances, this leads to 
quite pragmatically satisfactory ends. Discovering the source of somatic pain, 
for example, allows for its alleviation. Noting a lesion in the brain can illumi-
nate the source of mental afflictions. The correlation between the hammer, 
which I drop on my toe, and the resulting pain is not contingent, rather fills 
in a conditional proposition. If hammer falls on big toe, then pain! Such 
pragmatism, however, can be stretched overzealously to explaining away the 
mental completely. ‘Overzealously,’ because clear-cut cases of somatic pain 
cannot justify similar correlative attempts regarding intention. The proble-
matic presupposition of the free will experiments grows out of this basic 
principle of correlation that bolsters empirical experiments in the natural 
sciences. 
Without intending to simplify the phenomenal experience of ‘clear-cut 
cases’ of pain, the case of intentional action does seem to present two good 
reasons for requiring different treatment when attempting to squeeze it into 
correlative relations. First, we feel intention to be the movement from a men-
tal event to a physical event, which contrasts the causal correlation in simple 
cases of pain. Second, a supposition of an empirical correlation ignores that 
this mental event arises with ends in mind, instead of pure effects. Ends be-
long to a contextual web involving one’s personal history, one’s cultural envi-
ronment, along with one’s interpersonal network – thus, demanding herme-
neutic considerations along with empirical descriptions. Intention, therefore, 
requires attentive unpacking since it is an essential building block of the ex-
periments, i. e., move when you feel the urge to do so. 
A discussion of intention in the context of the experiments is also of 
special prevalence because a common critique of the results of the free will 
experiments claims that the experiments fail to measure real intention. 
Jürgen Habermas, for example, refers to the free will as the ‘reflected’ or ‘deli-
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berated will’,5 from which follows that the experiments deal with an insuffi-
cient sort of intention since the participant should decide to move sponta-
neously. Such an insightful argument, however, treats the spontaneous ac-
tions as a sort of inferior subspecies under the genus ‘intentional action,’ as 
though this concept were clear. I think that these critiques, however, are 
wrong in not taking the spontaneous actions as serious elements within the 
sphere of intentional actions, for they beg the question: How can we call de-
liberated actions intentional, if the physical (spontaneous) actions, which 
they comprise and which are voluntary, belong to a separate intentional do-
main? Or put differently: where does ‘real’ intention begin and end? These 
questions I think block the progress of the above-mentioned critiques and 
give reason to hesitate before accepting immediately that the experiments fail 
to measure ‘real’ intention, whatever that is. 
These questions resonate with G.E.M. Anscombe’s thinking in Inten-
tion.6 In her example that runs from §23 through §26, an example of a man 
pumping well water is offered. Along with the act of pumping – taken as a 
purely physical motion willed by the pumper – the man may intend to pump 
to a specific rhythm, intend to resupply water to a house of politicos (with a 
malevolent agenda), and (simultaneously) intend to do these actions with the 
knowledge that the water has been poisoned. The series of intentions in-
volved may be ‘swallowed up’ by that intention ‘with which’ the man performs 
the series of connected acts.7 In other words, the intention to move his arm, 
the intention of drawing water from the well, and the intention to resupply 
the house with water, may be subsumed under the lead intention of poison-
ing those men. Intention becomes manifold in these considerations; it re-
mains anything but diaphanous and basic. The intention to act is not found 
in any one place or another, rather spread throughout the composite action 
as a whole. A spontaneous, intended movement makes up a salient moment 
within the arc of intentional action. It follows that we should take free, spon-
taneous action seriously for the sake of our deliberative actions, which build 
upon its substrate.8 
                                                 
5
 Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt am  
Main 2005), 160, my translation. 
6
 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, Massachussetts 1957). 
7
 Anscombe, Intention, §26, esp. 46. 
8
 John Bishop, in ‘Exercising Control in Practical Reasoning: Problems for Naturalism about 
Agency,’ in Philosophical Issues, 22, Action Theory (2012), refers to spontaneous, unreflected action as 
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Let us draw these considerations over into the free will experiments. 
What do the investigators understand as intentional action? Three basic sup-
positions form this understanding that leads to the presupposition to be crit-
icized. To begin, the investigators study intention to act in contrast to unin-
tentional action. The spontaneous action of the participant moving her hand 
should not be a random spasm or carried out under hypnosis, i. e., the expe-
rimenters set out to measure action free from all external determinants. The 
act should be determined by an internal intention to do so. Intentional ac-
tion, however, cannot remain a purely internal factor and at the same time be 
understandable. An intentional action as such is in some way an amalgam of 
both internal factors and external factors centered about the person. 
Thus, the intention to act must secondly extend beyond the internal in-
tention to move one’s hand; an intentional action is nothing if not enacted. 
Beyond the internal intention to move, that which matters is the amalgama-
tion between an internal content and the external realization of this content. 
This amalgamation might be posited as the keystone to the entire experi-
ments’ validity. After all, if no amalgamation existed between an intention 
and an actual action, then the second report originating from the first-person 
perspective would become absolutely superfluous. One could say, in other 
words, ‘These actions are mysterious. Let us look in the brain to see where 
they come from,’ without needing to ask the participant at all. On the con-
trary, the experiment seeks to explore the connection between the activity of 
the brain and the everyday thoughts in which we posit intentions. 
Finally, the correlation of the temporal awareness of the intention to act 
and the action itself cannot be supposed as separate or isolatable. This prop-
osition also finds resonance in the thinking of Anscombe. Whatever inten-
tion is, it must remain a member of a ‘class of things known without observa-
tion.’9 Intention must be something directly knowable. If an intention to act 
were only realizable through observation, then two absurd consequences 
would follow. First, if the movement of one’s hand does not correlate to a 
specific intention to do so, then one must search for a separate cause, e. g., a 
                                                                                                                                         
consisting in ‘sub-agential’ components that ‘belong to what realizes the action’ (12). Here, as above, 
the argument grants naturalistic accounts those actions requiring little-to-no reflection, while seeking 
higher ground by attending truer, or more paradigmatic cases of intention, or as Bishop puts it, ‘real 
agency’ (13). Although insightful and differentiated, I cannot see how one can successfully draw a line 
between intentional actions of a sub-agential kind, and those of a real kind, and avoid falling into some 
sort of dualistic picture. 
9
 Anscombe, Intention, §8, esp. 14. 
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hypnotist or mind-controlling genius à la Dr. Mabuse. ‘I moved my hand,’ 
requires a direct relation – an intimate relation, one might say, with the cor-
relating action. Without something extra to fill this descriptive gap, everyone 
would be in danger of falling under the term ‘moved things.’10 Second, an in-
finite regress would force itself into discourse. If only indirectly aware of her 
movement, the mover would need a separate vantage point within herself 
from which she observed the movement, which would continue ad infinitum. 
Both of these consequences derail theoretical-explicative attempts complete-
ly. 
To summarize, we must take the spontaneous action tested in the expe-
riments seriously since deliberative intentions interweave with the substrate 
of spontaneous intentions. Also, we can succinctly synthesize the three cha-
racteristics that an intention to act comprises within the context of the expe-
riments. First, an intention to act involves an internal aspect basic to expe-
rience. Second, this internal aspect must essentially complete itself in exter-
nal realization to count at all. These first two characteristics represent two 
necessary, inseparable halves of the intentional whole. Third, the amalgama-
tion between the internal aspect and the external realization should be di-
rectly known without recourse to observation. 
Without knowing more about intention as such, we can posit a greater 
understanding of that which the experiments must suppose as occurring dur-
ing the reporting of the participant. The participant, in contrast to feeling 
pain, should affect, instead of being affected. Due to the assumption that this 
movement is (i) a unified amalgam of a basic kind between one internal and 
one external aspect that constitute a singular moment, and (ii) an amalgam 
about which the participant should be directly conscious, the presupposition is 
that a comparison with other basic, and directly knowable information is un-
problematic. The artificially recorded information represents information, 
which may also be individuated into basic, comparable elements. Thus, the 
experimenters presume that a comparison between a person’s self-reported 
intention to act and measurements from machines poses no inherent contra-
diction. 
                                                 
10
 Or, consider if you move and then were asked, ‘How did you know you really moved?’ The 
movement is mine without needing to refer to some mediating relation – no degree of separation exists 
between my pushing the button now and my intending to do so. 
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The presupposition, phenomenologically speaking, is that the only sa-
lient moment to be considered in a person’s first-person perspective is this 
internal moment of intention, which is directly attached to the actual action 
without requiring observation. This presupposition trivializes the rest of the 
first-person perspective, treating it as irrelevant to the precipitant moment of 
action. Yet, even if we were to grant the investigators the point and forget all 
overarching phenomenological complexity, the presupposition would still 
remain problematic. For when considered in a phenomenological light, even 
the ostensibly basic moment of willed (and, thus, intentionally) spontaneous 
action embedded within the first-person perspective consists of at least two 
acts, where the presupposition posits only one. 
 
 
4. IN A PHENOMENOLOGICAL LIGHT 
Let us now consider specifically those operations of reporting that are at 
play in the experiments testing the free will. First, both operations of report-
ing focus on the same trigger-event. A movement occurs, which the subject 
(necessarily) intends. Second, two operations should report the occurrence of 
this movement. The first operation of reporting is the measurements by the 
artificial, mechanical devices involved, which react automatically; they con-
sist in a chain of single actions. We must suppose a pure cause-effect relation 
with regards to the recording actions of the devices. If our artificial means for 
recording information consisted of the same layering found in embodied per-
ceptual consciousness, then they could hardly offer accurate measurements. 
Furthermore, the reports created by these operations are static in the sense 
that the data remain intransigent to external manipulation. As much as one 
may like to rearrange a bad photograph of oneself, the pixels remain (sans 
technical manipulation) fixed upon the paper; just so, a major tenet of empir-
ical natural science, is that the data are static pieces of information, which 
remain the same regardless of one’s point (and time) of view. The data are 
fixed – because the operation fixing them is designed to do just that – freeze 
and capture that which comes before it, and only that which it is designed to 
freeze and capture. 
The other operation of reporting is the intentional self-reporting em-
bedded in the first-person perspective of the participant. When considered in 
a phenomenological light, even the so-called basic or direct moment of spon-
taneous action (as discussed in the second part) consists in at least two ac-
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tions. First, the urge or decision to act occurs and one is simultaneously 
aware of this. Second, the participant must combine this initial act1 with the 
perceptual and cognitive act2 of marking this felt urge by remembering the 
position of an external timepiece. These two acts, albeit banal when com-
pared with more complex activities and tasks, reveal the implicit complexity 
of our experiences. If asked, a participant could not locate the interval be-
tween the two acts because the two acts occur as if they were one more com-
plex act. Pointing out that in fact two acts fill the space where an elementally 
simple action is postulated provides enough potency for revealing a basic 
asymmetry – especially, when one considers that these two acts interweave 
with the ever-unfolding history of the participant in affective embodiment. 
Where empiricism posits a simple datum, we actually find a multi-faceted 
action, which cannot be boiled down to a single, basic element.11 
But are they truly two acts? The basic considerations of the experiment 
postulate that this moment of intention, at least in theory, should be just as 
immediate as any other immediate action. We should be able to move spon-
taneously in some way no matter how confined the space. The investigators, 
however, want consciously considered, spontaneous freedom, indicated by an 
awareness of the time that one was conscious of the urge to act. Thus, two 
acts do occur, and necessarily so for the sake of the experiment, which wants 
not just arbitrary pressing of buttons, rather decidedly timed pushing of but-
tons. The person does not simply move. The person moves and at the same 
time makes conscious note of the position of an external timepiece. Although 
not requiring any grandiose physical movement, a second act coinciding with 
the pressing of the experimental button should indeed occur via the con-
scious attention given to a moving, external object. The two acts are not only 
logically present in the executed action; they are, in fact, implicit in the in-
structions given to the participants by the investigators. The experiment re-
quires that both acts occur. It simply forgets to take into account the precon-
dition for such multi-faceted actions occurring in the first place: namely, an 
unfolding presence of mind permanently constituting such multi-faceted 
moments. 
                                                 
11
 For an account of the impossibility of reducing the experiential experience of time down to ba-
sic, singular elements, cf. Henri Bergson, Zeit und Freiheit [Essai sur les données immédiates de la con-
science, Paris 1889] (Jena 1911), esp. 134ff. 
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Drawing attention to this complexity does not require technical lan-
guage of the classic phenomenological sort (although such language would 
be easy to find). Instead, the complexity is so unmistakably evident from our 
everyday experience that we mistake it as constituting data, which may be 
compared without question to the information measured by automated ma-
chines and manipulated immediately by algorithms of computer programs. 
This presupposition, which supports the methodology of the experiment, 
fails. For, if forced to compare the two processes, then the asymmetry of the (i.) 
statically preprogrammed, next to the (ii.) dynamically (i.e., lived) multi-
faceted, necessarily refutes prima facie claims of congruency. 
Yet, is it not possible to deny this claim of inherent incongruence be-
tween the operations evidentially? It is precisely the insight (quite literally, 
in-sight) offered by fMRI readings, which is cited as the final nail in the coffin 
of free will. How can it be that readings from the machine allow (albeit with 
some margin of error) predictions of which hand the participant will move 7 
– 10 seconds before the actual ‘conscious’ act? 
To such a rebuttal, one must again turn to the methodological presup-
position of the experiment. When brain activity in the frontopolar and pa-
rietal regions of the brain is being detected 10 seconds prior to the action, the 
key question goes unasked: namely, what is going on within the thoughts of 
the participant prior to and during those 10 seconds? The reason that this 
question goes unasked is due to the basic presupposition of the experiments, 
which is that the free will we want to measure is of a basic, directly knowable 
kind. It is solely the pushing of buttons, which counts as an immediate and 
directly knowable moment. The problem with such a presupposition is that 
the simplification of the self-reporting operation whittles the enlivened par-
ticipation down to a flash of intentional action.12 
When looking to the 10 seconds intervening between the onset of cere-
bral activity and the actual action, one understands why investigators forget 
the phenomenological context. After all, the participant is remaining as still 
as possible in those seconds for the sake of accuracy. Further, she is not in 
those moments supposed to be ‘planning’ her act, rather waiting to feel the 
conscious ‘urge’ to act. Thus, if complacent with the instructions, she should 
                                                 
12
 See Fuchs, ‘Verkörperte Freiheit – personale Freiheit,’ in: Marsilius-Kolleg 2008–2009 (Heidel-
berg 2010), 43, in which he refers to this simplification of the free will as one that presents it as being 
‘isolated’ and ‘lightning-like’ (‘blitzartig’), which further focuses the consideration at hand – the free 
will is set off in a vacuum (isolated) and so simple that it is practically elemental (lightning-like). 
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not be filling this temporal span with a mental countdown. And yet, in a 
phenomenological light, there is one more facet worth mentioning, which (as 
with the acts above) is required by the context of the experiment. This facet 
represents a sort of background tacit awareness: The participant, while fulfil-
ling the assigned tasks, should be simultaneously conscious of her role in the 
experiment. In other words, the experiment demands that the participant 
maintains in those 10 seconds the constant and tacit knowledge that she is in 
an experiment with a pre-determined role to play. Thus, in those ten seconds 
she is, for the experiment’s sake, conscious of her predicament and not day-
dreaming instead about lying in a hammock. By ignoring this tacit, but ne-
cessary consciousness, the investigators forget to be consistent regarding 
their presupposition. They forget that, even in the absence of visible move-
ment, phenomenological acts and contents are definitely occurring just be-
low the surface. 
In our phenomenological analysis, no supernatural material is necessary 
to explain these contents. A purely descriptive attentiveness finds the suppo-
sedly basic action to be multi-faceted. Empirical investigations are important, 
but must also respect the inherent complexity of the first-person perspective. 
Instead of rushing through presuppositions towards the coveted results, one 
must first honor the context. 
 
 
5. WHAT PHENOMENOLOGY OFFERS A DISCUSSION OF ‘EMBODIED RELIGION’13 
With ‘honoring the context’ in mind, here are a few caveats regarding 
the following subsections. First, my personal background, along with the 
background of the discussed author, is a Christian monotheistic one. Second, 
the jump from the above critique into philosophy of religion may seem quite 
jolting. Yet, I think it is, in truth, quite logical. Finally, my considerations 
build upon only a fragment of theoretical considerations from a philosopher 
who has written a substantial corpus. Thus, the following points cannot do 
justice to the thinker at hand, nor can it offer a positive theory; instead it 
looks to implications arising out of the above considerations, which offer 
food for further thought.  
                                                 
13
 The notion of ‘embodied religion’ arises from the conference title of this year’s European Socie-
ty for the Philosophy of Religion (ESPR) Conference in Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
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Why is the transition logical? It is logical, because free will is the sine 
qua non of moral responsibility. From the conception of ‘moral responsibility’ 
follows (necessarily) the notion of good and evil. It is then a short jump to 
religion, in which discourse abounds about an all-good God and our freedom 
to try and emulate this paragon of goodness. Thus, philosophers of religion 
must take seriously a free will experiment claiming that human actions are 
actually predetermined, not by the individual or God, but by an unconscious 
‘readiness potential.’ Since this discourse includes necessarily talk of expe-
rience, and phenomenology is the investigation of experience, it follows that 
our transition is well grounded. Moreover, the philosophy of religion cannot 
help but allow phenomenological considerations into discourse, as long as it 
welcomes the theme of the individual’s religious experience as such. 
The discussion that follows resonates with a slightly disharmonic rela-
tion to one position maintained by Marcel Sarot in this volume. Principally, 
Sarot’s contribution14 is insightful in its adumbration of the role that free will 
plays both in Christian religion and neuroscience. His denial, however, that 
the experiments in principle pose any challenge to our belief in free will finds 
disharmonic resonance with the above critique. 
 
5.1. THE POINT OF DISHARMONY WITH SAROT 
Let us consider that aspect of Sarot’s (quite enlightening paper) that fails 
to harmonize with the above considerations. The critical juncture deals ex-
clusively with his treatment of the limitations of empirical experiments. 
First, let us consider the point that he wishes to make. Sarot begins by 
granting empirical experiments their due. Empirical experiments ‘shed some 
light’ on the question of free will.15 Specifically, he is willing to accept that 
science sheds light on ‘a limited class’ of actions, which constitute ‘random 
and pointless bodily movements.’16 In other words, the results of the experi-
ments should be accepted, as long as one simultaneously grants that the real 
class of free actions, namely, ‘acts of moral or religious significance,’ remain 
unaffected. Sarot accepts the experiments to be valid ‘in principle,’ but ‘in 
practice’ claims that they have no bearing on what matters. 17 
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 Marcel Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 115–119. 
15
 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 117. 
16
 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 117. 
17
 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 117. 
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Reasons abound for doubting in principle such a claim of methodological 
validity. Briefly, one could first show that such a presupposition overlooks 
the inherent incongruence of the compared operations. Yet, even circum-
venting this source of doubt leaves a serious problem, namely, the question 
of differentiation. How does one differentiate acts of fake intention from real 
intention, if the acts of fake intention, in the end, constitute the real ones? 
One can attempt, like Anscombe, to argue for a sort of ‘swallowing up’ of the 
micro-intentions within the macro-intention ‘under which’ the micro ones 
are executed. Such an attempt, however, maintains one form of intention ex-
pressed multifariously, rather than two distinct species. Thus, we would con-
clude the opposite of what Sarot concludes, namely, that the experiments are 
limited not only in practice, but also in principle, because intention makes no 
sense if reduced to a lightning strike of intention (i. e., extricated of all con-
text). Intention, even in ‘pointless’ acts, remains principally opposed to com-
plete reduction. 
Trying to answer the question of where ‘real’ intention begins and ends 
poses a serious problem because such a division leads inevitably to dichoto-
mies. Such dichotomies, however, may be acceptable for Sarot. I think, how-
ever, that a dichotomy would remain, which would fail logically and which 
would be unacceptable even for Sarot. 
First, what sort of a free will is it that Sarot believes in? He writes: ‘I de-
fend indeterminism with respect to human choices and actions.’18 If, howev-
er, empirical methods indeed were limited not in terms of ‘principle,’ but in 
terms of ‘practice’ (as he states), then the empirical methods in question, it 
follows, could (eventually) explain the ‘real,’ libertarian free will (i. e., the will 
free of all external determinants). This would, in turn, require that empirical 
methods could reveal the ‘why’ of our actions more precisely than any first-
person account ever could; they would essentially be capable in practice of 
finding the determining source. An empirical prescience could reach beyond 
simple predictions as to which hand one will use to press buttons. Accepting 
empirical research as in principle capable of finding the unconscious deter-
minants of spontaneous acts, would grant the hypothetical possibility of it 
finding the determinants of libertarian, intentional acts as well. If this were 
the case, empiricism would reach beyond pure observation – it could literally 
discover within the participant the determinants before the late-working 
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 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 109. 
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consciousness itself had the faintest idea. The reasons we adduce to defend 
our ‘libertarian free will’ would become epiphenomena of a compatibilist 
sort, which is precisely the position Sarot claims to oppose.19 In other words, 
the dichotomy would cut deeper than that of body and spirit; it would cut 
between (a) the omniscience of our science (and Creator) and (b) our pseu-
do-knowledge. An empirical discovery would (in practice) undercut our own, 
direct grasp of our intentions. The only way of avoiding such a dichotomy is 
advocating that even ‘random and pointless’ bodily movements are in principle 
irreducible when it comes to complete reduction under physical laws. 
 
5.2. EMBODIED RELIGION? 
In summary, the phenomenological complexity of experience revealed 
the problematic nature of experiments that treat it as basic. Following this 
thread, Sarot’s position was discussed with regard to a critical implication 
taken from my critique. In contrast to Sarot, I advocated the complexity of 
intention for even the most ‘random and pointless bodily movements,’ 20 and 
defended them from prima facie reduction. 
But can we avoid a dualism between the phenomenological on one side 
and the physical on the other? Avoiding dualisms is a challenge. Conceptions 
dealing with embodiment, however, attempt to get around dualisms by treat-
ing the person and her environment as a whole. It is impossible to think of a 
person living outside of an ecological environment, outside a cultural envi-
ronment, or outside of an interpersonal environment. Thus, embodiment 
carries with it many dimensions, which carry undetermined weight in devel-
oping a person both physically and experientially. Embodiment is a concept 
used for avoiding dualisms – it introduces instead pluralisms. 
Our critique above revealed the essential contextual complexity of even 
unreflective movements. Now, what does the embodiment hinted at in this 
critique have to do with religion? At first glance, the connection is nothing 
explicit. The embodied first-person perspective must not involve religion. A 
religious person, however, is religious within a context. Faith and doubt, pie-
ty and sin, these words mean nothing in a vacuum, because they, at least as 
far as they can be considered through experience, also begin and end in expe-
rience. An embodied religion, then, in contrast to a purely systematic view of 
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 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 108–112. 
20
 Sarot, ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’ 117. 
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religion, must incorporate the context of the person’s direct experience. Al-
though banal, a look towards religious experience wins much from the above 
considerations. Rather than revealing the complexity of simply moral, deli-
berative acts, a more fundamental sphere was detailed, in which the dis-
course defended the entire, saturated first-person perspective from reduc-
tion. Thus, a religious experience wins from an embodied conception because 
value is placed on the experiential stream as such. Or put differently, embo-
died religious experience may play out on a physical stage, but referring to 
physical laws alone fails to elucidate such an experience’s meaning. 
  













If the majority of process theologians and some feminist theologians are right, 
then God’s world can be understood as God’s body. A view that reveals envi-
ronmental degradation in a different light. The essay ‘God’s World – God’s 
Body’ first of all presents Charles Hartshorne’s as well as Sallie McFague’s pa-
nentheistic conception of God. Both concepts stress the idea of God’s corpo-
reality. In a second step the author hints at the concepts’ environmental im-
plications; she explains what the consequences are, if Hartshorne and McFa-
gue are to be correct. Finally, the previously said opens out into showing in 
how far a movement ‘back-to-religion’ implies a ‘back-to-nature-’ movement.  
 
KEYWORDS 
world, body, environment, environmental degradation, panentheism,  
feminist theology, process theology 
 
‘As each of us is the supercellular individual of the cellular society 
called a human body, so God is the super-creaturely individual of the 
inclusive creaturely society. Yet God is superior to all these in a manner 
of which the person-to-cell analogy gives only a faint idea.’1 
                                                 
1
 Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY 1984), 59. 
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28 … 28 is the number of hectares of rainforest that were deforested 
within the last one minute. 28 hectares: that approximates 40 football pitches 
– in one minute!2  
More than seven billion living humans on earth,3 more than five billion 
mobile phones worldwide,4 1 billion cars.5 126 liters a day is the approximate 
consumption of water of a German.6 88.2 kilograms meat is consumed in in-
dustrialized countries per person in one year.7 More than 50,000 species per 
year are driven to extinction due to rainforest destruction.8 Glaciers are melt-
ing; coral reefs are dying and ecosystems changing because of fatal heat 
waves….9 
If the majority of process theologians10 and some feminist theologians11 
are right, then God’s world12 can be understood as God’s body.13 A view that 
reveals environmental degradation in a different light.14 
In the following, I will first of all present Charles Hartshorne’s as well as 
Sallie McFague’s panentheistic conception of God. Both concepts stress the 
idea of God’s corporeality. In a second step I hint at the concepts’ environ-
mental implications, that is, I aim to explain what the consequences are, if 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V., ‘Weltweite Abholzungen gehen weiter’ [http://www. wel-
thungerhilfe.de/abholzung-weltweit.html (Status: 8/2/2012 (9:30 a.m.)]. 
3
 Cf. United States Census Bureau, World POPClock Project [http://www.census.gov/ popula-
tion/popclockworld.html (Status: 9/7/2012 (3:00 p.m.)]. 
4
 Cf. BCC News, ‘Over five million mobile phone connections worldwide’ (9 July 2010) 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10569081 (Status: 9/7/2012 (3:57 p.m.)]. 
5
 Cf. Huff Post, ‘Number of Cars Worldwide Surpasses 1 Billion’ (9/7/2012) [http://www. huffing-
tonpost.ca/2011/08/23/car-population_n_934291.html]. 
6
 Cf. Universität Oldenburg, ‘Entwicklung des Trinkwasserverbrauchs in Deutschland’ 
[http://www.hydrologie.uni-oldenburg.de/ein-bit/12045.html (Status: 9/7/2012 (3:08 p.m.)]. 
7
 Cf. World Health Organization, ‘Global and regional food consumption patterns and trends: 
Availability and changes in consumption of animal products’ [http://www.who.int/nutrition 
/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index4.html (Status: 9/7/2012 (3:23 p.m.)]. 
8
 Cf. Yann Arthus-Bertrand (director), Home (2009) [http://www.homethemovie.org/ (Status: 
9/7/2012 (3:53 p.m.)]. 
9
 Cf. International Union for Conservation of Nature [http://www.iucnredlist.org/ (Status: 
9/7/2012 (3:47 p.m.)]. 
10
 E.g. Charles Hartshorne, Daniel Dombrowksi. 
11
 E.g. Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (London 1993); Grace Jantzen, 
God's World, God's Body (Philadelphia, PA 1984). See also: Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-theology (Lon-
don 2008), 146–163, esp. 150–153. I recommend Deane-Drummond’s postscript, which delivers a helpful 
explication of the interconnectedness of theology and eco-ethics. Cf. 179–185.  
12
 While I usually adopt McFague’s usage of the earth as ‘the world’ (cf. McFague, The Body of 
God), it is more precise to talk about ‘the universe’ – in the sense of ‘God’s whole creation’ – being God’s 
body (as Jantzen points out: cf. Jantzen, God's World, God's Body, 122f.). 
13
 However – in a panentheistic view – God is more than God’s body. 
14
 Cf. Jantzen, God’s World, God’s Body, 156. 
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Hartshorne and McFague are to be correct. Finally, the previously said opens 




1. CHARLES HARTSHORNE’S AND SALLIE MCFAGUE’S CONCEPTS OF GOD15  
In Charles Hartshorne’s point of view, God lives in a real, close, reci-
procal and bilateral relationship with each and every one of us. This God-
creature-relationship is actually the center of Hartshorne’s religious philoso-
phy. Unlike classical theism, Hartshorne’s neoclassical theism refuses to 
adopt Thomas Aquinas’ idea of God being the ‘unmoved mover.’16 In Hart-
shorne’s process theism, God is viewed as the cosmic power, which perma-
nently interacts with the local powers, thus with God’s creatures. God is con-
sidered to be dipolar, meaning that the one God has an absolute, unchanging 
and abstract pole on one side. Divine attributes like God’s love, benevolence, 
God’s essence and status as the highest, can be considered as eternally un-
changing. However, on the other side, God also interacts with God’s crea-
tures. Thus, the relative and changing pole refers to those attributes that are 
the concretion of God’s abstract attributes. Therefore, the relative pole is the 
one existing in relation to God’s creatures. This interacting and flexible part 
of God influences God’s creatures just like God is influenced by God’s crea-
tures.17 For Hartshorne, ‘to be’ means – in the platonic sense of ‘dynamis’ – ‘to 
                                                 
15
 For an analysis of Harthorne’s concept of God, see also: Julia Enxing, Gott im Werden: Die Reli-
gionsphilosophie Charles Hartshornes (Regensburg 2013 (forthcoming)). 
16
 Cf. Thomas von Aquin, Summa Theologiae / Die deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe: Vollständige, un-
gekürzte deutsch-lateinische Ausgabe der Summa theologica (Salzburg et al. 1982), I, q.8, art.1 ad2; q.28, 
art.1 ad3; q. 105, art.2 ad1.; Klaus Müller, Glauben–Fragen–Denken: Selbstbeziehung und Gottesfrage (III) 
(Münster 2010), 756f.; Klaus Müller, ‘Paradigmenwechsel zum Panentheismus? An den Grenzen des 
traditionellen Gottesbildes,’ in: Herder Korrespondenz (Spezial)/2 (2011), 33–38, esp. 37. Viney points 
out that the argument of God’s necessary unchangeableness stems from the Platonic tradition. In Pla-
to’s Politeia each way of changeability is described as a lack of perfection. If one assumes that God is 
perfect, changeability is thus excluded. Cf. Donald W. Viney, Reading on Philosophy of Religion (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), 3; Daniel Dombrowski, ‘Hartshorne, Platon und die Auffassung von Gott,’ 
in:  Julia Enxing & Klaus Müller (eds.), Perfect Changes: Die Religionsphilosophie Charles Hartshornes 
(Regensburg 2012), 53–72, esp. 54; Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism 
(Hamden, CT 
2
1964), 23; Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New 
Haven; London 1967), 36, 143. 
17
 Cf. Santiago Sia, Religion, Reason and God: Essays in the Philosophies of Charles Hartshorne and 
A.N. Whitehead (Frankfurt am Main; New York 2004), 32. – John B. Cobb & David R. Griffin (eds.), 
Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia, PA 1976), 47f., 68. – Müller, Glauben–
Fragen–Denken, 732f, 757. Regarding relative and absolute perfection cf. Hartshorne: God, as personal. 
– Whitehead also assumes a dipolar nature of God. He describes the poles as ‘primordial’ and ‘conse-
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have some kind of power’ and further: ‘to be is to create.’18 Consequently, if 
God calls other entities into ‘being’ then those entities are God’s co-creators, 
are the local powers. It follows that God cannot be considered as the only one 
having power, neither as almighty, without saying that God is just ‘one of 
us.’19 God is superior to us, God cannot be surpassed by any one of us; howev-
er, God can and does constantly surpass Godself. This is why Hartshorne re-
fers to the divine as the ‘self-surpassing surpasser of all.’20 God has the high-
est possible power, the greatest influence, without being almighty or all-
determining. In the process theistic point of view – as Hartshorne represents 
it – God’s way of interacting with God’s creatures is through persuasion.21 
God’s goal for the world consists in increasing harmony and in sight of this 
goal God persuades and guides the local powers. Furthermore, Hartshorne 
proclaims a panentheistic God-world-view. Panentheism states that the 
world is in God, in the same way as everything is in God, without saying that 
God and the world are identical – like the pantheistic position proclaims.22 
                                                                                                                                         
quent nature.’ The question, in as far as they can be compared to the Hartshornian concept of a con-
crete and abstract pole is not analysed in this article. – To this, cf. Randall C. Morris, Process Philosophy 
and Political Ideology: The Social and Political Thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hart-
shorne (Albany, NY 1991), 54. – Tobias Müller, Gott–Welt–Kreativität: Eine Analyse der Philosophie A. N. 
Whiteheads (Paderborn 2009), 126–139, esp. 126–132. – Müller, Glauben–Fragen–Denken, 727f. In the 
idealistic concepts (foremost in Schelling), Hartshorne had already seen a modern panentheism with a 
dipolar conception of God represented. – Cf. Charles Hartshorne & William Reese, Philosophers Speak 
of God (Chicago, IL 1953), 233–243. 
18
 Cf. Dombrowski, ‘Hartshorne, Platon und die Auffassung von Gott,’ 58. 
19
 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, ‘Das metaphysische System Whiteheads,’ in: Zeitschrift für philoso-
phische Forschung 3/4 (spezial print) (1949), 566–575, esp. 575; Dombrowski, ‘Hartshorne, Platon und 
die Auffassung von Gott.’ 
20
 Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, 20. 
21
 ‘This divine method of world control is called “persuasion” by Whitehead and is one of the 
greatest of all metaphysical discoveries, largely to be credited to Whitehead himself.’ Charles Hart-
shorne, Divine Relativity, 142; cf. 135. Cf. Alfred N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York 
18
1969), 
53, 87–109. – Cobb & Griffin, Process Theology, 69; Marian Sia & Santiago Sia, From Question to Quest: 
Literary-Philosophical Enquiries into the Challenges of Life (Newcastle 2010), 215, 220. Whitehead speaks 
of God’s lure, whereas Hartshorne speaks of God’s persuasion. Cf. Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and 
Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York 1969), esp. 103, 105, 107, 214, 216f, 262;  Hartshorne, ‘Das 
metaphysische System Whiteheads,’ 575; Ingolf U. Dalferth, Gott: Philosophisch-theologische Denkver-
suche (Tübingen 1992), 180. 
22
 Karl Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) introduced the term panentheism (although the panentheis-
tic idea is much older, this is why Brierley talks about a ‘quiet revolution’ (Michael W. Brierley, ‘Nam-
ing a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology,’ in: Philip Clayton & Arthur Pea-
cocke (eds.), In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Pres-
ence in a Scientific World (Grand Rapids, MI 2004), 1–15, esp. 4f., cf. 2f, 13.) Cf. Karl C. F. Krause, Vorles-
ungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaften (Göttingen 1829), 484; John W. Cooper, Panenthe-
ism. The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI 2006), 121; Klaus 
Müller, ‘Gott – größer als der Monotheismus? Kosmologie, Neurologie und Atheismus als Anamnesen 
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God is more than the world and cannot be fully identified nor comprehended 
by any creature. It becomes clear that the classical assumption that God and 
world are two completely different parameters and that God stands on the 
one side while the world stands on the other side; while God is able to influ-
ence the world without being influenced by it, as Anselm of Canterbury 
states in his Proslogion,23 is rejected by process theism. Hartshorne himself, 
but also feminist theologians like Grace Jantzen, Carter Heyward and Sallie 
McFague express the idea of the world being God’s body. However, just like 
God’s creatures have a body – or are bodies, as McFagues suggests in her 
book The Body of God24 – but are themselves more than pure bodies, God’s 
world is God’s body, but in a panentheistic sense, not saying that God and 
God’s body are identical, even though the world can be considered as part of 
God’s identity.25  
McFague’s theological cosmology is based on two pillars: her renewed 
theology of creation26 and her body-of-God concept. In this concept ‘body’ 
                                                                                                                                         
einer verdrängten Denkform,’ in: Frank Meier-Hamidi & Klaus Müller (eds.), Persönlich und alles zug-
leich: Theorien der All-Einheit und christliche Gottesrede (Regensburg 2010), 9–46, esp. 43f; Müller, 
Glauben–Fragen–Denken, 744–771, esp. 744f, 747, 753f; Müller, Paradigmenwechsel zum Pan-
entheismus?, esp. 36.; ‘Dombrowski, Hartshorne, Platon und die Auffassung von Gott,’ 56; Benedikt P. 
Göcke, Alles in Gott? Zur Aktualität des Panentheismus Karl Christian Friedrich Krauses (Regensburg 
2012). Cf. The definition in the Oxford Dictionary, which Brierley (Brierley, ‘Naming a Quiet Revolu-
tion,’ 5.) describes as the ‘classical’ one. Cf. Clayton & Peacocke (eds.), In Whom We Live and Move and 
Have Our Being. This book provides a helpful insight into the diverse panentheistic approaches and 
positions. Regarding Harthorne’s ‘panentheistic turn’ cf. Klaus Müller, ‘Gott: Totus intra, totus extra: 
Über Charles Hartshornes Transformation des Theismus,’ in: Julia Enxing & Klaus Müller (eds.), Perfect 
Changes: Die Religionsphilosophie Charles Hartshornes (Regensburg 2012), 11–24, esp. 8, 22–24; Roland 
Faber, Gott als Poet der Welt: Anliegen und Perspektiven der Prozesstheologie (Darmstadt 2003), 116–118. 
23
 Cf. Anselm von Canterbury, Proslogion: Lateinisch/Deutsch (Übersetzt von Robert Theis) 
(Stuttgart 2005), VIII, 33; Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle, IL 1967), 55. 
24
 ‘We do not have bodies, as we like to suppose, distancing ourselves from them as one does 
from an inferior, a servant, who works for us (the “us” being the mind that inhabits the body but does 
not really belong there). We are bodies, “body and soul.’’’ McFague, The Body of God, 16. 
25
 McFague, The Body of God, 141. ‘Pantheism says that God is embodied, necessarily and totally; 
traditional theism claims that God is disembodied, necessarily and totally; panentheism suggests that 
God is embodied but not necessarily or totally.’ McFague, The Body of God, 149f. Cf. Daniel Dom-
browski, ‘Alston and Hartshorne on the Concept of God,’ in: International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 36 (1994), 129–146. esp. 133f. Charles Hartshorne, ‘God, as personal,’ in: Vergilius Ferm (ed.), An 
Encyclopedia of Religion: The Philosophical Library (New York 1945), 302–303; Faber, Gott als Poet der 
Welt, 31, 41. Cooper appropriately points out that the assumption of the world being God’s body re-
quires a bilateral God-world-influence. It further comprehends the world as being part of God’s iden-
tity. Cf. Cooper, Panentheism, esp. 178, 180, 184, 193. 
26
 ‘[…] God as immanently present in the process of the universe’. Sallie McFague, ‘An Earthly 
Theological Agenda,’ in: The Christian Century January 2-9 (1991), 12–15 [http://www.religion-
online.org/showarticle.asp?title=54 (Status: 9/7/12 (5 p.m.)]. Cf. Deane-Drummond, Eco-theology, 152. 
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functions as a collective term for all kinds of bodies. Every entity – even 
atoms – can be understood as a ‘body.’ I assume it being legitimate to use the 
term ‘creation’ – in the sense of a creatio ex profundis et continua27 – as an 
equivalent for ‘God’s body.’ At this point, I do not consider it helpful nor ne-
cessary, to go deeper into McFague’s spiritualization of ‘body,’ although I as-
sume that her idea of uniting spirit and body and comprehending body as 
ultimately related or entangled with spirit, opens up a new perspective that is 
especially interesting for her feministic approach as she succeeds to demon-
strate.28 However, I would like to stress McFague’s idea of God’s transcen-
dence being immanent in the world respectively in creation. It is through our 
experience of the world that we experience God’s immanent transcendence 
and God’s transcendent immanence. Experiencing God’s transcendence in 
nature is a radicalization of the divine immanence.29 Nevertheless, McFague 
makes a point by saying that all we can see and all we can experience is God’s 
back. Thereby, she refers to Exodus 33.23b: ‘…and you will see my back; but 
my face must not be seen.’ (NIV)30 No one has ever or will ever succeed in 
seeing God’s face. In the consequence, neither theology nor philosophy will 
find adequate terms to describe God’s face; all we can (and should!) do, is 
turn our attention to the planet, which is a reflection of God’s back. We are 
‘invited to see the creator in the creation, the source of all existence in and 
through what is bodied forth from that source.’31  
                                                 
27
 Cf. David R. Griffin, ‘Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical 
Free Will Theism,’ in: John B. Cobb & Clark H. Pinnock (eds.), Searching for an Adequate God: A Dia-
logue Between Process and Free Will Theists (Grand Rapids, MI 2000), 1–38. esp. 12. David R. Griffin, ‘In 
Response to William Hasker,’ in: John B. Cobb & Clark H. Pinnock (eds.), Searching for an Adequate 
God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists (Grand Rapids, MI 2000), 246–262, esp. 247–253; 
Donald W. Viney, ‘The Varieties of Theism and the Openness of God: Charles Hartshorne and Free-
Will Theism,’ in: The Personalist Forum 14/2 (1998), 199–238 (Viney Discussion: 239–245), esp. 203f. 
There are diverse concepts respectively terms on creation as process theology understands it. While 
Viney talks about a creatio ex hyle (Viney, The Varieties of Theism and the Openness of God, 204.), Kel-
ler states a creatio ex profundis, cf. Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London; 
New York 2003), esp. 155–228; Catherine Keller, ‘Ex profundis: Die verlorene Chaostheorie der Schöp-
fung,’ in: Severin J. Lederhilger (ed.), Mit Gott rechnen: Die Grenzen von Naturwissenschaft und Theolo-
gie (7. Ökumenische Sommerakademie Kremsmünster 2005) (Frankfurt am Main; New York 2006), 39–
57; Catherine Keller, ‘Creatio ex profundis: Chaostheorie und Schöpfungslehre,’ in: Evangelische Theo-
logie 69/5 (2009), 356–366. Müller, ‘Gott – größer als der Monotheismus?’ 40. 
28
 Cf. McFague, The Body of God, 14f, 22-25; 141–150. 
29
 Cf. McFague, The Body of God, 20. 
30
 McFague, The Body of God, 131–136; cf. 144, 150. ‘The implication of this picture is that we never 
meet God unmediated or unembodied.’ Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, 
Nuclear Age (Philadelphia, PA 1987), 184. 
31
 McFague, The Body of God, 133f. Cf. Deane-Drummond, Eco-theology, 151. 
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This concept, of an immanent-transcendent God, the idea that God is – 
somehow – present in the world, is described as ‘embodied.’32 McFague even 
goes further by talking about ‘The Cosmic Christ.’33 In this context, she claims 
a ‘cruciform living,’ ‘an alternative notion of the abundant life, which will in-
volve a philosophy of ‘enoughness,’ limitations on energy use, and sacrifice 
for the sake of others.’34  
Furthermore, McFague betakes the spirit-body-issue to explain God’s re-
lation to the world. Thereby, God is understood as ‘the spirit that is the 
breath, the life, of the universe, a universe that comes from God and could be 
seen as the body of God.’35 She uses spirit instead of mind, because other than 
mind, spirit can be found in all creatures and entities of the universe. Doing 
so, she promotes cosmocentricism instead of anthropocentricism. Moreover, 
the spirit-body-analogy antagonizes a dualistic world approach as well as an 
association of the divine with the solely intellectual and controlling part, the 
one ordering and limiting the universe. Instead, spirit understood as the 
energizing and enlivening part interweaves every entity and allows for a the-
ology of nature, focusing the God-creature-relationship instead of just the 
God-man-relationship.36 We are only adequately described, if the spirit-body 
existence is taken into consideration. Neither our spirit nor our body suc-
ceeds in properly characterizing us. Moreover, I assume most readers would 
agree that they are one person, with a bodily as well as spiritually world-
approach, without considering it adequate to speak of two entities within one 
person. Comparably, McFague articulates one God, existing in a bodily di-
                                                 
32
 Margit Eckholt, Schöpfungstheologie und Schöpfungsspiritualität: Ein Blick auf die Theologin 
Sallie McFague (München 2009), 21. 
33
 Cf. McFague, The Body of God, 102, 179–191. McFague’s idea of the ‘Cosmic Christ’ touches the 
following aspects: salvation occurring in creation, in the body of God (179); the interrelatedness and 
interconnectedness of creation and salvation (180); the liberation of nature from oppressions (‘our 
oppressive practices’) (187); the healing of the human and the nonhuman (188f). Deane-Drummond, 
Eco-theology, 100–107; 152. 
34
 Sallie McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril (Minne-
apolis, MN 2001), 14. 
35
 McFague, The Body of God, 144. 
36
 Cf. McFague, The Body of God, 144f. Hartshorne uses the mind-body-analogy as well as the 
body-cell-analogy to describe the God-world-relation. Cf. ‘In sum, then, God’s volition is related to the 
world as though every object in it were to him a nerve-muscle, and his omniscience is related to is [sic!] 
as though every object were a muscle-nerve. A brain cell is for us, as it were, a nerve-muscle and a mus-
cle-nerve, in that its internal motions respond to our thoughts, and our thoughts to its motions. If there 
is a theological analogy, here is its locus. God has no separate sense organs or muscles, because all parts 
of the world body directly perform both functions for him. In this sense the world is God’s body.’ Hart-
shorne, Man’s Vision of God, 185; cf. 174–211. Cf. Viney, The Varieties of Theism and the Openness of God, 
205. 
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mension – the world – and in one or perhaps uncountable incorporeal di-
mensions. At this point, the phenomenological experts might not be amused 
by the undifferentiated usage of the terms ‘Leib’ and ‘Körper.’ Keeping in 
mind that myriads of books have been written on that topic, and – to put it 
very simple – ‘Körper’ is usually used in a more scientific-physical sense while 
‘Leib’ goes far beyond scientific aspects, I am not aware that either Hart-
shorne or McFague emphasize the difference here. My main point in this ar-
ticle is to analyze the consequences of the idea that God’s world is unders-
tood as God’s body. I will do so in the next step, before making a point in say-
ing that – based on the correctness of the arguments presented – living in a 
close relationship with God, that is living a spiritual life, necessarily implies a 




2. TAKING THE CONSEQUENCES INTO ACCOUNT 
If Hartshorne and McFague are right, then what we do does not only in-
directly, but directly affect God. On the one hand, Hartshorne and McFague 
stand in a long tradition of demonstrating in how far God encounters us in 
other entities, or, to talk with Buber, Levinas and Derrida – to only name a 
few – God is in ‘the other.’ On the other hand, the process theologian and the 
ecofeminist theologian accentuate a slightly different point that nevertheless 
affects us in an essential way: God encounters us not only in ‘the other’ – in 
the sense of another human being or animal – but in ‘nature.’ The eco-
theological perspective brings our environment into focus, nature in its mul-
tifaceted presences, thereby bringing man into his position as God’s servant, 
thus the servant of nature, in contrast to his idea of being creation’s crowning 
glory. If one takes the assumption of God’s world being God’s body seriously, 
one can provocatively say: 
…If God is truly embodied in nature, then God is not only in big trouble 
in recent years, moreover, God seems to be the subject of destruction.  
…If God is truly embodied in nature, then we do not only drive 50,000 
species per year to extinction, we then drive God Godself to extinction. 
…If God is truly embodied in nature, then we deplete God, when we use 
up natural resources. 
…If God is truly embodied in nature, then we waste God, when we waste 
water. 
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…If God is truly embodied in nature, then we harm God, when we con-
tinue the emission of global warming gases, we expose God’s body to a death-
ly heat shock.  
Relating to McFague’s spirit-body-analogy as one possible way of im-
agining the idea of God’s world being God’s body, one might say that there is 
a difference that is not properly taken into consideration here: the difference 
between God and us. Just because our bodies experience illnesses, harm and 
pain suggests nothing about God’s body having those experiences. The differ-
ence might be that – unless us – God is perfect. Therefore God’s body has to 
be immortal, inviolable, always healthy, while we are the incomplete and fal-
lible creatures, thus sinning and suffering from the consequences. Hart-
shorne agrees, using the following example: Just because a house consists of 
many small rooms does not make the house small.37 Just because we are pa-
nentheistically in God, and we are sinners, does not lead to a sinful God. In 
the same way Hartshorne does not see a conflict considering this imperfect 
world as God’s body. However, in the consequence of Hartshorne’s body-cell-
analogy, God does not necessarily experience pain in the same way as God’s 
bodily members do, but God suffers just like we – as a whole – suffer, when 
we, for example, cut our finger or break our leg. It is not just the finger or the 
leg that is suffering, we suffer. Thus, in a sympathetic, bilateral, panentheistic 
God-creature-relationship, God somehow suffers with God’s creatures.  
Furthermore, considering God’s creation as an ontological necessity – as 
Hartshorne does – leads to the assumption that God necessarily needs a 
body. This world is contingent, but a world – any world – is necessary.38 God 
                                                 
37
 Cf. Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 145. 
38
 ‘But the divine fiat must be as good as any other possible one. Thus God is free in what he 
does, and yet is not free to act in inferior fashion. He is slave to his goodness, if you will. But he can 
express this goodness as he pleases in any world arrangement that is not inferior to any possible other, 
so far as God determined or might determine it.’ (Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 137f.) ‘God requires 
a world, but not the world. By contrast, what the world requires is not simply a God but the one and 
only possible God, the Worshipful One.’ Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, 64f. Cf. Hart-
shorne & Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, 22; Griffin, Process Theology and the Christian Good News, 
12; Griffin, ‘In Response to William Hasker,’ 246–262, esp. 247–253. Hartshorne, ‘Das metaphysische 
System Whiteheads,’ 575. Brierley, ‘Naming a Quiet Revolution,’ 9; Müller, ‘Gott – größer als der Mono-
theismus?’ 43; Müller, Glauben–Fragen–Denken, 728, 738; Ingolf U. Dalferth, Becoming Present: An 
Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the Presence of God (Leuven 2006), 82. ‘Finally, the issue over incor-
poreality is tied up with the issue over creation. [...] Hartshorne argues effectively that God is related to 
the world in two crucial respects as a human mind is related to its body: (1) God is aware, with maxi-
mum immediacy, of what goes on in the world, and (2) God can directly affect what happens in the 
world. On the principle that what a mind (1) is most immediately aware of and (2) has under its direct 
voluntary control is its body, Hartshorne concludes that the world is God's body, and hence that God is 
not incorporeal. But this analogy can be pushed through all the way only if, as Hartshorne holds, the 
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could have had a different body, maybe God has one we do not know of, but 
a body – any body – is presupposed in order to ‘furnish the World Soul with 
awareness of, and power over, its bodily members.’39  
At this point, I will briefly summarize the main statements as well as ar-
guments so far: In the first place, God’s world can be understood as God’s 
body. Thus, the world is within God, part of God, however, God is not ab-
sorbed in the world; God is more than ‘world.’ God’s world is the place of 
God’s interaction with the world. Secondly, God lives in a close and real rela-
tionship with God’s creatures, whereby ‘creatures’ is understood in a broad 
sense embracing all created entities. Thirdly, what we do and what we fail to 
do influences God, with whom we live in a two-sided-relationship. Fourthly, 
even though God’s body is unique and cannot be equalized with creatures’ 
bodies, God’s body is severely suffering in those times, if God is – as White-




3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ‘EMBODIED RELIGION’ 
Those assumptions lead us to the concluding statement that believers 
need to be more aware of their ecological footprints. Moreover, one cannot 
live in a close relationship with God; preach a life in harmony with God’s will, 
thereby ignoring nature’s dignity. Therefore, Christian religion is inevitably 
called to accept the challenge of integrating nature – in all its facets – into 
their gospel. It is provoked to stop tabooing human nature as well as envi-
ronmental damage. Because as McFague states: ‘Christianity is the religion of 
                                                                                                                                         
world (some world or other) exists by metaphysical necessity, independent of God's will. Otherwise 
God will not be corporeal in the strongest sense – essentially corporeal. Of course even if God brings it 
about by a free act of will that the world exists, we might still, in a sense, regard the world as God's 
body. But in that case it would be a body that He had freely provided for Himself, one that He could 
just as well have existed without. He would not be essentially corporeal. If we understand corporeality 
in this stronger sense, and Hartshorne does espouse it in this sense, it is clear that it stands or falls 
along with Hartshorne's position on creation. If the classical doctrine of creation is retained, one can 
deny essential corporeality, while still agreeing with Hartshorne on relativity, contingency, and poten-
tiality.’ William Alston, ‘Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media,’ in: John B. Cobb & Franklin I. Gamwell 
(eds.), Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne (Chicago, IL 1984), 78–98, here 
87. 
39
 Daniel Dombrowski, ‘Does God Have a Body?’, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2/3 
(1988), 225–232, here 230. Regarding Hartshorne’s Plato-references also see Hartshorne, Omnipotence 
and Other Theological Mistakes, 52–56; 59–62.    
40
 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 351. 
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the incarnation par excellence. Its earliest and most persistent doctrines focus 
on embodiment: from the incarnation (the Word made flesh) and Christolo-
gy (Christ was fully human) to the Eucharist (this is my body, this is my 
blood), the resurrection of the body, and the church (the body of Christ who 
is its head), Christianity has been a religion of the body. Christianity during 
first-century Mediterranean culture, which was noted for its disparagement 
of the body and its otherwordly focus, defiantly proclaimed its message of 
enfleshment.’41 And yet, Christian religion stands in a long tradition of ex-
cluding, bashing, concealing and demerging man’s bodily needs instead of 
facing the challenge of integrating them into a Christian lifestyle. Similarly, it 
remains true to itself, by defying and neglecting the ‘body nature.’42 However, 
if God is truly embodied in the cosmos, then we urgently need to think about 
what the actualization of ‘embodied religion’ could be.43 
 
Reading this article up to here took approximately 20 minutes. Within 
those last 20 minutes, eight hundred football pitches of rainforest were lum-
bered. 
  
                                                 
41
 McFague, The Body of God, 14. Cf. Jantzen, God's World, God's Body, 157. 
42
 In this context, McFague talks about the interconnectedness of oppressions. Cf. McFague, The 
Body of God, 14. ‘Whatever else salvation can and ought to mean, it does involve, says the body model, 
first and foremost, the well-being of the body. A theology that works within the context of the body 
model claims that bodies matter, that they are indeed the main attraction.’ McFague, The Body of God, 
18. 
43
 ‘In sum, a Christian nature spirituality is Christian praxis extended to nature. It is becoming 
sensitive to the natural world, acknowledging that we live in this relationship as we do also in the rela-
tionship with God and other people. … A Christian nature spirituality, then, is loving nature in the 
same way that we love God and other people: as valuable in itself, as a “subject.” A Christian nature 
spirituality tells us further that in our time nature is oppressed and needs our special care. To care for it 
properly, we must pay attention to it, learn about its need, become better acquainted with it.’ Sallie 
McFague, Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature (Minneapolis, MN 1997), 24f. 







 Trinity, Embodiment and Gender 
 
SOILI HAVERINEN 
Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article will scrutinize the approaches of Janet Martin Soskice and Gavin 
D’Costa to the Trinity, embodiment and gender. It argues that the doctrine 
of the Trinity is closely connected with embodiment, and assesses Soskice’s 
and D’Costa’s answers to gender-related questions that have arisen from the 
connection between embodiment and the Trinity. The aim of the article is 
firstly to prove that orthodox interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity 
are not essentially exclusive to women, and secondly that the Trinitarian ap-
proach provides an intriguing model by which to understand sexual differ-
ence at the human level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What do embodiment and the Trinity have to do with each other? The 
doctrine of the Trinity is often seen as the most abstract doctrine in Christian 
dogma, a doctrine that transcends not only our physical reality but our ra-
tionality as well. In the present article, however, I shall argue that the doc-
trine of the Trinity is closely connected with embodiment, by drawing on the 
work of Janet Martin Soskice, Professor of Philosophical Theology at the Uni-
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versity of Cambridge and fellow of Jesus College, and Gavin D’Costa, Profes-
sor of Catholic Theology at the University of Bristol. Furthermore, I shall as-
sess their answers to gender-related questions that have arisen as a result of 
connecting the Trinity with embodiment. 
 Common to Soskice and D’Costa is their view that the Trinitarian ap-
proach is essential to contemporary assessments of embodiment in a Chris-
tian context. Soskice emphasizes that the connection between embodiment 
and the Trinity was already very close when the doctrine was first articulated. 
At the time, the need for a specific doctrinal formulation was practical rather 
than theoretical. It arose from the belief in God’s incarnation, i.e. from the 
conviction that God was embodied as an individual person in Jesus Christ, as 
well as from the practical and pastoral questions that the early Church asso-
ciated with this belief. The doctrine of the Trinity was a response to the prob-
lem of how it is possible to simultaneously believe that there is only one God, 
and that Jesus truly is God in a human body. She clarifies the process as fol-
lows: ‘The means, the tools at hand, were those of a Greek philosophy but the 
motives were pastoral and apologetic. The doctrine of the Trinity adds noth-
ing extra to the basic Christian confession.’1 
Although the notion of embodiment had already played an essential 
role from early on, gender-related questions concerning the Trinity and em-
bodiment did not arise until contemporary theology got underway in tandem 
with feminist approaches. Common questions posed by contemporary femin-
ists include the following. ‘If God is embodied as a male, what have women to 
do with him? Are men essentially closer to God and are women excluded from 
divinity due to their gender?’ Or, expressed metaphysically: ‘How is the gen-
dered state of human being as Imago Dei related to God, and what is the rela-
tion between sexual difference at the human level and gender-related imagery 
in religious language?’2 
My aim is to prove firstly that from orthodox interpretations of the 
doctrine of the Trinity it is possible to find answers to these questions that are 
not exclusive to women (or men), and secondly that the Trinitarian approach 
provides an intriguing model by which to understand sexual difference at the 
                                                     
1 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ in: Susan Frank Parsons (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Feminist Theology (Cambridge 2002), 135–150, esp. 136. 
2
 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 138–139. Elisabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in 
Feminist Theological Discourse (New York 1992), 18. Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Boston 1973), 
19. Pamela Sue Anderson, ‘Feminist Theology as Philosophy of Religion,’ in: Parsons (ed.), Cambridge 
Companion to Feminist Theology, 40–57, esp. 42. 
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human level. Both Soskice and D’Costa reflect on these questions, striving to 
take the feminist challenge seriously, and to answer them from within the 
Christian, mostly Roman-Catholic, tradition. 
 
 
INCLUSION WITHOUT FEMALE DIVINITY 
The French feminist Luce Irigaray formulates the feminist criticism of the 
Christian concept of the Trinity in terms of exclusive maleness in the follow-
ing way:  
Christianity tells us that God is in three persons, three manifestations, and that 
the third stage of the manifestation occurs as a wedding between the spirit and 
the bride. Is this supposed to inaugurate the divine for, in, with women? The 
female? Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign. No 
human subjectivity, no human society has ever been established without the 
help of the divine… There is no woman God, no female trinity: mother, daugh-
ter, spirit.3 
Irigaray demands that there be a female god and finds a possible candidate in 
the third person of the Trinity, the Spirit. She is not entirely alone here, for in 
early Syriac tradition the Spirit had been styled as feminine, because the 
gender of this noun in Semitic languages is female – ruha’ in Syriac and ruâh 
in Hebrew. However, her motive for feminizing the Spirit is not historical or 
linguistic but rather ideological.4 She suggests that God’s incarnation in Jesus 
Christ should be understood only as a partial incarnation and that the femi-
nine spirit following him had made the incarnation complete. Only in that 
way would the Godhead include feminity and provide possibility of subjectivi-
ty for women.5  
Gavin D’Costa accepts Irigaray’s challenge and offers two compatible 
solutions to the problem she presents. In both, he rejects Irigaray’s demand by 
highlighting that God’s incarnation should not be understood as an exclusion 
of women even though God was incarnated as a man. First, God in fact did not 
only utilize Christ’s male body as the instrument of salvation but the female 
                                                     
3
 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies transl. Gillian C. Gill (New York 1993), 62. 
4
 Janet Martin Soskice, The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language (Oxford 
2007), 112. Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 143–144. Gavin D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity: Gender, Culture 
and the Divine (London 2000), 43–45. 
5
 D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity, 8. 
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body of Christ’s mother Mary as well. The physical motherhood of Mary thus 
proves that femininity cannot be contrary to divinity. Secondly, he partly 
agrees with Irigaray’s argument that God’s incarnation as the individual male 
Jesus Christ could be understood as an incomplete incarnation.6 
D’Costa, however, rejects Irigaray’s view that the incarnation was com-
pleted only in the incarnation of a female spirit, because that would assign 
sexual difference within the Trinity. Instead, the incarnation was completed 
only in the life of Jesus’ resurrected body – the Marian church – which is addi-
tionally depicted as the body of Christ and as his bride. This ‘Church-body’ 
has been described as a female body throughout history and will not be com-
plete until the eschaton. Every member – female and male – of the Church, 
the body of Christ, is a part of the salvific act of the Trinity. According to 
D’Costa, as members of Christ’s body, members of the Church are also co-
redeemers with Christ, as is Mary, the first Co-Redeemer. In spite of Irigaray’s 
criticism of this model, women are not excluded, but have their own subjec-
tivity by participating in the Trinitarian life as members of Christ’s body, 
without having, however, a sovereign subjectivity. We shall shortly return to 
the concept of subjectivity later in this article.7 
 D’Costa also criticized Irigaray’s call for feminine divinity, that her 
model would actually essentialize sexual difference in a way that would be 
alien to the Christian understanding of both man and woman being created in 
the image of each person of the Trinity. D’Costa as well as Soskice reject any 
attempt to assign sexual difference to the Trinity. They both emphasize that 
God is beyond human gender-limits, in other words he does not lack gender, 
but surpasses it, and therefore each of the three persons can be described with 
both male and female imagery. Furthermore, they both remark that in the 
previously mentioned Syriac tradition the Spirit was considered to be inferior 
to the Father and Son, and therefore feminine. This view is in contradiction 
with feminist purposes as well as orthodox understandings of the Trinity.8 
 D’Costa asserts that in assigning gender to the divine per se, Christiani-
ty is in danger of idolatry, that is, of univocally assigning qualities from the 
created world to God. He writes: ‘Analogy reminds us that any likeness that 
indeed exists always does so within a greater unlikeness and difference. To 
                                                     
6
 D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity, 38–39. 
7
 D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity, 38–39. 
8
 Gavin D’Costa, ’Queer Trinity,’ in Gerald Loughlin (ed.), Queer Theology: Rethinking the Wes-
tern Body (Oxford 2007) , p.269–280, esp. 273–274. Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 144. 
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forget this is to be idolatrous and anthropomorphic.’9 He suggests that ‘it is in 
the relationship between gendered difference, not in gender itself, that we 
find the analogical bridge to the Trinitarian God.’10  
Even Christians from other – non-Catholic – denominations, like my-
self, may find D’Costa’s points fruitful and worth considering. Although the 
role of Mary and appealing to Marian dogmas may sound alien, his argument 
about being members of Christ’s body is not far removed from the Lutheran 
dogma of common priesthood, for example. However, Lutherans would prob-
ably not talk about co-redeemers, but rather co-workers, or they would not 
say that Christ’s incarnation was incomplete. Yet they could agree with 
D’Costa that men and women are members of the same body, the body of 
Christ and his Church-bride. According to this understanding, sexual differ-
ence does not subvert common humanity but is compatible with it. The work 
of the Holy Spirit in the Church demonstrates the inclusion of both men and 
women in union with God. And this union is performed bodily in the sacra-
ments, in prayer, and in the Church’s proclamation that repeats the unique 
event of incarnation like an echo.  
 Further, Irigaray calls for a female god in order to establish the auton-
omy and subjectivity of women. In other words, she wishes to change some 
divine attributes on account of her feminist purposes. But since God is by de-
finition a necessary being, the prime cause and mover of all existence who 
himself has no cause, would a god whose attributes are defined according to 
certain needs of certain people be God at all, or rather an idol? God has the 
desired influence upon culture, societies and the subjectivity of individuals 
solely as God, as an omnipotent, good, necessary and personal being. By 
changing the reference to the concept, its influence would be changed as well. 
It is not evident that any idol could provide help in establishing the subjectivi-
ty of women. Another question is whether Irigaray’s ideal of subjectivity and 
autonomy is even desirable, but we shall return to this later.  
  
 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE GENDERED LANGUAGE OF THE TRINITY? 
While Gavin D’Costa provided an interpretation of the continuing incar-
nation as an answer to the feminist challenge, Janet Martin Soskice’s response 
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 D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity, 43. See also D’Costa, ‘Queer Trinity,’ 270. 
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 D’Costa, Sexing the Trinity, 61. 
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focuses on the interpretations of gendered imagery in Christian language. 
Soskice notes that questions concerning gender and the Trinity are not rele-
vant to feminist theologians who have already cast off the basic elements of 
the Trinitarian doctrine in their thinking. According to her, the Trinity has 
essential significance only for those who have a reasonably high Christology, 
in other words, for those who wish to say ‘Jesus is God incarnate.’11 
To such persons she gives four reasons for adhering to the Trinitarian 
doctrine despite its ostensible masculinism. First she notes that the doctrine 
of the Trinity protects the otherness of God from anthropomorphism. One 
God with three persons is infinitely different from any human being. God is 
not a creature, or a male, although he was incarnated as a man. ‘Father’ and 
‘Son’ are not to be understood strictly in biological terms.12 
Secondly, she sees the doctrine as defeating the main target of the fe-
minist critique: covert monarchianism. The indifferent and distant god criti-
cized by feminist theologians is not the God of Scripture or the Trinity but 
rather the god of deism.13 She argues that the Trinitarian God of Scripture 
creates from love and is present in his creation. The Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity describes the ways in which God is with us all the way to incarnation, 
adopting human flesh and dying on the cross, and present among us in the 
Spirit.14 
Thirdly, the Trinitarian doctrine endorses the fundamental goodness 
and beauty of the human being through the incarnation. Jesus was true man 
and true God, and in him God became a fully and truly sexed human being in 
a real human body.15 But it is precisely this male embodiment of God that is a 
stumbling block for several feminists. However, if it is complicated for them 
to accept that God was incarnated as a man, what would the alternative be? 
What if God had been incarnated as a woman, but every other detail in the 
biblical narrative remained in place? What would change? If God had been 
born as a little girl from the Virgin Mary without any contribution from a 
man, would this alternative not be rather exclusive of men? In that case would 
there not be a good reason for men to complain that they have no role in 
God’s plan? A female god would have been born as a girl with a female body 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 136–137. 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 137. Soskice, The Kindness of God, 69. 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 139. See also: Soskice, The Kindness of God, 110–111. 
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from a female body, and men would have been completely unnecessary. But 
unlike that narrative, God, according to the Bible, employed both a female 
body and a male body to accomplish his salvific act, not, however, by allocat-
ing each an equal role, not by flattening sexual difference, but rather by con-
firming it. I think that it would be appropriate to ask whether the feminist 
interpretation of the exclusion of women is essentially a failure to recognize 
the significance of physical motherhood. In addition, D’Costa has noted that 
feminists probably would not accept a female incarnation either, because Je-
sus ended up being violated and crucified. A tortured female savior would in-
stead be seen as affirming phallic violence against women rather than pro-
scribing it.16  
The fourth point Soskice makes relates to philosophical questions that 
have been articulated by postmodernists and contemporary feminists. Soskice 
regards the doctrine of the Trinity as challenging the ‘philosophies of One’ 
that constitute the same targets of both feminism and postmodernism. The 
doctrine of the Trinity moves us beyond the binarism of ‘the One’ and ‘the 
other,’ where ‘the other’ is defined only as ‘not me’ and thus only serves the 
establishment of ‘the One.’17 Soskice notes that Trinitarian theology was origi-
nally formulated to counter a similar metaphysics of the One which does not 
allow any genuine otherness but in which the otherness is merely the ‘Other 
of the Same.’ The Trinitarian God is unity in difference and relational in him-
self.18 None of the three persons can be understood as separate or indepen-
dent from the other two. The persons of the Trinity are only in relation to 
each other in a ‘perichoretic outpouring of love.’19 
Earlier in this article Luce Irigaray was quoted as calling for divine help 
in order to establish women’s autonomy and sovereignty. In contrast to her 
view, the doctrine of the Trinity provides a quite different ideal for human 
subjectivity. As Soskice emphasizes, the persons of the Trinity exist only in 
relation to each other, which means that genuine subjectivity is not to be 
found in distant solitude and autonomy but rather in loving relations with 
other subjects. This ideal is quite opposite to the feminist ideal of an indepen-
dent emancipated woman who could paradoxically be seen as a representation 
of the Cartesian ideal of subjectivity. 
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248 SOILI HAVERINEN 
 
According to Soskice, the doctrine of the Trinity reveals that ‘to-be’ 
most fully is ‘to-be-related’ in difference.20 She refers to Augustine’s De Trini-
tate where the imago Dei is considered to mean that human beings are 
created in the image of the Trinity instead of that of the Son, which is a male 
image. In this way Augustine rejected the implication that women were not 
created fully in the image of God long before feminists set out their questions 
on the same subject.21  
Soskice reminds us that it is not possible to avoid masculine terminolo-
gy in Christianity ‘as long as the New Testament is with us.’22 In contrast to 
the Old Testament, ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ in the New Testament are very central 
divine nominations. Trying to replace the Christian language of ‘God as Fa-
ther’ would result in a new religion.23 
Instead of replacing the language, Soskice is willing to draw attention to 
the reason why a gendered imagery is so crucial in biblical writings as well as 
in the liturgical tradition. She remarks that the gendered imagery found in the 
Bible mainly involves kinship titles like ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ and concludes that 
the main purpose of the writers was not to emphasize sex but kinship, a close 
and loving relationship between God and human beings.24 Furthermore, the 
way in which gendered nominations are usually applied rules out literal read-
ings of the imagery. As an example, the image of God as a rock giving birth, 
with him being both the Father and the spouse of Israel, are rather effective in 




Will these answers satisfy feminists who have been worried about the 
masculinism of the Trinitarian doctrine? Feminists such as Luce Irigaray who 
wish to find an essential establishment of human sexual difference in the sex-
ual difference that occurs at the divine level will certainly be disappointed. 
The Trinitarian doctrine does not justify assigning sexual difference univocally 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 141. 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 142. 
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 Soskice, The Kindness of God, 73. 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 4–5, 78. 
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a strong expression of authority and gender without any associations to kinship.  
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to the Trinity. Instead of that, a feminist could be relieved that the Trinitarian 
doctrine does not describe divinity as one, or three, distant divine men but 
rather as one God in three persons, which transcends human gender defini-
tions. The Trinitarian God is present in his creation, especially as being born 
into this world – in a male body but through a female body. The Trinitarian 
doctrine asserts that both sexes can be employed as instruments of God’s holy 
work and therefore neither of them as embodied beings is alien to God or ex-
cluded from union with him. The most spiritual event of the incarnation was 
at the same time a thoroughly bodily event. In other words, the doctrine of 
the Trinity breaks the boundaries between spiritual and embodied reality. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that the Trinitarian approach provides an 
intriguing model for understanding the concept of difference. The difference 
between the persons of the Trinity is not contrary to their unity but rather a 
force that draws them to each other in reciprocal love, from which the whole 
of creation originates. Although we cannot apply divine reality to human life 
univocally, it can open up for us a potential perspective in which difference is 
not necessarily seen as separating and alienating. Instead, some forms of dif-
ference should rather be understood as being of a connecting nature, and 
therefore good as such.  
However, this view does not claim that all differences function this way. 
Some produce alienation, discrimination and oppression. Perhaps all differ-
ences are capable of engendering these conditions if misinterpreted and mi-
sused, if the goodness or likeness of God is attributed to one part of the differ-
ence and wickedness correspondingly to the other. But if God as a perfectly 
good being contains difference within himself, it follows that human differ-
ences, such as the sexual difference between men and women, can be consi-
dered as essentially good as well, as a part of the richness of divine self-
expression. Sexual difference could be seen as a connecting force, not as dis-
criminating but as binding humankind together through marriage and fami-
lies, and producing new life. In that case rejecting sexual difference in an at-
tempt to resist discrimination and oppression would be a mistake. A more 
fruitful approach would be to strengthen those interpretations of sexual dif-
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ABSTRACT 
Philosophy of religion can embrace the discoveries of neuroscience and 
thereby endorse these scientific texts, whilst offering a prophetic discord with 
regards to the reading of these texts. Certain neuroscientific discoveries are 
arguing for a radical immanence or total material embodiment, as everything 
can be explained via the internal neurological functioning of the body/brain. 
However, if one understands the body as text, how does this radical embodi-
ment differ from the radical immanence of Derrida’s famous statement that 
there is nothing beyond the text? This would open the way to interpreting the 
radical embodiment or materialism of neuroscience as something inter- and 
intra-textual with no beyond the text. Yet Derrida’s famous statement is part 
of his auto-deconstructive reading of texts within their contexts and thus there 
is a radical openness towards the other (alterity), because of différance. The 
task of philosophy of religion is to challenge the one-dimensional 
(closed/conclusive) reading of these texts (body as text), and rather argue for 
the radical openness of texts as something that is internal to the grammar of 
the text itself. In reading the body as a text, a neuroscientific text, such a read-
ing remains fundamentally open to various readings thereby not denying the 
discoveries of science, but embracing these discoveries as texts in need of 
reading. It is in the reading of these texts that philosophy of religion can play 
an important role – not in the traditional sense of bringing to the reading al-
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ternative normative texts, but exploring the structures of texts and in the 
structural make-up of these texts discovering the role of faith, trust and hope 
in both the construction and reading of texts. This exploration of the funda-
mental structures of texts will focus on Derrida’s ‘grammar of faith’ and thus 
celebrate the neuroscientific texts whilst reading them sacramentally.   
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In this article I will suggest that Wentzel van Huyssteen’s proposal of a 
postfoundationalist epistemological space can facilitate a respectful and 
meaningful conversation, or as he argues, a fruitful duet between science and 
religion.1 In Duet or duel? he follows the developments in evolutionary epis-
temology2 to argue for a postfoundationalist epistemological space where 
there is an acute awareness and appreciation that no single reasoning strat-
egy can sufficiently house the complexity of human rationality.3   
On the question of the development of the human mind/rationality 
(evolutionary epistemology) and the subsequent arguments for free will, con-
sciousness and responsibility, there are two main streams of arguments that 
can be broadly identified. The first is that everything can be explained bio-
logically4 which can be described as a naturalist argument or as radical bodily 
immanence. The second stream argues that human rationality is too complex 
a phenomenon, taking into account the diverse reasoning strategies that the 
human mind is capable of. The human mind that can develop reasoning 
strategies for diverse fields such as science, music and art cannot be ex-
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 J.W. Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in the Postmodern World (London: 
SCM Press, 1998).   
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 See Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, 134.  
3
 See Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, xiv.  
4
 See for example: M. Arbib, ‘Towards a Neuroscience of the Person,’ in: R.J. Russel et al. (eds.), 
Neuroscience and the Person (Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, and the 
Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1999),  77–100; B. Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’ , 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 6/8–9, 1999, pp. 47–57; D.F. Swaab, 2001, ‘Hersenen, bewustzijn en 
geloof: neurobiologische aspecten [Brain, Consciousness, and Faith: Neurobiological Aspects],” in: P. 
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plained in simple terms by taking evolutionary biology alone into account. To 
take this complexity into account other metaphors evolved to explain the 
development of human rationality such as emergence, complexity, creativity, 
etcetera which transcends purely biological evolution.5 It is clear and all 
agree that biology is the necessary cause,6 but where there is disagreement is 
as to whether biology is the sufficient cause.7 These two different readings 
can be compared to either a purely intra-textual reading (evolutionary biol-
ogy) alone or an inter-textual reading where evolutionary biology is only one 
aspect, the necessary cause of human rationality, but certainly not the suffi-
cient cause and thus conversation with other disciplines is necessary. To 
really understand the emergence of the complexity of the human mind vari-
ous disciplines enter in an inter-disciplinary conversation or inter-textual 
reading of the text (body as text) and context or text (body) in context (envi-
ronment). 
Van Huyssteen argues that it is the quest for understanding the com-
plexity of the human mind itself, evolutionary epistemology,8 which guides 
us towards this space where inter-disciplinary or cross-disciplinary conversa-
tions are necessary to understand the complexity of the human mind.9 In this 
space he proposes a postfoundational epistemology10 which allows for various 
reasoning strategies to interact with each other in conversation. He argues 
that evolutionary epistemology yields the kind of postfoundationalist, com-
prehensive epistemology that is necessary to respond to the challenges of 
postmodernity and help us rediscover the resources of human rationality that 
are shared deeply by both theology and science.11 What Van Huyssteen dis-
covers in evolutionary epistemology is a way to think and facilitate the chal-
lenge of a constructive form of postmodernism: ‘the need for a more compre-
hensive and integrated approach to the problem of human knowledge.’12 
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 See S. Conway Morris The Crucible of Creation: The Burgess Shale and the Rise of Animals (New 
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It is in this postfoundational space that he argues theology can come to 
the conversation and enter into a fruitful and graceful duet with science. 
From science there are the metaphors of complexity theory, quantum phys-
ics, emergence, creativity and from theology there are the metaphors of Crea-
tor, intelligent design, etcetera. These metaphors are all acceptable and wel-
comed to the table because they are based on reasonable (sufficient) reason-
ing strategies that can be mutually respected and accepted by the various 
sciences towards a postfoundational conversation and these sufficient rea-
soning strategies13 allows the various disciplines with their diverse metaphors 
to sing in the cross-disciplinary choir.  
To explain the complex connection between evolutionary biology and 
cultural evolution, science has offered various immanent metaphors, for ex-
ample: complexity, emergence, quantum theory, etcetera. Some of these 
metaphors might currently be the best theories/metaphors, for example as 
Helrich14 argues that theoretical physics offers the best mathematical equa-
tions to understand the world and yet it needs to be kept in mind that sci-
ence is not the final mathematical equation with which to understand and 
interpret the world as was believed in modernity and therefore the space is 
opened for postfoundational inter- and intra-textual reading of the world or 
humanity. Helrich argues that theoretical physics certainly seeks such a 
mathematical equation, but he adds that such an equation will never be writ-
ten on a piece of paper and so the search to find the one ‘correct’ mathemati-
cal equation with which to comprehend the world and the self is impossible. 
Wigner argued that mathematics is the language for formulating the laws of 
physics with which humanity is able to understand the universe.15 In re-
sponse to Wigner and Helrich, the question could be asked: is mathematics 
the language of the universe? The universe itself is beyond language and be-
yond mathematics, because all we have is the text/equation/symbol/sign/ 
formula as there is no outside text.16 So even though, as Helrich argues, quan-
tum theory certainly seems to be the best mathematical language with which 
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 See Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, 34, 129. See also J.W. van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfounda-
tionalist Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 150.  
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 See J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, transl. G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997), 
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to understand the universe as it is the most effective tool to understand, it 
remains a metaphor and therefore the need for postfoundational conversa-
tion remains.  
These different metaphors seek to understand the world and humanity. 
Some of these metaphors seek to do this without a return of supernatural 
arguments or arguments for metaphysical being and others are open to su-
pernatural arguments thereby opening the space for theology to enter into 
the conversation. Theology can therefore bring to the table her metaphors of 
God, but to what purpose? Is this a form of apologetics using the gaps or un-
certainties in science to justify faith in God? Is the language of theology, spe-
cifically the Scriptural based theological language, truly useful to help under-
stand and interpret scientific challenges? What contribution does theology 
offer the scientific conversation? What does theology have to offer the scien-
tific discussion on the evolution of humanity? Can the theological concept of 
the Imago Dei truly contribute to the scientific discourse or is the conversa-
tion a struggle on the side of theology to identify where exactly in the scien-
tific discussion the image of God would be appropriate: a theology of the 
gaps? Or is it a unilateral conversation where science offers the paradigms 
and the language/metaphors in which to think about certain things, God, 
creation, miracles, soul, afterlife and the image of God, etcetera and then 
theology frantically tries to accommodate her metaphors to this scientific 
language? It can also be argued that this duet is an appeasing time-filler to 
keep the religions (a powerful force in contemporary culture) on board until 
science does find some answers that are maybe more useful than the current 
answers and then what happens to theology?  
Yet, just because science (evolutionary epistemology) itself points to-
wards a postfoundational inter-textual reading it does not automatically en-
tail an element of the supra-natural text. It does not exclude it, but nor does 
it include it – certain things cannot yet be explained, but that does not trans-
late into the existence of some supra-natural being or even a metaphysical 
Being or God. Evolutionary epistemology does not necessarily include supra-
natural elements just because it cannot conclusively explain the complex 
connection between biological evolution and cultural evolution.  
Therefore, although one recognises the role of experience, tradition and 
metaphor in all knowledge there is a bias towards science as offering the ul-
timate ‘rational language’ or the most sufficient reasoning strategies and 
therefore all other languages needs to be in response to this rational language 
that has proven itself through its utility and technological prowess. This bias 
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I can accept, but it only accentuates the question: what can theology offer in 
the postfoundationalist conversation? I will argue that theology does not 
have much to offer science, because it is not a scientific discourse and thus 
the concepts such as image of God, creation, God, etcetera are not scientific 
statements, but utterances of faith. Is Christian theology, as based in Scrip-
tures, necessarily about a supernatural Being? Is Christian theology a ‘science’ 
about a metaphysical Being or is Christian theology, as founded in Scripture, 
a science of faith in response to revelation as Karl Barth17 argued. One could 
argue that Christian theology focusses on the revelation of the Word (Christ) 
in Scripture. Thus Scripture as the basis for theology does not offer anything 
concerning science (physics) or anything concerning metaphysics, because it 
was not written as a physical (scientific) or metaphysical treatise, but it is 
about the Word of God (Christ) as witnessed to in scripture. In other words, 
it is about God's revelation of God-self in the immanence of Christ in the his-
tory of the world.  
I would rather propose that Theology (with its focus on the Word made 
flesh) can embrace the radical immanence of natural science and therefore 
endorse the scientific text full heartedly and enter into the intra- and inter-
disciplinary postfoundational conversation without any attempt to read the 
Other, as super-natural or metaphysical Being. All we have is the text,18 
hereby not denying the existence of an Other or other as every other is 
wholly other,19 but denying that one can make any conclusive statements 
concerning the other who is also wholly Other. If the insights of linguistic 
theory are taken into account then both naturalism and supernaturalism are 
texts seeking to understand the Other who is every other.20 Thus, there is no 
dualism and there is no duel, but if anything there is One (various texts) and 
a unilateral duality as both naturalism and supernaturalism unilaterally, in 
Laruelle’s sense, confront – not the Other (because the Other always comes 
to mind as text), but the future.21 Or as Žižek argues, that things do not 
merely appear; they appear to appear, thereby ‘concealing the fact that they 
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 K. Barth, God in Action, transl. E. G. Homrighausen & K.J. Ernst (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1937) 
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are what they appear.’22 This double framing conceals the fact that things are 
what they appear.  
Therefore the immanent reading of science remains inconclusive con-
cerning the other (reality) and it is necessarily grammatically so because of 
différance. Every other is wholly other, Derrida argues, and therefore science 
cannot provide conclusive answers just as there cannot be conclusive answers 
to the question of theism or for that matter on the question of atheism. So at 
best one is perhaps left with speculative realism as Quentin Meillassoux23 
argues. In his speculative realism he has created the space for the possibility 
of a future God.24 My question is: does theology want to engage in this specu-
lative realism or with the possibility of speculative super-realism somewhere 
in the future? My answer is, no, and I believe that there is a strong theologi-
cal tradition that would support such an emphatic No! A tradition that would 
argue that the focus of theology is not on that which cannot be known, God, 
but rather on that which is revealed (Christ) thus embracing the immanent 
text/s and contexts whilst offering prophetic discord, as these texts are never 
final but awaiting final judgement in the time that remains. The Christ event 
(alone) should be embraced in faith and grace alone. This revelation of the 
incarnated (immanent), crucified and resurrected Christ provides the herme-
neutical key not only to Scripture, as Luther argues,25 but I would argue to 
the postfoundationalist reading of texts and contexts as such. My vision of 
theology is to disengage from the speculative enterprise of either speculative 
realism or speculative super-realism and rather offer the world a hermeneuti-
cal key to read the grammar of texts of the world, and thereby offer an ethos 
of reading based on, as Laruelle argues, a science of Christ,26 not in an at-
tempt to answer questions concerning God, but with regards to the questions 
of the world in the hope of the kingdom that is still to come. The Christ event 
(narrative) as for example captured in the Carmen Christi (Philippians 2), 
read together with Derrida's understanding of language, could serve as such a 
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science of reading the texts of the One, as that is all there is, because any 
thinking of the Other is still in language, the language of the same/One. This 
is the contribution that theology can offer the science-religion conversation, 
and the Scriptures as texts of faith, hope and love can hermeneutically guide 
and offer an ethos for inter-disciplinary reading of texts and contexts. Stuart 
Kauffman, in an interview with Steve Paulson,27 argues for the need for a sa-
cred science. I would argue for the need for a Christ-science, for the reading 
of texts and contexts at the table of the kingdom to come. 
One can read the Christ event as the Ereignis of language and as such it 
is the Ereignis of difference.28 John Schad29 argues that each discourse can be 
read as an allegory or a re-writing of the other and it is possible because they 
are intertexts and one cannot read the one without the other. It is as Derrida 
argues,30 when one no longer knows what is an example of what then litera-
ture has begun as literature has always already begun. The Christ narrative 
will be read together with Derrida's understanding of différance, and the two 
will interpret each other. What makes such mutual interpretation both poss-
ible and impossible is that the grammar of différance and the trace is best 
described in the grammar of faith, promise, hope and thus prayer, and these 
Biblical texts have as their content narratives concerning faith, promise, hope 
and prayer and therefore they can function as exemplary texts of différance. 
These texts’ (Jewish-Christian Scriptures) ‘truth’ is not their metaphysical or 
onto-theological reference, but the ‘truth’ of language just as the poetic 
speaking of language was for Heidegger the purest (truest) form of lan-
guage.31 For Derrida, it is prayer32 that is the speaking of language.33 Thus one 
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can say that prayer, faith, promise and hope are the speaking of language. 
The ‘truth’ of these Scriptural texts therefore is not in their reference, but 
because they are narratives concerning faith, promise, hope and prayer they 
are exemplary of the grammar of writing and therefore they become exem-
plary texts of language and exemplary texts of texts and of contexts. As ex-
emplary texts they are necessary for the understanding and interpreting and 
opening of contexts – the ‘reality’ of the world. 
The Christ narrative can be used as an exemplary narrative, not to prove 
the truth of a historical Jesus, but to understand and interpret, deconstruct 
the texts of the world (context), by using the Christ narrative to read and re-
read the texts of all that is and in that sense discover the ‘truth’ of these narr-
atives, irrespective of their reference to which no one has conclusive access, 
but ‘truthful’ in the sense of useful interpretation (deconstruction) of reality 
(context) because of their grammar of faith, prayer, promise and messiah to 
come. In that sense the Christ narrative is perhaps exemplary of the story of 
language and as story of language it is exemplary of the story of the world 
(history of the world).34  
It begins with the incarnation of the God, the Logos, who becomes flesh 
– in other words, God pitches God's tent in human history. God the tran-
scendent becomes immanent in the context of human history. The Word 
(transcendental signified) becomes words, texts, writing, différance as it en-
ters human history and thus it becomes vulnerable.35 The Word becomes 
flesh so there is no outside text anymore, only a trace of the Other (Father), 
of an immemorial past never present and a future always still to come.36  
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This incarnate Word (this inscription of writing) becomes vulnerable 
like a baby in a crib. It becomes vulnerable to the wounding of différance, the 
wounding of the other. The incarnate word is opened (wounded, vulnerable) 
to the tout autre, which is every other.37  
Yet it is particularly vulnerable to the big other (the powers that be), the 
imperial forces that seek to be or represent the Transcendent as the tran-
scendental signified. However, the big other is conscious of the fact that it 
does not have perfect access to the transcendent and that it is not the ulti-
mate presentation or representation of the transcendent and therefore knows 
that its power is only as temporary as the myth survives.38  
These forces of the various big others hear of the Word made flesh and 
they are threatened in a dual sense. Firstly they are threatened by the idea of 
a possible other’s attempt at being the transcendental signified (big other) 
that might be more powerful than they and therefore they need to destroy 
this potential before it rises to power, or secondly they are threatened by the 
possibility that if it truly is the transcendental signified (the Word) that has 
become flesh, become context and text as is inscribed, that would mean that 
all power will be threatened as all power rests on a foundational myth that 
has forgotten that it is a myth and that there is no ‘true’ legitimization of 
power on the basis of a transcendental signifier (truth), as there is no tran-
scendental signifier but only a quasi-transcendental that deconstructs.39     
How right these imperial forces were with regards to this incarnate word 
that had entered their context (history) and thus had fatally wounded their 
power and authority. This inscription (archi-inscription – incarnation of the 
Word) had fatally wounded any claims to power based on metaphysics: a sin-
gle cause our ground. The incarnate Word began his ministry in the context 
of Palestine, the context of imperial forces (Roman universal imperialism and 
Pharisaic particular imperialism). His ministry (activity) challenged and de-
constructed these systems of power and control and thus the animosity grew 
between the powers that be and Jesus (the incarnate Word – the inscribed 
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text)40. The only solution for these powers that be was to destroy this inscrip-
tion that challenged or deconstructed their power. Jesus (the in-
scribed/incarnated Word – archi-writing) fundamentally questioned their 
power as he reinscribed the myths of their power. He fundamentally chal-
lenged the metaphysics of their thinking and their system and therefore he 
was crucified as the greatest criminal41 by the imperial forces of that time.42 
What makes this possible – this semi-translation of the story of Christ 
into the story of différance43? It is because différance, and more specifically 
deconstruction as an effect of différance, is impassioned by the messianic 
(the other still to come) and thus the messianic story fits, the difference be-
ing that the Christian believes that the messiah did come and différance 
holds onto the fact that the messiah is always still to come.  
The crucifixion: It is not the sign (the incarnate Word) that is crucified, 
but the messiah44. Christ is not crucified because of being the incarnate word 
(writing/différance), but he is crucified because of the disruption and decon-
struction this writing causes in the text or context and thereby challenges the 
powers that be. The Word incarnate, as argued above, translates into speech, 
signs, the inscription, archi-writing (flesh) and consequently the undecidabil-
ity of the play of différance. This play of différance deconstructed the powers 
that be and it was because of this ultimate criminality (deconstruction) that 
Jesus was crucified as he challenged the metaphysical foundations of the au-
thority of the powers that be by revealing them to be powerless inscriptions 
and thus re-inscribing them into the play of undecidability.   
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The powers that be responded to this deconstruction, seeking to arrest 
this undecidability, trying to arrest the certainty of uncertainty that ques-
tioned their certainties. It is this grammar that they sought to arrest and de-
stroy so that they could return to their certainties. It is the way, the truth and 
the life45, which is the grammar of all that is with nothing beyond (text and 
context), that they hoped to destroy by crucifying Christ.  
The Messiah (messianic way) was crucified, this way, life and truth was 
crucified, crossed out, erased. Within the story of the text or in the context, 
the messiah was crucified by the two powers according to the legal function-
ing of the Roman and Jewish law, but theologically it is also argued that God 
(tout autre) crucified him and yet it was God who was crucified46. Therefore 
it was the Other (God) who crucified the messiah so as to save the Other 
(God) and the same. One could argue that the cross is the death of the death 
of God, which does not translate into the life of God, but maybe the life of 
God as understood as the endless desertification of language47.  
Différance, like God, needs saving from becoming the final Word: the 
certainty of certainty which would indeed be death namely the end of play as 
Schad48 argues. If the transcendent (the Word) is incarnate (there is no out-
side text) and if the Messiah (death of God) rises to power (if différance does 
indeed become the Messiah, a new transcendental signified) then it would be 
the end of history, namely death: the certainty of certainty and the absolute 
reduction of the other to the same, of Différance with a capital D. The world 
would collapse, as the world that is created (poeisis) in and of dif-ference49 
would be without dif-ference. Thus the death on the cross of God is not the 
death of the transcendental signifier as that death already occurred in the 
incarnation. It is the death of a capitalised Writing or Différance, the death of 
the Messiah who came: the death of the death of God. The death on the cross 
is not the certainty of certainty (death) as Schad argues, but the return of 
play, and therefore the certainty of uncertainty, the re-inscription of 
Différance into différance so that this play never rises to power. The cross 
ensures that différance is only ever a weak force50 (weak messiah) who has no 
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power and yet all power comes from him51: a quasi-transcendental and never 
the Transcendental.    
In a sense one can say the Messiah came and did not come, and Chris-
tians still await him/her (the second coming) – an important aspect in the 
story of Christ and différance so that différance does not become a capitalised 
transcendental signifier, but remains, if anything, a quasi-transcendental. 
Christ, a quasi-Messiah, who came and is still to come and thus opens the 
space of history in the time that remains.  
Différance crucifies (deconstructs) any attempt to be the final judgment 
(transcendental signified) and opens the space for the messiah still to come 
(second coming). The trace of the other who has not been heard, who has no 
place52, and thus any theology based on the Christ event, that uses the name 
of God, is haunted by a democracy still to come (hearing the other who has 
not been heard), by justice still to come (offering the other a place who has 
no place) and offers hospitality to the unheard, place-less other. In such a 
context of offering hospitality to the other, of praying for justice and democ-
racy still to come, it is impossible to rise to an imperial power.  
This is exactly where Theology, and specifically the Word of God 
(Christ), can help and offer an important contribution to the conversation. 
Theology thus does not provide us with interesting ideas (metaphors) about 
the Other that can engage in a fruitful duet with science, because such ideas, 
as Luther says, can only lead to the devil53, but theology rather provides a 
hermeneutical key (Christ event) to read the grammar of the texts rather 
than speculate about that which is beyond.  
Theology thus does not sing the duet with science about the Other, but 
offers the sciences the hermeneutics (science of reading) and ethos for a 
cross-disciplinary postfoundational conversation.       
In this article I have sought to propose the postmetaphysical turn to-
wards language in the thoughts of Derrida as a more useful space and maybe 
theologically ‘more suitable space’ for theology to engage in the postfounda-
tional conversation with the other sciences rather than to seek to sing a duet 
with science on metaphysical or super-natural questions, where the possibil-
ity always remains that the duet turns into a duel. Furthermore to rather fa-
cilitate the space where this postfoundational conversation as unilateral dual-
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 Matthew 25:45. 
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 See Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 33. 
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ity, turns not towards speculation concerning the Other of metaphysics, but 
towards the future that can only be faced in faith, hope and love – the three 
gifts of the Spirit54. It is the Christ event that offers and guides such a reading 
(faith, hope and love) of the texts and contexts of the world towards a more 
just interpretation (justice understood as offering hospitality towards those 
who have no voice or place).   
The task of theology is not to seek to argue for the truth of metaphysical 
arguments over against the arguments of science, but rather that theology 
redefines her ancient role as queen of the sciences who in the past invited the 
various disciplines to her royal court. Today a more suitable biblical image 
might be the inclusive kingdom table of the feast or celebration of commun-
ion where ever more are invited to share the body of texts. At this inclusive 
table to offer a hermeneutical key (a science of Christ) to read and decon-
struct (crucify) the body of texts in the postfoundational epistemological 
space for the multi- or Cross-disciplinary conversation and to drink of the 
wine of the new covenant of hope, faith and love. Theology is not the Queen 
of the sciences playing an imperial role as an absolute monarch with regards 
to the content of the arguments and thereby having the right to determine 
what is right or wrong, but rather liturgically facilitating the space by provid-
ing the hermeneutical key to unpack the grammar for the conversation and 
playing, if anything, the role of the court jester or holy fool55 and thereby de-
constructing or crucifying the absolute laws that seek to hold all that is cap-
tive to a single theory or metaphor.   
This Christ science guided by the metaphor of the sacrament of the table 
can perhaps provide an ethos for interdisciplinary conversation where every 
knee will bow at the name of the crucified Christ in humility and acknowl-
edgement of the vulnerability of all our knowledge constructions, but in the 
spirit of hope, faith and love and an openness to the future of the kingdom 
always still to come.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents cases of religious embodiment which are concrete corpo-
real manifestations of ‘theologies of the body.’ Beginning in the second half of 
the 20th century, US evangelicals have developed biblically based dieting and 
fitness programs which offer a ‘Christian alternative’ to the ‘secular’ fitness and 
dieting world. These regimens blend elements of bible study and exercise rou-
tines, drawing their spiritual authority from divine inspiration. It is not just in 
well-known liturgical contexts that the presence of God is made sensually per-
ceivable. The often physically exhausting workout routines are considered as 
‘spending time with God’ and ‘taking care of God’s temple, your body’ and will 
be analyzed from the perspective of the embodiment paradigm. 
 
KEYWORDS 




The 19th conference of the ESPR was dedicated to ‘Embodied Religion’ 
and it was based on the underlying thesis that ‘religion is always embodied in 
various ways.’ Setting out from this statement, this paper will present cases of 
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religious embodiment which are peculiar as it is unequivocal for both partici-
pants and researchers that they are dealing with concrete, very practical and 
corporeal ‘in-corporations’ of ‘theologies of the body.’ 
Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, US evangelicals have 
developed biblically based dieting and fitness programs which offer a ‘Chris-
tian alternative’ to the ‘secular’ fitness and dieting world.1 These regimens 
consciously blend elements of bible studies and exercise routines, drawing 
their spiritual authority from divine inspiration. This fashion of religiously 
disciplining the body mirrors in many ways commonly accepted body stan-
dards of contemporary western societies. 
Such programs provide evidence of the assumption that the relationship 
between God and the believer is not just of a spiritual kind but may be physi-
cally enacted. Just as religious frameworks structure issues of sexuality, re-
production and family, they also inform concepts of health and disease. In 
the case under observation, health is unmistakably associated with a slender 
and fit body while disease lurks in sugar and fat. 
The goal of this paper is to illustrate how religion ‘does not only change 
the human mind’ but also ‘affects the human body,’2 by describing the ‘reli-
gious’ imperative of exercising and slimming down.3 I will hence present 
some first ideas from my doctoral thesis which is supervised in the Depart-
ment of Religion at Muenster University. 
For this purpose, I will start with examples from the field that I observed 
in the fall of 2011 in the USA (chapter 2). After that, the embodiment para-
digm will be introduced (chapter 3). I suggest to distinguish concepts of em-
bodiment sensu lato and sensu stricto and then apply the latter in an exem-
plary fashion to the before described phenomena (chapter 4). 
Most observers, academics and non-academics alike, when confronted 
with devotional fitness, immediately criticize these programs for their see-
mingly naïve attitude towards contemporary slimness ideals and the poten-
tial health hazards inherent to every program in favor of slimming down and 
losing weight. I wholeheartedly agree with this criticism. In this paper, how-
                                                 
1
 Ruth Marie Griffith has, from a historical perspective, extensively dealt with these groups in 
Born Again Bodies: Flesh and Spirit in American Christianity (Berkeley 2004). 
2
 As the Call for Papers for the ESPR conference phrased it. 
3
 Gregor Schrettle has analyzed this religious imperative in Gwen Shamblin’s organization called 
‘Weigh Down Workshop,’ see Gregor Schrettle, Gwen Shamblin’s Dieting Religion and America’s Puritan 
Legacy (Essen 2006). 
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ever, I will restrict myself to referencing influential critics while focusing on 
other matters of interest.4 
 
 
 ‘BOD4GOD,’ ‘BODY & SOUL,’ ‘FIRST PLACE 4 HEALTH’ 
Bod4God is a book5 and weight-loss program published in 2009 and de-
signed by Steve Reynolds, Pastor of Capital Baptist Church in Annandale, VA, 
in the outskirts of Washington, DC. Reynolds raised considerable interest by 
the media and his program was subject to public debates.6 Reynolds, labeled 
the ‘Anti-Fat Pastor’ by the media, dealt with serious weight and health issues 
himself before he discovered that the solution to overweight shall be found in 
the Bible. A keyword search for the word ‘body’ produced 179 incidents.7 A 
subject which is discussed that often in biblical texts, Reynolds concluded, 
must be of importance in God’s eyes. 
In his book, Reynolds developed ‘four keys’ to succeed in weight-loss. 
These keys are: 
(1) Dedication – ‘honoring God with your body,’ 
(2) Inspiration – ‘motivating yourself for change,’ 
(3) Eat and Exercise – ‘managing your habits,’ 
(4)  Team – ‘building your circle of support.’ 
His book, a ‘theology of the body,’ lays the groundwork for weight-loss 
oriented competitions called ‘Losing to Live.’ These events originated in Rey-
nolds’ congregation and have been implemented in other churches in the US 
as well, e.g. in the Independent Bible Church in Martinsburg, WV, the First 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Floresville, TX, and The Journey Church in 
New York, NY. They take place over a period of twelve weeks and include 
groups competing against each other about how much weight they lose to-
gether. Every week, on Sundays, the groups get together in the church to cel-
ebrate last week’s winners, to meet their small groups, spend time in prayer 
and bible study, and learn about healthy living and eating right. 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g. Mary Louise Bringle, The God of Thinness: Gluttony and Other Weighty Matters (Nash-
ville 1992) and Lisa Isherwood, The Fat Jesus: Christianity and Body Image (New York 2008). 
5
 Steve Reynolds, Bod4God: The Four Keys to Weight Loss (Ventura 2009). 
6
 See e.g. Jacqueline L. Salmon, ‘An Almighty Weight Loss,’ The Washington Post, January 7, 
2008. Likewise, Reynolds has been discussed on the popular TV show ‘The View,’ hosted by Barbara 
Walters, Whoopi Goldberg, Joy Behar, Elisabeth Hasselbeck und Sherri Shepherd. 
7
 Reynolds, Bod4God, 22–23. 
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Reynolds cooperates with two large organizations of devotional fitness: 
‘Body & Soul Fitness’ and ‘First Place 4 Health.’ The first one focuses on fit-
ness classes and working out. They have developed fitness routines choreo-
graphed to Christian praise music, combined with communal prayer and 
sharing. ‘First Place 4 Health,’ on the other hand, is a Christian diet program 
based on small group meetings and bible study. 
‘Body & Soul Fitness – Where Faith and Fitness Meet’ was developed in 
1981 by Jeannie and Roy Blocher from Germantown, MD. Their goal is to ‘en-
courage you to pursue both physical and spiritual fitness, wherever you are in 
the world.’8 They start from the assumption that ‘[f]itness involves more than 
just your body’ and that ‘developing and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is 
part of being a good steward of this “physical body” we’ve been given.’ There-
fore they place a major emphasis on exercise classes that are designed to 
‘help you get (and stay) in shape.’ They assume that ‘there is more to fitness 
than a great workout’ and hence seek to affect all other areas of life by follow-
ing a ‘truly holistic approach to fitness because there is a tangible connection 
between the physical and spiritual dimensions of our lives.’9 
What are the effects pursued in Body & Soul? First, the program wants 
to ‘energize’ participants for ‘physical strength and spiritual energy.’ They 
also intend to help members ‘grow stronger physically’ and ‘discover God’s 
plan for your life.’ Apart from that, and supporting these effects, the program 
provides information on how to lead and maintain a ‘healthy and active life.’10 
Lynne Gerber has researched ‘First Place 4 Health’ extensively in a re-
cent publication.11 Style and rhetoric of this program are strongly reminiscent 
of popular weight-loss programs such as ‘WeightWatchers’ with the excep-
tion that, in First Place 4 Health, extensive bible study and scripture memori-
zation play a crucial role. Participants regularly meet over a period of twelve 
weeks. Getting together as a group and sharing their troubles and worries is 
considered an important element. Intimacy and mutual trust are nourished 
and cherished. A central ‘ritual’ is the ‘weighing in’ right at the beginning of 
                                                 
8
 Body & Soul, ‘Body & Soul Fitness: Where Faith and Fitness Meet’ [http://bodyandsoul.org/, ac-
cessed July 17, 2011]. 
9
 Body & Soul, ‘Body & Soul Fitness: Where Faith and Fitness Meet.’ 
10
 Body & Soul, ‘Body & Soul Fitness: Where Faith and Fitness Meet.’ 
11
 Lynne Gerber, Seeking the Straight and Narrow: Weight Loss and Sexual Reorientation in Evan-
gelical America (Chicago 2012). 
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each small group meeting. Participants are required to step on the scales and 
recite a scripture verse.12 
One of the first questions proponents of devotional fitness have to deal 
with is: What does fitness have to do with faith? Among the most common 
arguments, proponents of devotional fitness programs will often employ the 
idea that God cares about everything his followers do – ‘everything’ specifi-
cally includes issues of eating and weight. Carol Showalter, designer of the 
‘3D’ plan (short for ‘Diet, Discipline and Discipleship’), e.g., writes on her 
homepage, ‘The Bible says that He cares about sparrows, and even about the 
hair on your head! So why wouldn’t God care about my struggles with eat-
ing?’13 
Besides many other arguments which I do not have the space to elabo-
rate here, founders and leaders of such programs usually stress that our bo-
dies are God’s instruments on earth and that Christians can only fulfill their 
mission if they are physically and spiritually fit. 
An important argument in favor of Christian fitness programs that is 
more apt to convince skeptic ‘insiders’ is the need to evangelize. Reynolds, 
author of Bod4God does not conceal that this is a prominent intention behind 
his concept.14 People that usually would not approach a church might none-
theless feel attracted to fitness and healthy living and thus interact more easi-
ly with evangelical milieus than they would usually do. 
 
 
EMBODIMENT AS A PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
Embodiment as a terminological figure has been known for quite some 
time in anthropology, ethnology and the study of religion, yet on a more gen-
eral level compared to the approach I wish to focus on here. For instance, 
Clifford Geertz’s now classical definition of religion as a cultural system un-
derstands ‘symbols’ as ‘tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from 
experience fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, atti-
                                                 
12
 This r i tual  has been analyzed by Lynne Gerber ,  ‘Weigh - In , ’  Freq .uenc i .es  
[http://freq.uenci.es/2012/01/02/weigh-in/, accessed January 3, 2012]. 
13
 Carol Showalter & Maggie Davis, ‘The 3D Plan: Eat Right, Live Well, Love God,’ 
[http://www.3dyourwholelife.com/lovegod.php, accessed July 17, 2012]. 
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 Reynolds, Bod4God, 203. 
270 MARTIN RADERMACHER 
 
tudes, judgments, longings, or beliefs.’15 Thomas Luckmann, too, thinks of 
symbols as ‘incorporations of a different reality in the ordinary [reality].’16 
When Luckmann and Geertz talk of ‘embodiment’ or ‘incorporation,’ 
they harness a version of the concept which I refer to as ‘embodiment sensu 
lato.’ Quite certainly, they do not associate ‘embodiment’ exclusively with the 
fleshly matter of being, the corporeal reality of human experience. More gen-
erally, they consider symbols as metaphorically tangible concepts that have 
left the world of ‘ideas, attitudes, judgments,’ etc. and have been ‘objectified’ 
to the extent that they are now a more or less standardized form of everyday 
communication. 
The notion of ‘embodiment sensu lato’ draws attention to the fact that 
mental or cognitive notions require ‘tangible’ manifestations, metaphorically 
and, in addition, literally, to impact individuals and society. This idea is fun-
damental to the emergence of embodiment as a paradigm. In this restricted 
use of the term – embodiment sensu stricto – the concept refers to the con-
crete fleshly body, tangible in a very literal sense, and prone to visual, haptic, 
auditory etc. perceptions. Translating this idea to religion, Matti Kamppinen 
defines: ‘Embodied religion is […] something that involves actively engaged 
religious bodies, performing rituals, or otherwise communicating with super-
natural entities. Embodied religion is religion as it is studied in respectable 
fieldwork-based ethnography. Embodied religion is not a specific type of reli-
gion, but rather a research setting, where religious bodies are studied by 
means of interview and participant observation.’17 It is noteworthy, I think, 
that Kamppinen focuses on the corporeal bodies of both actors and research-
ers in the ‘religious field’ and thus acknowledges the role of the scholar’s 
physical presence in the field. 
With this distinction in mind, it is easier to review the manifold ap-
proaches labeled ‘embodiment.’ Albeit simplified and dichotomized, it may 
be a useful tool in academic discussions where it is not always made explicit 
how broad the term ‘embodiment’ should or should not be understood. The 
rather diffuse notion of embodiment as something both ‘metaphorical’ and 
‘literal,’ to my mind, impedes efficient inter- and cross-disciplinary commu-
nication, let alone unambiguous interaction with non-academic circles. 
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 Clifford Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System,’ in: Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cul-
tures: Selected Essays (New York, 2009), 87–125, esp. 91–94 (italics added). 
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 Thomas Luckmann, Die unsichtbare Religion (Frankfurt 1967), 175–76 (italics added). 
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 Matti Kamppinen, ‘The Concept of Body in Religious Studies,’ in: Tore Ahlbäck, Religion and 
the Body (Åbo 2011), 206–215, esp. 209. 
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Indeed, when entering the debate beyond academe, ‘embodiment sensu 
stricto’ might be an apt point of departure to get across scholarly notions of 
materialization and objectification of ‘purely’ mental concepts and ideas. The 
actual physical body, according to this paradigm, is the inevitable locus of 
manifestations of non-physical entities. Ideas cannot become tangible if not 
through and by means of the human body. In extension, the embodiment 
paradigm challenges exactly this notion of the ‘physical’ being separate from 
the ‘mental.’ 
In short, anthropological approaches to the ‘body’ following the embo-
diment paradigm in its strict sense have two major concerns. (1) They try to 
overcome classic mind-body-dualisms and (2) they focus on materiality and 
substance rather than on ideas and notions. Opposing older assumptions 
that the body is a function of mental processes, e.g., erudite rules of ritual, 
newer accounts entertain the idea that, vice versa, mental notions might 
themselves be a function of the body.18 
Against older accounts, anthropological work following the somatic 
turn19 does not uphold the analytic dichotomy of ‘body’ and ‘soul,’ or of expe-
riences related to the body and those related to the soul. Instead, research 
inspired by the somatic turn focuses on the fact that these positions are com-
plementary and mutually dependent. 
In a new collection on the subject, Anna Fedele and Ruy Llera Blanes 
propose a ‘comprehensive approach to this key point: the significance and 
agency behind religious conceptions of the body in their relationship with 
ideas of the soul. We propose to bring to the forefront of the anthropology of 
religion the part of the body-soul dichotomy that tended to be neglected or 
treated as merely accessory in many discussions of religious phenomena: the 
issue of corporeality in religious contexts.’20 
Thomas J. Csordas’ work is often reckoned among the most influential in 
the field of embodiment.21 His seminal article ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm for 
Anthropology’22 argues that ‘a paradigm of embodiment can be elaborated for 
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 Catherine Bell, ‘Embodiment,’ in: Jens Kreinath, Jan Snoek & Michael Stausberg (eds.), Theoriz-
ing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts (Leiden 2006), 533–543, esp. 538. 
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 The expression ‘somatic turn’ (σῶμα = body), in this paper, shall refer to the emergence of the 
embodiment paradigm sensu stricto. 
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 Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes, ‘Introduction,’ in: Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes (eds.), En-
counters of Body and Soul in Contemporary Religious Practices: Anthropological Reflections (New York, 
2011), x–xxvii, esp. x–xi. 
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 E.g. by Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes, ‘Introduction,’ xv. 
22
 Thomas J. Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology,’ Ethos 1 (1990), 5–47. 
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the study of culture and the self’.23 This paradigm states that the ‘locus of the 
sacred is the body, for the body is the existential ground of culture.’24 
A paradigm as a consistent methodological perspective, Csordas sug-
gests, should make possible a re-evaluation of existing work and new ap-
proaches in empirical research. He explicitly does not try to incorporate the 
vast multi-disciplinary literature on the body but leans strongly towards phe-
nomenology.25 ‘This approach to embodiment begins from the methodologi-
cal postulate that the body is not an object to be studied in relation to cul-
ture, but is to be considered as the subject of culture.’26 
Csordas’ central intention is to bring about a collapse of dualities be-
tween mind and body, subject and object.27 ‘This collapse allows us to inves-
tigate how cultural objects (including selves) are constituted or objectified, 
not in the processes of ontogenesis and child socialization, but in the ongo-
ing indeterminacy and flux of adult cultural life.’28 Accordingly, Csordas tries 
to ‘elaborate a non-dualistic paradigm of embodiment for the study of cul-
ture.’29 
Both Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Bourdieu, whose work Csordas 
draws on, ‘attempt […] to collapse these dualities, and embodiment is the 
methodological principle invoked by both. The collapsing of dualities in em-
bodiment requires that the body as a methodological figure must itself be 
non-dualistic, that is, not distinct from or in interaction with an opposed 
principle of mind.’30 
 
 
APPROACHING DEVOTIONAL FITNESS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF  
THE EMBODIMENT PARADIGM 
The contributions to Fedele’s and Blanes’ Encounters of Body and Soul in 
Contemporary Religious Practices have drawn attention to the fact that en-
counters of body and soul are central to religious experience and that it is 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 5. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 39. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 5. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 5. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 7. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 39–40. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 12. 
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 Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm,’ 8. 
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useful to consider these entities as interwoven and not opposite.31 Following 
this and recurring on the approaches summarized above, I would like to con-
sider devotional fitness as embodied religious practice.  
In some cases, where there is a proper ‘theology of the body,’ devotional 
fitness is highly reflective. In these incidents, founders sometimes think of 
their programs in terms of embodiment. One has to bear in mind, though, 
that they apply a concept of ‘embodiment’ which differs from the academic 
understanding explained above. 
‘ActivPrayer’ is such an example. In their somewhat theologized attempt 
to explain Christian fitness, they start from the idea that ‘Christian fitness (as 
in physical fitness) is a natural application of the Christian faith to general 
health and well-being’ and that a combination of Christianity and fitness 
makes ‘perfect sense.’ The body ‘plays a key role in the Christian faith’ be-
cause Christianity is based on the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ. There-
fore, ActivPrayer concludes, ‘Christianity is an incarnate religion’ and ‘being a 
body’ is a central element in a true Christian’s life. The body has appetites 
and desires which should be moderated but it is also an important medium 
and catalyst of spiritual experience, e.g. ‘when we experience deep love (of 
God, or even another human person), we can feel it in our very bodies.’32 
The authors conclude that we have to ‘understand the embodiment of 
the human person or the embodied nature of our soul’ in order to ‘open up a 
door to an entire world of possibilities in Christian fitness.’33 Christian faith, 
in this case, is considered to be existentially grounded in the body; it is ‘em-
bodied’ at its very core. This understanding correlates with scholarly perspec-
tives on the embodiment paradigm which place the body in the center of cul-
ture and society. Devotional fitness therefore becomes a particularly ade-
quate testing ground and research field for theories of embodiment. 
If we follow the claim that the body is the existential ground of culture34 
we will have to understand the body in order to understand culture, or, in 
Cecil G. Helman’s words: ‘[T]he body is culture – an expression of its basic 
themes. A full under-standing of any human body gives, at the same time, a 
fuller understanding of the culture embodied within it.’35 
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 Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes, ‘Introduction,’ xxi. 
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In this case, dealing with evangelical fitness culture, I seek to under-
stand the role of the human body within this culture in order to understand 
devotional fitness. I would like to demonstrate this approach in a provisional 
manner with regard to two particular aspects of embodiment. 
(1) Somatic representations of individuality and collectivity 
Every kind of sports is set in and shaped by its surrounding social and 
cultural context. What happens to our bodies happens to society and vice 
versa. Sports and fitness incorporate and enact social patterns of conduct and 
clusters of values.36 
The fact that most evangelical fitness classes are based on routines that 
require neither partner nor opponent is, I hypothesize, linked to the value of 
autonomy in contemporary US culture.37 Many of these programs do not 
even require a group gathering and are designed to be practiced at home in-
dividually learning through media such as books and DVDs, working out in 
front of the TV, and contemplating upon biblical scripture in solitude and 
stillness. 
In contrast to these programs, other designs intentionally incorporate 
partner exercises. They explicitly encourage group meetings and appreciate 
the harmony and friendships nourished in their programs. This is, for in-
stance, the case in the above-described organization First Place 4 Health. 
The scholar of culture38 may relate these phenomena to experiences of 
communitas according to Turner – events that celebrate togetherness and 
the spirit of community.39 A central feature of these programs is their at-
tempt to build commitment and accountability toward the group. They also 
stress equality among the group members; even the ‘leader’ is just ‘one on the 
journey’ and not hierarchically superordinated. In short, success is not possi-
ble when you are on your own. 
Yet again, the central goal and motivation of these programs is not a col-
lective one, it is an individual one. Weight-loss can only be achieved by an 
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 Thomas Alkemeyer, ‘Bewegung und Gesellschaft: Zur “Verkörperung” des Sozialen und zur 
Formung des Selbst in Sport und populärer Kultur,’ in: Gabriele Klein (ed.), Bewegung: Sozial- und 
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individual body; it can only become visible in a single body. Programs that, 
like ‘Losing to Live,’ arrange competitions based on collective weight-loss 
(see above) try to soften this ambiguity: In fact, success or failure is shared as 
groups compete with other groups, yet, in every case, both within the group 
and in the overall competition, winners and losers are not collective bodies – 
they are individual bodies. 
To sum up, the body in these examples reveals and, at the same time, 
enacts, a central ambiguity of evangelical fitness culture: the longing for col-
lectivity or communitas and for individuality or autonomy at the same time. 
(2) Somatic representations of contemporary body ideals 
Participants and designers of devotional fitness programs virtually never 
question the idea that slimness (usually communicated in terms of ‘health’) is 
something one should strive for. I cannot go into the depths of the emer-
gence of contemporary slimness ideals here,40 but it seems unquestionable 
that the bodies of devotional fitness reveal commonly accepted body ideals in 
their quest for fitness and slenderness. Michelle Mary Lelwica, who, in her 
1999 book Starving for Salvation, has analyzed The Spiritual Dimension of Eat-
ing Problems among American Girls and Women agrees that Christian weight-
loss programs incorporate ‘prevailing cultural norms of health and beauty.’41 
In bodies, and especially in female bodies,42 ‘the prevailing social order [is] 
negotiated and reproduced.’43 However, in the special case of devotional fit-
ness, this is not everything: Social norms are not only reproduced, they are, at 
the same time, reshaped and re-signified, so to speak. A ‘healthy’ (i.e., slend-
er) body is not only desirable because of the ‘mundane’ advantages associated 
with fitness (being popular, attractive, successful etc.). Also, and more impor-
tantly, it becomes ‘the visible marker of godliness,’ as Griffith concludes in 
her much acclaimed study on Flesh and Spirit in American Christianity.44 In 
other words, the bodies in evangelical fitness programs enact a worldview 
which is underpinned both ‘religiously’ and ‘secularly,’ which implements 
both fleshly and spiritual matter. 
                                                 
40
 See, e.g., Hillel Schwartz’s oft-quoted study Never Satisfied: A Cultural History of Diets, Fanta-
sies, and Fat (New York 1986). 
41
 Michelle Mary Lelwica, Starving for Salvation: The Spiritual Dimension of Eating Problems 
among American Girls and Women (Oxford 1999), 77. 
42
 For the time being, I cannot deal with devotional fitness from the perspective of gender stu-
dies, even though this is a useful instrument which will be harnessed for my doctoral thesis. 
43
 Michelle Mary Lelwica, Starving for Salvation, 182. 
44
 Griffith, Born Again Bodies, 180. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
As this paper has shown, the embodiment paradigm sensu stricto with 
its central premise of the corporeal body as the existential ground of culture 
is a useful perspective when trying to approach devotional fitness. The col-
lapse of dualities, a central feature of the embodiment paradigm, is not only a 
goal in methodological discussions of scholarly kind, it is also a distinct fea-
ture of devotional fitness (as the example ‘ActivPrayer’ has shown, see above). 
Furthermore, various strands of contemporary spirituality highlight the im-
portance of (re-)uniting body and soul. Actors criticize the outworn dualities 
of body and soul in Christian theologies and, instead, formulate holistic con-
cepts of body and soul.45 
As a result, I may notice that this is a common feature of both contem-
porary spirituality and evangelical fitness. On a more general level, devotion-
al fitness may therefore be seen in the wider context of contemporary spiri-
tuality. Take, e.g., Giselle Vincett’s and Linda Woodhead’s idea of spirituality 
as presented in their contribution to Religions in the modern world. Spirituali-
ty as a meta-term, in their view, shows seven characteristics: 
(1) ‘a value-laden contrast between spirituality and religion’; 
(2) ‘emphasis on the importance of inner, subjective, ineffable expe-
rience’; 
(3) ‘authorization of the individual to be the final arbiter of spiritual 
truth’; 
(4) ‘high valuation of “seeking;” open and tolerant attitude towards other 
spiritual “paths”’; 
(5) ‘promotion of practical, often embodied, means and techniques for 
attaining spiritual insight – e.g. meditation [or, in this case: fitness]’; 
(6) ‘tendency to embrace “progressive” and “anti-establishment” causes, 
including liberalism, equality, democracy, self-development […]’; 
(7) ‘universalistic or “holistic” emphasis (i.e., an emphasis on the inter-
connectedness of things).’46 
Except for the ‘tolerant attitude towards other spiritual “paths”’ (4) and 
the ‘tendency to embrace “progressive” and “anti-establishment” causes’ (6) 
most of these traits are well applicable to describe devotional fitness. It does 
                                                 
45
 Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes, ‘Introduction,’ xvi. 
46
 Giselle Vincett & Linda Woodhead, ‘Spirituality,’ in: Linda Woodhead, Hiroko Kawanami & 
Christopher H. Partridge (eds.), Religions in the modern world: Traditions and transformations (London 
2009), 319–337, esp. 320. 
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not agree with the evangelical worldview to appreciate non-Christian paths 
to salvation and most currents within US evangelicalism are politically con-
servative and do not embrace democracy. Especially the fifth point, however, 
the ‘promotion of practical, often embodied, means and techniques for at-
taining spiritual insight,’ gets hold of a central feature of devotional fitness. 
Slightly modifying the concept of Vincett and Woodhead, devotional 
fitness may nonetheless be considered as a highly embodied form of contem-
porary spirituality, one that poses specific challenges to the researcher and 
opens new horizons in the study of embodied culture and religion. 
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ABSTRACT 
In order to assert that the determinism of neuroscience is comparable with 
that of Calvinism, Dick Swaab, a leading neuroscientist, speaks of ‘neurocal-
vinism.’ To test this assertion, the author uses the classic view of Calvinism, 
propounded by Jonathan Edwards, as a conceptual framework. This allows the 
author to conclude that Edwards has a holistic understanding of human per-
sonality, that he defends compatibilism and upholds responsibility and moral-
ity. However, Swaab presents himself as an incompatibilist who has a tenden-
cy to deny responsibility and morality. Thus, in the case of Edwards, it is not 
possible to speak about neurocalvinism. 
 
KEY WORDS 




Neuroscience is very popular among all kinds of people, particularly be-
cause this branch of science promises to help us to develop an understanding 
of ourselves. One of the most important and perplexing issues concerning 
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our human identity is the question of the freedom of will.1 It appears that our 
modern understanding of a human being – characterized by having auto-
nomous free will – is being undermined by neuroscience.2 It is understanda-
ble that people are both shocked and, at the same time, hugely interested in 
the consequences of these discoveries, because these discoveries examine 
what our identities as human beings are. Among the many questions raised 
by contemporary research are: can a system of neurons provide for features 
like freedom to reason and to decide? If our decisions are simply the product 
of a neuronal state, how can we be held morally responsible for them?  
One of the leading neurobiologists in The Netherlands is Dick Swaab 
who wrote a very popular book about neuroscience which attracted the in-
terest of thousands of people.3 In this book, he speaks about neuroscience as 
‘neurocalvinism,’ referring to the doctrine of predestination found in Calvin-
ism.4 In making this reference, he suggests that his approach to neuroscience, 
and the many consequences that it has for the understanding of human re-
sponsibility, will, personality and morality are comparable with, or are at 
least related to, the Calvinistic view of human beings, especially in its indica-
tion of a deterministic worldview.5 The suggested relationship between Cal-
vinism and neuroscience demands that a deeper examination of the relation-
ship between the Calvinistic and neuroscientific understandings of human 
beings is conducted.  
After some methodological clarification, this paper describes in broad 
outline Jonathan Edward’s Calvinistic thoughts about free will and determin-
ism in relation to responsibility and morality. Consequently, an investigation 
is made as to how Swaab’s neuroscience relates to this Calvinistic paradigm. 
This leads to a conclusion about the ‘Calvinistic’ character of neuroscience 
                                               
1
 Some current Dutch popular books: V.A.F. Lamme, De vrije wil bestaat niet. Over wie er echt de 
baas is in het brein (Amsterdam 2010); T. v.d. Laar en S. Voerman, Vrije wil: Discussies over verantwoor-
delijkheid, zelfverwerkelijking en bewustzijn [(Rotterdam 2011); M. Sie (ed.), Hoezo vrije wil? Perspectie-
ven op een heikele kwestie (Rotterdam 2011). 
2 
Much of the contemporary case for the illusory nature of free will is derived from the work of B. 
Libet, A. Freeman & K. Sutherland, ‘Editor’s Introduction: The Volitional Brain,’ Journal of Conscious-
ness Studies 6/8–9 (1999), ix–xxiii, xvi. Cf. T. Bayne, ‘Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism,’ in: R. 
Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford 2011), 25–46, 26.   
3
 D.F. Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein: Van baarmoeder tot Alzheimer, (Amsterdam 2010).  Since Octo-
ber 2010 this book has continually been on www.debestseller60.nl (accessed 2012, July 23).  
4
 Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 381. 
5
 C. Blakemore expresses: ‘The human brain is a machine which alone accounts for all our ac-
tions, our most private thoughts, our beliefs,’ cited by R. Tallis, Aping Mankind: Neuromonia, Darwinitis 
and the Misrepresentation of Humanity (Durham 2011), 52.  
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and the ‘claim’ that Swaab makes. In this context some considerations about 
the relevance of the concepts of freedom and determinism in Calvinism, and 
what these may add to the body of knowledge on neuroscience, are made. 
 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
Speaking about ‘neurocalvinism’ and relating neuroscience to Calvinism 
necessarily involves looking at a problem of methodology: can neuroscience 
be related to theology? Isn’t it anachronistic to compare a theologian of the 
eighteenth century with a neurobiologian of the twenty-first? Another ques-
tion that concerns the broad scope of Calvinistic theology is: can it be spoken 
of as the Calvinistic theology? Questions such as these demand answers that 
can only be found at the level of methodology. 
Firstly, a neurobiologian is talking about ‘neurocalvinism’; straight away 
this justifies the research question about whether Calvinism has some type of 
relationship with neuroscience. Secondly, given the fact that a neuroscientist 
is asserting that neuroscience has implications for philosophy, morality, the-
ology and humanity, it is justified that, from the point of view of philosophy, 
morality and theology, the claims made by the neuroscientist should be ex-
amined. Thirdly, since the turn of this century, there has been such an 
enormous increase in the level of cooperation between theologians and neu-
robiologists in understanding the coherence of brains and religion that some 
people have even spoken about ‘neurotheology.’6 This is not the ultimate 
proof of the correctness of the relationship between theology and neuros-
cience, but it is an indication that this cooperation is widely accepted. 
Fourthly, it can be argued that a relationship exists between theology and 
neuroscience, because although both academic disciplines look at person-
hood and identity, they both hold very different views about the problem of 
the human will. Fifthly, given the fact that the implications of the discoveries 
                                               
6 Compare www.ibcsr.org and the magazine, Religion, Brain and Behavior; W.S. Brown, N. Mur-
phy & H. Newton Mahony (eds.), Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
Human Nature (Minneapolis 1999); R.J. Russell, N. Murphy, T.C. Meyering & M.A. Arbib (eds.), Neuro–
science and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Berkeley 2002); U. Lüke, H. Meisinger & 
G. Souvignier (eds.), Der Mensch – nichts als Natur? Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen (Darmstadt 2007); 
A.W. Geertz, ‘When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from 
a philosophy of science perspective,’ in: Religion 39/4 (December 2009), 319–324; W. Achtner, Willens–
freiheit in Theologie und Neurowissenschaften: Ein historisch-systematische Wegweiser (Darmstadt 
2010).  
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made by neuroscience can justifiably be looked at from a theological point of 
view, it is clear that the choice of Calvinism is a given when Swaab’s choice is 
made. A problem in the Calvinistic tradition is that this tradition is not un-
ambiguous about free will and necessity. There is a difference, for example, 
between the concepts of Calvin,7 Voetius8 and Edwards.9 
In this essay, Jonathan Edward’s concept of free will is compared with 
that of Swaab, because firstly, Edwards opposes the same front of self-
determination as Swaab.10 Secondly, Edwards opposes this front because he 
understands the tendencies of the modern age.11 Thirdly, the fact that Ed-
wards, despite his deterministic thinking, maintained morality and responsi-
bility make it interesting to look at the key-structures of his thought. This 
leads to the formulation of the central question in this article: does Swaab 
rightly refer to Edwards’s Calvinism to underpin his concept of human per-
sonality in relation to free will? 
 
 
3.  EDWARDS’S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
The Arminians of Edwards’s time – as far as he understood – reasoned 
that determinism and necessity would destroy freedom, responsibility and 
morality.12 Edwards’s opponents understood human beings as impersonal 
machines who acted from necessity and as the links in the chain of cause and 
effect. To maintain humanity they denied the necessity of human deeds and 
argued that human beings could not be held responsible for the deeds that 
they executed out of necessity. To uphold responsibility and morality, a self-
determining will was necessary. 
                                               
7 
See P. Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford 2004), 157–183.  
8 
See A.J. Beck, ‘The Will as Master of Its Own Act: A Disputation Rediscovered of Gisbertus Voe-
tius (1589–1676) on Freedom of the Will,’ in: W.J. van Asselt, J.M. Bac & R.T. te Velde (eds.), Reformed 
Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids 
2010), 145–170. 
9
 Edwards thematized free will, WJE 1 (The Works of Jonathan Edwards, New Haven 1957vv, vol. 
1). Edwards identifies himself with Calvinism, WJE 1:131.  
10
 Compare WJE 3:375; WJE 16:722–723. D.A. Sweeney and A.C. Guelzo understand Edwards’s un-
derstanding of will as ‘the engine of the Edwardsean tradition,’ The New England Theology: From Jona-
than Edwards to Edwards Amasa Park (Grand Rapids 2006), 57.    
11
 Compare his letter to John Erskine, WJE 16:491; G.M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New 
Haven 2003), 437–438; M.J. McClymond & G.R. McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Oxford 
2012), 15. 
12
 WJE 1:277, 295. The problem of free will was central, WJE 3:375. 
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In this section, the holistic dimension of Edwards’s concept of freedom 
is explored and his qualification of the concept of freedom is examined in 
detail. Finally, an investigation is made into how Edwards reconciles deter-
minism on the one hand, with responsibility and morality on the other. 
 
3.1 THE HOLISTIC DIMENSION OF EDWARDS’S VIEW 
Edwards understands the Arminian concept of a self-determining will as 
follows: 
These several concepts belong to their notion of liberty: 1) That is, it consists of 
a self-determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty which the will has 
over itself (…). 2) Indifference belongs to liberty in their notion of it, or that the 
mind, previous to the act of volition, is in equilibrio. 3) Contingence is another 
thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the 
word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any 
fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its exis-
tence.13 
To achieve this freedom, Arminians isolate the will from the entirety of 
the human personality, which means that the functioning of the will is re-
duced to the moment of choosing and that choosing and willing become ac-
cidental occurrences.14 A further consequence of this approach is that it is 
only the ‘pure act’ of the will that values the ‘act’ of the will, not the habit 
that caused the act.15 This means that a bad heart could be an excuse for vice, 
but having a good disposition of the heart would be no reason to speak about 
virtue. The characteristic of this libertarian concept of free will is indiffe-
rence.16 
Edwards’s deepest motivation for the rejection of this concept is theo-
logical. He cannot accept the repudiation of determinism, because he under-
                                               
13
 WJE 1:164–165. Compare WJE 3:375–376.  
14
 WJE 1:303–304. 
15 
WJE 1:324–325, 329–330. 
16 
WJE 1:303–304. Edwards opposes a certain (extreme) version of Libertarianism. For more about 
Libertarianism, see R.H. Kane, ‘Libertarianism,’ in: Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas, Four Views on 
Free Will (Oxford 2007), 5–43. Kane defends an undetermined free will, ‘Responsibility, Luck, and 
Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism,’ Journal of Philosophy 96, 217–240. See also Joseph 
Keim Campbell, Free Will (Cambridge 2011); T.J. Mawson, Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed (London 
201 1) ;  T .  Honderich (ed . ) ,  ‘The Determin ism and Freedom Phi losophy W ebsi te , ’  
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm (accessed 2012, July 23). 
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stands this to be a repudiation of the all-decreeing God.17  Theological aspects 
of the dispute, such as these, are not included in this essay; however, efforts 
will be made to examine the anthropological arguments.  
Edwards’s criticism is specifically directed at indifference as a property 
of the self-determining will: 
Those notions of liberty of contingence, indifference and self-determination, as 
essential to guilt or merit, tend to preclude all sense of any great guilt for past 
and present wickedness (…). All wickedness of heart is excused as what, in it-
self, brings no guilt.
18
 
Edwards criticizes this concept of freedom, because its effect is the op-
posite of what is aimed at, namely the denial of responsibility and morality. 
According to Edwards, to value indifference as virtue contradicts common 
sense.19 It implies that a cold heart and a compassionate attitude would both 
be valued equally by a friend in need. 
Another property of this concept of freedom concerns the function of 
commandments and promises. Because commandments are used to take 
away the indifference of the will and to influence will, commandments, ac-
cording to the Arminian scheme, will undermine freedom, which is against 
all common sense. This view leads one to the conclusion of inconsistence, 
because every appeal to virtue takes away the virtuous character of obedience 
to that appeal.20 Edwards does not only deny that morality and responsibility 
are bound to the Arminian concept of freedom, but returns the argument; 
the Arminian concept of liberty of contingence, indifference and self-
determination will destroy morality and responsibility instead of promoting 
it. To promote morality and responsibility, it is necessary to use the concepts 
of the habitual dispositions of the heart.21 This means that the human will 
cannot be isolated from the entirety of the human personality: 
If strict propriety of speech is to be insisted on, it may more properly be said, 
that the voluntary actions which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the 
mind’s volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, 
                                               
17
 WJE 16:722; P. Ramsey, ‘Editor’s introduction,’ WJE 1:25–26. Edwards accepts the comparison 
with the Stoic worldview, however he rejects this concept because of the lack of freedom, WJE 1:372–
374. Edwards defends that God chooses what is wise and most fitting, denying the arbitrariness of 
God’s will, WJE 1:375–396, 418, 434.  
18 




 WJE 1:331. 
21
 WJE 1:156–157. 
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than the preference or choice itself, but that the act of volition itself is always 
determined by that in or about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to 
appear most agreeable.22 
The implication of Edwards’s concept is that human will is not to be un-
derstood as a source of choices, but as an instrumental function of the hu-
man person. The alternative to this instrumental function of the human will 
is that an indifferent will can make choices that go completely against the 
strongest inclinations of human personality, which would be absurd. 
This approach of Edwards coheres with another aspect of his concept. 
Instead of three hierarchically-ordered faculties of the soul, he speaks about 
two equal faculties, namely mind and will.23 The affections are included in 
the will, which implies a less intellectualistic and a more voluntaristic and 
intuitive approach. Edwards denies that the human mind and the will are 
parts of the human soul, but understands them as being different modes of 
operation of the same human soul.24  
In the background of Edwards’s understanding of the status of human 
will is his worldview. As a child of the Newtonian age, he reasons from a me-
chanistic worldview in which the order of cause and effect form part of the 
basic structures of reality.25 It is important to understand that Edwards ap-
plies this mechanistic worldview of cause and effect to his anthropology. This 
order means that it is absurd to infer that the human will causes itself. Ed-
wards compares this absurdity with an animal which begat itself and was 
hungry before it had being.26 In this way, Edwards confirms the absurdity of 
an uncaused free will and defends the stance that the will is determined by a 
combination of the object and the mind’s view of the object.27 
 
3.2 EDWARDS’S VIEW OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Edwards formulates a second point of criticism of the Arminian concept 
of freedom and necessity: 
                                               
22
 WJE 1:144–145. 
23
 WJE 1:217; 2:96. See McClymond & Dermott, Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 311–318; P. Ramsey 
shows the relation to John Locke, WJE 1:49.   
24 
Cf. McClymond & Dermott, Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 314. 
25




 WJE 1:144. Compare G.M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, 445.  
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We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it even if 
we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow it, be-
cause of some impending defect of obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either 
in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral 
inability is seen not in any of these things, but in either the want of inclination 
or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of a sufficient motive in 
view to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent mo-
tives to the contrary (…). A woman of great honor and chastity may have a 
moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty 
to his parents may be unable to be willing to kill his father.28 
Edwards distinguishes between natural and moral necessity to explain 
that the human inability to behave in a moral way can be against our will or 
in accordance with our will; natural abilities are against our will, for example, 
while moral inabilities are not. However, Edwards is not completely clear 
about the boundary of the definition of human inabilities, although his posi-
tion does have the potential to distinguish moral necessity from other neces-
sities. In this way, Edwards qualifies the concept of necessity as maintaining 
responsibility as a category on the one hand, and as maintaining freedom as a 
category on the other. This also leads to a redefinition of freedom: 
But I would observe one more thing concerning what is vulgarly called liberty, 
which is the power and opportunity for one to do and conduct himself as he 
will (…). Let the person come to his volition or choice of how he will, yet, if he 
is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing 
his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and com-
mon notion of freedom.29 
In Edwards’s view the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is not a pre-
requisite condition for the maintenance of freedom and responsibility, but 
the conscious voluntariness of human volition is a sufficient condition for 
it.30 For example: if a boy finds himself in a place where there is only one girl 
to bond with, and he loves this one girl, he loves her freely. 
Apparently, Edwards unites freedom and responsibility in the same way 
as the Arminians in his context do. If free will cannot be saved in a certain 
way, responsibility is lost. This approach implies that human beings are re-
sponsible for their morally bad behavior if natural inability was not the cause 
                                               
28
 WJE 1:156–160. Edwards was among those who worked out this distinction. See P. Ramsey, 
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of it, and if they behaved voluntarily in this bad way. Behind this viewpoint is 
the conviction that moral inability is ultimately qualified as unwillingness 
and for unwillingness there is no excuse.31 Edwards’s view coheres with the 
distinction between human beings before and after the fall; sin did not de-
stroy human will as a faculty, but changed its orientation. Despite sin, human 
will remained free but, because of the sinfulness of the heart, human beings 
are not free to choose good. The reverse is also true. The eschatological di-
mension of the work of the Spirit implies that believers’ experience the high-
est liberty that coheres with the necessity of virtues.32 
In this way, Edwards clarifies his concept of freedom by distinguishing 
between moral and natural inability or necessity. This distinction gave him 




Edwards denied the dismissal of determinism, he accepted the Arminian 
conjunction between free will on the one hand and morality and responsibili-
ty on the other, and he offered his own concept of freedom in which he ap-
pears to be a compatibilist, reconciling determinism and free will.33 In his 
attack on the Arminian concept of a self-determining will, Edwards designed 
an alternative holistic concept of the human soul in which understanding 
and will contribute equally to human identity. In response to the Arminian 
concept of necessity, Edwards qualified necessity by making a distinction 
between moral and natural inability. In Edwards’s understanding, freedom 
exists in the willingness of our will. In this way, Edwards could maintain de-
terminism and necessity on the one hand, while maintaining human free-
dom, responsibility and morality on the other. 
Against the reproach that determinism and necessity would dehumanize 
human beings, reducing them to machines, Edwards replied that the exis-
tence of human understanding and will upholds humanity. At the same time 
he clarified that the reproach actually attacks Arminians, who hold that a 
                                               
31
 WJE 1:307–308. In the tradition after Edwards, the ‘Exercisers’ saw evil as concentrated in the 
will only. See McClymond & Dermott, Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 608.   
32
 WJE 1:364. Edwards sees the Christian life as an eschatological life, WJE 4:236–237.  
33 
Edwards is a classic compatibilist. The new compatibilism (of Harry Frankfurt) makes a dis-
tinction between first-order and second-order desires. If the first-order desires are in control of the 
second-order desires, there is freedom.   
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human being is less than machine, because the so-called machine of Edwards 
is led by human intelligence, while their human will is led by nothing at all.34 
 
 
4. ASSESSMENT OF SWAAB’S VIEW 
How does Swaab’s view of free will compare to that of Edwards? Accord-
ing to Swaab, our complete personality is controlled by billions of brain cells. 
Every choice, even religious choice, can be related to the functioning of a part 
of the human brain. In other words, if the brain does not function, the hu-
man spirit does not function. Because the functioning of human spirit can be 
described and explained in physical terms, human will is controlled by physi-
cal laws. This explains the deterministic character of Swaab’s understanding 
of human will. The difference between Edwards’s determinism and that of 
Swaab is that Edwards’s determinism has a metaphysical character while 
Swaab’s physical determinism lacks this metaphysical dimension. The simi-
larity between Edwards and Swaab is that both accept the physical order of 
cause and effect.  
However, Edwards’s approach was not on the level of brain science; Ed-
wards’s concept is open to Swaab’s concept of physical determinism, knowing 
Edwards’s acknowledgement of the physical order of cause and effect. With-
out being explicit about the definition of free will or justifying the use of a 
certain definition, it can be determined that Swaab reacts against the under-
standing that free will is described as the possibility of deciding or making 
choices without internal or external restrictions. Given this understanding of 
free will, he denies the possibility of a complete freedom of the will; he does 
not, however, define the word ‘complete.’  
Both Edwards and Swaab deny the libertarian concept of human free 
will, which proposes that the ultimate decision about our existence, willing 
and acting is taken in an isolated abstract human will. Although Swaab 
misses the finer anthropological distinctions that Edwards makes about the 
relationship between will and understanding, Edwards and Swaab agree that 
human will has to be understood and determined by the human personality, 
education and environment. At first glance, Edwards and Swaab seem to 
agree because they both oppose the same front. However, a more detailed 
examination reveals the differences between both views. Edwards is a compa-
tibilist, while Swaab is an incompatibilist, and as such, their views are parallel 
                                               
34
 WJE 1:371. 
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to soft determinism and hard determinism respectively. Swaab denies that a 
deterministic worldview coheres with the free will of human beings,35 while 
Edwards accepts and defends free will. 
Edwards understands human free will as human willingness in choosing 
and acting, relating free will to human consciousness. Swaab understands 
free will against the background of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities as 
an interpretative paradigm for free will, and he lacks the conceptual frame-
work to understand free will as an awareness of voluntarily choosing. On the 
one hand, he gives the impression that conscious willingness is no more than 
a product of unconscious neural brain processes; on the other hand, he is 
bound to this impression, because he understands consciousness as the result 
of unconscious processes which are controlled by physical laws.36 
The fact that Edwards and Swaab both defend the coherence of free will 
and responsibility,37 and that Swaab denies the freedom of will, implies that 
Swaab tends to deny responsibility in social life.38 He illustrates this problem 
with several examples. Can a pedophile be responsible for his sexual orienta-
tion as this orientation is caused by his genetic background and the irregular 
development of his brain? Parallel with his acceptance that a homophile 
orientation is not a choice, Swaab suggests that it is also acceptable to view 
kleptomania and other forms of aggressive and delinquent behavior as beha-
vior that is exhibited without choice, with all the consequences this has for 
accountability and responsibility.  
From Edwards’s perspective, Swaab makes the same mistake as the Ar-
minians do by not distinguishing between moral and natural inability. Lack 
of this distinction explains the lack of human freedom and the lack of any 
possibility of justifying morality and responsibility. While Edwards would 
blame Swaab for projecting the structures of natural ability and inability 
upon the moral dimension of human life, Swaab would reply that morality 
has to be understood in physical terms, namely neural processes. 
In this context, it is significant that Swaab denies the human soul.39 He 
argues that a ‘psychon’ does not exist, but a ‘neuron’ does. Dying means that 
brains stop functioning. He does not see any reason to think that the soul is 
anything more than the functioning of billions of brain cells and thinks that 
                                               
35
 Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 380–381.  
36 
See Achtner, Willensfreiheit, 223–232 for the common views of neuroscientists. 
37
 Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 385, 391. 
38
 Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 392. 
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 Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 357. 
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the universal belief in the existence of the soul is based on anxiety about 
death and the desire that humans have to be reunited after death. Thus 
Swaab argues from the point of view of reductionism, in which the working 
of the soul is reduced to the functioning of brain cells.40 This leads to the 
overall conclusion that Swaab has a monistic materialistic understanding of 
human personality. Swaab’s physical determinism has led him to conclude 
that physics is the all-embracing reality of the human being and that physi-
calism is ‘all’ (the position that only physical matter is needed to account for 
everything that exists in nature); a sure sign of this can be seen in the title of 
his bestseller: We are our brain. 
Here, the core of the difference between Edwards’s and Swaab’s views is 
explained. Edwards can accept physical determinism, but Swaab cannot ac-
cept metaphysical determinism. Edwards accepts physical determinism as the 
natural order of cause and effect in which humanity participates, without 
reducing human being to physics. In Edwards’s understanding of reality, the 
metaphysical world bears the physical reality. As an example: the physical 
world is for Edwards like a map of the world, while the reality of the world 
cannot be explained in terms of the map. All is physics, but physics is not all. 
This means that Edwards’s worldview cannot be characterized as physicalism, 
but must be understood as metaphysicalism. 
Edwards’s metaphysicalism made him reject the Arminian reproach that 
Calvinists understand the human being as a machine; the same meta-
physicalism would analyse Swaab’s concept of the human being as a machine. 
So an answer has been derived for the central question of this essay: does 
Swaab rightly refer to Edwards’s Calvinism to underpin his concept of human 
personality in relation to free will? The answer is no.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Table 1. Comparison of Edwards’s and Swaab’s understanding of determin-
ism and free will 
 
Perspective Edwards Swaab 
Metaphysics? Yes No 
Physical determinism? Yes Yes 
                                               
40
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Libertarian understanding of 
will? 
No No 
Compatibilism? Yes No 
Freedom of will? Yes No 
Responsibility and morality? Yes No 
 
Table 1 illustrates the comparability of Edwards’s and Swaab’s under-
standings of physical determinism and the libertarian understanding of will. 
Edwards and Swaab differ on all other points; while Edwards is a compatibil-
ist  , Swaab is not. Edwards’s position allows the possibility of speaking about 
freedom of will, while Swaab denies it. Responsibility and morality are 
integral to the structure of Edwards’s concept of human personality, while 
Swaab’s concept denies any space for them. These differences go back to an 
acceptance or rejection of metaphysics. We can conclude that Swaab’s ‘neu-
rocalvinism’ and Edwards’ Calvinism are not compatible. 
Swaab’s approach brought us into contact with physicalism, a stance 
that understands reality as a closed physical system. While reductive-
physicalism can easily be attacked, this is not the case with non-reductive 
physicalism whose main tenet is that the mind operates at a higher level of 
complexity and cannot be directly reduced to physical conditions, implying 
that mental states are a byproduct of the physical state of the brain. 
Does this reveal that there is some openness here to the concept of the 
human soul? Scientists, philosophers and theologians are afraid of a Carte-
sian dualism of soul and body. While a concept of the human soul cannot be 
developed within Cartesian dualism, this does not indicate that we do not 
have to think about the concept of the human soul. This research indicates 
that we are not to be enclosed in physicalism. Edwards’s distinction between 
metaphysics and physics offers a midway between physical monism on the 
one hand and Cartesian dualism on the other,41 namely a duality within a 
coherent reality which guarantees human freedom, responsibility and morali-
ty.42 
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ABSTRACT 
Two seminal experiments in neuroscience indicated that brain activities were 
detected by EEG or fMRI before the participants were aware of their decisions. 
The findings suggested that free will is an illusion. It is assumed that conscious 
decision is a necessary condition for free will. However, the history of science 
is full of examples about how problem-solving emerged from unconsciousness, 
such as Kekule’s benzene ring and polymerase chain reaction. The author sug-
gests that free will should be viewed as a continuum with self-imposed con-




continuum, atheism, materialism, naturalism, history of science, free will, 
physical tendency, determinism 
 
NEUROSCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE OF FREE WILL  
Since the 1980s two seminal studies in neuroscience have been provok-
ing debates regarding free will and determinism.  In a study that utilized 
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Electroencephalography (EEG) to monitor the brain waves of subjects, Libet, 
Gleason, Wright and Pearl discovered the state of ‘readiness potentials’ (RP), 
which are the activations of specific areas of the cerebral cortex prior to the 
participants’ conscious decision of moving their finger. To be fair to Libet, he 
realized that there is a small window of opportunity for the conscious mind 
to overrule the action. This implies that we have ‘free won’t’ instead of free 
will.1 The central idea of Libet is that unconscious processes initiate our con-
scious experiences.2 However, quite a few subsequent writers, such as Daniel 
Wegner, took Libet’s experiment to advocate the notion that conscious will is 
just an illusion.3 
In a similar thread, Haynes and his colleagues utilized functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) to monitor patients as they were asked to 
make a decision. They found that brain activities had already occurred before 
the participants made the conscious decision of pushing a left or right but-
ton. Haynes’s research team stated that they could predict what a participant 
would do six to ten seconds before that participant is aware of his or her 
choice.4 Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes explicitly stated, ‘The impression 
that we are able to freely choose between different possible courses of action 
is fundamental to our mental life. However, it has been suggested that this 
subjective experience of freedom is no more than an illusion and that our 
actions are initiated by unconscious mental processes long before we become 
aware of our intention to act.’5  
The objective of this paper is to explain why the common interpretation 
of these two experiments fails to deny free will, and to offer an alternate ex-
planation: free will is a continuum, and thus any physical disposition or con-
straint detected by neuroscience does not necessarily constitute evidence 
against free will. On the contrary, exercising free will is making self-imposing 
constraints, as indicated by the adage, ‘You make habits and habits make 
                                                          
1
 Benjamin Libet. ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary 
Action,’ Behavioral Brain Science 8 (1985), 529–566. Benjamin Libet, Curtis Gleason, Elwood Wright, & 
Dennis Pearl, ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-
Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,’ Brain 106 (1983), 623–642. 
2
 Benjamin Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005). 
3
 Daniel Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2002). 
4 
John-Dylan Haynes, ‘Decoding and Predicting Intentions,’ Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 1224 (2011), 9-21. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.05994.x.  
5
 Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes, ‘Unconscious De-
terminants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,’ Nature Neuroscience 11 (2008), 543–545. 
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you.’ When habits are formed, our behaviors work similar to an ‘auto-pilot’ 
mode.  Specifically, our actions are driven by unconscious tendencies, which 
have been previously developed in a conscious mode. 
 
 
ATHEISM AND NATURALIZATION OF MIND 
On the basis of the findings of neuroscience, Sam Harris, one of the ‘four 
horsemen’ of the New Atheism, declared that free will is nothing but an illu-
sion and wishful thinking.6 By the same token, Jerry Coyne stated, ‘I’m start-
ing to realize there are striking parallels between belief in God and belief in 
free will. There is no evidence for the existence of either, and plenty of evi-
dence against both. Belief in both makes people feel better.’7 
Determinism does not necessarily go hand in hand with atheism while 
the notion of free will is not inherent in religion. This is exemplified by both 
Buddhism and Christianity. Buddhism embraces the doctrine that a coherent 
self is illusory. The so-called ‘self’ is a result of a tentative composition of 
fleeting elements. Since there is no authentic self, there is, consequently, no 
genuine will.8 Further, within the Christian community there have been de-
bates regarding Calvinism and various schools that advocate free will.9 None-
theless, as mentioned in the beginning, atheism and the rejection of free will 
seem to form a strong association (e.g. Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne). The histori-
cal root of this connection could be traced back to as far as the 18th century. 
Long before Harris and Coyne, D’Holbach (1723–1789) had asserted that free 
will was an illusion. So-called the concept of ‘choice’ could not provide any 
escape from the causal chain that stretches back to our birth. According to 
Nichols, D’Holbach is arguably the best example of a hard determinist from 
the early period of modern philosophy. As a naturalist (materialist), D’Hol-
bach supported psychological determinism, the philosophical view that all 
mental processes are determined by prior psychological or physical events. It 
is his conviction that nature consists of substance and motion only, hence 
                                                          
6 
Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012), 5. 
7 
Adam Fetterman, ‘Free Will is the New God,’ Social Psychology Eye (2001) 
[http://socialpsychologyeye.wordpress.com/2011/06/14/free-will-is-the-new-god/]. 
8 
Shaun Nichols, Great Philosophical Debates: Free Will and Determinism (Chantilly, VA: Teach-
ing company 2008), 46. 
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everything in nature, including the human mind, is subject to and can be ex-
plained by physical laws.10  
This ‘naturalization’ of the mind is echoed by quite a few modern scho-
lars. The ‘astounding hypothesis’ proposed by Crick is a typical example: 
‘Your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense 
of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a 
vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.  As Lewis Car-
roll’s Alice might have phrased it: “You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.”’11 
Additionally, according to Bloom and Weisberg, the ‘common sense’ that the 
mind is fundamentally different from the brain comes naturally to children. 
Preschool children accept that the brain is responsible for some aspects of 
mental life, such as solving math problems. But at the same time, they deny 
that the brain has something to do with loving one’s brother. To Bloom and 
Weisberg, the mind is simply the brain, and therefore they are resentful that 
this type of ‘nonscientific’ concept, grounded in common-sense intuitions, is 
transmitted by seemingly trustworthy sources.12 
To people who subscribes to the materialistic and natural worldview, 
free will is considered mystical or even supernatural.  Nothing can go beyond 
materials; everything must be explained by physical laws formulated by 
science. Apparently, the advent of neuroscience provides evidence to support 
the view that the mind is the brain and free will is illusory. However, the ar-
gument based upon the Libet and Haynes experiments has two major logical 
flaws. First, it assumes that a conscious decision is a necessary condition for 
free will. The title of Wegener’s book even equates free will with conscious 
will. It seems that if the conscious awareness of the action and the brain ac-
tivity associated with the action do not happen simultaneously, we are not 
considered free to choose our action. Second, if our thought is limited by a 
certain physical disposition, there is no free will either. The counter-
argument given by the author is anchored by the definition of free will de-
rived from classical compatibilism, the view that free will and determinism 
are fully compatible.13 According to classical compatibilism, free will is not 
the opposite of indeterminism, in which nothing can restrict our mind. Ra-
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ther, free will implies that our minds are free from external coercion only. But 
the presence of internal compulsion, including our desire and disposition, 
does not negate free will. 
 
 
ARE INTENTIONS ALWAYS CONSCIOUS? 
Marcel wrote, ‘Many psychologists seem to assume that intentions are 
by their nature conscious.’14 Bargh and Morsella call it ‘conscious-centric bi-
as.’15 They pointed out that until quite recently in the history of science and 
philosophy, mental life was viewed as mostly conscious in essence. This view 
is manifested by Descartes’ cogito (I think therefore I am) and Locke’s ‘mind 
first’ cosmology. In reality, actions resulting from unconscious thought might 
precede the conscious mind. In other words, action precedes reflection. Simi-
larly, Schlosser argued that actions yielded from free will are not always con-
sciously initiated. Every conscious event may have unconscious precursors.16 
Mele illustrated the unconscious mode of intentions by using an every-
day example: He goes to his office almost every morning. When he intention-
ally unlocks his office door, he’s operating in the auto-pilot mode. He does 
not need a conscious decision to unlock it. However, if he hears a fight in the 
office, then he might pause for a moment to decide whether he should con-
tinue to keep his door unlocked or leave.17 Mele criticized that Libet and his 
followers were confused between urge (wanting, wish, or desire), intention, 
and decision. In Libet’s experiment, the participants’ physical tendency to 
move a finger might be considered a desire, but it is not an intention at all. 
As explained before, there is a subtle difference between intention and deci-
sion, and the former does not require full consciousness.18  
In Mele’s view, the readiness potentials discovered by Libet should be 
treated as an urge, not an intention or a decision. In addition, Mele pointed 
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Anthony Marcel, ‘The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action,’ in: Johannes 
Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: 
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18 
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out that in Libet’s experiment the subjects were told in advance not to move 
their fingers, but to prepare to move them later. This preparation might have 
created the so-called readiness potentials. Interestingly enough, Schlosser 
offered a similar counter-argument: the subjects in Libet’s experiments made 
a conscious decision to participate in the study and follow the instruction. 
Schlosser called it ‘distal intention’ because the action following the intention 
is not immediate. However, the conscious decisions made at the beginning of 
the study ‘work their way’ into the motor control system.19 Schlosser argued 
that most of our decisions have two components: what to do and when to do. 
The former is more important than the latter because the when-decision, 
concerned with how to implement a what-decision, is made after the what-
decision. The author of this article would like to use this example: if a woman 
says ‘yes’ to her boyfriend’s proposal, this is certainly a what-decision. What 
happens next is concerned with deciding when the wedding and the honey-
moon will take place. In a sense the wedding and the honeymoon are ‘pre-
determined’ by the what-decision earlier. Following this line of reasoning 
Libet’s study at best implies that certain when-decisions are tied to physical 
dispositions, but not what-decisions.20 
The history of science is full of examples about how innovations and 
problem-solving emerge from unconsciousness. Many times the scientists 
made a conscious commitment to solve a particular problem, and this deci-
sion ‘worked its way’ into the unconscious side of the mental structure. For 
example, Kekule found the solution to the problem of the structure of a ben-
zene molecule while watching the snake-like dance of fire in his fireplace. 
Indeed, the solution did not pop up ‘suddenly.’ Long before the vision at the 
fireplace, Kekule had seen a gold ring consisting of two intertwined snakes 
biting their own tails. By citing the example of the benzene ring, Seifert, 
Meyer, Davidson, Patalano and Yaniv speculated that the final steps on the 
road to insight may be subconscious.21 Had the brain of Kekule been scanned 
by modern medical equipment, we would have observed that before Kekule 
solved the problem, the image of the snake had already activated certain sec-
tions of his brain. However, it is problematic to say that Kekule should not be 
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praised for the discovery because it is ‘determined’ by his brain or the gradual 
built-up of the solution is unconscious.  
The invention of the polymerase chain reaction by molecular biologist 
Kary Mullis followed a similar path. Mullis said, ‘The revelation came to me 
one Friday night in April, 1983, as I gripped the steering wheel of my car and 
snaked along a moonlit mountain road into northern California’s redwood 
country.’22 Again, it is unlikely that the solution emerged ‘suddenly.’ Like the 
participants in Libet’s experiment, Mullis had decided to conduct research in 
biotechnology and this distal what-decision ‘worked its way’ into his cogni-
tive system. But unlike Libet’s subjects, Mullis virtually had no control of the 
when-decisions. Rather, certain areas of his brain had definitely been acti-
vated to pave the way for the solution. 
 
 
FREE WILL IS NOT FREE OF INTERNAL COMPULSION  
To a certain extent the study conducted by Haynes and his associates is 
a more serious challenge to free will than Libet’s study. The former has no 
component relating to response readiness, and thus the counter-argument 
based on distal what-decisions and when-decisions becomes irrelevant. In 
Haynes et al.’s experiment, subjects could decide to choose pressing one of 
two buttons with either the left or the right index finger.  
However, at most Haynes’s study implies that our decision is confined 
or influenced by our physical condition of the brain. Haynes could predict a 
left or right button press with 60% accuracy only. In other words, there is a 
40% chance that the subject could override the physical tendency. Indeed it 
is harder to defend absolute determinism than free will. The probability that 
X will happen or X will be ‘chosen’ must be 100% in order to call the event 
‘pre-determined.’ However, if there is just 1% probability that X will not hap-
pen, it has left sufficient room for free will to act. Consider this hypothetical 
scenario: There is a country that has been ruled by a dictator for more than 
half a century. In this nation information is tightly filtered and controlled. As 
a result, all citizens are brainwashed to unconditionally support the regime. 
The population of this nation is 10 million, but out of these 10-million people 
there are a few dissidents who dare to promote democracy, liberty, and hu-
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man rights, and speak against the regime. One may argue that the majority of 
these people are ‘pre-determined’ to be submissive, and they have ‘no choice.’ 
But as long as there is the probability that one out of a million people could 
choose otherwise, free will prevails. In probability and statistics there are 
many different forms of distributions, such as Chi-square distributions, t-
distributions, F-distributions, and Poisson distributions. In short, every event 
has a distribution and even extreme cases (outliers). Uniform outcomes 
across all the members in a sample or a population are not realistic. Natural-
ists or materialists maintain that everything is subject to natural or physical 
laws. Following this line of reasoning, probability and statistical laws, which 
tell us that not everyone has exactly the same response or action, are also 
part of natural law. 
Haynes demonstrated that our will or mind has a physical basis, but his 
notion is indeed fully compatible with the philosophy of ‘embodied mind.’23 
In other words, free will should not be equated with the absence of any con-
straints or influences, including our bodily constraints. Simply put, the no-
tion of embodied mind rejects the mind-body dualism that has been preva-
lent in the Western culture for several centuries, and faculty psychology that 
has been misguiding psychologists for a century. Lakoff and Johnson wrote, 
‘The architecture of your brain’s neural network determines what concepts 
you have and hence the kind of reasoning you can do.’24 In this view, our per-
ception is equated with our conceptualization, and vice versa.  
Take our concept of colors as an example. The perception of color is 
based on human internal neural structures and the external physical condi-
tions (e.g. wavelength). We perceive that a banana is yellow even under dif-
ferent lighting conditions.25 This color consistency results from our brain’s 
ability to compensate for variations in the light source. As a photographer, 
this author is well-aware of the interactive nature of our perception. If we 
take an indoor photo under fluorescent bulbs without a flash unit, the pic-
ture will be flooded with green light. There is nothing wrong with your cam-
era. In fact, the camera sensor and lens capture the exact lighting. In a room 
we ‘see’ white light instead of green because our brain compensates for the 
‘incorrect’ color. In short, our color concepts have a strong physical base. Al-
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though the theory of embodied mind did not arise from the context of the 
free will-determinism debate, it is still highly relevant in the sense that our 
mind is never independent from our physical configuration. But does it mean 
that we are not free? It depends on how we define free will. 
One of the classical definitions of free will is that it requires the absence 
of constraint (coercion and interference). But this definition does not specify 
whether the source of coercion and interference is internal or external. If my 
action is caused by external compulsion, I have no free will. For example, if I 
am a slave, my labor is not freely chosen. But what if I am an alcoholic who is 
driven by my internal urge to indulge in binge drinking? Did I lose my free 
will?  Am I still responsible for my obsession? The same question can be 
asked about drug addicts, compulsive gamblers, and even psycho-killers. By 
common sense we might say, ‘They are still responsible for what they did in 
spite of their internal compulsion or physical disposition though they may 
not be fully responsible.’ Yamada (personal communication) went even fur-
ther to assert that ‘free will has more to do with the ability to overcome or 
nullify constraints and to institute and enforce new constraints, than it does 
with the absence of constraints.’ When the author talked to several recovered 
or recovering gamblers during a short term mission trip in Panama, it was 
observed that many gamblers and ex-gamblers go back and forth between the 
old and new lifestyles.  The most effective way to overcome obsession is not 
trying to free oneself from the constraint by will alone. Rather, the person 
must build a new healthy habit as a replacement of the old one. In short, ex-
ercising free will is making self-imposed constraints, a new type of internal 
compulsion. You make habits and habits make you! 
Hence, free will might not be as dichotomous as most people thought 
(either your choice is totally free or your behaviors are totally determined). 
Rather, it should be viewed as a continuum between two polarities. In 
Haynes’s experiments on the average there is a 40% chance that you could do 
otherwise, but there is a distribution or within-group variance. Some people 
might have a high degree of internal compulsion and some may have a weak-
er one. In the perspective of within-subject distribution and free will/deter-
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DISCUSSION 
In summary, if we do not confine free will to conscious decisions and ex-
tend free will to boundless freedom without any internal disposition and 
compulsion, then it seems that Libet’s and Haynes’s studies cannot decisively 
negate the existence of free will. Nonetheless, by recognizing that our mind is 
embodied and our will is influenced by the neural structures, free will and 
determinism are better considered as a continuum instead of a dichotomy.  
The challenge to free will introduced by Libet and Haynes is not new. Its 
scientific root can be traced back to as early as the 17th century. Based on 
Newtonian physics, French scientist Laplace claimed that everything in the 
universe is determined by physical laws. If there is an intellectually powerful 
being (called Laplace's demon) that can fully comprehend Newtonian law, 
and knows the position and momentum of every particle in the universe, 
then he could definitely predict every event in history. Originally Laplace's 
determinism was applied to the realm of extended, spatial, material sub-
stances only. Later this type of determinism was expanded to the realm of 
psychological events. Under determinism, there is only one necessary out-
come in the causal chain.26 Interestingly enough, like the bond between 
modern determinism and atheism, Laplace’s determinism is also associated 
with a naturalistic tendency. When Laplace presented his scientific theory to 
Napoleon, Napoleon wondered how God could fit into the theory. Laplace 
answered, ‘I have no need of that hypothesis.’27  
Today determinism and this type of alleged predictive power switch the 
foundation from physics to neuroscience. However, later the probabilistic 
worldview of quantum mechanics overshadows the Laplace demon. Accord-
ing to quantum mechanics, there are infinite possible universes. Physicists 
found that in the subatomic world, events are not the inevitable and unique 
solution to single-valued differential equations, but are the random expres-
sion of a probability distribution. The present state limits the probability of 
future outcomes, but does not determine a definite fixed result.28  Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle shows us that we cannot measure the position 
and the momentum of a particle at the same time, and thus Laplace’s demon 
is physically impossible. Laplace’s view emerged at the dawn of modern phys-
ics (Newtonian mechanics) and needless to say, his assertion was premature 
                                                          
26
 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, UK: CUP, 1992). 
27
 Rouse Ball, A Short Account of the History of Mathematics (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1908/2010). 
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 Roy Weatherford, The Implications of Determinism (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
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and over-simplistic. Bluntly speaking, neuroscience is a fairly new discipline, 
and after all, Libet and Haynes only studied a very simple form of awareness 
and decision-making: moving the finger. However, if someday neuroscien-
tists could predict whether a college graduate would continue on to graduate 
study or which stock an investor would buy, then we would have to take a 
fresh look into this area of study. For now any bold statements or strong infe-
rences out of these experiments should be interpreted with caution.29 
  
                                                          
29
 Special thanks to Dr. Walter Yamada, Mr. Craig Jentink, Mr. Paul Cords, Miss. Jade Wranosky, 
and Miss. Kasey Carter for their valuable input to this article. 







RODERICH BARTH is professor of systematic theology and ethics at Justus-Liebig-
Universität Gießen. Homepage: http://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz 
/fb04/institute/ev_theologie/systematische_theol/personen/ barth.roderich 
 
JONNA BORNEMARK is director at The Center for Studies in Practical Knowledge at 




ARIANNE CONTY is assistant professor of philosophy at the American University of 




JOHN COTTINGHAM is professor emeritus of philosophy, University of Reading, and 
professorial research fellow, Heythrop College, University of London. Homepage: 
http://www.johncottingham.co.uk/. 
 
INGOLF U. DALFERTH is professor emeritus of systematic theology, symbolism and 
philosophy of religion at the University of Zürich and Danforth Professor of Philoso-
phy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University. Homepage: 
http://www.cgu.edu/pages/5589.asp. 
 
ALEXANDER T. ENGLERT is a graduate student at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Hei-
delberg (Germany). Beginning in August 2013, he will begin his Ph.D. in philosophy 
at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland (USA). 
 
JULIA ENXING is a postdoc research assistant at the Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion 
and Politics’ (WWU Muenster). Homepage: http://www.uni-muenster.de/Religion-
und-Politik/en/personen/projekt/enxing.shtml 
 
SOILI HAVERINEN is doctoral student at the University of Helsinki in The Finnish 






PETER JONKERS is professor of philosophy at Tilburg University, and dean a.i. of the 
School of Catholic Theology. Homepage: 
http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/nl/webwijs/show/?uid=p.h.a.i.jonkers 
 
JOHANN-ALBRECHT MEYLAHN is associate professor of Practical Theology at the Uni-
versity of Pretoria, South Africa. Homepage: 
http://web.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=19696&language=0 
 




MARCEL SAROT is professor of fundamental theology at Tilburg University. Home-
page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/?uid=m.sarot. 
 
PETRUSCHKA SCHAAFSMA is Lecturer in Ethics at the Protestant Theological Universi-
ty (Amsterdam). Homepage: 
http://www.pthu.nl/over_pthu/Medewerkers/e.p.schaafsma/. 
 
OLA SIGURDSON is professor of systematic theology and director of the Centre for 
Culture and Health at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Homepage: 
http://www.lir.gu.se/english/staff/teachers-and-researchers/ola-sigurdson/ 
 
AKU VISALA is research fellow at the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton. 
 
WILLEM VAN VLASTUIN is assistant professor systematic theology at VU University, 
The Netherlands, and research associate at UFS Bloemfontein, South-Africa. 
 
MARK WYNN is professor of philosophy and religion in the School of Philosophy, 




CHONG HO YU (Alex) is associate professor of psychology at Azusa Pacific University, 
USA. Homepage: http://www.creative-wisdom.com/pub/pub.html 
